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ABSTRACT 
 
Developing an adjudicative institutional framework for effective social security provisioning 
in South Africa entails the establishment of a system that gives effect to the rights (of access) 
to social security and to justice. These rights are protected in the Constitution and in various 
international law instruments. In the Constitution, the Bill of Rights guarantees everyone the 
right to have access to social security, including appropriate social assistance for persons who 
are unable to support themselves and their dependants. It further requires the State to take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of the right to access to social security. Since a dispute resolution 
(adjudication) framework is an integral part of any comprehensive social security system, it is 
included in the constitutional obligation of the State. The establishment of a social security 
adjudication system is an intersection of the right of access to social security and the right of 
access to justice. The Constitution states that everyone has the right to have any dispute that 
can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, 
where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.  
 
In addition, other rights protected in the Constitution have a bearing on the realisation of the 
rights of access to social security and to justice. There is a close correlation between all the 
rights in the Bill of Rights, as they are interrelated, interdependent and mutually supporting. 
They must all be read together in the setting of the Constitution as a whole and their 
interconnectedness must be taken into account in interpreting rights; and in determining 
whether the State has met its obligations in terms of any one of them. These rights, which 
include the right to equality (section 9), the right to human dignity (section 10) and the right 
to just administrative action (section 33) must thus be considered in establishing a social 
security adjudication system. Also to be considered are other constitutional prerequisites for 
the establishment of a social security adjudication system, such as the limitation and 
enforcement of rights (sections 36 and 38 respectively); principles relating to courts and the 
administration of justice (Chapter 8) and basic values and principles governing public 
administration (Chapter 10).  
   
In establishing a social security adjudication system in South Africa, international law 
standards and developments in comparative systems must also be taken into account. The 
Constitution adopts an international law- and comparative law-friendly approach. It states 
that when interpreting fundamental rights, international law must be considered while foreign 
law may be considered (section 39).  
 
This thesis aims to develop an adjudicative and institutional framework for effective social 
security provisioning in South Africa that realises the rights of access to social security and to 
justice in the South African social security system. This is achieved by exploring the concept 
of access to justice, and its application in the social security adjudication system. The current 
social security adjudication system is evaluated against the concept of access to justice 
applicable in international and regional law instruments, comparable South African (non-
social security) systems and comparative international jurisdictions. Principles and standards 
on the establishment of a social security adjudication system are distilled; and a reformed 
system for South Africa is proposed.    
 
KEY TERMS: access to justice, social security, social protection, adjudication, dispute 
resolution, international standards, constitutional obligations, review, reconsideration, appeal, 
hearing, jurisdiction, fairness, decisions, integrated, uniform. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The South African social security system consists of various institutions/forums, mechanisms 
and procedures established for the provision of access to social security. The institutions, 
mechanisms and procedures are established in order to give effect to the constitutional right 
of access to social security of applicants and/or beneficiaries. The Constitution accords 
everyone the right to have access to social security, including if they are unable to support 
themselves and their dependants, appropriate social assistance.
1
 The State is required to take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of the right to access to social security.
2
 The Constitution therefore 
compels the State to develop a social security system that ensures access for everyone (a 
comprehensive social security system).  
 
A system set up by the State to realise the right of access to social security would be 
incomplete without an effective and efficient dispute resolution system. An established social 
security system that must thus include a dispute resolution framework that enables users of 
the system to resolve any disputes that might arise. Such a dispute resolution system must 
also be established in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution. Section 34 of the 
Constitution guarantees the right of access to justice (courts). It states that everyone has the 
right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair 
public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial 
tribunal or forum. Therefore, the social security dispute resolution framework must not only 
comply with the requirements of the right of access to social security, but also access to 
justice. 
 
In addition to the right of access to social security and of access to justice, the realisation of 
these rights would also require that other rights, that have a bearing on access to courts and to 
                                                 
1
 Section 27(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the 
Constitution). 
2
 Section 27(2) of the Constitution. 
2 
 
social security, are also realised. The other rights are related to the rights of access to courts 
and to social security and have an impact on the enjoyment of the two rights. In Government 
of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others,
3
 the Constitutional 
Court held that the right of access to social security cannot be interpreted in isolation as there 
is a close correlation between it and other constitutional rights and values. The Court pointed 
out that the rights in the Bill of Rights are interrelated, interdependent and mutually 
supporting.
4
 The court remarked that rights must be read together in the setting of the 
Constitution as a whole, and their interconnectedness needs to be taken into account in 
interpreting rights, and in determining whether the State has met its obligations in terms of 
one of them.  
 
In the Court’s opinion, giving effect to a particular right would require that other elements, 
which form the basis of other rights, must be in place as well. Together these rights have a 
significant impact on the dignity of people and their quality of life. Affording socio-economic 
rights to all people therefore enables them to enjoy the other rights enshrined in Chapter 2. 
The realisation of these rights is also key to the advancement of race and gender equality and 
the evolution of a society in which men and women are equally able to achieve their full 
potential.
5
 Therefore, fulfilling the right to access to justice would have an impact on the 
extent to, or way in which, the right to have access to social security as well as other rights 
are fulfilled. 
 
In addition, the Court held that the requirement of progressive realisation means that the State 
must take steps to achieve this goal. It means that accessibility should be progressively 
facilitated; legal, administrative, operational and financial hurdles should be examined and, 
where possible, lowered over time; and that rights must be made more accessible not only to 
a larger number of people but to a wider range of people as time progresses.
6
 
 
In establishing an adjudication framework that secures the rights of access to courts and 
social security for applicants/beneficiaries, some of the related rights that have an impact on 
                                                 
3
 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC); 
2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (hereinafter referred to as the Grootboom case). 
4
 Grootboom case para 24. 
5
 Grootboom case para 23. 
6
 Grootboom case para 45. 
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the adjudication framework and that must also be given effect to include the right to 
equality,
7
 the right to human dignity,
8
 and the right to just administrative action.
9
  
 
The establishment of a social security adjudication framework will also be informed by 
constitutional principles that have a bearing (either directly or indirectly) on the realisation of 
constitutional rights. Some of the constitutional principles that will be relevant in the 
establishment of a social security adjudication system include principles relating to courts and 
administration of justice;
10
 and the basic values and principles governing public 
administration.
11
 These principles are useful tools in the protection and advancement of the 
rights in the Bill of Rights.
12
  
 
In the determination of the scope and content of the rights in the Bill of Rights, the 
Constitution favours an international law- and comparative law-friendly approach. The 
Constitution requires that when interpreting fundamental rights, international law must be 
considered
13
, while foreign law may be considered.
14
 In addition, section 233 requires that 
when interpreting any legislation, any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is 
                                                 
7
 Section 9 of the Constitution states as follows: 
1. Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.  
2. Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of 
equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.  
3. The State may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, 
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, 
age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.  
4. No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in 
terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.  
5. Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that 
the discrimination is fair.  
8
 Section 10 of the Constitution states that “everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity 
respected and protected.” 
9
 Section 33 of the Constitution provides as follows: 
1. Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.  
2.  Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the right to be given   
written reasons.  
3.  National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must:  
a.  provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, an independent and 
impartial tribunal;  
b.  impose a duty on the State to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and (2); and  
c.  promote an efficient administration.  
10
 Chapter 8 of the Constitution regulates the “Principles Relating to Courts and Administration of Justice.”  
11
 Chapter 10 of the Constitution regulates the “Basic Values and Principles Governing Public Administration.” 
12
 Brand D “Introduction to socio-economic rights in South African Constitution” in Brand D & Heyns C (eds) 
Socio-economic rights in South Africa Pretoria, PULP (2005) 5. See also Mashavha v President of the RSA and 
Others 2004 (12) BCLR 1243 (CC) where the Court used technical and non-rights related principles in the 
(Interim) Constitution to protect the right of access to social assistance of the complainant.   
13
 Section 39(1) (b) of the Constitution.  
14
 Section 39(1) (c) of the Constitution. 
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consistent with international law must be prepared over any alternative interpretation that is 
inconsistent with international law. The provisions of international instruments relating to the 
adjudication of social security are in the form of standards, and act as benchmarks for the 
evaluation of domestic adjudication frameworks. 
 
This implies that in evaluating the current South African social security adjudication system 
and in developing a reformed framework, adjudication standards in international law and in 
comparative social security systems will play a pivotal role (such as on the scope and content 
of the right of access to justice for social security applicants and/or beneficiaries; and the 
State’s obligations in this regard).    
 
2. AIMS OF STUDY 
 
The study aims to investigate and evaluate relevant principles, norms and standards for an 
effective and efficient social security adjudicative and institutional framework in South 
Africa. It further seeks to analyse barriers that deny access to justice for users of a social 
security dispute resolution system (such as social, economic and other relevant contexts) and 
attempts to eliminate or reduce such possible barriers. 
 
In the process of examining, finding and developing the relevant principles, norms and 
standards informing effective and efficient social security adjudication, attention is paid to 
social security adjudication structures, mechanisms and procedures, as well as the monitoring 
institutions. This is to identify any gaps and challenges in the legislative and institutional 
frameworks. It is also aimed at assessing the effectiveness of the dispute resolution 
framework in ensuring that every social security applicant or beneficiary is able to resolve a 
dispute affecting their right of access to social security. A review of the current social 
security adjudication framework will indicate any shortcomings in the system and provide 
guidelines towards the development of a new efficient system. 
 
Attention is also paid to the relevant norms and standards informing effective social security 
provisioning in the institutional context, the role and impact of administrative law on 
effective service delivery and the South African constitutional context (this relates to the Bill 
of Rights, norms and standards on the administration of justice in Chapter 8 and principles 
relating to public administration in Chapter 10 of the Constitution). The institutional context 
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is also evaluated against the backdrop of comparative experiences and best practices, as well 
as international law provisions.  
 
The current South African social security adjudicative institutional framework is evaluated 
against norms and standards in international law, in comparative international social security 
systems and from some key comparative South African (non-social security) adjudication 
institutions/forums and procedures. The recommended framework for effective social 
security provisioning in South Africa is also informed by these norms and standards.  
 
Finally, the research attempts to distil the applicable legal principles, norms and standards 
pertaining to the social security adjudicative and institutional frameworks that are applicable 
within the South African context. This is with a view to make suggestions for the 
improvement of the South African social security dispute resolution system and to establish 
an adjudicative institutional framework for effective and efficient social security 
provisioning. 
 
3. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM TO BE STUDIED 
 
There is currently no uniform social security dispute resolution institution in South Africa. 
This is due to the piecemeal manner in which social security schemes were established and/or 
how protection against individual risks is regulated. The result is that the current social 
security dispute resolution system is fragmented and uncoordinated, with each statute 
providing for its own dispute resolution institution(s) and processes. There is a wide array of 
laws providing for dispute resolution institutions and procedures. Appeal mechanisms are 
also fragmented across the social security system, at times involving specially-constituted 
appeal bodies and at times the High Court. There are various other gaps and challenges that 
the current South African social security dispute resolution systems face. Some of these 
challenges relate to the inaccessibility of some social security institutions; inappropriateness 
of some current appeal institutions; the lack of a systematic approach in establishing appeal 
institutions; the limited scope of jurisdiction and powers of adjudication institutions; 
inconsistencies in review and/or appeal provisions in various laws; the unavailability of 
alternative dispute resolution procedures; the absence of institutional independence of 
adjudication institutions or forums.  
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The gaps and challenges in the current social security dispute resolution system indicate that 
it is unable to realise the right of access to justice and related rights of users of the system. 
There is thus a need for the establishment of an appropriate framework. The establishment of 
such a framework is further motivated by the gravity and importance of the issues at stake. 
 
This calls for the introduction of special and earmarked adjudication institutions and 
procedures, in order to ensure access to justice and to deal effectively with social security 
disputes. 
 
4. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY  
 
The study is significant as it identifies the deficiencies in the social security dispute resolution 
system. Legal principles, norms and standards emanating from social security adjudicative 
and institutional frameworks in international and regional instruments and in comparative 
best practices serve as guidelines in evaluating the current South African system and in 
developing a reformed system.  
 
The recommendations of the thesis (the establishment of a reformed social security dispute 
resolution framework) provide policy proposals for the improvement of the current social 
security dispute resolution system. Since an effective and efficient dispute resolution 
framework is an integral part of any social security system, the study thus contributes to 
present government initiatives to develop a comprehensive social security system of South 
Africa.
15
  
 
Apart from its policy impact, the study also contributes to scholarship through its analysis of 
the nature and scope of the rights of access to justice and to social security in South Africa 
and of the obligations of the State in giving effect to the rights. 
 
                                                 
15
 The study has already contributed to the development of policy proposals for an integrated dispute resolution 
system, as parts of it were used in a Project for the Department of Social Development on “Developing a policy 
framework for the South African social security adjudication system” (see Olivier M, Govindjee A & Nyenti M 
Developing a Policy Framework for the South African Social Security Adjudication System: First (Research) 
Report (Report prepared for the Department of Social Development, South Africa (May 2011)); and Olivier M, 
Govindjee A & Nyenti M Developing a Policy Framework for the South African Social Security Adjudication 
System: Draft Policy (Prepared for the Department of Social Development, South Africa (October 2011)). 
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5. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
 
The reformed social security dispute system is based on principles and standards drawn from 
the Constitution and international law standards and best practices of how these principles 
and standards have been implemented in other South African legal spheres and in other 
international jurisdictions. However, it must be borne in mind that these principles and 
standards may not be directly transplantable into the South African (social security) 
environment in practice, due to its peculiar context.  
 
6. PROCEDURE OF THE STUDY  
 
This study involves mainly desk-bound or library-based research. Information on the South 
African and international law contexts is sourced from libraries and on the internet. 
Information on the social security adjudication framework of comparative systems is partly 
accessed from libraries and on the internet and involves direct interaction with people in the 
relevant institutions in the form of interviews. These interviews consisted of face-to-face 
discussions, emailed questions and telephonic conversations. Questions were also posed 
during visits to some of the social security adjudication institutions.  
 
7. ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY  
 
The study is divided into the following seven chapters: background of the study; 
constitutional perspectives on developing an effective social security adjudication 
framework; social security adjudication standards in international and regional instruments; 
dispute resolution systems in key comparative South African (non-social security) 
jurisdictions; social security dispute resolution systems in comparative international 
jurisdictions; current South African social security dispute resolution system; and 
Establishment of an efficient and effective social security dispute resolution framework in 
South Africa. 
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7.1 Chapter One: Background of the study 
 
This chapter sets out the framework for the study. It introduces the study, and describes the 
aim of study, the problem to be studied, the significance of the study, limitations of the study, 
the research procedure, the organisation of the study and the conceptual framework.  
 
7.2 Chapter Two: Constitutional perspectives on developing an effective social security 
adjudication framework 
 
This chapter analyses some of the constitutional issues arising in the context of the 
establishment of an effective and efficient social security adjudication framework in South 
Africa. Constitutional requirements for the realisation of the right of access to courts, the 
right of access to social security and related rights; and the obligations in relation to these 
rights are investigated. Pertinent issues that are considered include the role and impact of the 
Constitution (including the role and impact of the aims and values underpinning the 
Constitution); the nature and scope of the rights to have access to courts and to social security 
(and other related rights); as well as the scope and nature of the State’s obligation in terms of 
both rights, the relation between these rights and other fundamental rights; the particular 
interpretation to be given to the fulfilment of the rights in relation to South Africa’s past and 
present contexts (including the Constitution’s focus on protecting persons who are 
particularly vulnerable and desperate); the nature and scope of obligations imposed on the 
State and other entities in giving effect to these rights; and possible limitations to these rights. 
Analysing these will determine the prerequisites for the development of an appropriate social 
security adjudication framework from a constitutional perspective. 
 
7.3 Chapter Three: Social security adjudication standards in international and regional 
instruments 
 
This chapter investigates the international and regional standards pertaining to the 
development of a social security dispute resolution system that ensures access to justice. 
Some of these include the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights;  the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; International Labour Organisation Conventions (such 
as the Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention and the Employment Promotion and 
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Protection against Unemployment Convention); the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the Code on Social Security in the SADC. 
  
The Constitution favours an international law - and comparative law-friendly approaches in 
interpreting the rights in the Bill of Rights. Adjudication standards in international law thus 
play a pivotal role in the evaluation of the South African social security adjudication system 
(and the scope and content of the right of access to courts for social security applicants and/or 
beneficiaries) and the State’s obligations in this regard.  
 
7.4 Chapter Four: Dispute resolution systems in key comparative South African (non-
social security) jurisdictions 
 
This chapter analyses the dispute resolution systems in some key comparative South African 
(non-social security) jurisdictions. The institutions, mechanisms and procedures in these 
jurisdictions, established to provide resolve disputes that may arise are reviewed to provide a 
possible benchmark for comparison with the current social security dispute resolution 
framework. The selected dispute resolution systems investigated are the labour relations 
system (which consists of the CCMA, the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court 
established by the Labour Relations Act (LRA)); the business competition regulation 
jurisdiction (which involves the Competition Commission, the Competition Tribunal and the 
Competition Appeal Court established in terms of the Competition Act); and the consumer 
protection jurisdiction (the National Consumer Tribunal is established in terms of the 
National Credit Act).  
 
These institutions and their procedures have been established to realise the constitutional 
rights of their respective users (especially the rights of access to justice and to a fair trial). 
Therefore, it seeks to comply with the constitutional requirements of the rights. These 
mechanisms and procedures are thus examined to ascertain the effectiveness of these systems 
in providing access to justice for their users. Such mechanisms and procedures can provide 
guidelines for the development of a social security dispute resolution system.  
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7.5 Chapter Five: Social security dispute resolution systems in comparative 
international jurisdictions 
 
This chapter reviews systems established for the resolution of social security disputes in 
jurisdictions that are comparable to South Africa. The jurisdictions examined include 
countries in the SADC region, Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom and Germany. 
Institutions and procedures established for the resolution of social security disputes are 
investigated. These countries have been selected in view of their developed, longstanding and 
well-established social security systems and adjudication institutions and procedures that 
ensure the reaslisation of social security claimants’ right of access to justice.  
 
These institutions and their procedures have been established to realise constitutional, 
statutory and/or common law rights of social security claimants (such as the right of access to 
justice, the right to a fair hearing and the right (of access) to social security). They are also 
established in compliance with the international law obligations of (some of) these countries. 
The variety of the social security adjudication institutions (tribunals and other forums in 
Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom; and courts in Germany) and their 
procedures is also in line with the institutions and procedures proposed in section 34 of the 
Constitution as possible avenues for realising the right of access to courts. The effectiveness 
of the institutions and procedures in achieving access to justice and/or a fair hearing for social 
security claimants could therefore be instructive in proposing a social security dispute 
resolution system for South Africa.  
 
7.6 Chapter Six: Current South African social security dispute resolution system 
 
This chapter analyses the current South African social security dispute resolution system. The 
piecemeal manner in which schemes were established and/or protection against individual 
risks is regulated has resulted in each statute providing for its own dispute resolution 
institution(s) and processes. Therefore, reviewing South Africa’s current social security 
dispute resolution framework involves the consideration of the institutions and processes 
provided in each statute (the Social Assistance Act (SAA);
16
  the Compensation for 
Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act (COIDA);
17
  the Occupational Diseases in Mines and 
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 Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004. 
17
 Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993. 
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Works Act (ODMWA);
18
  the Unemployment Insurance Act (UIA);
19
  the Road Accident 
Fund Act (RAFA);
20
  the Pension Funds Act;
21
  and the Medical Schemes Act.
22
 In addition, 
the role of the High Court is examined, as it is the external appeals institution for many of the 
social security dispute resolution institutions). 
 
This is to assess their compliance with constitutional prerequisites and international 
standards. It is also to compare and/or contrast them with social security dispute resolution 
systems in comparative international jurisdictions, as well as comparative South African 
(non-social security) systems. It also seeks to identify the existing gaps and challenges (if 
any) in the present social security dispute resolution framework. This is to assess their 
effectiveness in ensuring that every social security applicant or beneficiary (irrespective of 
their social, economic and other conditions) has access to a streamlined, integrated and 
coordinated system that resolves social security disputes in a fair, expeditious and 
participatory manner. A review of the current adjudication system will provide guidelines for 
proposals towards the development of a new adjudicative and institutional framework. 
 
7.7 Chapter Seven: Establishment of an effective social security dispute resolution 
framework in South Africa 
 
This chapter proposes the most appropriate adjudicative (and institutional) framework for 
effective and efficient social security provisioning. This is achieved by highlighting 
principles and standards on the establishment of such a system, taking into account the 
application of these principles and standards in the South African context.  
 
The principles and standards that are relevant in establishing an effective and efficient social 
security dispute resolution system are laid down by the South African Constitution and 
international standards. These principles and standards have been implemented in the current 
South African social security and comparative (non-social security) dispute resolution 
systems; and in the social security dispute resolution systems in international comparative 
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 Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001. 
20
 Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996. 
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 Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956. 
22
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jurisdictions. Therefore, these provide benchmarks and guidelines on the development of a 
reformed social security dispute resolution system. 
 
8. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION 
 
Since the study aims to establish a dispute resolution system that ensures access to justice for 
social security claimants, it is useful to clarify the nature and scope of the concepts of “access 
to justice” and “social security” as employed here. Approaches to these concepts have varied 
over different periods of time and in different environments. Approaches to the concept in 
South Africa may not be the same as approaches in other settings. 
    
8.1 The concept of social security 
 
The concept of social security in South Africa has developed from the traditional definition 
proposed by the ILO to a more comprehensive approach.
23
 The ILO definition of the concept, 
based on employment-related social insurance and targeted and means-tested social 
assistance, was deemed to be too restrictive and narrow for the problems faced by developing 
countries like South Africa.
24
 
 
The concept of social security has therefore been broadened from the income situation to 
include general basic needs and the range of contingencies was also widened. This is in the 
belief that it is necessary to link traditional social security mechanisms with social and 
economic policies in general.
25
  
                                                 
23
 The ILO views social security as the protection that society provides for its members, through a series of 
public measures, against the economic and social distress that otherwise will be caused by the stoppage or 
substantial reduction of earnings resulting from sickness, maternity, employment injury, unemployment, 
invalidity, old age, and death; the provision of medical care; and the provision of subsidies for families and 
children (see the ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention 102 of 1952 and ILO Introduction to 
Social Security (Geneva, 1989) 3). 
24
 The ILO definition was considered to be too restrictive and narrow as it fails to capture the characteristics of a 
developing country like South Africa for a number of reasons, including the extent of poverty and deprivation to 
which millions of people in developing countries are exposed to, and the present exclusion of a majority of these 
from social security coverage; the rise in informal employment and the exclusion and/or marginalisation of the 
informally employed from social security; peculiar South African constitutional imperatives granting social 
security entitlements on a non-discriminatory basis, and which aim to promote human dignity, equality and 
freedom; and socio-economic imperatives of poverty reduction, increased access to adequate basic services and 
the creation of an environment for the sustainable advancement of all people. See Olivier MP “The Concept of 
Social Security” in Olivier MP et al Social Security: A Legal Analysis (Lexis Nexis, 2003) 4. 
25
 Social security is thus defined as any kind of collective measures or activities designed to ensure that 
members of society meet their basic needs, such as adequate nutrition, shelter, health care and clean water 
supply, as well as being protected from contingencies – such as illness, disability, death, unemployment and old 
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This is the approach adopted by the South African White Paper on Social Welfare where it 
states that social security means policies that ensure adequate economic and social protection 
during unemployment, ill health, maternity, child bearing, widowhood, disability, old age, 
social assistance in relation to old age, disability, child and family care and poverty relief. 
Social security therefore covers a variety of public and private measures that provide cash 
and in-kind benefits or both (firstly, in the event of an individual’s earning capacity 
permanently ceasing, being interrupted, never having developed or being exercised only at 
unacceptable social cost and such a person being unable to avoid poverty; and, secondly, in 
order to maintain children). It is as such aimed at poverty prevention, poverty alleviation, 
social compensation and income distribution.
26
 The White paper concluded that social 
security is a system geared towards the provision of a national integrated and sustainable 
social security system with universal access, with the ultimate goal being to ensure that all 
South Africans have a minimum income, sufficient to meet basic subsistence needs and 
should not have to live below minimum acceptable standards.
27
 It held that this approach is 
not only advisable but also necessary, so as to fully utilise limited resources.  
 
This view of the concept, as a general system of basic social support, no longer linked to the 
regular employment relationship and founded on the conviction that society as a whole is 
responsible for its weaker members was termed social protection.
28
 The United Nations 
Commission on Social Development states that social protection embodies society's 
responses to levels of either risk or deprivation, and includes secure access to income, 
livelihood, employment, health and education services, nutrition and shelter.
29
 The 
Commission remarked that:  
 
“the ultimate purpose of social protection is to increase capabilities and opportunities and, thereby, 
human development. While by its very nature social protection aims at providing at least minimum 
standards of well-being to people in dire circumstances, enabling them to live with dignity, one should 
not overlook that social protection should not simply be seen as a residual policy function of assuring 
                                                                                                                                                        
age, and to enable them to maintain a standard of living consistent with social norms. See Getubig IP & Schmidt 
S (Eds) Rethinking Social Security: Reaching Out to the Poor (UN Asia and Pacific Development Centre, 
1992).     
26
  White Paper on Social Welfare (GN 1108 in GG 18166 of August 1997) Chap. 7, para 1. 
27
 White Paper on Social Welfare, Chapter 7, para 27. 
28
 Von Maydell B “Fundamental Approaches and Concepts of Social Security” in Blanpain R Law in Motion 
(Kluwer 1997) 1034. 
29
 United Nations Enhancing Social Protection and Reducing Vulnerability in a Globalising World: Report of 
the Secretary-General 39th session of the Commission for Social Development (New York, 13-23 February 
2000) as quoted in Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa 
Transforming the Present – Protecting the Future (Draft Consolidated Report) (March 2002) 40. 
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the welfare of the poorest – but as a foundation at a societal level for promoting social justice and 
social cohesion, developing human capabilities and promoting economic dynamism and creativity.”
30
  
 
The Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa 
adopted this broad approach to the concept, due to its merits for the country.
31
 However, it 
recognised that in the case of South Africa, such a system, even more than suggested by the 
United Nations Commission, must be embedded in economic organisation and social 
relations enabling it to address the country’s underlying structural and material basis of social 
exclusion. Therefore, the Committee developed the concept of “comprehensive social 
protection. It held that: 
 
“comprehensive social protection is broader than the traditional concept of social security, and 
incorporates developmental strategies and programmes designed to ensure, collectively, at least a 
minimum acceptable living standard for all citizens. It embraces the traditional measures of social 
insurance, social assistance and social services, but goes beyond that to focus on causality through 
integrated policy-approach, including many of the developmental initiatives undertaken by the 
State.”
32
  
 
Comprehensive social protection seeks to provide the basic means for all people, living in 
South Africa, to effectively participate and advance in social and economic life, and in turn to 
contribute to social and economic development.
33
 It consists of certain core elements such as 
measures to address income poverty, measures to address capability and asset poverty, as 
well as measures to address specific needs. These core elements should be available to all 
South Africans – including certain categories of non-citizens – and need to be established in a 
universal-as-possible package of basic income transfers, services and assets, with access 
                                                 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 The Committee was of the opinion that the concept incorporates developmental strategies and programmes 
which are more appropriate for a developing country such as South Africa (it increases opportunities for people 
doing “informal” work to gain access to social protection coverage); it provides a coherent framework for 
integrating economic and social policy interventions (wider functions and objectives of social protection which 
are better able to address socially and economically embedded problems ); and could create added potential for 
integrated private-, public- and community-sector interventions and benefit systems. See Committee of Inquiry 
into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa Transforming the Present – Protecting the 
Future (Draft Consolidated Report) (March 2002) 40. 
32
 Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa Transforming the 
Present-Protecting the Future 41.            
33
 Ibid. 
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provided in a non-work-related manner and whose availability is not primarily dependent on 
an ability to pay.
34
  
 
The Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa 
further argued that the social security concept does not merely cover measures of a public 
nature. Social, fiscal and occupational welfare mechanisms, collectively and individually, 
whether public or private or of a mixed public and private origin, must be considered in the 
development of coherent social security policies.
35
 
 
Despite modern approaches to the concept of social security (both in South Africa and 
internationally), and current South African efforts to develop a comprehensive and integrated 
social security system,
36
 the present system still follows the risk-based approach to the 
concept of social security adopted by the International Labour Organisation. This implies that 
different laws regulate, and different institutions administer, each of the social security risks. 
This also results in the absence of a uniform social security dispute resolution institution and 
processes. This is the approach adopted in this thesis, as dispute resolution institution and 
processes established by each of the statutes is evaluated. 
 
8.2 The concept of access to justice 
 
The concept of access to justice has evolved over the years from a narrow definition that 
refers to access to legal services and other state services (access to the courts or tribunals that 
adjudicate or mediate) to a broader definition that includes social justice, economic justice 
and environmental justice.
37
 The broadening of the concept was due to the belief that its 
confinement to the courts or tribunals that adjudicate or mediate was considered to be too 
narrow a definition, although courts or tribunals that adjudicate or mediate were a very 
important component of access to justice.  In the case of South Africa, it is argued that: 
                                                 
34
 Ibid 42. 
35
 Ibid 50. 
36
 The Government has established an Interdepartmental Task Team on Social Security (IDTT) and an Inter-
Ministerial Committee on Social Security, Retirement Reform and National Health Insurance that are working 
towards the creation of a new comprehensive social security system. See IDTT Comprehensive Social 
Protection: Overview (consultation document, prepared for the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Social Security, 
Retirement Reform and National Health Insurance) (2010) and Department of Social Development Creating 
Our Future: Strategic Considerations for a Comprehensive System of Social Security (2008). 
37
 Open Society Foundation for South Africa Access to Justice Round-Table Discussion (Parktonian Hotel, 
Johannesburg, 22 July 2003) 5. 
16 
 
 
“justice is not the exclusive preserve of the courts. The Constitution … is designed to achieve justice 
in the broader sense including social justice and various functionaries including government, 
independent institutions, the private sector and indeed civil society take on a special responsibility for 
the achievement of justice and thus access to justice is more, much more tha[n] simply access to 
courts.”38 
 
However, social security dispute resolution systems, as required by the right (of access) to 
social security, are concerned with the resolution of disputes in a fair public hearing by a 
court or another independent and impartial tribunal or forum. In this instance, the concept 
thus relates to access to justice in the sense of access to the courts or tribunals that adjudicate 
or mediate social security disputes.  
 
The legal dimension of the concept of access to justice developed as an element of the 
fundamental principle that all people should enjoy equality before the law. It proposes 
(amongst others) that each person should have effective means of protecting his or her rights 
or entitlements under the substantive law.
39
  
 
The concept of access to justice is understood in terms of legal rights, processes and 
procedures. It denotes the situation where state legal systems are organised “to ensure that 
every person is able to invoke the legal processes for legal redress irrespective of social or 
economic capacity” and “that every person should receive a just and fair treatment within the 
legal system”.40 This view of the concept is based on the principle that the legal system 
should be structured and administered in such a manner that it provides everyone with 
affordable and timeous access to appropriate institutions and procedures through which to 
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 Kollapen J “Access to Justice within the South African context” Keynote Address to Open Society 
Foundation for South Africa Access to Justice Round-Table Discussion (see Open Society Foundation for South 
Africa Access to Justice Round-Table Discussion (Parktonian Hotel, Johannesburg, 22 July 2003) 5). 
39
 Sackville R “Some thoughts on access to justice” paper presented at the New Zealand Centre for Public Law 
First Annual Conference on the Primary Functions of Government (Faculty of Law, Victoria University of 
Wellington, New Zealand: 28 & 29 November 2003) 1. He further remarks that the concept assumes that access 
to justice can be achieved by the law and the legal system, and that a just society will be prepared to find the 
resources required to achieve the goal of access to justice. It also suggests that it is feasible to establish 
mechanisms that will effectively break down the barriers preventing disadvantaged individuals and groups from 
utilising the legal system to enforce their rights and protect their interests.   
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 Murlidhar S Law, Poverty and Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Justice (Lexis Nexis, 2004) 1. 
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claim and protect their rights. In this case, access to justice refers to “the equity with which 
those from differing backgrounds are able to gain from the justice delivery system”.41 
 
Such a view of the concept only focuses on the operation of the dispute resolution system. 
For example, a review of access to justice in the United Kingdom by Lord Woolf was only 
concerned with the civil justice system and the problems it faced.
42
 The principles laid down  
were thus aimed at solving these problems and in this way improve access to the system.
43
  
The view of the concept by the Law Society of New South Wales (Australia) is also restricted 
to the functioning of the justice system, by placing importance on the  system being, and seen 
to be, accessible and affordable, readily easy to understand, fair, efficient and effective.
44
 It is 
contended that this approach:  
 
“centralises the issue of overcoming the procedural barriers within the court system itself. Such an 
approach tends to concentrate on issues of overcoming delays within the court process, efficiency, 
formality and cost of proceedings, and the organisation, structure and administration of courts and 
tribunals.”45 
 
A slightly wider approach to the concept of access to justice was adopted by the Australian 
Access to Justice Advisory Committee. It considers access to justice to consist of three key 
elements: equality of access to legal services (ensuring that all persons, regardless of means, 
have access to high quality legal services or effective dispute resolution mechanisms 
necessary to protect their rights and interests); national equity (ensuring that all persons 
enjoy, as nearly as possible, equal access to legal services and to legal service markets that 
                                                 
41
 Bowd R Access to justice in Africa: Comparisons between Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Zambia Institute of 
Security Studies Policy Brief Nr 13 (October 2009) 1. 
42
 Woolf HK (The Right Honourable Lord Woolf, Master of the Rolls) Access to Justice: Final Report to the 
Lord Chancellor on the civil justice system in England and Wales (July 1996) 2. The problems identified in civil 
law system at the time were that it is too expensive in that the costs often exceed the value of the claim; too slow 
in bringing cases to a conclusion and too unequal: there is a lack of equality between the powerful, wealthy 
litigant and the under resourced litigant. It is too uncertain: the difficulty of forecasting what litigation will cost 
and how long it will last induces the fear of the unknown; and it is incomprehensible to many litigants. Above 
all it is too fragmented in the way it is organised since there is no one with clear overall responsibility for the 
administration of civil justice; and too adversarial as cases are run by the parties, not by the courts and the rules 
of court, all too often, are ignored by the parties and not enforced by the court. 
43
 Lord Woolf Access to Justice: Final Report 2. The Report stated that the civil justice system should be just in 
the results it delivers; be fair in the way it treats litigants; offer appropriate procedures at a reasonable cost; deal 
with cases with reasonable speed; be understandable to those who use it; be responsive to the needs of those 
who use it; provide as much certainty as the nature of particular cases allows; and be effective (i.e. adequately 
resourced and organised).  
44
 Law Society of New South Wales Access to Justice - Final Report (December 1998) 11. 
45
 Schetzer L, Mullins J & Buonamano R “Access to Justice & Legal Needs: A project to identify legal needs, 
pathways and barriers for disadvantaged people in NSW” (Background Paper) August 2002, 65. 
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operate consistently within the dictates of competition policy); equality before the law 
(ensuring that all persons, regardless of race, ethnic origins, gender or disability, are entitled 
to equal opportunities in such fields as education, employment, use of community facilities 
and access to services).
46
 
 
It has been remarked that: 
 
“while this concept of access to justice focuses on the justice system, it is confined neither to the 
courts nor to services associated with courts.  It extends to the structure of the legal services market, 
improved access to sources of information for consumers (in both the public and private sector), and 
alternatives to the judicial process for the resolution of complaints or disputes.”
47
 
 
An even broader approach to the concept of access to justice sees the law as only one means 
of achieving justice. It is proposed that “a variety of other means of doing justice including 
alternative dispute resolution, participation in social movement politics, democratic 
representation, and civic education for the respect of rights must proliferate”.48 This view 
therefore suggests that justice in the courtroom should give way to justice in many rooms.
49
  
 
The evolution of the definition of the concept of access to justice indicates that earlier 
approaches to the concept failed to take into account the impact of social and economic 
conditions on the ability of claimants to use dispute resolution institutions and processes. 
Therefore, the concept of access to justice must go beyond the functioning of institutions that 
resolve disputes and legal processes and should be defined within the context of the social 
and economic conditions of prospective users of the justice system. Despite the availability of 
well-functioning dispute resolution institutions and processes, conditions such as poverty, 
illiteracy, geographical location etc. have an inevitable impact on the ability to utilise the 
legal system. Defined as such, any measures adopted to enhance access to justice will include 
measures aimed at empowering users in using the established systems.   
                                                 
46
 Access to Justice Advisory Committee (Australia) Access to Justice: An Action Plan (AGPS, Canberra: 1994) 
7–9. 
47
 Sackville R “Some thoughts on access to justice” paper presented at the New Zealand Centre for Public Law 
First Annual Conference on the Primary Functions of Government (Faculty of Law, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 28 & 29 November 2003) 2. 
48
 Parker C Just Lawyers: Regulation and Access to Justice (Oxford University Press, 1999) 56.  
49
 Parker C Just Lawyers: Regulation and Access to Justice (Oxford University Press, 1999) 207. See generally 
Galanter M “Justice in Many Rooms” in Cappelletti M (ed) Access to Justice and the Welfare State (Sitjhoff, 
1981) 147-181. 
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Such an expended view of the concept of access to justice was recognised as early as the 
1960s and 1970s. This recognition engendered the idea that an aggrieved individual’s formal 
right to litigate or defend a claim must be transformed into a right of effective access to the 
legal system.
50
 This implied that affirmative steps had to be taken to give practical content to 
the law’s guarantee of formal equality before the law. It was thus “necessary to overcome, or 
at least ameliorate, the barriers inhibiting access”.51 This was because it was: 
 
“... no longer sufficient for the law to provide a framework of freedom in which men, women and 
children may work out their own destinies: social justice, as our society now understands the term, 
requires the law to be loaded in favour of the weak and exposed, to provide them with financial and 
other support, and with access to courts, tribunals and other administrative agencies where their rights 
can be enforced.”52 
 
Therefore, the modern concept of access to justice must be defined in a manner that also 
considers the number of ways in which access is denied either through spatial, temporal, 
linguistic, social or symbolic barriers.
53
 The concept is also about breaking down the barriers 
that prevent the poor and indigent from accessing the social security adjudication system.  
 
This view of the concept of access to justice is supported in the South African context, as the 
Constitution guarantees a right of “access to justice”. It requires that access to justice must be 
defined together with the right to equality (formal and substantive) and other rights.
54
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 Cappelletti M and Garth B (eds) Access to Justice: A World Survey (Vol. 1) (Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1978) 6–
10. 
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 Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales (Australia) Access to Justice Roundtable: Proceedings of a 
Workshop on July 2002 (April 2003) 20. 
52
 Scarman L English Law - The New Dimensions (Hamlyn Lectures, Stevens & Sons, 1974) 28-29; as quoted in 
Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales (Australia) Access to Justice Roundtable Proceedings of a 
Workshop July 2002 (April 2003) 20. 
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 Baxi P “Access to justice and rule-of- [good] law: the cunning of judicial reform in India” Working Paper 
Commissioned by the Institute of Human Development, New Delhi on behalf of the UN Commission on the 
Legal Empowerment of the Poor (May 2007) 4. 
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 See Chapter Two (infra) on the constitutional perspectives on developing an effective social security 
adjudication framework.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPING AN EFFECTIVE SOCIAL 
SECURITY ADJUDICATION FRAMEWORK 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The establishment of an effective and efficient social security dispute resolution system 
entails the realisation of mainly the constitutional rights of access to courts
55
 and to social 
security.
56
 This implies that the social security dispute resolution system that is established 
must fully give effect to both rights as required by the Constitution. The realisation of these 
rights would also require that other rights that have a bearing on access to courts and to social 
security are also realised. The other rights are related to the rights of access to courts and to 
social security and have an impact on the enjoyment of the two rights. As the Constitutional 
Court has stated, the rights in the Bill of Rights are interrelated, interdependent and mutually 
supporting; and must be read together in the setting of the Constitution as a whole.
57
 Their 
interconnectedness needs to be taken into account in interpreting a right and in determining 
whether the State has met its obligations in terms of one of them. The Court further held that 
realising a particular right (in this case the right of access to courts or the right of access to 
social security) would require that other elements which form the basis of other rights must 
be in place as well.  
 
In establishing an adjudication framework that secures the rights of access to courts and 
social security for applicants/beneficiaries, some of the related rights that have an impact on 
the adjudication framework and that must also be given effect to include the right to 
equality,
58
 the right to human dignity,
59
 and the right to just administrative action.
60
 The 
                                                 
55
 Section 34 of the Constitution (Constitution of South Africa, 1996) states that “everyone has the right to have 
any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, 
where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.”  
56
 Section 27(1) (c) of the Constitution states that “everyone has the right to have access to social security, 
including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social assistance.” 
57
 See for example Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others (2000) 11 
BCLR 1169 (CC) para 24. 
58
 Section 9 of the Constitution states as follows: 
1. Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. 
2.  Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of 
equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. 
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development of the social security adjudication system would have to be informed by the 
nature and scope of all of the rights of access to courts and to social security, as well as 
related rights. Furthermore, the system will also be informed by the nature and scope of the 
obligations on the State and other actors in connection to these rights.  
 
In addition, the adjudication framework will also be informed by constitutional principles that 
have a bearing (either directly or indirectly) on the realisation of constitutional rights. Some 
of the constitutional principles that will be relevant in the establishment of a social security 
adjudication system include principles relating to Courts and Administration of Justice;
61
 and 
the basic values and principles governing public administration.
62
  These principles are useful 
tools in the protection and advancement of the rights in the Bill of Rights.
63
  
 
This chapter analyses some of the constitutional issues arising in the context of the 
establishment of an effective and efficient social security adjudication framework in South 
Africa. Constitutional requirements for the realisation of the right of access to courts, the 
right of access to social security and related rights; and the obligations in relation to these 
rights are investigated. Pertinent issues that are considered include the role and impact of the 
Constitution (including the role and impact of the aims and values underpinning the 
Constitution); the nature and scope of the rights to have access to courts and to social security 
(and other related rights); as well as the scope and nature of the State’s obligation in terms of 
                                                                                                                                                        
3. The State may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, 
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
4. No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms 
of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. 
5. Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the 
discrimination is fair.  
59
 Section 10 of the Constitution states that "everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity 
respected and protected." 
60
 Section 33 of the Constitution provides as follows: 
1. Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. 
2. Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the right to be given 
written reasons. 
3. National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must   
a. provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, an independent and 
impartial tribunal;  
b. impose a duty on the State to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and (2); and  
c. promote an efficient administration.  
61
 Chapter 8 of the Constitution regulates the “Principles Relating to Courts and Administration of Justice.”  
62
 Chapter 10 of the Constitution regulates the “Basic Values and Principles Governing Public Administration.” 
63
 Brand D “Introduction to socio-economic rights in South African Constitution” in Brand D & Heyns C (eds) 
Socio-economic rights in South Africa Pretoria, PULP (2005) 5. See also Mashavha v President of the RSA and 
Others 2004 (12) BCLR 1243 (CC) where the Court used technical and non-rights related principles in the 
(Interim) Constitution to protect the right of access to social assistance of the complainant.   
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both rights, the relation between these rights and other fundamental rights; the particular 
interpretation to be given to the fulfilment of the rights in relation to South Africa’s past and 
present contexts (including the Constitution’s focus on protecting persons who are 
particularly vulnerable and desperate); the nature and scope of obligations imposed on the 
State and other entities in giving effect to these rights; and possible limitations to these rights. 
Analysing these will determine the prerequisites for the development of an appropriate social 
security adjudication framework from a constitutional perspective. 
 
2. ROLE AND IMPACT OF THE CONSTITUTION 
 
The Constitution has an impact on the development of a social security adjudication 
framework due to its protection of the rights to have access to courts and to social security as 
fundamental human rights in the Bill of Rights.
64
 In addition to access to courts and to social 
security, many other rights that are related to these rights are also guaranteed in the 
Constitution. The status of the Constitution also ensures that these rights must be realised. 
Constitutional supremacy is one of the foundational values of the Republic of South Africa.
65
 
The Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic. Law or conduct inconsistent with it is 
invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.
66
 The Bill of Rights applies to all 
law and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and all organs of State.
67
 The Bill 
of Rights also binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that it is applicable, 
taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the rights.
 68
 
The Constitution further requires every court, tribunal or forum to promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights when interpreting any legislation and when developing the 
common law.
69
 
 
The Constitution places obligations on the realisation of these rights. Section 2 states that 
duties imposed by the constitution must be performed, while section 7(2) enjoins the State to 
respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. The State is also compelled 
                                                 
64
 The Bill of Rights is in Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
65
 Section 1(c) of the Constitution. 
66
 Section 2 of the Constitution. 
67
 Section 8(1) of the Constitution. 
68
 Section 8(2) of the Constitution.   
69
 Section 39(2) of the Constitution. 
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to take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve 
the progressive realisation of the right of access to social security.
70
 
 
2.1 Aims of the Constitution 
 
The Preamble of the Constitution stipulates what was hoped to be achieved through the 
enactment of a Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic. The aims reflect the spirit 
and purpose of the Constitution, and must be taken into consideration when constitutional 
rights and obligations are to be interpreted, and when the rights are to be limited. It has been 
declared that: 
 
“the Preamble in particular should not be dismissed as a mere aspirational and throat-clearing exercise 
of little interpretive value. It connects up, reinforces and underlies all of the text that follows. It helps 
to establish the basic design of the Constitution and indicate its fundamental purposes.”71 
 
Some of the aims of the Constitution are to heal the divisions of the past and establish a 
society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights and to 
improve the quality of life of all citizens.
72
 Therefore, the Constitution was adopted and a bill 
of fundamental rights was entrenched, not only to avoid a repetition of and to redress South 
Africa’s past injustices, but in order to establish a new society based on mutual respect, 
equality and freedoms.
73
 The Constitution’s aims to heal the divisions of the past and to 
improve the quality of life of all citizens, further indicates that is seeks to eradicate social and 
economic disadvantages (such as inequality, poverty and lack of access to basic human 
rights). This has been confirmed by the Constitutional Court, when it stated that: 
 
“we live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. Millions of people are living in 
deplorable conditions and in great poverty. There is a high level of unemployment; inadequate social 
security and many do not have access to clean water or adequate health services. These conditions 
already existed when the Constitution was adopted and a commitment to address them, and to 
transform our society into one in which there will be human dignity, freedom and equality lies at the 
heart of our new constitutional order. For as long as these conditions continue to exist that aspiration 
will have a hollow ring. ... This commitment is also reflected in various provisions of the bill of rights 
                                                 
70
 Section 27(2) of the Constitution. 
71
 S v Mlungu 1995 3 SA 867 (CC); 1995 7 BCLR 793 (CC) para 112. 
72
 Preamble of the Constitution. 
73
 Olivier MP et al “Constitutional issues” in Olivier MP et al (eds) Social Security: A Legal Analysis (2003) 52.    
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and in particular in sections 26 and 27 which deal with housing, health care, food, water and social 
security.”74  
 
2.2 Values underpinning the Constitution 
 
A social security adjudication framework, that seeks to realise the rights of access to courts 
and to social security, must promote the values that inform and underpin the objectives of the 
Constitution. The Constitution states that some of South Africa’s foundational values are 
human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and 
freedoms.
75
 Constitutional values lie at the heart of the Bill of Rights,
76
 and are important in 
the interpretation and enforcement of the rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights. The impact 
of constitutional values in interpreting the constitution and understanding its fundamental 
purpose was highlighted by the Constitutional Court when it stated that:  
 
“the introduction of fundamental rights and constitutionalism in South Africa represented more than 
merely entrenching and extending existing common law rights, such as might happen if Britain 
adopted the bill of rights. The Constitution introduces democracy and equality for the first time in 
South Africa. It acknowledges a past of intense suffering and injustice, and promises a future of 
reconciliation and reconstruction …. To treat it with the dispassionate attention one might give a tax 
law would be to violate its spirit as set out in unmistakably plain language. It would be a repugnant to 
the spirit, design and purpose of the Constitution as a purely technical, positivist and value-free 
approach to the post-Nazi constitution in Germany.”
77
        
 
Constitutional values must also be taken into account when a constitutional right is 
interpreted, as section 39 enjoins every court, tribunal or forum to promote the values that 
underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom when 
interpreting the rights in the Bill of Rights. In addition, the Constitution’s imitation clause 
adopts a value-based approach, as section 36 requires that a right in the Bill of Rights must 
only be limited to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.
78
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The Constitutional Court has stated that the fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights are 
entrenched because South Africa is a society that values human beings and wants to ensure that 
people are afforded their basic needs. A society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of 
life are accessible to all if it is to be a society in which human dignity, freedom and equality are 
foundational.
79
  Constitutional values are also important for the smooth functioning of South 
African society, as a system which disregards historical injustices and offends the 
constitutional values of equality and dignity could result in instability.
80
 
 
Therefore, the right to have access to courts by social security beneficiaries, as is the case 
with all other rights, must be interpreted in the light of underlying constitutional values, as 
well as the interests that that right is meant to protect. Analysis of the values and purpose of 
the right to have access to courts provides the right with its substantive content.
81
 These 
constitutional values are instrumental to the establishment of a social security adjudication 
framework as the framework must seek to promote these values. The adjudicative framework 
put in place must seek to ensure that users of the system are able to realise their rights to have 
access to court equally, freely and with dignity.  
 
2.2.1 Equality 
 
Equality is a foundational value that informs constitutional interpretation, as well as a 
fundamental right. The Constitution provides that everyone is equal before the law and has 
the right to equal protection before the law;
82
 and that equality includes the full and equal 
enjoyment of all the rights and freedoms.
83
 In addition, section 34 guarantees everyone the 
right of access to courts. Therefore, equality in respect of access to courts is implicit in the 
reference to everyone in section 34. As it has been stated: 
 
 “fundamental to that spirit and tenor was the promise of the equal protection of the laws to all the 
people of this country and a ringing and decisive break with a past which perpetuated inequality and 
irrational discrimination and arbitrary governmental and executive action.”84   
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The right to equality can form the basis for demands that rights that are afforded to a person 
or category of persons be extended to another person or category of persons.
85
 The social and 
economic status of social security applicants/beneficiaries has also been elevated to a ground 
similar to the grounds in section 9(3), in terms of which a person may not be unfairly 
discriminated against.
86
 The word “including” in section 9(3) indicates that the list was not 
intended to be a closed one. As a result, the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act
87
 enacted in terms of section 9(4)
88
 of the Constitution has proposed 
socio-economic status as one of the additional grounds for inclusion into the list of prohibited 
grounds.
89
  
  
The right to equality has both formal and substantive dimensions.
90
 Formal equality entails 
the prohibition of unjustified discrimination, in the sense that all persons must be treated in 
the same manner, irrespective of their circumstances. Equality of access to courts, in the 
formal sense, ensures that all persons should have access to effective dispute resolution 
mechanisms necessary to protect their rights and interests. Formal equality requires sameness 
of treatment, implying that the adjudication system should be open to everybody, irrespective 
of their circumstance. It therefore ignores economic and social disparities between 
individuals or groups of persons.
91
 Where a concept of formal equality is applied in relation 
to access to a social security adjudication framework, access may be denied to some potential 
litigants due to their social and economic situation. Formal equality is therefore insufficient to 
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ensure equality of access to justice since attributes such as affluence, race and political power 
influence the administration of justice to a greater or lesser extent. This calls for the socio-
economic upliftment of economically and socially deprived persons for the achievement of 
equality.
92
 Equality in term of access must thus be interpreted as a whole, with “a broad 
judicial examination of equality relating to both formal and substantive issues.”93 A concept 
of equality that goes beyond formal equality is then required.    
 
The Constitution requires a substantive approach to equality as section 9(2) states that 
equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. Substantive 
equality aims to promote the attainment of equality by focusing on outcomes. It requires the 
law to ensure equality of outcome and is prepared to tolerate disparity of treatment to achieve 
this goal.
94
 In this case, the economic and social conditions of individuals or groups of 
persons are taken into account in determining the attainment of equality. Substantive equality 
dictates that the equality provisions could be used to address historical imbalances by 
granting more favourable treatment to the historically and socially disadvantaged.  
 
Therefore, one purpose of equality, as a constitutional value and a fundamental right, is to 
remedy historical disadvantage and material inequalities. A substantial approach to equality 
permits and requires positive measures, tailored for the needs of particular individuals and 
groups, to address inequality and remedy disadvantage, thus creating the conditions for full 
and equal participation in society.
95
 The Constitutional Court has remarked that the equality 
clause in the Constitution was adopted in the recognition that discrimination against people, 
who are members of disfavoured groups, can lead to patterns of group disadvantage and 
harm. Such discrimination is unfair as it builds and entrenches inequality amongst different 
groups in our society. The need to prohibit such patterns of discrimination and to remedy 
their result is the primary purpose of the equality clause.
96
 In President of the Republic of 
South Africa v Hugo, the court held that:  
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“... we need ... to develop a concept of unfair discrimination which recognises that although a society 
which affords each human being equal treatment on the basis of equal worth and freedom is our goal, 
we cannot achieve that goal by insisting upon identical treatment in all circumstances before that goal 
is achieved. Each case, therefore, will require a careful and thorough understanding of the impact of 
the discriminatory action upon the particular people concerned to determine whether its overall impact 
is one which furthers the constitutional goal of equality or not. A classification which is unfair in one 
context may not necessarily be unfair in a different context.”
97
    
 
Substantive equality requires that the adjudication system should be designed to ensure 
equality of outcome and must be able to accommodate the disparity of its users in order to 
achieve equality.
98
 In this case, access to justice would not only mean that everybody should 
have equal access to the mechanisms of justice; but should also ensure the promotion of 
equality and social justice for poor and other vulnerable persons by taking into account their 
social, economic, cultural and other relevant contexts. Equality, in terms of access to justice, 
means access should be equal, in the sense that the poor should not be excluded on the basis 
of their socio-economic and other disadvantages; and that there should be equity in the 
provision of justice.
99
 Such disadvantages limits an affected person’s access to justice, as 
 
“... a marked characteristic of virtually all communities living in extreme poverty is that they do not 
have access, on equal terms, to the institutions and services of Government that give effect to human 
rights. This inequality of access, in particular to justice, is often linked to discrimination on other 
grounds. Although commonly seen as an issue of economic and social rights, the experience of the 
poor is as likely to be marked by repression as by economic depression and indeed the two are 
interlinked.”
100
 
 
The need for the adoption of substantive equality is further necessitated by the Constitution’s 
focus on particularly vulnerable and desperate persons. The State’s constitutional obligations 
require that the State protects particularly vulnerable and desperate persons and groups. The 
Constitutional Court has stated that the State has to make provision for the most vulnerable 
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and desperate in society.
101
 In the case of social security litigants, their particularly vulnerable 
and desperate status is indisputable. This is especially true of social assistance applicants or 
beneficiaries, who are indigent and have to satisfy the means (income and asset) test to 
qualify for benefits. The position of social security applicants or beneficiaries is further 
worsened by the fact that the social security dispute resolution process - litigation - only 
commences after an application for a benefit has been rejected or payment of the benefit has 
either been stopped or only partially paid. Where the social security statute provides for 
internal administrative remedies as a prerequisite for external adjudication, these remedies 
would also have been exhausted. Delays in the justice system further mean that before court 
cases are eventually decided, most litigants will be in a very precarious financial position. 
The need to pay court and attorney fees further compounds matters for most litigants.
102
 As 
Anderson asserts, the poor tend to reach court in cases where they are at risk of destitution – 
both because their margins for error are smaller and because the most fundamental 
components of livelihood are at stake.
103
  
 
Therefore, due to the vulnerable status of the social security beneficiaries, it could, in the 
light of the relevant constitutional provisions and developing jurisprudence, constitutionally 
be expected of the State to establish a comprehensive adjudication system. It further requires 
the development of innovative mechanisms to effectively realise their right of access to court. 
An example of an instance where innovative mechanisms have been developed to effectively 
realise their right of access to court is the possibility in terms of the Constitution for a group 
or class of people to bring a case in court (class actions).
104
 In developing the common law of 
standing to make provision for the realisation of the constitutional right to bring a class 
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action, the court in The Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 
Provincial Government v Ngxuza
105
 was able to develop an innovative mechanism through 
which a category of particularly vulnerable and desperate persons (social assistance 
(disability grant) beneficiaries whose grants had been unlawfully terminated) to have access 
to court to enforce their right of access to social security.   
 
The notion of substantive equality will require the redefinition of the concept of access to 
courts to incorporate the promotion of equality and social justice for poor and other 
vulnerable persons.
106
 Adopting such an approach to equality in this respect requires the 
development of an adjudication system that takes into account their social, economic, cultural 
and other relevant contexts. Due to the particularly vulnerable and desperate status of social 
security applicants or beneficiaries in general, and aggrieved social security 
applicants/beneficiaries in particular, it may necessitate the development of a special dispute 
resolution system. The socio-economic context of social security litigants (the very poorest of 
our society) warrants the consideration of dispute resolution systems or mechanisms that will 
be more suitable to their peculiar needs and circumstances. This category of persons therefore 
requires an expeditious, efficient, affordable and easily accessible dispute resolution system. 
Such a system is necessary because when people are poor, individual incidents of unjust 
administrative action or unfair denial of access to services, can tip them into greater poverty 
and widen inequalities.
107
 
 
The Constitutional Court has proposed a further concept of “restitutionary equality” due to the 
requirement in section 9(2) that legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance 
persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. In National Coalition 
for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice, the Court held that: 
 
“particularly in a country such as South Africa, persons belonging to certain categories have suffered 
considerable unfair discrimination in the past. It is insufficient for the Constitution merely to ensure, 
through the Bill of Rights, that statutory provisions which have caused such unfair discrimination in 
the past are eliminated. Past unfair discrimination frequently has ongoing negative consequences, the 
continuation of which is not halted immediately when the initial causes thereof are eliminated, and 
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unless remedies, may continue for a substantial time and even indefinitely. Like justice, equality 
delayed is equality denied.... One could refer to such equality as remedial or restitutionary 
equality.”
108
     
 
2.2.2 Human Dignity 
 
Human dignity is also a foundational value and a fundamental right that will inform the social 
security adjudication system. Section 1 states that the Republic of South Africa is one 
sovereign democratic state founded on the values of human dignity, the achievement of 
equality and advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism; 
while section 7(1) further states that the Bill of Rights is the cornerstone of democracy in 
South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic 
values of human dignity, equality and freedom. Section 10 states that everyone has inherent 
dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.  
 
Human dignity informs constitutional interpretation at a range of levels. It is a value that 
informs the interpretation of many, possibly all rights. It is not only a value but also a 
justiciable and enforceable human right that must be respected and protected.109 The value of 
human dignity will also be influential in the interpretation of the right of access to courts and 
the State’s obligations in this regard. It has been remarked that: 
 
“... as an abstract value, common to the core values of our Constitution, dignity informs the content of 
all the concrete rights and plays a role in the balancing process necessary to bring different rights and 
values into harmony.  It too, however, must find its place in the constitutional order. Nowhere is this 
more apparent than in the application of the social and economic rights entrenched in the Constitution. 
These rights are rooted in respect for human dignity, for how can there be dignity in a life lived 
without access to housing, health care food, water or in the case of persons unable to support 
themselves, without appropriate social assistance? But social and economic policies are pre-eminently 
policy matters that are the concern of government. In formulating such policies the government has to 
consider not only the rights of individuals to live with dignity, but also the general interests of the 
community concerning the application of resources.”110   
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The influence of human dignity in this instance is further increased by the relationship 
between access to courts for aggrieved social security beneficiaries and the realisation of their 
right of access to social security. Lack of access to courts affects their ability to have access 
to social security and other constitutional rights, which in turn affects their ability to ensure a 
basic standard of living. As the Constitutional Court has stated, “there can be no doubt that 
human dignity, freedom and equality, the foundational values of our society, are denied those 
who have not food, clothing and shelter”.111 In President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Hugo the Court held that: 
 
“at the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a recognition that the purpose of our new 
constitutional and democratic order is the establishment of a society in which all human beings will be 
accorded equal dignity and respect regardless of their membership of particular groups. The 
achievement of such a society in the context of our deeply inegalitarian past will not be easy, but that 
that is the goal of the Constitution should not be forgotten or overlooked.”
112
 
 
It is only when access to courts is realised that people will be able to protect their dignity. 
Without dignity, the law’s legitimacy will be undermined; and without the rule of law, 
democracy and the Constitution itself will feel hollow for the poor, who are the majority in 
South Africa.
113
  
 
3. IMPACT OF THE RIGHT TO HAVE ACCESS TO COURTS 
 
In order to determine the meaning of the right to have access to courts, regard must be had to 
the approach to interpreting the Constitution; the purpose and importance of the right; the 
nature and scope of both the right as well the State’s obligations in terms of the right; and 
possible limitations to the right. 
 
3.1 Approach to interpreting the right 
 
Interpreting the right of access to courts must be done in accordance with the approach for the 
interpretation of the rights in the Bill of Rights. In terms of the Constitution, any 
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interpretation of the rights in the Bill of Rights must promote the values that underlie an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, must consider 
international law and may consider foreign law.
114
 It must also promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights.
115
 The Constitutional Court has also laid down the approach to 
be adopted in the interpretation of a fundamental right in the Constitution. In the case of S v 
Zuma,
116
 the Court held that the approach to be adopted in interpreting the Constitution is an 
approach which, whilst paying due regard to the language that has been used, is generous and 
purposive and gives expression to the underlying values of the Constitution. Therefore, a 
right must be interpreted in a manner that seeks to realise the objectives of the right. The 
Court held that: 
 
“the meaning of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter was to be ascertained by an analysis of 
the purpose of such guarantee; it was to be understood, in other words, in the light of the interests it 
was meant to protect. In my view, this analysis is to be undertaken, and the purpose of the right or 
freedom in question is to be sought by reference to the character and the larger objects of the Charter 
itself, to the language chosen to articulate the specific right or freedom, to the historical origins of the 
concept enshrined, and where applicable, to the meaning and purpose of the other specific rights and 
freedoms with which it is associated within the text of the Charter. The interpretation should be… a 
generous rather than a legalistic one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and securing for 
individuals the full benefit of the Charter’s protection.”117   
 
In the Grootboom case, the Constitutional Court held that rights must further be interpreted 
with regard to the context within which the right was enacted.
118
 The Court stated that 
interpreting a right in its context requires the consideration of two types of context. On the 
one hand, rights must be understood in their textual setting (which requires a consideration of 
Chapter 2 and the Constitution as a whole), and, on the other hand, rights must also be 
understood in their social and historical context. 
 
In relation to the history and background to the adoption of the right of access to courts, the 
right needs to be interpreted with regard to history of deliberate denial of access by the State. 
Before the adoption of the Constitution, the State used various mechanisms to eliminate the 
                                                 
114
 Section 39(1) (a)-(c). 
115
 Section 39(2). 
116
 S v Zuma 1995 4 BCLR 401 (CC); 1995 2 SA 642 (CC).  
117
 S v Zuma para 15. 
118
 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others paras 21-22. 
34 
 
jurisdiction of the courts. These include the prohibition of legal proceedings against the State; 
the use of “ouster clauses” and restrictive time limit and notice requirements.119 
 
The outright prohibition against the bringing of legal proceedings against the State was one of 
the mechanisms that restricted access to justice. An example of this was the Ciskei Definition 
of State Liability Decree. The Decree provided that “no legal proceedings may be brought 
against the State in respect of any claim arising from any procedural irregularity, abuse of 
power, maladministration, nepotism, corruption or act of negative discrimination on the part 
of any member or servant of the Government of the Republic of Ciskei which was 
overthrown on 4 March 1990”.120 Such provisions automatically eliminated access to courts, 
as a litigant could not institute legal proceedings, irrespective of the correctness of the claim. 
They would therefore be in contravention of the right of access to courts.
121
   
 
The right of access to court was also restricted through the use of the so-called “ouster 
clauses”. These clauses, which have the effect of ousting the jurisdictions of courts to review 
state conduct, ensured that apartheid-era state conduct was beyond judicial scrutiny.
122
 
Access to court was also restricted by interfering in the independence of the judiciary. This 
was achieved by appointing executive-minded judges into the judiciary and making political 
appointments of judges.
123
 The right of access to courts must therefore be interpreted with 
regards to the historical denial of the right and the Constitution’s aim to prevent the 
recurrence of this.  
 
Restrictive time limits and notice requirements pose barriers to access to justice. Time limits 
and/or notice periods for the institution of a case are stipulated in various statutes.
124
 Time 
limits and notice periods are necessary in a dispute resolution system as they bring certainty 
and stability to social and legal affairs and maintain the quality of adjudication (which is 
central to the rule of law).
125
 However, where a statute imposes a time limit and/or notice 
period requirement, an aggrieved person is barred from bringing the case to court after the 
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expiry of the time limit. The negative effect of time limits and notice requirements on the 
right of access to court has been described in many cases. Such requirements have been 
described as “conditions which clog the ordinary right of an aggrieved person to seek the 
assistance of a court of law”;126 as “a very drastic provision” and “a very serious infringement 
of the rights of individuals”.127 Such requirements have the effect of “hampering as it does 
the ordinary rights of an aggrieved person to seek the assistance of the courts”.128  
  
In Brümmer v Minister for Social Development and Others, the Constitutional Court held 
that: 
 
“time bars limit the right to seek judicial redress.  However, they serve an important purpose in that 
they prevent inordinate delays which may be detrimental to the interests of justice.  But not all time 
limits are consistent with the Constitution.  There is no hard and fast rule for determining the degree of 
limitation that is consistent with the Constitution.  The “enquiry turns wholly on estimations of 
degree.”  Whether a time bar provision is consistent with the right of access to court depends upon the 
availability of the opportunity to exercise the right to judicial redress.  To pass constitutional muster, a 
time bar provision must afford a potential litigant an adequate and fair opportunity to seek judicial 
redress for a wrong allegedly committed.  It must allow sufficient or adequate time between the cause 
of action coming to the knowledge of the claimant and the time during which litigation may be 
launched.  And finally, the existence of the power to condone non-compliance with the time bar is not 
necessarily decisive.”
129
  
 
In evaluating the appropriateness of a time-bar or notice requirement, the Constitutional 
Court has held that: 
 
“what counts … is the sufficiency or insufficiency, the adequacy or inadequacy, of the room which the 
limitation leaves open in the beginning for the exercise of the right. For the consistency of the 
limitation with the right depends upon the availability of an initial opportunity to exercise the right 
that amounts, in all the circumstances characterising the class of case in question, to a real and fair 
one.”
130
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Therefore, adequate time must be given to institute a claim and the practical possibility and 
genuine opportunity to do so is important.  
 
It is also necessary to interpret access to courts within the broader context of the Bill of 
Rights, including the rights which have a bearing on the right. The right of access to courts is 
protected in the Bill of Rights together with other rights. As the Constitutional Court has 
affirmed, all the rights contained in the Bill of Rights are interrelated and mutually 
supporting. Together, these rights have a significant impact on the dignity of people and their 
quality of life.
131
 The right of access to courts is related to all the other rights in the Bill of 
Rights, as it is considered a “leverage right” through which a person can enforce their other 
rights. It is therefore a constitutional tool for the enforcement of all the other rights in the 
Bill.
132
   
 
This right also needs to be interpreted and understood in its social context. In relation to the 
socio-economic and historical context of persons in need of access to courts in general, it was 
remarked that South Africa is: 
 
“a land where poverty and illiteracy abound and differences of culture and language are pronounced, 
where such conditions isolate the people whom they handicap from the mainstream of the law, where 
most persons who have been injured are either unaware of or poorly informed about their legal rights 
and what they should do in order to enforce these, and where access to the professional advice and 
assistance that they need so sorely is often difficult for financial or geographical reasons.”
133
 
 
The social context reflective of aggrieved social security applicants or beneficiaries in 
particular has been explained in numerous cases. In Soobramoney v Minister of Health 
(KwaZulu Natal),
134
 the court highlighted the socio-economic and historical conditions 
prevailing in South Africa when it remarked that:  
 
“we live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. Millions of people are living in 
deplorable conditions and in great poverty. There is a high level of unemployment; inadequate social 
security and many do not have access to clean water or adequate health services. These conditions 
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already existed when the Constitution was adopted and a commitment to address them, and to 
transform our society into one in which there will be human dignity, freedom and equality lies at the 
heart of our new constitutional order. For as long as these conditions continue to exist that aspiration 
will have a hollow ring.”  
 
3.2 Importance and purpose of the right of access to court 
 
In realising the right of access to courts, an adjudication system must consider the importance 
and purpose of the right. The right to have access to court is vital for various reasons. Firstly, 
the right is important due to the historical context of access to courts. The right is guaranteed 
due to the significant obstacles that stood in the way of an unqualified access to courts in the 
past, which made it difficult for aggrieved persons to seek redress. Courts were also 
prohibited from dispensing justice independently and impartially
135
 to all. Access to courts is 
fundamental to a viable and dynamic legal system that is based on justiciable human rights; 
the substantive rights in the Bill of Rights would be inaccessible and therefore meaningless to 
the ordinary person if there was no right of access to courts. The absence of access to courts 
would make fundamental rights elitist and negate the principle of equality.
136
 
     
The realisation of the right of access to courts is vital due to its relationship with all the other 
rights in the Bill of Rights. The Constitution has made it clear that the rights in the Bill of 
Rights are interrelated, interdependent and mutually supporting.
137
 It is therefore impossible 
to define the scope and content of a right in isolation. The rights must be read together and 
their inter-relatedness must be considered when delineating the scope of each right. When 
considered together, the rights have a significant impact on the dignity of people and their 
quality of life. Therefore, the right of access to courts is an integral component of the right of 
access to social security. The realisation of the right of access to social security would be 
incomplete without a realisation of the right of access to courts.  
 
Access to justice is essential for the success of an operative Bill of Rights and the promotion 
of human rights. It is the core of social and economic rights and of making law and justice 
accessible to all. The right is considered to be of cardinal importance for the adjudication of 
justiciable disputes, and due to the nature of the right, there can surely be no dispute that the 
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right of access to court is by nature a right that requires active protection.
138
 It is thus the core 
of constitutional rights and in making law and justice accessible to all. The Constitutional 
Court is of the opinion that “untrammelled access to the courts is a fundamental right of every 
individual in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. 
In the absence of such right the justiciability of the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights 
would be defective; and absent true justiciability, individual rights may become illusory”.139 
 
In Napier v Barkhuizen, the Constitutional Court stressed that South Africa’s democratic 
order requires an orderly and fair resolution of disputes by courts or other independent and 
impartial tribunals.
 
This is fundamental to the stability of an orderly society. It is indeed vital 
to a society that, like South Africa, is founded on the rule of law.
 
Section 34 gives expression 
to this foundational value by guaranteeing to everyone the right to seek the assistance of a 
court.
140
 In addition, the Court held that “section 34 is an express constitutional recognition of 
the importance of the fair resolution of social conflict by impartial and independent 
institutions. The sharper the potential for social conflict, the more important it is, if our 
constitutional order is to flourish, that disputes are resolved by courts”.141 The Court 
concluded that access to courts not only reflects the foundational values that underlie our 
constitutional order, it also constitutes public policy.
142
 
 
The realisation of the right to access to courts is also necessary for the judiciary to properly 
execute its constitutional duties. In this respect, it is argued that unless the need for justice 
and remedies for injustice are effectively met by the courts and the law, there will be negative 
consequences for the popular legitimacy of the courts and indeed the Constitution itself. This 
creates a political imperative to improve access to justice.
143
 Therefore, the need for access to 
justice should be a core concern of the courts, for it goes to the very essence of their function. 
If people in need are not able to bring their cases to court and present them effectively, then 
the courts cannot satisfactorily perform the function entrusted to them by the Constitution.
144
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In another instance, the Court stated that section 34, and the access to courts it guarantees for 
the adjudication of disputes, is a manifestation of a deeper principle, one that underlies our 
democratic order.
145
 The court further remarked that: 
 
“the right of access to court is indeed foundational to the stability of an orderly society. It ensures the 
peaceful, regulated and institutionalised mechanisms to resolve disputes.... Construed in this context 
of the rule of law ... access to court is indeed of cardinal importance. As a result, very powerful 
considerations would be required for its limitation to be reasonable and justifiable.”
146
 
 
The fundamental right of access to courts is protected in the Constitution because the right is 
essential for constitutional democracy under the rule of law; and in order to enforce one‘s 
rights under the Constitution, legislation and the common law everyone must be able to have 
a dispute, that can be resolved by the application of law, decided by a court.
147
 The right of 
access to court under section 34 of the Constitution is of fundamental importance to ensure 
that concrete expression is given to the foundational value of the rule of law.
148
 It is a 
provision that is fundamental to the upholding of the rule of law, the constitutional state and 
the regstaatidee.
149
 In a constitutional state and a rules-based society, people should “be able 
to use the rules when needed in order advance the objectives of the Constitution and 
ultimately have proper, substantive and meaningful access to the various institutions that 
interpret the rules and deal with the various contestations that inevitably arise”.150 
 
3.3 Nature and scope of the right of access to courts  
 
Section 34 of the Constitution has three components.151 In the first instance, it guarantees 
everyone who has a dispute the right to be able to bring that dispute to a court or tribunal to 
seek redress (right of access to justice). This is to ensure protection against actions by the 
State and other persons which deny access to courts and other forum and the elimination of 
obstacles in the way of access to courts. Secondly, the right further requires that courts, 
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tribunals or forums that resolve disputes must be independent and impartial in the execution 
of their duties. Finally, section 34 guarantees the right to have disputes resolved in a fair and 
public hearing. 
 
3.3.1 The right to bring a dispute to court (access to justice) 
  
Section 34 of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to have any dispute that 
can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, 
where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.  
 
Therefore, the social security adjudication framework that is established must be in 
conformity with the right as envisaged in section 34 of the Constitution. The Constitution 
envisages that right will be realised only when the various components of the right are 
fulfilled – in relation to the scope of the concept of access to justice and its implications for 
social security adjudication.  
 
The current social security adjudication framework requires reform so as to realise the 
constitutional right of access to courts for social security applicants or beneficiaries. The right 
to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided before a court or 
another independent and impartial tribunal or forum seeks to ensure access to the institutions 
and mechanisms to resolve disputes. In relation to social security applicants and beneficiaries, 
it thus ensures access to justice.  
 
As discussed earlier, the concept of access to justice is defined both narrowly and broadly.
152
 
The narrow (traditional) definition of the concept of “access” to “justice” is the situation 
where state legal systems ensure that every person is able to utilise the legal processes for 
legal redress irrespective of their social or economic capacity and where every person 
receives a just and fair treatment within the legal system. The traditional definition of the 
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concept is based on the principle that the legal system should be structured and administered 
in such a manner that it provides everyone with affordable and timeous access to appropriate 
institutions and procedures through which to claim and protect their rights.  
 
The traditional definition of the concept of access to justice, which is understood in terms of 
legal rights, processes and procedure,
153
 fails to take into account the impact of the social and 
economic conditions (such as poverty, literacy, geographical location etc.) on the ability of 
claimants to use the adjudication system. A broad approach to the concept of access to justice 
goes beyond access to the institutions that resolve disputes and to legal services. The socio-
economic condition of claimants (especially poverty) has an inevitable impact on the ability 
of the poor and the marginalised to utilise the legal system. Therefore, the concept of access 
to justice is defined in a manner that also considers the number of barriers to the ability to 
utilise the legal processes to receive a just and fair treatment. Such ability is hampered 
through various barriers (geographical, time-related, linguistic, cultural, social or legal etc). 
 
It is accepted that in South Africa in particular, the impact of the socio-economic conditions 
of claimants and other barriers on their ability to utilise the adjudication system must be 
considered within the concept of access to justice.
154
  
 
Access to justice, as expressed in section 34 of the Constitution (the ability of a person to 
utilise the legal system to receive a just and fair treatment), has three components. In the first 
instance, access to justice requires that accessibility to the adjudication institutions must be 
ensured. This means everyone who has a dispute must be able to bring a dispute to a court or 
tribunal to seek redress. Secondly, access to justice entails that effective dispute resolution 
institutions and mechanisms must be in place. Effectiveness requires, amongst others, that 
courts, tribunals or forums that resolve disputes must be independent and impartial in the 
execution of their duties. Finally, in order to ensure access to court, section 34 guarantees the 
right to have disputes resolved in a fair and public hearing.  
 
Accessibility of adjudication institutions requires that law or conduct should not deny the 
ability and opportunity to access dispute resolution institutions; and that all obstacles in the 
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way of access to courts must be eliminated. It thus encompasses a number of different 
aspects. It includes the ability of the users of the adjudication system to be able to bring a 
dispute to a court and the right to have their dispute heard. It also encompasses issues such as 
the fairness with which they are treated; the justness of results delivered; the speed with 
which cases are processed; the responsiveness of the system to those who use it; and the 
ability of the adjudication institutions to ensure equal treatment of persons from different 
backgrounds (including socio-economic backgrounds).
155
  
 
The scope of the concept of access to justice in the Constitution is also interpreted in terms of 
the interrelated, interdependent and mutually-supporting nature of the rights in the Bill of 
Rights (the interrelationship of the rights of the Constitution are discussed later in this 
policy). In this case, the concept of access to justice means not only access to the courts, but 
includes the (collective) rights to equality, human dignity, just administrative action and other 
matters concerning the administration of justice.
156
 The relationship between access to justice 
and other rights in the Constitution (especially socio-economic rights) requires that access to 
these other constitutional rights must also be included in the notion of access to justice. 
Access to socio-economic and other rights is thus necessary for the achievement of access to 
justice. This is because there can be no access to justice in the face of poverty, unemployment 
and social inequality.
157
   
 
The Constitution guarantees access to justice for everyone. Therefore, the concept of access 
to justice must be interpreted within the context of the Constitution’s concept of equality.158 
There is a need to adopt a substantive approach to equality in relation to access to justice for 
social security applicants/beneficiaries (since it is about breaking down the barriers that 
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prevent the poor and indigent from accessing the social security adjudication system). In this 
case: 
 
“access to court therefore means more than the legal right to bring a case before a court. It includes the 
ability to achieve this. In order to be able to bring his or her case before a court, a prospective litigant 
must have knowledge of the applicable law; must be able to identify that she or he may be able to 
obtain a remedy from a court; must have some knowledge about what to do in order to achieve access; 
and must have the necessary skills to be about to initiate the case and present it to the court. In South 
Africa the prevailing levels of poverty and illiteracy have the result that many people are simply 
unable to place their problems effectively before the courts.”
159
 
 
A broad conceptualisation of access to courts in the South African context accords with the 
Constitution’s equality concept. Equality in terms of the Constitution involves both formal 
and substantive dimensions.
160
 Adopting a substantive approach to equality in relation to 
access to court for social security applicants/beneficiaries is about breaking down the barriers 
that prevent the poor and indigent from accessing the social security adjudication system.  
 
Access to justice for social security claimants thus requires that an appropriate adjudication 
system needs to be established. Therefore, the necessary legislative, policy, institutional (and 
other relevant) requirements for the resolution of social security disputes must be put in 
place. In addition, it also includes ensuring that prospective users of the dispute resolution 
system are able to access the system. The adjudication system developed should take into 
account and/or eliminate possible barriers that (may) prevent users of the system from 
utilising the system. An effective or efficient social security adjudication system must be 
sensitive to the social, economic and other relevant contexts of the users of the system. It has 
been  remarked that traditionally, access to justice is understood in terms of legal rights, 
processes and procedure, often shadowing the socio-economic element, particularly that of 
poverty. However, the link between justice and poverty is the inevitable impact on poor and 
marginalised communities, the majority of whom are women, who are “deprived of choices, 
opportunities, and access to basic resources”.161  
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Some of the barriers of access to justice for social security claimants include poverty;
162
 
geographic location of adjudication institutions;
163
 physical inaccessibility of adjudication 
institutions;
164
 lack of knowledge of rights (also due to illiteracy);
165
 inappropriate dispute 
resolution institutions and mechanisms;
166
 procedural hurdles;
167
 and delay in the resolution 
of disputes.
168
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Due to the particularly vulnerable and desperate status of social security claimants, it may be 
necessary to develop a special dispute resolution system. The socio-economic context of 
social security litigants (the very poorest of our society) warrants the consideration of dispute 
resolution systems or mechanisms that will be more suitable to their peculiar needs and 
circumstances. This category of persons therefore requires an expeditious, efficient, 
affordable and easily accessible dispute resolution system. 
 
3.3.2 Establishment of a court or another independent and impartial tribunal or forum 
 
In order to be able to guarantee access to justice, an adjudication institution must be effective. 
Effectiveness of the adjudication institution entails that the institution must be able to provide 
claimants with appropriate redress. For an adjudication to be able to do this, it must be able to 
decide disputes according to the facts and the law, including freedom from improper 
influence (both internal and external).
169
 This means that to be effective, an adjudication 
institution must be independent and impartial. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
insurmountable procedural hurdles. Procedural rules give content to substantive rights, and must enable the 
effective realisation of the rights. It has been declared that “a substantive right on paper is of no use unless it is 
harnessed to an effective procedural remedy which allows the litigant to actually bring the case before the court 
in good time and without excessive cost. Legal gateways are important determinants of what kind of justice can 
be achieved. ... Legal procedures not only determine whether the poor can get access to legal remedies, and how 
quickly and effective such remedies will be, they can also influence the way that a particular dispute is 
construed by the law, and the kinds of outcomes which are possible” (Anderson MR “Access to justice and legal 
process: making legal institutions responsive to poor people in LDCs” (IDS Working Paper 178) Sussex, 
Institute of Development Studies (February 2003) 15). 
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The right of access to justice in section 34 requires that a person who has a dispute has the 
right to have the dispute resolved by a court or where appropriate, another independent and 
impartial tribunal. Section 34 therefore envisages that there will be circumstances where it 
may be more appropriate for a tribunal or forum to resolve such disputes. There is thus no 
right to have a dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided only by a court 
of law.170 Where it is appropriate to do so, legal disputes can and should be resolved by other 
tribunals and forums apart from ordinary courts.  
 
The right further requires that another forum decides a dispute where it is “appropriate” to do 
so. The term “appropriate” implies that an adjudication institution should be preferred if it is 
ideally suited for the type of dispute in question. This implies that where it is appropriate to 
do so, legal disputes can and should be resolved by other tribunals and forums apart from 
ordinary courts. Where the selected adjudication forum is ideally suited for the type of 
dispute in question, the State has an obligation to prefer and establish such a forum. Other 
adjudication forums and procedures apart from the normal courts could be preferable for a 
particular type of dispute due to their specialisation, expertise, the need to consider local 
circumstances, and the need for the adoption of expeditious, informal and inexpensive 
procedures.
171
 
 
The need for more appropriate avenues for dispute resolution further involves the preferred 
mechanisms or procedures for dispute resolution. There are various mechanisms or processes 
in place for the resolution of disputes, and parties to a dispute should choose the most 
appropriate mechanism. A dispute resolution mechanism will be appropriate where its 
procedure, goals and values are suitable to the requirements of the parties’ situation.172 In 
addition, whether a mechanism is appropriate in each case will depend on the nature of the 
dispute, the amount of money involved, the remedies sought, the willingness of the parties to 
resolve the dispute and the nature of the relationship between the parties.173 
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In addition to requiring courts to be independent,174 the Constitution, in section 34, requires 
tribunals and forums that resolve disputes to be independent and impartial. However, 
different standards of independence exist between courts and other tribunals and forums. As 
part of the Bill of Rights, section 34 (and the standard of independence guaranteed therein) 
may be subject to limitations of a reasonable nature. Such a limitation is not contemplated 
under section 165.175 The difference in independence standards between courts and alternative 
tribunals or forums has been attributed to differences in the judicial functions performed. It is 
suggested that since courts perform a variety of judicial functions, they must comply with the 
highest standards of judicial independence.176 On the other hand, alternative tribunals or 
forums may depart from a strict standard of independence. In Financial Services Board v 
Pepkor Pension Fund, it was held that: 
 
“there are undoubtedly degrees of independence. Not every tribunal can be as completely independent 
as a court of law is expected to be. The independence of courts of law and of administrative tribunals 
cannot be measured by the same standard.”177   
 
Judicial authority in the country is vested in the courts. However, the overburdened state of 
the courts and their inappropriateness to hear certain disputes, due to either a lack of 
specialised knowledge or experience, means another independent and impartial tribunal or 
forum may be preferred in a particular type of dispute. Another adjudication institution could 
be preferable for a particular type of dispute due to its expertise, the need to consider local 
circumstances, or the need for the adoption of expeditious, informal and inexpensive 
procedures.
178
  
 
In addition, access to justice requires tribunals and forums that resolve disputes to be 
independent and impartial. There are various important reasons in support of the 
establishment of independent and impartial tribunals.
179
 These include the fact that a tribunal 
is able to focus its attention on the issues presented by the parties without being distracted by 
the broader concerns of the relevant department; when the individual rights and interests in 
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question (in this case the right of access to social security) are so important as to merit the 
special attention which only a body undistracted by general administrative concerns can give 
them; the desirability of an impartial decision free from the considerations of policy which 
departmental officials and ministers propagate but which engender so-called ‘departmental 
bias’; and the desirability of insulating the decision concerned from the vicissitudes of 
parliament and party politics, especially considering the important legal rights and interests 
are at stake. 
 
The independence of a tribunal or forum has three essential components.180 These 
components include security of tenure for the tribunal or forum officials; a basic degree of 
financial independence for the tribunal; and institutional independence in matters that relate 
directly to the exercise of the tribunal’s judicial function. Institutional independence implies 
control over the administrative decisions that bear directly and immediately on the exercise of 
the tribunal’s or forum’s judicial functions.  
 
Tribunals or forums must also be impartial. The requirement that an adjudication institution 
must be impartial means that the institution’s decisions should be unbiased. The test is not 
whether the institution (or person) making the decision is in fact biased, but whether it (or 
he/she) may be perceived as biased by a reasonable member of the public. In De Lange v 
Smuts NO and Others, the Constitutional Court that:   
 
“although there is obviously a close relationship between ‘independence’ and ‘impartiality’, they are 
nevertheless separate and distinct values or requirements. Impartiality refers to a state of mind or 
attitude of the tribunal in relation to the issues and the parties in a particular case. The word 'impartial' 
. . . connotes an absence of bias, actual or perceived …. The word ‘independent’ … embodies the 
traditional constitutional value of judicial independence. As such, it connotes not merely a state of 
mind or attitude in the actual exercise of judicial functions, but a status or relationship to others, 
particularly the Executive branch of government that rests on objective conditions or guarantees.”
181
 
 
The perception on the part of users of the social security system is thus a further 
consideration supporting the requirements of independence and impartiality. The word 
'impartial' therefore connotes an absence of bias, actual or perceived. 
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3.3.3 Procedural fairness (including the requirement of a public hearing) 
 
In order to ensure access to justice, the Constitution requires disputes to be decided in a fair 
public hearing by independent and impartial institutions. As discussed above, the right to a 
fair trial implies that adjudication institutions are impartial and have judicial independence to 
decide disputes according to the facts and the law, including freedom from improper internal 
and external influence. 
 
In De Beer NO v North-Central Local Council and South-Central Local Council, the court 
stated that the hearing itself must also be fair.182 The need for a fair public hearing is 
important for the realisation of the right. As the Constitutional Court has remarked: 
 
“this section 34 fair hearing right affirms the rule of law which is a founding value of our Constitution. 
The right to a fair hearing before a court lies at the heart of the rule of law. A fair hearing before a 
court as a prerequisite to an order being made against anyone is fundamental to a just and credible 
legal order. Courts in our country are obliged to ensure that the proceedings before them are always 
fair. Since procedures that would render the hearing unfair are inconsistent with the Constitution the 
courts must interpret legislation and the rules of court, where it is reasonably possible to do so, in a 
way that would render the proceedings fair.”
183
   
 
Section 34 requires that an alternative tribunal or forum must also conduct proceedings in a 
fair public hearing.184 However, the proceedings need not be identical to those of a court of 
law,185 as the requirements of fairness in terms of section 34 are flexible and depend on 
different factors. In addition, it would neither be unfair nor unconstitutional for a tribunal or 
forum to adopt procedures different from those of a court.186 
 
The resolution of disputes must also be undertaken in a fair manner.  Embedded in the right 
to a fair trial is also the right to procedural equality.
187
 This implies that adjudication 
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institutions should therefore ensure that claimants have reasonable opportunities to assert or 
defend their rights. This implies, among other things:
188
 
 
o Reasonable notice of the time when the dispute is to be decided should be given to a 
person concerned.189 The adjudication institution should also be given the power to 
condone a failure to comply with any notice requirements. 
o Power to determine the appropriate procedures (where a dispute is resolved by a 
tribunal or another forum, the procedures do not have to be identical to those of a 
court of law. This is because the requirements of fairness in terms of section 34 are 
flexible and depend on different factors. Therefore, a tribunal or forum can be 
empowered to adopt procedures different from those of a court. This would enable a 
measure of flexibility to be granted to tribunal or forum in deciding disputes. 
o Personal appearance and appropriate representation (each party to a dispute should be 
able to participate in the adjudication of the dispute. Each party should also be 
guaranteed the right to engage a lawyer or another qualified representative of their 
choice).190  
o Equal access to evidence (each party should also have access to the relevant evidence, 
including documents, expert opinions, etc.)  
o Rapid resolution of disputes (disputes must be resolved as expeditiously as possible, 
especially in social security disputes).  
o Inexpensive adjudication procedures (procedures should be free or costs should be 
kept at the absolute minimum so as to allow even the poor to be able to resolve 
disputes). 
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o Guarantee of an effective remedy (the adjudication institution should be able to make 
a decision that has to be duly motivated or, in other words, explain the reasoning that 
led to the decision in the dispute, and be legally enforceable). 
 
Legal assistance to claimants who cannot afford legal assistance should be provided by the 
State. The right to free legal assistance has also been read into the right to have a fair public 
hearing in section 34. This is by virtue of the differences in the wording of the right of access 
to court in both the Constitution and the Interim Constitution;191 comparative jurisprudence 
on the right to free legal representation; the constitutional requirement of equality between 
civil and criminal litigants and emerging South African jurisprudence on the issue.    
 
Proponents of a right to free legal assistance in South Africa point to the differences in the 
wording of the right of access to court in section 34 of the Constitution and in section 22 of 
the Interim Constitution. Section 22 of the Interim Constitution guaranteed the right to have 
justiciable disputes settled by a court of law or, where appropriate, another independent and 
impartial forum. In Bernstein v Bester,192 the court contrasted section 22 of the Interim 
Constitution with article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) which 
guarantees the right to a fair civil trial by providing for a right to a fair public hearing.193 It 
held that:  
 
“a provision cannot ordinarily be implied if all the surrounding circumstances point to the fact that it 
was deliberately omitted. That the framers of the Constitution were alert to issues of 
constitutionalising rules of procedural law and justice is evident from the detailed criminal fair trial 
provisions in section 25(3). The internal evidence of the Constitution itself suggests that the drafters 
were well informed regarding provisions in international, regional and domestic human and 
fundamental rights instruments. Section 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights explicitly 
confers the right to a fair and public hearing, not only in a criminal trial, but also in regard to the 
determination of civil rights and obligations ...
 
Nearer home, article 12(1)(a) of the Namibian 
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Constitution expressly provides that “[i]n the determination of their civil rights and obligations ... all 
persons shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by an independent, impartial and competent Court 
or Tribunal established by law ...”. In these circumstances an argument could be made out that the 
framers deliberately elected not to constitutionalise the right to a fair civil trial.”194 
 
Therefore, the inclusion of the right to a fair public hearing in section 34 of the Constitution 
indicates that a right to a fair civil trial is envisaged.195  
 
A right to free legal assistance is also determined by having regard to the provisions of 
Constitution on free legal assistance and the equality principle. Section 35(3)(g) of the 
Constitution provides persons accused of a crime with the right to free legal assistance “if 
substantial injustice would otherwise result”. The clarification of the meaning of the phrase 
“if substantial injustice would otherwise result” by the Constitutional Court has been 
interpreted as providing a corollary right to free legal assistance in section 34.
196
 In S v 
Vermaas; S v Du Plessis,
197
 the Constitutional Court laid down guidelines for the provision of 
free legal assistance in criminal cases. The court held that “the accused person’s aptitude or 
ineptitude to fend for himself or herself” must be assessed. The court further held that regard 
must be hard to the: 
 
“ramifications [of the decision to grant legal representation] and their complexity or simplicity … how 
grave the consequences of a conviction may look, and any other factor that needs to be evaluated in 
the determination of the likelihood or unlikelihood that, if the trial were to proceed without a lawyer 
for the defence, the result would be ‘substantial injustice’.”
198
 
 
If the court’s guidelines are applied in civil cases, it implies that free legal assistance must be 
provided if substantial injustice would result.
199
 It is proposed that when evaluating whether 
or not a fair public hearing has been achieved in a civil proceeding, factors to be considered 
include the consequences of the case for the party concerned; the complexity of the issues; 
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the ability of the party to represent himself or herself effectively; the risk of error if a party is 
not represented and possible ‘inequality of arms’ if the other party is likely to be 
represented.
200
 Therefore, in the same way as in a criminal case, the social security litigant’s 
aptitude or ineptitude to fend for himself or herself must be assessed, as well as the 
ramifications of the decision whether or not to provide free legal assistance, the complexity 
or simplicity of the case, the consequences of a failure to have access to justice (the inability 
realise all the rights in the Bill of Rights).   
 
The provision of free legal assistance is also influenced by the equality principles in the 
Constitution. The right to equality entails that every litigant should have access to state-
provided legal assistance. However, Legal Aid South Africa provides services mainly in 
criminal matters.
201
 Although Legal Aid South Africa is increasing its assistance in civil cases 
(where it prioritises matters involving children, women in divorce proceedings, maintenance 
and domestic violence cases and unlawful evictions), legal assistance is still largely directed 
at criminal cases. During the year 2007/2008 financial year, the Legal Aid Board assisted 
clients in 396,068 matters. Of all the cases dealt with, ninety percent (90%) were criminal 
cases with only ten percent (10%) being civil cases.
202
 This indicates that:  
 
“... legal assistance for poor persons is lacking in a variety of civil matters, in administrative forums 
where their rights are routinely overlooked; in government bureaucracies which deny them access to 
social security, and other socio-economic rights (such as in social security administration and delivery 
institutions and government departments); and in the general context of upholding their dignity, 
equality and social justice.”
203
 
 
This state of affairs has grave consequences for the rights of equality and human dignity of 
civil cases and for the legitimacy of the Constitution itself. As the contention goes: 
 
“confining the provision of legal services primarily to criminal matters, and defining access (to 
justice) so narrowly, has other serious consequences…for example that the focus on criminal defence 
has implications for gender discrimination. The channelling of limited resources into the provision of 
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representation to accused persons takes away resources from other areas where legal services are 
required, and as a majority of criminal accused are men, women (and other groups) are underserved by 
the legal aid system. The areas of law affecting women, children, the disabled and the poor – domestic 
and family issues, access to facilities, jobs, education and social services – are inadequately catered for 
in the current delivery models.”
204
 
 
Emerging South African jurisprudence has also reinforced the notion of a constitutional right 
to free legal assistance. In Nkuzi Development Association v Government of the Republic of 
South Africa,
205
 the Land Claims Court held that the right to a fair hearing includes the right 
to legal representation at state expense, in certain circumstances. The Court held that:  
 
“there is no logical basis for distinguishing between criminal and civil matters. The issues in civil 
matters are equally complex and the laws and procedures difficult to understand. Failure by a judicial 
officer to inform these litigants of their rights, how to exercise them and where to obtain assistance 
may result in a miscarriage of justice.”
206
 
 
The court held that the litigants in the case have a right to free legal assistance, and that the 
State had an obligation to provide such legal assistance through mechanisms selected by it.
207
  
The court therefore ordered that the State take all reasonable measures to provide free legal 
assistance, so that people in all parts of the country who have rights to free legal assistance 
are able to exercise their rights effectively. 
 
Court or tribunal proceedings must also be held in public. This is due to the need for 
transparency, giving a proper opportunity for the issues to be decided openly and providing 
for the presentation of evidence.
208
 Where proceedings are to be held in private, these would 
also constitute a limitation of section 34 and must be justified in terms of the Constitution.      
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4. IMPACT OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO SOCIAL SECURITY 
 
4.1 Nature of the right of access to social security 
 
Section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution states that everyone has the right to have access to social 
security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate 
social assistance. The constitutional right of access to social security therefore vests in 
“everyone”. The constitutional reference to everyone implies that all in need must have 
access to the social welfare scheme that the State has put in place. If some who are in need 
are excluded, this implies that not everyone has access to the scheme. The Constitutional 
Court has stated that the word ‘everyone’ is a term of general import and unrestricted 
meaning, which means what it conveys. Once the State puts in place a social welfare system, 
everyone has a right to have access to that system.
209
 
 
Access to social security and its supporting rights is necessary as a result of its impact on the 
realisation of the founding values of the Constitution and enjoyment of the other rights in the 
Bill of Rights. Courts have stated that socio-economic rights must be understood in the 
context of the founding values of our Constitution. The right of access to social security, like 
all other socio-economic rights in the Constitution, is closely related to the founding values of 
human dignity, equality and freedom. Access to socio-economic rights is crucial to the 
enjoyment of the other rights mentioned in the Bill of Rights, in particular the enjoyment of 
human dignity, equality and freedom.
210
 The protection of the right of access to social 
security also seeks to promote equality, as section 27 entitles everyone to have access to 
socio-economic rights.
211
 It is also protected to ensure a person’s dignity, as the protection of 
a person’s dignity is the core aim and basis for social security and other socio-economic 
rights.
212
 This was confirmed by the Constitutional Court, when it remarked that:  
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“there can be no doubt that human dignity, freedom and equality, the foundational values of our 
society, are denied those who have no food, clothing or shelter.”
213
 
 
The right of access to social security is entrenched due to the impact apartheid had on the 
quality of life of many South Africans, and their enjoyment of socio-economic rights. In an 
attempt to redress past injustices (including poverty and inequality), social security seeks to 
realise some of the aims of the Constitution, such as to heal the divisions of the past and 
establish a society based on democratic values and to improve the quality of life of all citizens 
and free the potential of each person.
214
 
 
The right of access to social security, including social assistance, for those unable to support 
themselves and their dependants is further entrenched because the South African society 
values human beings and wants to ensure that people are afforded their basic needs.
215
 In the 
Grootboom case, it was remarked that a society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities 
of life are accessible to all if it is to be a society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom.
216
 The State has an obligation to ensure that its residents have their basic needs met 
and as such have access to food, clean water and shelter. Social security is a vital component 
of the social system that is available for those who cannot meet these basic needs for 
themselves or their families.
217
 It enables people to avoid destitution and affords that their 
basic needs are met upon stoppage or disruption of their income or their earning potential 
never developing. It also ensures complete protection against human damage, an adequate 
standard of living and protection against destitution. It serves to protect human beings from 
the life-threatening and degrading conditions of poverty and material insecurity.
 218
  
 
Social security and other socio-economic rights serve the additional purpose of facilitating 
the integration of persons into society so as to further their sense of participation. It also 
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prevents the arbitrary discrimination of access to or participation in society and the 
eradication of stumbling blocks that impede access to benefits.
219
     
 
The failure to establish an effective and efficient adjudication system that secures the right of 
access to social security will also be evaluated through the impact of such absence on the 
litigants’ right of access to social security. The absence of an efficient adjudication system 
through which aggrieved social security beneficiaries can enforce and realise their rights 
entails that they would be denied access to social security. To borrow from comments by the 
Constitutional Court, the denial of the right of access to social security would be total (no 
access) and the consequences of the denial would be grave (social exclusion, poverty, lack of 
basic services, denial of equality and human dignity). They would be relegated to the margins 
of society and would be deprived of what may be essential to enable them to enjoy other 
rights granted under the Constitution. Denying them their right under section 27 (1) therefore 
affects them in a most fundamental way.
220
  
 
4.2 Scope of the right of access to social security 
 
Although the Constitution guarantees the right of access to social security, it does not offer a 
definition of the concept. The Constitution merely refers to social security and social 
assistance. Therefore, the Constitution considers the concept to consist of social insurance221 
and social assistance.222 However, the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of 
Social Security for South Africa has developed an ideal South African social security concept 
in the notion of (comprehensive) social protection.223 The Committee states that:  
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“comprehensive social protection is broader than the traditional concept of social security, and 
incorporates developmental strategies and programmes designed to ensure, collectively, at least a 
minimum acceptable living standard for all citizens. It embraces the traditional measures of social 
insurance, social assistance and social services, but goes beyond that to focus on causality through an 
integrated policy-approach including many of the developmental initiatives undertaken by the 
State.”224  
 
Since dispute resolution mechanisms (should) constitute an integral part of any social security 
framework, they could be considered as included in the notion of measures aimed at ensuring 
comprehensive social security. As Olivier asserts, “social protection also encapsulates 
elements and rights related and ancillary to social security itself. Together with social 
security, the presence of these elements ensures adequate social protection.”225 He concludes 
that: 
  
“conceptual refinement does not merely provide a theoretical basis for understanding this vast terrain 
of interventions and mechanisms, but ... requires a proper understanding of the importance of adopting 
a multi-factoral, fundamental rights-friendly, goal-orientated and co-ordinated, multi-actor and multi-
dimensional approach in order to realise social security.  Given the nature and socio-economic and 
political historical context of the South African environment, these issues are indeed critical for giving 
effect to the constitutionally-entrenched rights operating in the areas of social security and social 
protection.”226   
 
Such as broad concept of social security is endorsed by the Constitution, as section 27(1)(c) 
guarantees a right to have access to social security as opposed to a right to social security. 
The phrase “the right to have access to” was initially interpreted as qualifying or limiting 
rights. However, the Constitutional Court concluded that the right to have access to (housing) 
is a much wider notion than the right to social security.
227
 The Constitutional Court’s 
comments on the implications of the difference between the words a right to and a right to 
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have access to in relation to section 26(1) has implications for the interpretation of section 
27(1) (c). In the Grootboom case, the court held that 
 
“the right delineated in section 26 (1) is a right of “access to adequate housing” as distinct from the 
right to adequate housing …. This difference is significant. It recognizes that housing entails more 
than bricks and mortar. It requires available land, appropriate services such as the provision of water 
and the removal of sewage and the financing of all these, including the building of the house itself. For 
a person to have access to adequate housing all of these conditions need to be met. There must be 
land, there must be services, there must be a dwelling. Access to land for the purposes of housing is 
therefore included in the right.” 
228
           
 
The right of access to social security intersects with other rights in the Bill of Rights and 
reinforces these rights at the points of intersection. Socio-economic rights and the rights to 
life and human dignity are intertwined in the Constitution.
229
 As pointed out in the 
Grootboom case,
230
 the rights in the Bill of Rights are interrelated, interdependent and 
mutually supporting. Their interrelatedness has immense human and practical significance in 
a society founded on the values of human dignity and equality.
231
 As a result, the rights must 
all be read together in the setting of the Constitution as a whole and their interconnectedness 
needs to be taken into account when interpreting socio-economic rights, and in determining 
whether the State has met its obligations in terms of one of them. Therefore, the right of 
access to social security must be interpreted in terms of the close correlation between it and 
the other rights. In the Court’s opinion: 
 
“... affording socio-economic rights to all people therefore enables them to enjoy the other rights 
enshrined in Chapter 2. The realisation of these rights is also key to the advancement of race and 
gender equality and the evolution of a society in which men and women are equally able to achieve 
their full potential.”232 
 
The Constitutional Court further remarked that realising a particular socio-economic right 
would require that other elements which form the basis of other socio-economic rights must 
be in place as well. Together these rights have a significant impact on the dignity of people 
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and their quality of life. Fulfilling the right of access to social assistance could have an 
impact on the extent to or way in which the other rights have to be fulfilled. As the Court 
stated:         
 
“the poor are particularly vulnerable and their needs require special attention. It is in this context that 
the relationship between sections 26 and 27 and the other socio-economic rights is most apparent. If 
under section 27 the state has in place programmes to provide adequate social assistance to those who 
are otherwise unable to support themselves and their dependants, that would be relevant to the state’s 
obligations in respect of other socio-economic rights.”233   
 
It is proposed that access to social security entails the process by which an individual enters 
into the social security (assistance) system and must include access to the decision-making 
process.
234
 Applying the Grootboom interpretation of access to section 27(1)(c), the 
realisation of social security requires that an infrastructure for the realisation of the right and 
the provision of all relevant services and processes, including adjudication processes be 
created. Access further requires the State to create the conditions that make these services 
accessible to persons or categories of people.
235
 A social security adjudication system that 
enables litigants to resolve disputes with social security institutions is one such infrastructure 
that the State is required to provide in fulfilling its obligations in term of social security.  
 
The relationship between the right of access to social security and the other rights is also 
relevant in determining whether the State has fulfilled its constitutional obligations. As the 
Constitutional Court stated in Khosa: 
 
“when the rights to life, dignity and equality are implicated in cases dealing with socio-economic 
rights, they have to be taken into account along with the availability of human and financial resources 
in determining whether the state has complied with the constitutional standard of reasonableness. This 
is, however, not a closed list and all relevant factors have to be taken into account in this exercise. 
What is relevant may vary from case to case depending on the particular facts and circumstances 
…”
236
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In addition, the Court held that even where the State may be able to justify a limitation of the 
right of access to social security through the provisions in section 27(2), the criteria upon 
which they choose to limit the right must be consistent with the Bill of Rights as a whole. 
Thus, if the means chosen by the legislature to give effect to the State’s positive obligation 
under section 27 unreasonably limits other constitutional rights, that too must be taken into 
account.
237
 
 
5. IMPACT OF THE RIGHT TO JUST ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION  
 
5.1 Application of the right to just administrative action 
 
Section 33 of the Constitution entrenches the right of everyone to administrative action which 
is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.
238
 Everyone whose rights have been adversely 
affected by administrative action has the right to be given written reasons.
239
 The State is 
compelled to pass national legislation to give effect to the right of administrative justice and 
to provide for the review of administrative action by a court or other independent and 
impartial tribunal.
240
 
 
The provisions of section 33 are relevant to any social security adjudication framework as the 
Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all 
organs of state
241
 and, to the extent foreseen by the Constitution, natural and juristic 
persons.
242 
It is already accepted that the right to just administrative action in general 
(including the provisions of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA)) to some 
extent bind even private bodies when taking decisions that adversely affect a person’s 
rights.
243
 The provisions of section 33 regulate the conduct of public administration. 
Administrative justice ensures that public officials act within their powers under the various 
social security statutes and that the procedures they apply are fair and that the outcomes of 
their decisions are reasonable. Together, the rights to administrative justice and access to 
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social security seek to ensure that everyone has lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair 
access to social security. In the first instance, determining a person’s of eligibility to social 
security and the provision of benefits by statutory social security institutions and (to the 
extent applicable) private social security institutions constitutes administrative action, which 
means they are bound by section 33.
244
 Therefore, the decisions of statutory and private social 
security institutions which negatively affect the rights of applicants or beneficiaries will be 
evaluated against the requirements of administrative justice in the Constitution.  
 
Before evaluating the impact of the right to just administrative action on the social security 
dispute resolution framework, it is imperative to ascertain whether section 33 is applicable. 
Secondly, section 34 requires that disputes that can be resolved by the application of law to 
be decided by a court or another independent and impartial tribunal or forum. It is thus clear 
that social security disputes could be resolved by either a court (as defined in Chapter 8 of the 
Constitution) or an alternative independent and impartial tribunal or forum. The question to 
be answered is whether or not the court, tribunal or forum falls within the defined scope for 
the application of just administrative action. 
 
Generally, the right to just administrative action applies to all actions taken by persons or 
bodies exercising public power or performing public functions. However, some specific 
exceptions to this general rule have been laid down. These exceptions include legislative 
action by elective legislatures, executive policy decisions, judicial action by judicial officers, 
and matters falling within the labour relations sphere.
245
 More specifically, PAJA has also 
defined the scope of actions that fall under the term administrative action. 
 
For the requirements of just administrative action to be applicable to the actions of social 
security (dispute resolution) institutions, it must be ascertained whether these actions fall 
outside the exceptions specified by the Constitutional Court, or if they are not specifically 
excluded in terms of PAJA. The Constitutional Court has held that in trying to ascertain 
whether the requirements of just administrative action are applicable in a particular case, 
“what matters is not so much the functionary as the function. The question is whether the task 
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itself is administrative or not”.246 This requires examining the task(s) of the institutions 
involved in the social security dispute resolution system. 
 
The social security dispute resolution system comprises the institutions or organs 
administering and paying out social security benefits and either a court or an alternative 
tribunal or forum. The administrative institutions or organs that undertake the determination 
of applicants’ rights to social security benefits would also undertake internal review 
procedures (or first level adjudication procedures) such as reconsideration or revision of the 
initial decision. After the exhaustion of the internal review (or first level) processes, 
applicants would have access to an external appeal mechanism to a court or an alternative 
independent and impartial tribunal or forum (second level adjudication procedures). 
 
The internal review procedures or first level adjudication procedures by the institutions or 
organs administering and paying out social security benefits, although forming part of the 
dispute resolution process, constitute and integral part of their duties of determining 
eligibility for social security benefits. The actions of these institutions and organs (especially 
the statutory schemes) would qualify as administrative action as they are certainly exercising 
public power or performing public schemes. Their functions cannot be termed judicial action 
by judicial officers, and would not constitute an exception to the application of administrative 
action as laid down by the Constitutional Court. They would also not conform to the 
exceptions provided in PAJA.  
 
The “functions test” laid down in the South African Rugby Football Union and Chirwa cases 
can also be applied to the court or alternative independent and impartial tribunal or forum 
undertaking external appeals or second level adjudication procedures. Where a court (as 
defined and regulated in Chapter 8 of the Constitution) is established, its actions could 
constitute “judicial action by judicial officers”, falling within the scope of the exceptions to 
administrative action specified by the Constitutional Court and by PAJA.   
 
Where an alternative independent and impartial tribunal or forum is preferred, the 
applicability (or not) of administrative justice may not be as clear-cut. Due to the possible 
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wide array of functions to be performed by such an institution (including mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration and litigation) its functions may constitute (on the one hand) “judicial 
action by judicial officers”. On the other hand, some of its functions could also be viewed as 
administrative decisions which would constitute administrative action subject to PAJA.
247
 
 
This results from the possibility of the dispute resolution institution being considered to be 
performing a judicial, a quasi-judicial and/or an administrative function, since not only its 
functions but also its form and characteristics can be said to “straddle a wide spectrum”.248 In 
the Sidumo case, the Constitutional Court stated that while a tribunal or forum implements or 
gives effect to policy or to legislation, it may also resemble a court of law.
249
 The Court held 
that:  
 
“an administrative body, although operating as such, may nevertheless in the discharge of its duties 
function as if it were a court of law performing what may be described as judicial functions, without 
negating its identity as an administrative body and becoming a court of law.”
250
 
 
Section 33 may further apply to a social security adjudication tribunal or forum due to the 
interconnected and over-lapping nature of the right of access to courts and the right to just 
administrative action. In the Sidumo case, the Constitutional Court responded to arguments 
that CCMA Commissioners do not perform an administrative function and that their awards 
should not be subject to administrative review under PAJA. It was also argued that the 
realisation of labour rights in arbitrations conducted under the LRA are linked to the 
fundamental rights provided for in sections 23 and 34 and not to the right to just 
administrative action contained in section 33 of the Constitution.
251
 In rejecting this 
argument, the Court held that: 
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“this submission is based on the misconception that the rights in sections 23, 33 and 34 are necessarily 
exclusive and have to be dealt with in sealed compartments. The right to fair labour practices, in the 
present context, is consonant with the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair. Everyone has the right to have these rights enforced before the CCMA acting as an 
impartial tribunal. In the present context, these rights in part overlap and are interconnected.”
252
  
 
The Court also stated that where sections 33 and 34 are considered to be mutually exclusive 
provisions, this will lead to a formalist jurisprudence based on a distinction between 
“administrative” in section 33 and “judicial” or ”adjudicative” decisions by tribunals 
governed only by section 34, which is at odds with the substantive vision of the 
Constitution.
253
   
 
In terms of the approach of the Constitutional Court in the Sidumo judgment, it is clear that a 
tribunal or forum established to resolve social security disputes in terms of section 34 would 
have to comply with the requirements of independence, impartiality and fair public hearings, 
as is the case with a court of law. However, it would also be bound by the provisions of 
section 33 and PAJA as its form, characteristics and functions straddle both rights.       
 
Therefore, for the purposes of this study, the processes and decisions by social security 
institutions that fall under the dispute resolution framework (internal or first-tier decisions) 
will be investigated, as will the processes and decisions of an external (second-tier) tribunal 
or forum. This will include the reconsideration and/or review of the initial decision by the 
social security institution and the review or consideration of an appeal by a court, tribunal or 
forum. 
 
5.2 Context of the right to just administrative action  
 
The entrenchment of the right to just administrative action in the Constitution must be viewed 
against the social, economic and historical context of the right, and against the historical 
context of the enjoyment of the right. The historical context of just administrative action is 
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one of abuse of governmental power, with wide ranging discretionary powers by government 
officials.
254
 South Africa’s apartheid past was characterised by poor and inefficient 
administration and the flagrant disregard of basic administrative law tenets.
255
 At the same 
time, the authority of courts to review administrative action was also curtailed.  
 
Administrative law is the interface between the bureaucratic state and its subjects. The day-
to-day lives of ordinary people are profoundly affected by the way those who hold power 
over their lives exercise their power. Important steps towards the creation of a just society can 
be taken by opening up the administrative process and developing an equitable system of 
administrative law.
256
 The constitutional rights to administrative justice, access to courts and 
access to social security (together with the rights to equality and human dignity) operate to 
ensure that everyone has lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair access to the social security 
adjudication system. Administrative justice seeks to ensure that adjudication officials act 
within their powers under the Social Assistance Act, that the procedures they apply are fair 
and that the outcomes of their decisions are reasonable. In addition, the Constitution seeks to 
empower courts to review administrative action that is non-compliant, and to ensure that 
persons whose rights are infringed by unlawful administrative action can get redress.
257
   
 
The right to just administrative action is vital for the attainment of the aims of the 
Constitution, such as to heal the injustices of the past, to ensure social justice and to improve 
the quality of life for all South African citizens. As a result, the Constitution requires public 
officials to perform their duties in accordance with the fundamental principles of justice, 
fairness and reasonableness.
258
 Just administrative action is also necessary for the realisation 
of the State’s duty to provide effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government.259 
As stated in President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union:  
 
“the constitution is committed in establishing and maintaining an efficient, equitable and ethical public 
administration which respects fundamental rights and is accountable to the broader public. The 
importance of ensuring that the administration observes fundamental rights and acts both ethically and 
accountably should not be understated. In the past, the lives of the majority of South Africans was 
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governed by labyrinthine administrative regulations which, amongst other things, prohibited freedom 
of movement, controlled access to housing, education and jobs and which were implemented by a 
bureaucracy hostile to fundamental rights or accountability. The new constitution envisages the role 
and obligations of government quite differently.”
260
     
 
The Constitutional Court further held that the principal function of section 33 is to regulate 
the conduct of the public administration and, in particular, to ensure that where the action 
taken by the administration affects or threatens individuals, the procedures followed comply 
with the constitutional standards of administrative justice. These standards will, of course, be 
informed by the common law principles developed over decades.
261
  
 
Section 33(1) states that everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair. Furthermore, in terms of section 33(2) everyone whose 
rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the right to be given written 
reasons.  
 
It is also required that national legislation must be enacted to give effect to the right to 
administrative action, and to provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, 
where appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal; impose a duty on the State to give 
effect to the right to administrative action; and to promote an efficient administration.
262
   
 
5.3 The right to just administrative action 
 
5.3.1 Lawful administrative action 
 
The Constitutional Court has stated that the exercise of public power is only legitimate when 
it is lawful. It further held that an administrative functionary “may exercise no power and 
perform no function beyond that which is conferred by law.”263 These two statements form 
the basis of the principle of legality and lawful administrative action, and the rule of law.  
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In the context of administrative action, the principle of lawful administrative action requires 
that the decision-maker must hold the necessary authority to take the decision in question 
(where there are prior conditions that must exist before the power may be exercised, those 
conditions must exist or otherwise the decision will be unlawful; and if the power is derived 
from another person, there must be a lawful delegation or assignment of the power).
264
  
 
5.3.2 Reasonable administrative action 
 
The principle of reasonable administrative action requires that the public authority entrusted 
with the discretion must act in a reasonable and rational manner, taking into account all 
relevant considerations. The outcome of the decision must not be unreasonable. The 
Constitutional Court explained the principle as follows in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association of South Africa: In Re: Ex Part Application of the President of the Republic of 
South Africa: 
 
“It is a requirement of the rule of law that the exercise of public power by the executive and other 
functionaries should not be arbitrary. Decisions must be rationally related to the purpose for which the 
power was given, otherwise they are in effect arbitrary and inconsistent with this requirement. It 
follows that in order to pass constitutional scrutiny the exercise of public power by the executive and 
other functionaries must, at least, comply with this requirement. If it does not, it falls short of the 
standards demanded by our Constitution for such action.”
265
 
  
The elements of the right to reasonable administrative action have been laid down by various 
cases.
266
 These include (amongst others) that the decision must be based on relevant 
circumstances (also called ‘considerations’) and must not be influenced by irrelevant 
considerations; it is rational and not arbitrary (i.e. the administrator has thought properly 
about the issues before him/her or must have “applied his mind properly); it is justifiable (i.e. 
it must be capable of being explained in a way that shows it is based on the facts before the 
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official and the purpose of the legislation); and it is not materially influenced by an error of 
fact or law.  
 
Reasonableness does not mean that the decision must be right, or the best solution available. 
It merely means that the decision must fall within the range of appropriate decisions. The 
evaluation of the reasonableness of a decision does not mean that it must determine whether 
the decision is correct or not, or that the court must agree with the decision. The court instead 
asks the question whether the decision is justifiable.
267
 
 
5.3.3 Procedurally fair administrative action 
 
Fair procedures enhance the legitimacy of administrative decisions and can be regarded as 
fundamental principles of good administration. Section 195(1) of the Constitution provides 
that public administration should be governed by the democratic values and principles 
enshrined in the Constitution, including the maintenance of a high standard of professional 
ethics, accountability, responsiveness to the needs of the people and impartial, fair and 
equitable services. 
 
The right to procedurally fair administrative action entitles affected persons to ‘the principles 
and procedures’ which in the circumstances are ‘right and just and fair’.268 The essence of 
procedural fairness (also known as the principle of common sense and common decency) is 
also that those who are affected by official decisions are entitled, prior to any decision being 
taken, to be heard by an unbiased decision-maker.
269
 
 
5.3.4 The right to written reasons 
 
The Constitution requires that a person whose rights are affected by administrative action 
must be provided with written reasons. Providing reasons for a decision makes administrators 
to be accountable; and increases public confidence in the administrative process, thus 
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enhancing its legitimacy.
270
 It also promotes a culture of justification.
271
 In Bel Porto School 
Governing Body and Others v Premier of the Western Cape Province and Another, the 
Constitutional Court remarked that: 
 
“the duty to give reasons when rights or interests are affected has been stated to constitute an 
indispensable part of a sound system of judicial review.
 
Unless the person affected can discover the 
reason behind the decision, he or she may be unable to tell whether it is reviewable or not and so may 
be deprived of the protection of the law. Yet it goes further than that. The giving of reasons satisfies 
the individual that his or her matter has been considered and also promotes good administrative 
functioning because the decision-makers know that they can be called upon to explain their decisions 
and thus be forced to evaluate all the relevant considerations correctly and carefully.”
 272
 
 
For reasons to be effective, they must be sufficiently particular. As the Transvaal Provincial 
Division of the High Court has held, it is not sufficient to merely “recite the words of the 
statute”, such as saying that “the reason why you are refused a disability grant is because you 
are not unable to work”. Requiring the reasons for refusal seems to be a different thing from 
merely requiring the local authority to state which of the specified grounds (in the statute) the 
refusal was based on. Therefore, the reasons must state why the person has been found to be 
able to work, for example that he or she can perform the functions necessary for manual 
labour of the type available in his or her locality.273    
 
In Nomala v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial 
Government, it was further held that it is also not sufficient to provide a letter with a box 
ticked off that sets out a general category justifying the decision, such as “not medically 
unfit” or “insufficient medical details”. The reasons must contain sufficient particularity of 
the applicant’s own personal circumstances to enable the person to know what case he has to 
meet on appeal. This case held that standard form reasons containing only general statements 
such as “not disabled”/ “able to work” did not constitute proper reasons in a refusal of a 
disability grant, as they put the applicant in no better position to appeal the decision, not 
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knowing how the decision-maker had reasoned in coming to this conclusion.274 Proper written 
reasons must set out the decision and state the findings on the main facts, refer to the 
evidence or other material on which those findings were based and show the manner in which 
these facts were applied in arriving at the decision.   
 
5.4 Promotion of Just Administrative Act (PAJA) 3 of 2000 
 
Pursuant to the requirement that national legislation must be enacted to give effect to the right 
to administrative action, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA) was adopted. 
PAJA set out the scope of the rights in section 33 (including the scope of the right to 
procedural fairness) and prescribes the requirements for the provision of reasons, provides 
frameworks for judicial review of administrative action and the enforcement of the rights in 
section 33.
275
 By giving effect to the right to just administrative action, PAJA seeks to 
promote an efficient administration and good governance, and create a culture of 
accountability, openness and transparency in the public administration or in the exercise of a 
public power or the performance of a public function.
276
 Therefore, the provisions of PAJA 
bind all public and to some extent even private bodies when taking decisions that adversely 
affect a person’s rights.277 This implies that the decisions of statutory and (to the extent 
applicable) private social security institutions which negatively affect the rights of applicants 
or beneficiaries will also be evaluated against the requirements of administrative justice in the 
act.  
 
In terms of section 1 of PAJA, the act aims to provide guidelines and benchmarks for 
administrative action and decisions. The act defines administrative action,
278
 decision,
279
 and 
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empowering provision;
280
 and provides detailed rules of procedural fairness.
281
 The Act 
requires a fair procedure in the event that administrative action materially and adversely 
affects the rights or legitimate expectations of any person.
282
 Section 3(2)(a) states that what 
constitutes fair administrative procedure will depend on the circumstances of each case. 
However, fair administrative procedure must include adequate notice of the nature and 
purpose of the proposed action; a reasonable opportunity to make representations; a clear 
statement of the action; adequate notice of any right of review or internal appeal, where 
applicable; and adequate notice of the right to request reasons.
283
 However, it must be noted 
that if it is reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances, an administrator may depart from 
any of the requirements of section 3(2)(b).
284
 Section 4(b) lists relevant factors to be taken 
into account to determine whether the departure is reasonable and justifiable.  
 
The right to reasons for adverse administrative action is regulated in section 5. This section 
deals with the furnishing of written reasons for administrative action. It allows a person 
                                                                                                                                                        
(aa) the executive powers or functions of the National Executive, including the powers or functions referred to 
in sections 79(1) and (4), 84(2)(a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (g), (h), (i) and (k), 85(2)(b), (c), (d) and (e), 91(2), (3), (4) 
and (5), 92(3), 93, 97, 98, 99 and 100 of the Constitution; 
(bb) the executive powers or functions of the Provincial Executive, including the powers or functions referred to 
in sections 121(1) and (2), 125(2)(d), (e) and (f), 126, 127(2), 132(2), 133(3)(b), 137, 138, 139 and 145(1) of the 
Constitution; 
(cc) the executive powers or functions of a municipal council; 
(dd) the legislative functions of Parliament, a provincial legislature or a municipal council; 
(ee) the judicial functions of a judicial officer of a court referred to in section 166 of the Constitution or of a 
Special Tribunal established under section 2 of the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act, 1996 
(Act No. 74 of 1996), and the judicial functions of a traditional leader under customary law or any other law; 
(ff) a decision to institute or continue a prosecution; 
(gg) a decision relating to any aspect regarding the appointment of a judicial officer, by the Judicial Service 
Commission; 
(hh) any decision taken, or failure to take a decision, in terms of any provision of the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act, 2000; or (ii) any decision taken, or failure to take a decision, in terms of section 4(1). 
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whose rights are affected to ask for written reasons for the decision, and requires the State 
official to provide them as soon as reasonably possible. In relation to a decision to grant or 
refuse social assistance, this section is superceded by the detailed provisions of the Social 
Assistance Act and its regulations that require written reasons for decisions to be given to 
beneficiaries without a prior request. If the Social Assistance Act does not cover any 
situation, section 5 of the PAJA would regulate the right to ask for and receive reasons. 
 
Regulations 26 to 28 of the Regulations under the PAJA set out the contents of a request for 
reasons and the procedure for dealing with it.
285
 They provide that the request must be in 
writing, and if the person cannot write, the administrator must give reasonable assistance to 
enable him or her to do so. The request can be sent by fax, e-mail, post or by hand. They must 
indicate the action concerned and what rights it impinges upon.   
 
The Act lists the grounds upon which administrative action may be reviewed.
286
 These 
grounds cover all forms of unlawful, unreasonable and unfair administrative action and the 
section gives authority to courts to strike down such action. In terms of the Act, an aggrieved 
person is restricted to bringing a claim for judicial review if it is alleged that the 
administrative action is unlawful. In terms of section 6(1), proceedings for the judicial review 
of an administrative action may be instituted in a court or tribunal.
287
 Furthermore, the review 
grounds contained in the Act are fairly limited.
288
 Bringing a claim for judicial review would 
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also imply that legal representatives would have to argue a case on behalf of a client. This 
may often be undesirable in the event of impoverished applicants who challenge a negative 
decision in the area of social security. The proceedings tend to be very formal, while the 
sheer costs of such an endeavour would make this option unattractive in most social security 
cases. 
 
Other procedural matters are also regulated.
289
 Section 7 regulates the time within which an 
application to review administrative action must be instituted, and the relationship between 
internal appeals and judicial review. Section 7(1) states that any proceedings for judicial 
review must be instituted without unreasonable delay and not later than 180 days after the 
date on which any proceedings instituted in terms of internal remedies have been concluded; 
or where no such remedies exist, of which the person concerned was informed of the 
administrative action, became aware of the action and the reasons for it or might reasonably 
have been expected to have become aware of the action and the reasons.
290
 
 
Section 7(2) requires the exhaustion of internal remedies, as no court or tribunal shall review 
an administrative action in terms of the Act unless any internal remedy provided for in any 
other law has first been exhausted. If a court or tribunal is not satisfied that any internal 
remedy has been exhausted, it must direct that the person concerned must first exhaust such 
remedy before instituting proceedings in a court or tribunal for judicial review in terms of this 
Act. However, in exceptional circumstances, and on application by the person concerned, a 
court or tribunal may exempt such person from the obligation to exhaust any internal remedy 
if the court or tribunal deems it in the interest of justice. 
 
Section 8 sets out the court’s powers to provide remedies in proceedings for judicial review. 
According to section 8(1), the court or tribunal, in proceedings for judicial review in terms of 
                                                                                                                                                        
(i) contravenes a law or is not authorised by the empowering provision; or 
(ii) is not rationally connected to— 
(aa) the purpose for which it was taken; 
(bb) the purpose of the empowering provision; 
(cc) the information before the administrator; or 
(dd) the reasons given for it by the administrator; 
(g) the action concerned consists of a failure to take a decision; 
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(i) the action is otherwise unconstitutional or unlawful. 
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section 6(1), may grant any order that is just and equitable, including orders directing the 
administrator to give reasons; or to act in the manner the court or tribunal requires; orders 
prohibiting the administrator from acting in a particular manner; orders setting aside the 
administrative action and remitting the matter for reconsideration by the administrator, with 
or without directions; or in exceptional cases substituting or varying the administrative action 
or correcting a defect resulting from the administrative action; or directing the administrator 
or any other party to the proceedings to pay compensation; orders declaring the rights of the 
parties in respect of any matter to which the administrative action relates; orders granting a 
temporary interdict or other temporary relief; or orders as to costs.  
 
In addition, the court or tribunal, in proceedings for judicial review in terms of section 6(3), 
may grant any order that is just and equitable, including orders directing the taking of the 
decision; orders declaring the rights of the parties in relation to the taking of the decision; 
orders directing any of the parties to do, or to refrain from doing, any act or thing the doing, 
or the refraining from the doing, of which the court or tribunal considers necessary to do 
justice between the parties; or orders as to costs.
291
 
  
Section 9 allows for the time periods prescribed in sections 5 and 7 of the PAJA to be 
extended. It states that the period of 90 days referred to in section 5 may be reduced; or 90 
days or 180 days referred to in sections 5 and 7 may be extended for a fixed period, by 
agreement between the parties or, failing such agreement by a court or tribunal on application 
by the person or administrator concerned.
292
 It further states that the court or tribunal may 
grant an application for extension of time periods where the interests of justice so require. 
 
5.5 Impact of PAJA on social security dispute resolution 
 
Various social security statutes provide for aggrieved persons to apply for the reconsideration 
or review of an initial adverse decision or for a right to appeal. The application for 
reconsideration, review or appeal is to be lodged with either the original decision-maker 
(social security institution), the administrative heads of the departments responsible for the 
social security institution (either the Directors-General or the Ministers) or to an appeal 
institution established in terms of the enabling legislation (such as appeal board or 
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committee).
293
 The reconsideration, review or the appeal procedures of these institutions 
and/or officials must be undertaken in accordance with the requirements of PAJA. 
 
The right to procedurally fair action requires that an aggrieved applicant or beneficiary who 
applies for reconsideration, review, or appeals a negative decision must be heard by an 
unbiased
294
 decision-maker before a decision is taken.
295
 The right to procedurally fair action 
requires that the opportunity to make representations is a concrete one. Therefore, there must 
be some appropriate opportunity to make representations. The circumstances may require that 
the affected person be orally heard or the opportunity may be limited to making written 
representations. The nature of the decision, its importance to the institution and the applicant 
or beneficiary and the circumstances of the affected applicant or beneficiary parties will 
determine what amounts to an appropriate opportunity to be heard.   
 
The applicant or beneficiary must be given sufficient information to enable him to respond 
meaningfully. The decision-maker must tell the person affected by the administrative action 
about the nature and purpose of the decision he/she intends to take. If there are important 
factual issues that the applicant or beneficiary must address, he/she must be made aware of 
these. The affected person should be given enough time to make representations. The 
applicant has the right to legal representation who can argue the issues where they are 
sufficiently complex.
296
  
 
Where reconsideration, or review, or an appeal is turned down or an adverse decision is 
taken, the applicant or beneficiary must be informed of his/her right to request the reasons for 
the decision.
297
 This implies that the decision-maker has a duty to provide reasons,
298
 which 
requires him/her to think more carefully and rationally about his/her decision. The right to 
request reasons also satisfies the principles of transparency and accountability in section 
195(1) of the Constitution. The reasons must be sufficiently particular of the applicant’s or 
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beneficiary’s own personal circumstances so that he/she can effectively challenge the 
decision on appeal.
299
 The reasons must set out the decision, state the findings on the main 
facts, refer to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based and show the 
manner in which these facts were applied in arriving at the decision. 
 
PAJA also contains provisions aimed at facilitating the proper functioning of the dispute 
resolution system. Section 1(iv) of PAJA extends the jurisdiction of courts over causes of 
action and persons, thereby increasing physical access to courts. Section 7(1) introduces a 
time limit for lodging an application for review, which limits judicial consideration of 
administrative action. In terms of section 7(2), a court is prohibited from reviewing an 
administrative action unless any internal remedy, provided in any other law, has first been 
exhausted. Where a social security statute provides for a right to apply for reconsideration,
300
 
or review to be lodged with the social security institution
301
 or an appeal to an appeal body in 
terms of the statute,
302
 section 7(2) requires that the reconsideration, review or appeal must 
first be undertaken before an application for review to a court is made. However, in 
exceptional circumstances and on application by the affected person, a court may exempt the 
need to exhaust internal remedies if it is in the interests of justice.  
 
The need to exhaust internal remedies and the courts’ discretion to waive this obligation is in 
an effort to promote the efficiency of the adjudication system.
303
 As one commentator has 
remarked: 
 
“in broad terms, it is appropriate that an internal remedy enjoys precedence and that judicial 
interference be deferred in favour of administrative self-management. A corrective process which is 
internalised and systemic can be considerably more efficient than the ad hoc external pronouncements 
which judicial review offers.”
304
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These provisions also facilitate an aggrieved person’s access to court, thereby promoting 
the right of access to courts. 
 
6. IMPACT OF THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS 
 
6.1 Nature of constitutional obligations 
 
Section 2 states that the obligations imposed by the Constitution must be fulfilled. Section 
7(2) compels the State to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. 
Sections 2 and 7(2) compel the State to actively implement the right of access to social 
security, while section 27(2) requires the State to take affirmative steps to give effect to the 
right.
305
 By entrenching the right of access to courts, the Constitution enables the 
enforcement of the right of access to social security by “creating avenues of redress through 
which complaints that the State or others have failed in their constitutional duties can be 
determined and constitutional duties can be enforced”.306 When sections 34 and 27(1)(c) are 
read together with the State’s constitutional obligations in sections 2 and 7(2), to respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights in section 7(2), it is clear that the 
Constitution imposes multi-level obligations on the State, with both negative and positive 
components.
307
 
 
The duty to respect requires the State and other (non-state) actors to refrain from unjustly 
infringing the right. The duty to respect requires negative state action and the courts will only 
expect the State not to unjustly interfere with a person’s fundamental rights. Therefore, there 
is at the very least, a negative obligation placed on the State and other non-state actors to 
desist from preventing or impairing access to the right.
308
  
  
This implies that section 34 accords every person the right not to have his/her access to courts 
subjected to undue and unjustified interference and/or restriction. Therefore, the right to have 
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access to courts entails that aggrieved social security beneficiaries or applicants should have 
an unfettered ability not only to bring a cause of action to a court or another adjudicating 
forum, but also to be able to get redress. This fulfils the purpose of the right to have access to 
courts, which is to provide protection against actions by the State and/or other entities which 
deny access to the courts and other forums.
309
 Actions or omissions that unreasonably impair 
the right to bring a dispute to court
310
 and access to social security
311
 would constitute 
violations of the State’s duty to respect the right of access to courts. The duty to respect the 
right of access to courts also requires the State to not take measures preventing existing 
access to the right (“deliberately retrogressive measures”).312  In Jooste v Score Supermarket 
Trading (Pty) Ltd (Minister of Labour intervening),
313
 the Constitutional Court upheld the 
constitutional validity of section 35 of the COIDA. The Court was asked to confirm a 
decision of the Eastern Cape High Court which declared this section unconstitutional.
314
  The 
Court declined to confirm the judgment. The Court held that although it was clear that the 
challenged provision differentiated between employees and non-employees; the legitimate 
purpose of the Act is to provide a system of compensation for employees for disability or 
death caused by injuries or diseases in the workplace.  Such a system supplants the common 
law right of an employee to damages from a negligent employer.  Instead, it allows the 
employee to claim limited compensation from a fund (to which employers are obliged to 
contribute) even where the employer was not negligent.
315
 The Court further held that, 
viewed in the context of the Act as a whole, section 35 was not arbitrary or irrational.  In 
addition, it did not favour employers only. Therefore, it was rationally connected to the 
legitimate purpose of the Act.
316
   
 
The duty to ‘protect’ a right means that the State must take measures to ensure that third 
parties do not deprive individuals of their access to the right.317 All fundamental rights require 
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the State to protect citizens from political, economic and social interference with their stated 
rights.318 This obligation requires setting up a framework wherein individuals can realise 
these rights without undue influence from the State.  
 
The Constitution requires that the State promotes everyone’s rights.319 In terms of the duty to 
promote, the State is required to actively educate the bearers of rights about their rights. The 
State must publicise the rights and inform bearers on how the rights can be accessed and 
enforced.
320
 The beneficiary has the right to require positive assistance, or a benefit or service 
from the State. The duty to promote requires that the relevant legislative, executive and 
judicial frameworks for the realisation of the right have to be both in place and effective.  
 
The duty to ‘fulfil’ means that the State must take measures to assist people to enjoy the right, 
to strengthen people’s access to and utilisation of resources and means to enjoy the right. It 
requires states to adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, 
promotional and other measures towards the full realisation of the right. Where individuals 
are unable, for reasons beyond their control, to enjoy the right by means at their own 
disposal, the State has an obligation to fulfil or provide that right directly.
321
 The duty to fulfil 
in this context means to provide opportunities for individuals or associations to realise the 
rights and/or to provide for the fulfilment of the right by directly providing for the need, for 
example by making available resources for the acquisition thereof. In the Grootboom case the 
Constitutional Court found that the State has a duty to provide emergency housing (i.e. 
shelter) to particularly needy and vulnerable groups of people, should they not be able to 
provide in this for themselves.  
 
The duty to fulfil the right plainly obliges the State to take positive measures that enable and 
assist individuals to enjoy the right. The nature of the duty to fulfil rights:  
 
‘... requires the state to take positive measures to assist those who currently lack access to the rights to 
gain access to them. This includes the adoption of ‘‘enabling strategies’’ to assist people to gain 
                                                 
318
 O’Regan K “Introducing socio-economic rights” 1999 ESR Review 1:4, 2. 
319
 Ibid. 
320
 In Minister of Health & others v Treatment Action Campaign & others, the court held that in order for the 
measures adopted by the State to realise the right (of access to health care services) to be reasonable, they “must 
be made known appropriately.” See also Liebenberg S “The interpretation of socio-economic rights” in 
Chaskalson M et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2
nd
 Edition, Original Service, 12-03)(2003) chapter 33, 
5. 
321
 Budlender G “Access to Courts” (2004) 121 SALJ 339-358 at 346. 
81 
 
access to the rights through their own endeavours and initiatives, as well as more direct forms of 
assistance to groups in especially vulnerable or disadvantaged circumstances.”
322
 
 
The rights in the Bill of Rights may also place a duty on the State to act rationally and in 
good faith, and require that it justifies its failure to fulfil its obligations.
323
 It may therefore be 
expected to provide valid reasons of its failure to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the 
rights of access to courts and to social security. 
 
6.2 Scope of constitutional obligations 
 
This section analyses the scope of constitutional obligations relating to both the right of 
access to courts and the right of access to social security. The scope of the State’s obligations 
in relation to the rights of access to courts and to social security has different dimensions. 
Firstly, the right presupposes the existence, or if not available, the establishment of a 
functional judicial system. This requirement was clarified by the Constitutional Court in 
President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery when the court stated that: 
 
“The first aspect that flows from the rule of law is the obligation of the State to provide the necessary 
mechanisms for citizens to resolve disputes that arise between them. This obligation has its corollary 
in the right or entitlement of every person to have access to courts or other independent forums 
provided by the State for the settlement of such disputes … The mechanisms for the resolution of 
disputes include the legislative framework, as well as mechanisms and institutions such as the courts 
...”
324
  
 
The constitutional obligation to realise the right of access to courts does not only imply the 
establishment of mechanisms for the resolution of disputes, the obligation extends beyond 
such establishment. In the Modderklip Boerdery case, the Court further stated that the State’s 
obligation in relation to the right: 
 
“goes further than the mere provision of the mechanisms and institutions referred to above … The 
precise nature of the state’s obligation in any particular case and in respect of any particular right will 
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depend on what is reasonable, regard being had to the nature of the right or interest that is at risk, as 
well as on the circumstances of each case.”
325
 
 
The State’s obligations involve more than the establishment of a dispute resolution system, in 
the sense of putting in place the necessary legislative, policy and budgetary framework to 
ensure the realisation of the right to access to court. It also includes ensuring that prospective 
users of the dispute resolution system are able to access the system. This requires addressing 
the obstacles or barriers that prevent potential users from having access to system.
326
 As a 
result, in developing an effective social security adjudication system, the State must have 
regard to the possible obstacles that may prevent users of the system from utilising the 
system. These obstacles or barriers on access to courts must be considered and where they are 
found to be limiting access to courts, they must be eliminated. If such obstacles are not 
eliminated, they would constitute a breach of constitutional obligations, unless where they are 
shown to be reasonable and justifiable limitations on the right in terms of section 36.  
 
In addition to obligations arising from section 34, the State also has obligations in terms of 
section 27. Section 27(2) of the Constitution requires the State to adopt reasonable legislative 
and other measures (within its available resources) to achieve the progressive realisation of 
the right of access to social security. When section 27(2) is read with the obligation to 
respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights, the conclusion is that there 
is:  
“... a clear and unambiguous undertaking by the drafters of the constitution to develop a 
comprehensive social security system, based on, inter alia,  two important paradigms: the right of 
access to social security for everyone, and financial viability. In this regard, the Constitution imposes 
an obligation on the state to ensure universal access to social security.”
327
  
 
The duties to protect, promote and fulfil this right place a positive duty on the State to set up 
legislative and institutional mechanisms whereby all persons can realise their right of access 
to social security. Social security legislation and other measures must be formulated in a way 
that ensures equal and non-discriminatory access to all persons, especially needy and 
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vulnerable people. The State is expected to set up the administrative and regulatory 
framework necessary for the realisation of this right and to create opportunities for its 
attainment. In the Grootboom case, the Court held that section 26(2)
328
 imposes a positive 
obligation upon the State “to devise a comprehensive and workable plan to meet its 
obligations in terms of the subsection”.329 The Court added that: 
 
“the state is required to take reasonable legislative and other measures. Legislative measures by 
themselves are not likely to constitute constitutional compliance. Mere legislation is not enough. The 
state is obliged to act to achieve the intended result, and the legislative measures will invariably have 
to be supported by appropriate, well-directed policies and programmes implemented by the executive. 
These policies and programmes must be reasonable both in their conception and their 
implementation.”330 
 
In terms of the positive duties, the State is expected to adopt legislative measures in 
conjunction with financial, administrative, educational and social measures with a view to 
progressively achieving the full realisation of the right to social security. The adopted 
measures must be deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards ensuring 
that everyone within the State’s jurisdiction has access to social security.331  
 
Section 27(2) requires the State to adopt reasonable legislative and other measures to realise 
the right. Therefore, the measures adopted by the State must be evaluated on the basis of their 
reasonableness. The reasonableness criterion lays down certain basic standards that must be 
complied with.
332
  
 
7. LIMITATION OF THE RIGHTS OF ACCESS TO COURTS AND TO 
SOCIAL SECURITY  
 
The failure to establish an effective and efficient social security dispute resolution system 
would constitute limitations of both rights. The State would be in breach of its constitutional 
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obligations, unless its failure to realise these rights conforms to the constitutional provisions 
on the limitation of rights. Constitutional rights are not absolute, and may be subjected to 
limitations of a reasonable nature. The Constitution sets out two kinds of possible limitations 
on the rights. Firstly, there is a limitation clause in section 36, which applies to every right in 
the Bill (this is sometimes referred to as external or general limitation clause). In addition, 
some sections provide limitations in respect of a particular right (sometimes referred to as 
internal or specific limitation). Where a right is to be limited, the limitation must be in 
accordance with the requirements of section 36. Where a right contains an internal limitation, 
a limitation must also be in accordance with the requirements of the internal limitation 
provisions. Since section 34 does not provide an internal or specific limitation clause, any 
limitation of the right must comply with section 36. Therefore, in addition to the internal 
limitation in section 27(2), a limitation of the right of access to social security must be in 
accordance with section 36. 
 
A claim that the State has breached its obligation to provide access courts and to social 
security, must indicate that the State is in breach of its duty to respect, protect, promote, and 
fulfil her right. The State’s failure to establish an effective social security dispute resolution 
system must not be justifiable in terms of the general limitation clause contained in section 36 
and the internal limitations in section 27(2). In addition, in order to ascertain whether the 
State is in breach, such a claim must establish what the exact scope of the right is, as well as 
the exact scope of the State’s obligation in terms of the rights. 
 
7.1 Limitations in terms of section 36 of the Constitution 
 
Section 36(1) of the Constitution states that the rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited 
only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, 
taking into account all relevant factors, including the nature of the right; the importance of the 
purpose of the limitation; the nature and extent of the limitation; the relation between the 
limitation and its purpose; and less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.  
 
Any infringement on the duty to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil the right of access to 
social assistance by current and future legislation will have to be measured against the 
provisions of section 36(1) of the Constitution. A court considering a constitutional challenge 
85 
 
will seek clarification of issues such as whether the limitation serves a legitimate purpose of 
sufficient importance; whether there is there a sufficient relationship between the limitation 
and the purpose, in other words, whether the limitation does not restrict the right in question 
more than is necessary; and whether there is no other reasonable alternative through which 
the objective can be attained. 
 
Where either of the rights is infringed, the question which arises then is whether section 36 of 
the Constitution permits such an infringement. The State’s action or inaction is reviewed 
according to the principle of proportionality or alternative means (rationality) and according 
to the principle of reasonableness (balance). The tests of reasonableness and justifiability 
require the competing interests and values that it impairs and promotes to be weighed against 
one another for an appraisal of their proportionality.
333
 In terms of the principle of 
proportionality, the court sets aside an act which restricts the right to access to social security 
unnecessarily or gratuitously. Consideration must also be given to the importance of the right 
in evaluating the proportionality of the measures taken.
334
 Under the principle of 
reasonableness or balance, an act is declared unconstitutional if there is a radical imbalance 
between the public interest served by the act and the limitation infringing the social and 
economic sphere of people's lives. 
 
In S v Makwanyane and Another,
335
 the Constitutional Court laid down guidelines on 
evaluating the proportionality and reasonableness of any restriction on a right. The Court 
remarked that in evaluating proportionality and reasonableness, issues to be considered 
include:  
 
“... the nature of the right that is limited, and its importance to an open and democratic society based 
on freedom and equality; the purpose for which the right is limited and the importance of that purpose 
to such a society; the extent of the limitation, its efficacy and, particularly where the limitation has to 
be necessary, whether the desired ends could reasonably be achieved through other means less 
damaging to the right in question.” 
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7.2 Limitations in terms of section 27(2) of the Constitution 
 
In addition to complying with the general limitation clause in section 36(1), a limitation of 
the right to have access to social security must further satisfy the requirements of the specific 
limitation clause in section 27(2). This implies that the State’s duty to respect, protect, 
promote, and fulfil the right to access to social security is further qualified by the phrasing of 
section 27(2). Section 27(2) states that the State must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of 
these rights. Therefore, although the Constitution provides everyone with a right of access to 
social security and imposes an obligation on the State to realise this right, section 27(2) gives 
it a certain degree of latitude in relation to three aspects: the progressive realisation of the right, 
the taking of reasonable measures and the availability of its resources. The meaning of the 
different provisions in section 27(2) has been highlighted by the Constitutional Court in the 
various cases. 
  
7.2.1 Adoption of reasonable legislative and other measures 
 
The Constitution requires the State to take reasonable legislative and other measures to 
progressively realise the right of access to social security. In Grootboom, the Constitutional 
Court stated that the State will fulfil its obligations if the measures adopted are reasonable, 
both in their conception and implementation.336 A court considering reasonableness will not 
enquire whether other, more desirable or favourable measures could have been adopted, or 
whether public money could have been better spent. The question would be whether the 
measures that have been adopted are reasonable. In Minster of Health and Others v 
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, the court stated that a purposive reading of section 
27 implies that the right should not be construed as entitling everyone to demand that a 
minimum core be provided to them. All that is possible, and all that can be expected of the 
State, is that it acts reasonably to provide access on a progressive basis.337  
 
The Court in Grootboom outlined the requirements relating to the reasonableness of the 
State’s measures. It held that: 
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“... reasonableness must also be understood in the context of the Bill of Rights as a whole. A society 
must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are provided to all if it is to be a society based on 
human dignity, freedom and equality. To be reasonable, measures cannot leave out of account the 
degree and extent of the denial of the right they endeavour to realise. Those whose needs are the most 
urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril, must not be ignored by the 
measures aimed at achieving realisation of the right. It may not be sufficient to meet the test of 
reasonableness to show that the measures are capable of achieving a statistical advance in the 
realisation of the right. Furthermore, the Constitution requires that everyone must be treated with care 
and concern. If the measures, though statistically successful, fail to respond to the needs of those most 
desperate, they may not pass the test.”
338
 
 
The reasonableness of legislative and other measures are therefore evaluated against criteria 
such as the social, economic and historical context of the system the measure aims to address; 
whether the programme is balanced, flexible and open to review, and make appropriate 
provision for attention to the deficiencies in the system and to short-, medium- and long-term 
needs; whether the programme is inclusive and does not exclude a significant segment of 
society; whether the measures ensure that basic human needs are met and take into account 
the degree and extent of the denial of the right they endeavour to realise; and whether the 
programme and measures ensue that a larger number of people and a wider range of people 
benefit from them as time progresses.
339
     
 
7.2.2 Within the available resources 
 
The second defining aspect of the State’s obligation is in terms of the right of access to social 
security is that the Constitution does not require the State to do more than its available 
resources permit. This means that both the content of the obligation in relation to the rate at 
which it is achieved, as well as the reasonableness of the measures employed to achieve the 
result are governed by the availability of resources.
340
 There is no unqualified obligation on 
the State to meet the existing needs of the citizens. The right to have access to social security 
is qualified by the availability of resources. The Constitutional Court in Soobramoney spelt 
out the implications of this limitation. It stated that:  
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“What is apparent from these provisions is that the obligations imposed on the state by sections 26 and 
27 in regard to access to housing, health care, food, water and social security are dependent upon the 
resources available for such purposes, and that the corresponding rights themselves are limited by 
reason of the lack of resources.  Given this lack of resources and the significant demands on them that 
have already been referred to, an unqualified obligation to meet these needs would not presently be 
capable of being fulfilled. This is the context within which section 27(3) must be construed.”
341
  
Therefore, limited resources may justify the State giving priority to the larger needs of 
society, rather than the specific needs of particular individuals within society. The 
Grootboom case also supported the available resources restriction, but noted that the State 
must make provisions for the extremely vulnerable.342 The effect of this is that those in 
desperate need should be provided with some form of immediate relief and should not have 
to wait for medium or long-term measures designed to ensure the progressive realisation of 
their rights. Resource constraints could, therefore, be a relevant factor in accessing the State’s 
ability to extend or universalise the present social assistance framework, due to the fiscal and 
macro-economic implications of such an endeavour. The availability of resources is thus a 
factor in determining whether the State has taken reasonable measures. Resource constraints 
could be a basis for the State justifying its rate of progress in achieving the full realisation of 
social security rights.  
 
7.2.3 Progressive realisation of the right 
 
The Constitution recognises that the right to have access to social security could not be 
realised immediately. In Grootboom, the Court stated that the term “progressive realisation” 
shows that it was contemplated that the right could not be realised immediately.  But the goal 
of the Constitution is that the basic needs of all in our society be effectively met and the 
requirement of progressive realisation means that the State must take steps to achieve this 
goal. It means that accessibility should be progressively facilitated: legal, administrative, 
operational and financial hurdles should be examined and, where possible, lowered over time; 
and that rights must be made more accessible, not only to a larger number of people, but to a 
wider range of people as time progresses.
343
 The Treatment Action Campaign case further 
reiterated the requirement of progressive realisation when it held that although the State’s 
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policy fails to meet constitutional standards because it excludes those who could reasonably 
be included, that does not mean everyone can immediately claim access to the right to health 
services.
344
 
 
Progressive realisation is also supported by relevant international law provisions. 
International law is important in delineating the scope of the State’s obligation in terms of s 
39(1)(b), which requires all courts, tribunals and forums to consider international law. The 
wording of the phrase "progressive realisation" is similar to the phrase used in Art 2(1) of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The United Nation 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stated that progressive realisation must 
be read in the light of the overall objective, indeed the raison d’être of the Covenant, which is 
to establish clear obligations for state parties in respect of the full realisation of the rights in 
question. It thus imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible 
towards the goal.
345
 
 
8. IMPACT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES ON COURTS AND 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
 
Where the right of access to justice for social security applicants and beneficiaries is realised 
through a court, the framework will be affected by constitutional provisions relating to courts 
and the administration of justice in Chapter 8. Therefore, the social security adjudication 
framework established in terms of section 34 must be consistent with the framework set out 
in Chapter 8.
346
 According to section 165(1), the judicial authority of the republic is vested in 
the courts. The courts must be independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, 
which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice;
347
 and no person or 
organ of state may interfere with their functioning.
348
 In addition, organs of state are required 
through legislative and other measures to assist and protect the courts to ensure the 
independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the courts.
349
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Section 166 provides that the courts are the Constitutional Court; the Supreme Court of 
Appeal; High Courts (including any high court of appeal that may be established by an Act of 
Parliament to hear appeals from High Courts); Magistrates’ Courts; and any other court 
established or recognised in terms of an Act of Parliament, including any court of a status 
similar to either the High Courts or the Magistrates’ Courts.350 In accordance with section 
166(e), specialist courts have been established such as income tax courts, the Labour Court 
and the Labour Appeal Court, the Land Claims Court, the Competition Appeal Court, the 
Electoral Court, divorce courts, “military courts” and equality courts. This may also be the 
constitutional basis for the establishment of a specialist social security court or tribunal (if 
necessary.) 
 
Due to the geographical spread of Magistrates’ Courts around the country, a special social 
security dispute resolution institution could be created in the Magistrates’ Courts, in the 
interest of the promotion of access to courts.
351
 This is by virtue of the constitutional 
provision that Magistrates’ Courts and all other courts may decide any matter determined by 
an Act of Parliament, but a court of a status lower than a High Court may not enquire into or 
rule on the constitutionality of any legislation or any conduct of the President.
352
 
 
The procedures of any proposed social security adjudication system may also be outlined in 
an enabling legislation as section 171 of the Constitution requires all courts to function in 
terms of national legislation, and their rules and procedures are to be provided for in terms of 
national legislation. These rules and procedures must promote the spirit, purport and objects 
of the Bill of Rights (such as the realisation of the rights in the Bill of Rights and the 
promotion of constitutional values). The Constitution also states that national legislation may 
provide for any matter concerning the administration of justice that is not dealt with in the 
Constitution.
353
 The section specifically mentions issues such as the training programmes for 
judicial officers; procedures for dealing with complaints about judicial officers; and the 
participation of people other than judicial officers in court decisions. However, this section 
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could also be used to provide other issues relevant to the proper functioning of a social 
security system and the realisation of the right of access of social security litigants. 
  
9. IMPACT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES RELATING TO PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 
 
The social security adjudicative institutions and processes must also be guided by the 
constitutional provisions governing the operation of public administration in Chapter 10. It is 
accepted that the foundational constitutional values of accountability, responsiveness and 
openness apply to the functioning of the judiciary as much as to other branches of 
government.
354
 Since social security adjudication institutions are bound by the principles 
governing public administration, these basic values and principles are relevant to their 
establishment and/or functioning. 
Chapter 10 of the Constitution lays down the basic values and principles that must govern 
public administration (and the public service). Section 195(1) provides that public 
administration must be governed by the democratic values and principles enshrined in the 
Constitution. The democratic values and principles that would be relevant to a social security 
adjudicative and institutional framework include the principles that a high standard of 
professional ethics must be promoted and maintained;
355
 efficient, economic and effective use 
of resources must be promoted;
356
 public administration must be development-orientated;
357
 
services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias;
358
 people's needs 
must be responded to, and the public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making;
359
 
public administration must be accountable;
360
 transparency must be fostered by providing the 
public with timely, accessible and accurate information;
361
 and good human-resource 
management and career-development practices, to maximise human potential, must be 
cultivated.
362
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The enforcement of these principles in the social security adjudication arena will ensure the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the social security adjudication system, and will further ensure 
that aggrieved social security applicants or beneficiaries are treated equally and with dignity 
and that their rights of access to courts and to social security are realised. As the courts have 
stated, the right to seek judicial redress (and the right to receive information necessary for the 
realisation of the right) is vital in a country which is founded on values of accountability, 
responsiveness and openness.
363
 
 
10. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The Constitution requires that the right of access to social security must be given effect to. By 
entrenching a fundamental right of access to social security and other related socio-economic 
rights, the Constitution aims to provide at least minimum income support to secure an 
adequate standard of living for those unable to support themselves and their dependants.  The 
provision of social security is fundamental to the realisation of the society envisaged by the 
Constitution: an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. 
As the Constitutional Court stated, there can be no doubt that human dignity, freedom and 
equality, the foundational values of our society, are denied to those who have no food, 
clothing or shelter. Affording socio-economic rights to all people therefore enables them to 
enjoy the other rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. The realisation of these rights is also 
critical to the advancement of race and gender equality and the evolution of a society in 
which men and women are equally able to achieve their full potential 
 
The Constitution thus compels the State to adopt reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources to achieve the progressive realisation of the right of access to 
social security. Therefore, the State is required to develop a comprehensive social security 
system, based on, inter alia,  the right of access to social security for everyone and financial 
viability. An appropriate dispute resolution system constitutes an integral part of any social 
security framework, and is considered to be included in the notion of measures aimed at 
ensuring comprehensive social security. 
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A social security dispute resolution system also realises the right of access to justice. It must, 
therefore, be consistent with the constitutional prescripts of realising the right. The 
Constitution entrenches the right to have access to courts so as to enable the bearers of the 
right of access to social security and other related rights with the ability to enforce these 
rights. Access to courts is therefore pivotal to the enjoyment of all other rights in the 
Constitution. It is in this connection that the right to have access to court must be interpreted. 
Its role in the realisation of the Constitution is so fundamental that an effective social security 
adjudication system that ensures untrammelled access to (prospective) social security litigants 
must be established. This will guarantee the realisation of the obligations to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the rights of access to courts and to social security. 
 
The right of access to justice requires that the institutions and mechanisms to resolve disputes 
must be effective. Effectiveness requires, amongst others, that courts, tribunals or forums that 
resolve disputes must be accessible to everyone. Everyone should have affordable and 
timeous access to appropriate institutions and procedures through which to claim and protect 
their rights. Effectiveness further requires that courts, tribunals or forums that resolve 
disputes must be independent and impartial in the execution of their duties. They must be 
able to provide claimants with appropriate redress. Finally, in order to ensure access to court, 
section 34 guarantees the right to have disputes resolved with procedural fairness.  
 
The State’s obligations to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights of access to courts 
and to social security do not simply entail the creation of a social security adjudication 
system. It also involves ensuring that social security litigants are enabled to effectively realise 
their rights. This implies that the adjudication system should take into account the social and 
economic conditions of claimants, and its impact on their ability to use the system.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
SOCIAL SECURITY ADJUDICATION STANDARDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Current dispute resolution institutions, mechanisms and procedures
364
 and any proposed 
system must realise the rights in the Constitution. These adjudication systems must therefore 
be consistent with the nature and scope of social security applicants’ and/or beneficiaries’ 
right of access to courts. In the determination of the scope and content of a right in the Bill of 
Rights, the Constitution favours an international law- and comparative law-friendly approach. 
Adjudication standards in international and comparative law thus play a pivotal role in the 
evaluation of the South African social security adjudication system (and the scope and 
content of the right of access to courts for social security applicants and/or beneficiaries and 
the State’s obligations in this regard).    
 
2. ROLE AND IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON THE SOCIAL 
SECURITY ADJUDICATION SYSTEM  
 
International standards must be considered in the development of the South African social 
security adjudication system. The Constitution requires that when interpreting fundamental 
rights, international law must be considered,
365
 while foreign law may be considered.
366
 In 
addition, section 233 requires that when interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer 
any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over 
any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law. The provisions of 
international instruments relating to the adjudication of social security are in the form of 
standards, and act as benchmarks for the evaluation of domestic adjudication frameworks. 
 
In addition, South Africa is a member of various international organisations and/or a party to 
international instruments that contain provisions relating to adjudication of disputes 
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(including social security disputes).
367
 South Africa is therefore bound by the obligations 
arising from these instruments. Even where South Africa is not bound by the obligations 
arising from an international instrument, similarities in the formulation of the right of access 
to courts in the South African Constitution and the provisions of some international 
instruments would require the consideration of such instruments in the interpretation of the 
rights of access to social security and to justice in the Constitution.
368
 The jurisprudence of 
the institutions charged with the monitoring and enforcement of these instruments which 
provide guidelines on the nature and content of the right in these instruments is helpful in 
interpreting the right in the Constitution.
369
 As the Constitutional Court has held: 
 
“. . . public international law would include non-binding as well as binding law. They may both be 
used under the section as tools of interpretation.  International agreements and customary international 
law accordingly provide a framework within which [the Bill of Rights] can be evaluated and 
understood, and for that purpose, decisions of tribunals dealing with comparable instruments, such as 
the United Nations Committee on Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the European Commission on Human Rights, and the 
European Court of Human Rights, and, in appropriate cases, reports of specialised agencies such as 
the International Labour Organisation, may provide guidance as to the correct interpretation of 
particular provisions of [the Bill of Rights].” 370 
 
3. PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
 
The right of access to justice is protected by various international, supra-national and regional 
instruments. Some of these include the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights; 371 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);
372
 the ILO Social Security 
(Minimum Standards) Convention;
373
 the ILO Employment Promotion and Protection against 
Unemployment Convention;
374
 the European Convention on Human Rights;
375
 and the Code 
on Social Security in the SADC.
376
  
 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires each State Party to ensure 
that any person whose rights and freedoms recognised in the Covenant are violated has an 
effective remedy’.377 In addition, the Covenant provides that “all persons shall be equal 
before the courts and tribunals, in the determination of ... his rights and obligations in a suit 
of law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law …”378 The Committee on Civil and Political Rights 
has remarked that the right of access to justice in the Covenant “are aimed at ensuring the 
proper administration of justice, and to this end uphold a series of individual rights such as 
equality before the courts and tribunals and the right to a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law”.379 
 
The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women enjoins all states to 
ensure that women are not subjected to “distinction, exclusion or restriction” when they 
appear “before the law”. In addition, CEDAW requires that all states ensure that all courts 
and tribunal procedures should apply equally to women and men.  
 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO)’s Social Security (Minimum Standards) 
Convention guarantees every claimant shall have a right of appeal in case of refusal of the 
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benefit or complaint as to its quality or quantity.
380
 However, the Convention states that 
where medical service is administered by a government department responsible to a 
legislature, the right of appeal may be replaced by a right to have a complaint concerning the 
refusal of medical care or the quality of the care received investigated by the appropriate 
authority.
381
 In addition, where a claim is settled by a special tribunal established to deal with 
social security questions and on which the persons protected are represented, no right of 
appeal shall be required.
382
  
 
The ILO Employment Promotion and Protection against Unemployment Convention 168 of 
1988 requires that a dispute concerning the refusal, withdrawal, suspension, or reduction of 
the quantum of benefits must be resolved by the body administering the scheme, and that 
there should thereafter be an appeal to an independent body.
383
 
 
The ILO Medical Care Recommendation requires the creation of a framework for the 
submission of complaints by beneficiaries concerning the care received to appropriate 
arbitration bodies under conditions affording adequate guarantees to all parties concerned.
384
 
Beneficiaries who have submitted complaints to the competent arbitration body should have a 
right to appeal their decisions to an independent tribunal.
385
 
 
The ILO Income Security Recommendation also protects the right of appeal for claimants in 
cases of dispute with the administrative authority concerning such questions as the right to 
benefit and the rate thereof. Appeals should preferably be referred to special tribunals, which 
should include referees who are experts in social insurance law, assisted by assessors, 
representative of the group to which the claimant belongs and, where employed persons are 
concerned, by representatives of employers also.
386
  
 
The African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights guarantees rights ancillary to the right of 
access to courts. It states that every individual has the right to have his or her cause heard.
387
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The scope of the right to have one’s causes heard, as protected in Article 7, includes the right 
to an appeal to competent national organs against acts violating a person’s fundamental rights 
as recognised and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force; the 
right to defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of his or her choice; and the 
right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal.  
 
The African Charter makes provision for the enactment of protocols and guidelines to 
supplement rights within the Charter. The African Commission on Human & Peoples’ Rights 
has adopted the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance; 
the Kigali Declaration,
388
 and the Grand Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action.
389
 
The protocols and guidelines make concrete and specific interpretations of the right to a fair 
and public hearing by a legally constituted competent, independent and impartial judicial 
body in the determination of a person’s rights and obligations.390 This is achieved by 
interpreting concepts such as fair and public hearings;
391
 independent and impartial 
tribunals;
392
 the right to an effective remedy;
393
 and access to legal aid and assistance.
394
 The 
protocols and guidelines also interpret the nature and scope of state obligations to provide fair 
and public hearings by independent and impartial tribunals. African Union Member States are 
required to guarantee independence, accessibility and affordability of their judicial 
systems.
395
 They further stress the need for an “independent, open, accessible and impartial 
judiciary which can deliver justice promptly and at an affordable cost”.396   
 
The Code on Social Security in the SADC requires that SADC Member States should 
endeavour to establish proper administrative and regulatory frameworks in order to ensure 
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effective and efficient delivery of social security benefits, in particular easy access for 
everyone to independent adjudication institutions that have the power to finally determine 
social security disputes, inexpensively, expeditiously and with a minimum of legal 
formalities.
397
 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights provides that “in the determination of his civil 
rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”.398 The European Court of 
Human Rights has held that Article 6 Paragraph 1 of the Convention “embodies the right of 
access to a court for the determination of civil rights and obligations”;399 and to fairness in the 
judicial proceedings where access to a court was not restricted.
400
 
 
4. SELECTED ADJUDICATION STANDARDS EMANATING FROM 
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
 
International instruments have set out various standards that are relevant in the development 
of the South Africa social security adjudication system. Some of these relate to the need to 
establish independent and impartial courts or tribunals, the sequential and complementary 
reviews and appeals procedures, the provision of reasonable time limits for reviews 
(complaints) and appeals, the need for expeditious and simple proceedings, the guarantee of 
representation and legal assistance, and the provision of effective (enforceable) remedies.  
 
 4.1 Sequential and complementary reviews and appeals procedures 
 
A primary consideration in the development of an adjudication system is the need to ensure 
an institutional separation between administrative accountability, review and revision (on the 
one hand) and a wholly-independent, substantive system of appeals (on the other).
401
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International instruments stress this sequential and complementary nature of reviews 
(complaints) and appeals. According to the ILO: 
 
“... social security disputes are settled in two stages: a first complaint phase, generally before the 
higher level administrative body within the social security institutions, and a second stage of appeal 
against the decision of the administrative body, generally before an administrative, judicial, labour or 
social security court or tribunal.”402 
 
The ILO Employment Promotion and Protection against Unemployment Convention 168 of 
1988 requires that a dispute concerning the refusal, withdrawal, suspension, or reduction of 
the quantum of benefits must be resolved by the body administering the scheme, and that 
thereafter there should be an appeal to an independent body.
403
 In relation to the right of 
appeal in cases of refusal of the benefit or complaint, as to its quality or quantity in Article 70 
of the Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, the ILO has stated that: 
 
“... the concept of appeal further implies the settlement of the dispute by an authority that is 
independent of the administration that reviewed the initial complaint. Merely guaranteeing the right 
to seek review of the decision by the same administrative authority would not therefore be sufficient to 
constitute an appeal procedure under Convention No. 102. In addition, in the absence of special 
appeal procedures against the decisions of an administrative authority responsible to the government 
which rules in the first and last resort, the Committee has previously observed that the safeguards 
provided for in the Convention could nonetheless be ensured by the application of the general rules 
governing the right of appeal to the ordinary courts in so far as these rules permit the review or 
annulment of any administrative ruling in the cases covered by Article 70.”404 
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Some South African adjudication systems, such as the Occupational Diseases in Mines and 
Works Act (ODMWA) framework fall foul of this principle.
405
   
 
4.2 Establishment of independent and impartial courts or tribunals 
 
The Constitution requires that disputes which can be resolved by the application of law may 
be decided before a court or, where appropriate, a tribunal or forum.
406
 International 
instruments also afford Member States the leeway to decide on whether a dispute (including a 
social security dispute) is to be resolved in a court or a tribunal. The ILO has held that: 
 
“In accordance with Convention No. 102, the right of appeal should be guaranteed against decisions of 
a social security administration either to a court of a general jurisdiction or to a special tribunal.”407  
 
A major requirement in the various international instruments for the establishment of an 
adjudication framework is for these to be independent and impartial. The ILO has observed 
that this fundamental right is intended to guarantee that courts and judges are impartial and 
have judicial independence to decide disputes according to the facts and the law, including 
freedom from improper internal and external influence.
408
  
 
Under the European Convention on Human Rights, an independent tribunal is one that is 
independent of the parties, and of the executive. Issues that are considered in determining the 
independence of an adjudication institution include the manner of appointment of its 
members, their terms of office, the existence of guarantees against outside pressures and the 
question as to whether there is the appearance of independence or not.
409
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The African Commission on Human & Peoples’ Rights has laid down guidelines on the 
requirements for a fair hearing in all legal proceedings, including the independence and 
impartiality of adjudication institutions in civil matters.
410
 It requires that the independence of 
judicial bodies and judicial officers shall be guaranteed by the constitution and laws of the 
country and respected by the government, its agencies and authorities. In order for 
independence to be achieved, there should not be any inappropriate or unwarranted 
interference with the judicial process, nor shall decisions by judicial bodies be subject to 
revision except through judicial review in accordance with the law. All judicial bodies should 
be independent from the executive branch. The process for appointments to judicial bodies 
should be transparent and accountable and the establishment of an independent body for this 
purpose is encouraged. Any method of judicial selection shall safeguard the independence 
and impartiality of the judiciary. The sole criteria for appointment to judicial office should be 
the suitability of a candidate for such office by reason of integrity, appropriate training or 
learning and ability. No persons should be appointed to judicial office unless they have the 
appropriate training or learning that enables them to adequately fulfil their functions. Judges 
or members of judicial bodies must have security of tenure until a mandatory retirement age 
or the expiry of their term of office. The tenure, adequate remuneration, pension, housing, 
transport, conditions of physical and social security, age of retirement, disciplinary and 
recourse mechanisms and other conditions of service of judicial officers shall be prescribed 
and guaranteed by law.
411
 
 
The Commission requires an adjudication institution to be impartial, with its decision based 
only on objective evidence, arguments and facts presented before it. Judicial officers should 
decide matters before them without any restrictions, improper influence, inducements, 
pressure, threats or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason. The 
impartiality of a judicial body could be determined on the basis of whether the position of the 
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judicial officer allows him or her to play a crucial role in the proceedings; if the judicial 
officer had expressed an opinion which would influence the decision-making; and if the 
judicial official would have to rule on an action taken in a prior capacity. The Commission 
believes that the impartiality of a judicial body would be undermined when a judicial official 
sits as a member of an appeal tribunal in a case which he or she decided or participated in on 
a lower judicial body. In any of these circumstances, a judicial official would be under an 
obligation to step down. A judicial official may also not consult a higher official authority 
before rendering a decision in order to ensure that his or her decision will be upheld.
412
  
 
4.3 Provision of reasonable time limits for reviews (complaints) and appeals 
 
Time limits and notice periods are considered necessary in a dispute resolution system as they 
bring certainty and stability to social and legal affairs and maintain the quality of 
adjudication.
413
 However, where a statute imposes a time limit and/or notice period 
requirement, an aggrieved person is barred from bringing the case to court after the expiry of 
the time limit. Time limits and notice requirements on the right of access to court have been 
described as “conditions which clog the ordinary right of an aggrieved person to seek the 
assistance of a court of law”;414 “a very drastic provision” and “a very serious infringement of 
the rights of individuals”.415 These requirements have the effect of “hampering as it does the 
ordinary rights of an aggrieved person to seek the assistance of the courts.”416   
 
The European Court of Human Rights has stated that the right of access to a court prohibits 
legal and factual impediments to judicial action, such as procedural rules.
417
 One such 
procedural rule is the time limits and/or required notice periods for reviews (complaints) and 
appeals. Social security statutes provide for time limits and/or notice periods for the 
institution of a case or an application.
418
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The European Court of Human Rights believes that the interests of the proper administration 
of justice will justify the imposition of reasonable time-limits and procedural conditions for 
the bringing of claims.
419
 The ILO suggests that although its standards do not prescribe the 
length of the period which should be available to the claimant to lodge a complaint, the 
Committee of Experts considers that such period should be of a reasonable duration.
420
 Even 
in the case of South Africa, the Constitutional Court has held that:  
 
“... time-bars limit the right to seek judicial redress. However, they serve an important purpose in that 
they prevent inordinate delays which may be detrimental to the interests of justice. But not all time 
limits are consistent with the Constitution. There is no hard-and-fast rule for determining the degree of 
limitation that is consistent with the Constitution. The enquiry turns wholly on estimations of degree‘. 
Whether a time-bar provision is consistent with the right of access to court depends upon the 
availability of the opportunity to exercise the right to judicial redress. To pass constitutional muster, a 
time-bar provision must afford a potential litigant an adequate and fair opportunity to seek judicial 
redress for a wrong allegedly committed. It must allow sufficient or adequate time between the cause 
of action coming to the knowledge of the claimant and the time during which litigation may be 
launched. And finally, the existence of the power to condone non-compliance with the time-bar is not 
necessarily decisive.”421  
 
Where time limits are applicable, they must therefore afford social security litigants an 
opportunity to bring a case, taking into account their ability to bring the case to court. As the 
Constitutional court remarked, the socio-economic conditions in South Africa (the backdrop 
of poverty and illiteracy in our society) are important in considering the reasonableness and 
justifiability of time bar and notice periods. This is because in a society where the workings 
of the legal system remain largely unfamiliar to many citizens, due care must be taken that 
rights are adequately protected as far as possible.
422
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4.4 Expeditious (rapid) and simple proceedings  
 
Delay in the adjudication of disputes impairs social security litigants’ rights of access to 
courts. South African courts have held that “inordinate delays in litigating damage the 
interests of justice. They protract the disputes over the rights and obligations sought to be 
enforced, prolonging the uncertainty of all concerned about their affairs”.423  
 
International standards require the expeditious resolution of disputes. This aims to protect the 
parties against excessive delays in legal proceedings and to highlight the impact of delay on 
the effectiveness and credibility of justice.
424
 According to the ILO, the general principles set 
out in international social security instruments, which call for recourse procedures to be 
rapid, militate in favour of the harmonisation of the applicable procedural law throughout 
dispute settlement procedures in social security matters. It adds that in certain cases, due to 
the sometimes inadequate guarantees relating to the impartiality and independence of the 
administrative bodies that examine complaints in the first resort, emphasis should be placed 
on observance during the complaint procedures of certain fundamental principles, which 
should therefore be reinforced, such as the right to obtain a rapid and reasoned decision. This 
is because one of the most important principles of regular proceedings, namely the prompt 
rendition of justice, is also crucial in social security matters, since claimants often have to 
rely on benefits to survive. This underscores the need to establish a procedure for the rapid 
solution of cases where the urgency is manifest.
425
 
 
Simple and rapid procedures are also crucial to ensure the accessibility and effectiveness of 
the rights of access to court. Simple and rapid procedures for the resolution of disputes are 
especially important in social security matters since in most cases social security benefits are 
the only financial support available to beneficiaries. Therefore, the language and terminology 
to be used should be readily understood by an individual of similar background, education 
and related circumstances (in this case social security applicants/beneficiaries, who may 
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either be illiterate or do not understand English).
426
 The procedures for review (complaint) 
and appeal of social security decisions must also be simple and rapid.427  
 
The requirement for simple procedures further requires that the law and regulations relating 
to social security be drafted in such a way that beneficiaries and contributors can easily 
understand their rights and duties. Simplicity should thus be a primary consideration in 
devising procedures to be followed by beneficiaries and contributors.
428
  
 
The European Convention on Human Rights requires hearings to be conducted within a 
reasonable time. The reasonableness of the duration of a hearing depends on the particular 
circumstances of each case. In assessing reasonableness, the European Convention of Human 
Rights takes into account the complexity of the cases, the conduct of the plaintiff and the 
conduct of the State.
429
 
 
4.5 Procedural guarantees to ensure a fair hearing 
 
It is required that the resolution of disputes must be undertaken in a fair and public manner. 
Fairness includes equality of arms between the parties to proceedings, whether the 
proceedings are administrative, civil, criminal or military in nature.
430
 The ILO is of the 
opinion that the right to a fair trial requires procedural equality between the parties in the 
dispute.
431
 The principle of equality between the parties is also extremely important in social 
security disputes, as claimants usually come up against a government or administrative body.  
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Dispute settlement bodies should therefore ensure that individual claimants have reasonable 
opportunities to assert or defend their rights. Equality of arms between the parties to 
proceedings further requires equal access to evidence. This means each party should also 
have access to the relevant evidence, including documents, expert opinions, etc. The burden 
of proof should also not lie exclusively with the complainant.
432
 Parties should have adequate 
opportunity to prepare a case, present arguments and evidence and to challenge or respond to 
opposing arguments or evidence.
433
 Parties should also be entitled to the assistance of an 
interpreter if they cannot understand or speak the language used in or by the judicial body.
434
 
  
Fairness further requires that social security applicants and/or beneficiaries are not deprived 
of the right to adjudication due to costs. As a result, it is required that where the gratuity of the 
appeal procedures for the beneficiary is not ensured, the cost of appeal should be kept at the 
absolute minimum so as to allow for the effective exercise of the right of access to court, 
including by persons of small means.435 
 
4.6 Guarantee of representation and legal assistance 
 
The right to a fair trial guarantees a right to representation. The African Charter affords 
litigants with an entitlement to consult and be represented by a legal representative or another 
qualified person chosen by the party at all stages of the proceedings.
436
 This position is also 
supported by the ILO, which proposes that during the resolution of a dispute, both parties 
should be guaranteed the right to engage a lawyer or other qualified representative of their 
choice.
437
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The ILO also advocates for the provision of free legal aid and legal assistance in social 
security disputes. The ILO advocates that the law should guarantee that claimants who cannot 
afford legal assistance must be entitled to be represented by a public defender or counsel for 
the defence appointed by the competent authority.
438
 It states that: 
 
“The right to receive legal aid is an essential means of helping beneficiaries in their efforts to identify 
and understand their legal rights and obligations. It is often the case that the provisions of the relevant 
national legislation are not formulated in simple and readily understandable terms. Such aid is also 
rendered necessary by the unequal positions of the parties involved, as state institutions and bodies are 
in a more favourable position. Beneficiaries often feel helpless when faced with complicated 
provisions, and without proper assistance they may be unable to resolve the issues that arise. 
Assistance in social security matters enables people to understand their legal obligations and assert 
their legal rights more effectively.”439 
 
The African Charter does not specifically regulate the issue of whether state-funded legal aid 
is an essential component of the right to a fair hearing. However, the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights has interpreted the right to a fair hearing as incorporating the 
right to legal aid. The Commission provides that a party to a civil case has a right to have 
legal assistance assigned to him or her in any case where the interest of justice so requires, 
and without payment by the party to a civil case if he or she does not have sufficient means to 
pay for it. The interest of justice is determined in civil cases by considering the complexity of 
the case and the ability of the party to adequately represent himself or herself; the rights that 
are affected; the likely impact of the outcome of the case on the wider community.
440
 
 
The absence of provisions relating to free legal assistance in social security cases may stem 
from lack of agreement on whether the right to a fair trial in section 34 of the Constitution 
entrenches a right to legal aid and legal assistance. This is due to the absence of a specific 
reference to such a right in section 34 (which deals with civil matters), contrary to section 35 
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where such a right is expressly protected.
441
 However, differences in the formulation of the 
right to a fair trial between the Constitution and the Interim Constitution
442
 and the similarity 
between section 34 of the Constitution and the Article 6(1) of the European Convention of 
Human Rights support the conclusion that a right to legal aid and legal assistance is intrinsic 
to the right to a fair hearing in section 34.
443
  
 
Section 34 now provides for the resolution of a dispute is a fair public hearing. The European 
Court of Human Rights has concluded that the right to a fair and public hearing in Article 
6(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights includes the right to legal aid and legal 
assistance in certain circumstances. In Airey v. Ireland, the court held that: 
 
“Article 6(1) may sometimes compel the State to provide for the assistance of a lawyer when such 
assistance proves indispensable for an effective access to court either because legal representation is 
rendered compulsory, as is done by the domestic law of certain Contracting States for various types of 
litigation, or by reason of the complexity of the procedure or of the case.” 444 
 
In the case of P, C and S v United Kingdom, the Court held that there is the importance of 
ensuring the appearance of the fair administration of justice and a party in civil proceedings 
must be able to participate effectively, inter alia, by being able to put forward the matters in 
support of his or her claims. Here, as in other aspects of Article 6, the seriousness of what is 
at stake for the applicant will be of relevance to assessing the adequacy and fairness of the 
procedures.
445
 
 
In Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom,
446
 the Court held that the lack of civil legal aid 
was a violation of Article 6. The case concerned a libel suit by the fast food chain McDonalds 
against the two applicants claiming compensation for damage caused by a leaflet allegedly 
written by the applicants, which severely criticised the practices and food of McDonalds. The 
applicants were refused legal aid and so represented themselves throughout the trial and 
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appeal, with only some help from volunteer lawyers in a trial that lasted for 313 court days 
(the longest in English legal history). The European Court of Human Rights noted that the 
case was factually and legally complex; and that in an action of this complexity, neither the 
sporadic help given by the volunteer lawyers nor the extensive judicial assistance and latitude 
granted to the applicants as litigants in person, was any substitute for competent and 
sustained representation by an experienced lawyer familiar with the case and with the law of 
libel. It stated that the very length of the proceedings was, to a certain extent, a testament to 
the applicants’ lack of skill and experience. The Court also stressed that it was McDonalds 
that had instituted the proceedings, not the applicants.
447
 
 
It therefore confirms a conclusion that a right to legal aid and legal assistance is foreseen in 
the right to a fair public hearing in section 34. South African courts have also confirmed this 
conclusion.
448
  
 
4.7 Provision of effective (enforceable) remedies 
 
The right to fair trial entails the provision of effective or enforceable remedies in case of 
disputes. In terms of ILO standards, the right to a fair trial further guarantees that any 
decision has to be legally enforceable.
449
 The United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights has also called for the availability of appropriate means of redress 
and accountability for violations of economic, social and cultural rights within national legal 
systems. It compels states to ensure that legal remedies, whether of a judicial or 
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administrative nature, are available to aggrieved individuals or groups. The remedies must be 
“accessible, affordable, timely and effective”.450 
 
The African Charter also compels states to provide effective remedy. The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights requires that everyone shall have a right to an 
effective remedy by competent national tribunals for acts violating rights granted in the 
constitution, by law or by the Charter, notwithstanding that the acts were committed by 
persons in an official capacity.
451
 Member States are compelled to ensure that any remedy 
granted is enforced by competent authorities; and that any state body against which a judicial 
order or other remedy has been granted complies fully with such an order or remedy.
452
   
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
International instruments lay down standards relating to the establishment of dispute 
resolution institutions and dispute resolution procedures. Where South Africa is a party to 
these instruments, it is bound to implement obligations arising from them. Even where South 
Africa is not bound, constitutional imperatives relating to international law compel it to 
consider and apply international law. Similarities between the South African Constitution and 
other international instruments entails that these instruments are authoritative guides in the 
interpretation and implementation of the right of access to courts. The jurisprudence of 
institutions charged with the monitoring and enforcement of these international instruments 
on the scope and nature of this right and of the obligations on state parties is thus relevant for 
the development of the South African social security adjudication framework. 
 
Therefore, the adjudication system would have to be reformed to take into account 
developments in international and regional instruments on the adjudication of social security. 
Adjudication institutions must be empowered to provide dispute resolution that is “accessible, 
affordable, timely and effective”.   
 
                                                 
450
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General comment No. 9: The domestic application of 
the Covenant (19th Session, 1998), UN doc. E/C.12/1998/24, para. 9. 
451
 African Commission on Human & Peoples’ Rights Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Fair Trial and 
Legal Assistance in Africa (1999) Section C. 
452
 Ibid. 
112 
 
South Africa is not in compliance with most of these international standards. For example, 
many of the social security dispute resolution institutions/forums that have been established are 
not independent and impartial (they can effectively be regarded as internal organs of the 
social security institutions and therefore not independent of these institutions).
453
 There is also 
a lack of sequential and complementary reviews and appeals procedures, as most social 
security statutes fail to make an appropriate distinction between (internal) reviews and 
(external) appeal procedures.
454
 Social security dispute are not always resolved through 
expeditious and simple proceedings.
455
 Many social security statutes also do not guarantee 
representation for parties to a dispute (by a lawyer or another representative) and free legal 
assistance is lacking.
456
 Furthermore, some statutes do not provide effective (enforceable) 
remedies (most of the adjudication forums are not afforded the power and mechanisms to 
enforce their rulings).
457
 However, reasonable time limits for reviews (complaints) and 
appeals are provided in most statutes.
458
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 There is also no legal assistance for social security claimants, since Legal Aid South Board provides services 
mainly in criminal matters (although it is increasing its assistance in civil cases such as those involving children, 
women in divorce proceedings, maintenance and domestic violence cases, and unlawful evictions.  
457
 For example, the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act does not regulate whether the decisions of 
the Reviewing Authority can be enforced and (if so) how they can be enforced. 
458
 Statutes mostly provide 90 days after (notification of) the decision and 180 days in the case of COIDA. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEMS IN KEY COMPARATIVE SOUTH AFRICAN 
(NON-SOCIAL SECURITY) JURISDICTIONS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter analyses the dispute resolution systems in some key comparative South African 
(non-social security) jurisdictions. The institutions, mechanisms and procedures in these 
jurisdictions, established to resolve disputes that may arise, are reviewed to provide a 
possible benchmark for comparison with the current social security dispute resolution 
framework. Selected dispute resolution systems investigated are the labour relations system 
(which consists of the CCMA, the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court established by 
the LRA);
459
 the business competition regulation jurisdiction (which involves the 
Competition Commission, the Competition Tribunal and the Competition Appeal Court 
established in terms of the Competition Act);
460
 and the consumer protection jurisdiction (the 
National Consumer Tribunal is established in terms of the National Credit Act).
461
  
 
These institutions and their procedures have been established to realise the constitutional, 
rights of their respective users (especially the rights of access to justice and to a fair trial). 
Therefore, it seeks to comply with the constitutional requirements of the right. The right of 
access to justice in the Constitution requires that dispute resolution institutions must be 
accessible; that these institutions must be independent and impartial in the execution of their 
duties; and that disputes must be resolved in a fair and public hearing. These mechanisms and 
procedures are thus examined to ascertain the effectiveness of these systems in providing 
access to justice for their users. Such mechanisms and procedures can provide guidelines for 
the development of a social security dispute resolution system.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
459
 LRA 66 of 1995. 
460
 Competition Act 89 of 1998. 
461
 National Credit Act 34 of 2005.  
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2. LABOUR RELATIONS DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
 
The framework for the resolution of disputes in the labour relations jurisdiction was 
established by the LRA. One of the objectives of the LRA is to provide simple procedures for 
the resolution of labour disputes through statutory conciliation, mediation and arbitration, and 
through independent alternative dispute resolution services accredited for that purpose.
462
 In 
order to achieve this purpose, the Act created an integrated and streamlined system consisting 
of specialist multi-tiered institutions that are accessible and guarantee fair dispute resolution 
processes that are complementary and seamless. The LRA established the CCMA and 
enabled other independent alternative dispute resolution services to resolve disputes. The Act 
also created the Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court as superior courts, with exclusive 
jurisdiction to decide matters arising from the Act.
463
 Appeals from these courts are directed 
to the Supreme Court of Appeal and then to the Constitutional Court.  
 
The multi-tiered and complementary nature of the labour relations dispute resolution 
institutions, their status and procedures guarantee their effectiveness in resolving labour 
disputes. This relates to their accessibility, procedural fairness, the scope of their jurisdiction 
and powers and their independence and impartiality. It has been remarked that the success of 
the framework lies in the fact that workplace justice has been made more accessible and less 
costly for unskilled workers. In the case of the CCMA, its accessibility has been enhanced by 
the absence of a requirement for formal pleadings and complicated referral procedures. The 
simplicity of the CCMA processes makes it accessible to a large number of workers (it has 
ensured that literacy, lack of skills and resources are not hindrances preventing entry to the 
system).
464
 
 
The new labour relations dispute resolution framework has been able to realise the right of 
access to justice of users of the system. Therefore, it provides guidelines for the establishment 
of a framework for the resolution of social security disputes. 
 
 
                                                 
462
 See section 1(d)(iv) of the LRA. 
463
 Preamble of the LRA. 
464
 Bhorat H, Pauw K and Mncube L Understanding the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Dispute Resolution 
System in South Africa: An Analysis of CCMA Data DPRU (September 2007) 6. 
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2.1 CCMA 
 
The CCMA was established to provide simple dispute resolution procedures. In establishing a 
new dispute resolution system that places a premium on conciliation, mediation and 
arbitration (and less on litigation, amongst others), the LRA sought to satisfy the need for 
expeditious, efficient and affordable procedures and easily accessible, specialist, but informal 
institutions in specified disputes in the labour terrain.
465
 In addition, the dispute resolution 
processes before the introduction of the LRA in 1995 (mainly through adversarial litigation in 
the Industrial Court) resulted in only 20 percent of disputes being settled. However, since its 
inception, the CCMA has enjoyed national dispute settlement rates of up to 70 percent.
466
  
 
2.1.1 Accessibility of the CCMA  
 
The accessibility of the CCMA is facilitated through the location of its premises as well as its 
dispute lodgement procedures and time periods. The CCMA has offices in all the provinces 
(with more than one office in some provinces). A Commissioner is required to attempt to 
resolve a dispute through conciliation within 30 days of the date the Commission receives the 
referral. However, the parties may agree to extend the 30-day period.
467
 
 
In terms of dispute lodgement procedures and time periods, any party to a dispute about a 
matter of mutual interest may refer the dispute in writing to the CCMA. The party who refers 
the dispute to the Commission must satisfy it that a copy of the referral has been served on all 
the other parties to the dispute.
468
 Where it is required for a dispute to be resolved through 
arbitration, the CCMA appoints a Commissioner to arbitrate that dispute, if a Commissioner 
has issued a certificate stating that the dispute remains unresolved; and within 90 days after 
the date on which the certificate was issued, any party to the dispute has requested that the 
dispute be resolved through arbitration. However, the CCMA condones a party’s non-
observance of that timeframe and allow a request for arbitration filed by the party after the 
expiry of the 90-day period where good cause is shown.
469
   
 
                                                 
465
 See van Niekerk et al Law@Work (2008) 399. The LRA requires that all labour disputes must be referred to 
the CCMA for conciliation before referral to the next stage of the dispute resolution process. 
466
 CCMA “About Us” accessed from http://www.ccma.org.za/ (24 June 2011). 
467
 Section 135(2) of the LRA. 
468
 Section 134(1) and (2) of the LRA. 
469
 Section 136(1) of the Labour Relation Act. 
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2.1.2 Scope of jurisdiction and powers of the CCMA  
 
The CCMA has a wide scope of jurisdiction and powers, although as a creation of the LRA it 
can only resolve disputes falling within the purview of the LRA (i.e. disputes between 
employers and employees).
470
 The LRA states that persons who can bring a case to the 
CCMA include one or more employees; or one or more trade unions; or one or more trade 
unions and one or more employees can bring a dispute to the CCMA against one or more 
employers; one or more employers’ organisations; or one or more employers’ organisations 
and one or more employers. The scope of matters that can be brought to the CCMA is also 
wide, as parties can bring lodge a dispute about any matter of mutual interest.
471
 
 
The CCMA resolves disputes referred to it in terms of the LRA through conciliation.
472
 
Where a dispute is not resolved after conciliation, the CCMA arbitrates the dispute (if it is 
required by the LRA and a party to the dispute has requested that the dispute be resolved 
through arbitration).
473
 The CCMA also arbitrates disputes where all the parties to a dispute 
in respect of which the Labour Court has jurisdiction consent to arbitration by the CCMA.
474
 
 
In attempting to resolve a dispute, a Commissioner can subpoena, for questioning, any person 
who may be able to give information or whose presence at the conciliation or arbitration 
proceedings may help to resolve the dispute; subpoena any person who is believed to have 
possession or control of any book, document or object relevant to the resolution of the 
dispute, to appear before the Commissioner to be questioned or to produce that book, 
document or object; call, and if necessary subpoena, any expert to appear before the 
Commissioner to give evidence relevant to the resolution of the dispute; call any person 
present at the conciliation or arbitration proceedings or who was or could have been 
subpoenaed for any purpose set out in this section, to be questioned about any matter relevant 
to the dispute; administer an oath or accept an affirmation from any person called to give 
evidence or be questioned; at any reasonable time, but only after obtaining the necessary 
written authorisation enter and inspect any premises on or in which any book, document or 
                                                 
470
 Sapekoe Tea Estates (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner Maake & others (2002) 23 ILJ 1603 (LC). See also Bosch C 
“Jurisdictional issues at the CCMA” presentation made at the 22nd Annual Labour Conference on New 
Challenges: Shifting Power in Uncertain Times on 12-14 August 2009. 
471
 Section 134(1) of the Labour Relation Act (emphasis added). 
472
 Sections 115(1(a) and 133(1) of the LRA. 
473
 See Hlope v The Minister of Safety & Security 2006 BLLR 297 (LC). 
474
 Sections 115(1 (b) and 133(2) of the LRA. 
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object, relevant to the resolution of the dispute is to be found or is suspected on reasonable 
grounds of being found there; and examine, demand the production of, and seize any book, 
document or object that is on or in those premises and that is relevant to the resolution of the 
dispute; and take a statement in respect of any matter relevant to the resolution of the dispute 
from any person on the premises who is willing to make a statement; and inspect, and retain 
for a reasonable period, any of the books, documents or objects that have been produced to, 
or seized by, the CCMA.
475
 
 
An arbitration award issued by a Commissioner is final and binding and it may be enforced as 
if it were an order of the Labour Court, unless it is an advisory arbitration award.
476
 If a party 
fails to comply with an arbitration award that orders the performance of an act, other than the 
payment of an amount of money, any other party to the award may enforce it by way of 
contempt proceedings instituted in the Labour Court.
477
 
 
The Commissioner can make any appropriate arbitration award in terms of the LRA, 
including, but not limited to, an award which gives effect to any collective agreement, which 
gives effect to the provisions and primary objects of the Act and which includes, or is in the 
form of a declaratory order.
478
 The Commissioner can make an order for the payment of costs 
according to the requirements of law and fairness.
479
 
 
The CCMA can make any settlement agreement in respect of any dispute that has been 
referred to it to be an arbitration award (if agreed to between the parties or on application by a 
party).
480
 Commissioners can also include an order of costs in the arbitration award if a 
person or representative conducted the case in a manner which lacked seriousness or 
proceeded with or defended the dispute in arbitration without sufficient grounds for action 
just to annoy the other party.
481
 
 
                                                 
475
 Section 142 of the LRA. 
476
 Section 143(1) of the LRA. An arbitration award may only be enforced if the Director has certified that the 
arbitration award is not an advisory award - section 143(3) of the LRA 
477
 Section 143(4) of the LRA. 
478
 Section 138(9) of the LRA. 
479
 Section 138(10) of the LRA. 
480
 Section 142A of the LRA. 
481
 See CCMA Fees and costs accessed at http://www.ccma.org.za/Display.asp? L1=32&L2=17 on 8 May 2011. 
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2.1.3 Fairness of CCMA procedures  
 
CCMA procedures promote the resolution of disputes quickly and fairly. It attempts to 
resolve any dispute referred to it in terms of the LRA through conciliation.
482
 A 
Commissioner is appointed, who then attempts to resolve the dispute through conciliation 
within 30 days of the date the CCMA received the referral. However, the parties can agree to 
extend the 30-day period.
483
 The Commissioner determines the process to attempt to resolve 
the dispute, which includes mediating the dispute, conducting a fact-finding exercise and 
making a recommendation to the parties, which can be in the form of an advisory arbitration 
award. Legal representation is not allowed in conciliation proceedings, which means the 
procedure is simple.
484
  
 
Where conciliation fails or after the 30-day period (or any further period agreed between the 
parties) the Commissioner issues a certificate stating whether or not the dispute has been 
resolved. The CCMA serves a copy of the certificate to each party to the dispute and the 
Commissioner files the original of the certificate with the CCMA.
485
  
 
Where a dispute referred to the CCMA is not resolved after conciliation, the CCMA 
arbitrates the dispute if it is required by the LRA and any party to the dispute has requested 
that the dispute be resolved through arbitration, or all the parties to a dispute in respect of 
which the Labour Court has jurisdiction consent to arbitration by the CCMA.
486
 
 
Where it is required for a dispute to be resolved through arbitration, the CCMA appoints a 
Commissioner to arbitrate the dispute if a Commissioner has issued a certificate stating that 
the dispute remains unresolved; and within 90 days after the date on which the certificate was 
issued, any party to the dispute has requested that the dispute be resolved through arbitration.  
However, the CCMA may condone a party’s non-observance of that timeframe and allow a 
request for arbitration filed by the party after the expiry of the 90-day period if good cause is 
shown.
487
 
 
                                                 
482
 Sections 115(1(a) and 133(1) of the LRA 
483
 Section 135 of the LRA. 
484
 See Rule 25 (1) of the rules of conduct of Proceedings before the CCMA. 
485
 Section 135(5) of the LRA. 
486
 Sections 115(1(b) and 133(2) of the LRA. 
487
 Section 136(1) of the LRA. 
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The Commissioner who attempted to resolve the dispute through conciliation can also be 
appointed for arbitration (although a party may object to his/her appointment.
488
 The 
Commissioner conducts the arbitration in a manner he/she considers appropriate in order to 
determine the dispute fairly and quickly, but must deal with the substantial merits of the 
dispute with the minimum of legal formalities.
489
 
 
If permitted by the Commissioner, a party to the dispute can give evidence, call witnesses, 
question the witnesses of any other party, and address concluding arguments.
490
 If all the 
parties consent, the Commissioner may suspend the arbitration proceedings and attempt to 
resolve the dispute through conciliation.
491
 A party to the dispute may appear in person or be 
represented only by a legal practitioner; a Director or employee of the party; or any member, 
office bearer or official of that party’s registered trade union or registered employers’ 
organisation.
492
 
 
If a party to the dispute fails to appear in person or to be represented at the arbitration 
proceedings, and the party had referred the dispute to the CCMA, the Commissioner may 
dismiss the matter. If the party that fails to appear in person or to be represented at the 
arbitration proceedings had not referred the dispute, the Commissioner may continue with the 
arbitration proceedings in the absence of that party or adjourn the arbitration proceedings to a 
later date.
493
 The Commissioner issues a signed arbitration award with brief reasons within 14 
days of the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings.
494
 
 
When a dispute has been referred to the CCMA, the appointed Commissioner determines a 
process to attempt to resolve the dispute, which may include mediating the dispute, 
conducting a fact-finding exercise and making a recommendation to the parties, which may 
be in the form of an advisory arbitration award.
495
 
 
                                                 
488
 Section 136(2) & (3) of the LRA. 
489
 Section 138(1) of the LRA. 
490
 Section 138(2) of the LRA. 
491
 Section 138(3) of the LRA. 
492
 Section 138(4) of the LRA. 
493
 Section 138(5) of the LRA. 
494
 Section 138(7) of the LRA. 
495
 Section 135(3) of the LRA. 
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In relation to disputes about dismissals based on operational requirements by employers with 
more than 50 employees, the CCMA is required to appoint a facilitator to assist the parties 
engaged in consultations if the employer has requested facilitation; or consulting parties 
representing the majority of employees whom the employer contemplates dismissing have 
requested facilitation and have notified the Commission within 15 days of the notice.
496
 
 
In relation to individual unfair labour practices and unfair dismissals, the LRA permits the 
implementation of a process known as “con-arb” (conciliation-arbitration). Con-arb is a 
speedier one-stop process of conciliation and arbitration which allows for conciliation and 
arbitration to take place as a continuous process on the same day, if required.
497
 
 
There is also a preference by the CCMA for the private resolution of disputes (a dispute 
cannot be referred to the CCMA where a private agreement exists for resolving the dispute, 
such as through private arbitration).
498
 
 
The LRA states that any Commissioner who has issued an arbitration award or ruling or any 
other Commissioner appointed by the Director for that purpose, may on that Commissioner's 
own accord or, on the application of any affected party, vary or rescind an arbitration award 
or ruling erroneously sought or erroneously made in the absence of any party affected by that 
award; an arbitration award in which there is an ambiguity, or an obvious error or omission, 
but only to the extent of that ambiguity, error or omission; or an arbitration award granted as 
a result of a mistake common to the parties to the proceedings.
499
 
 
The CCMA serves a copy of that award on each party to the dispute or the person who 
represented a party in the arbitration proceedings within 14 days of the conclusion of the 
arbitration proceedings and the CCMA files the original of that award with the registrar of the 
Labour Court.
500
 The Director may extend the period within which the arbitration award and 
the reasons are to be served and filed if good cause is shown.
501
 
 
                                                 
496
 Section 189A(3) of the LRA. 
497
 Section 191 of the LRA. 
498
 See CCMA Referring a dispute accessed at http://www.ccma.org.za/Display.asp? L1=32&L2=9 on 8
th
 May 
2011. 
499
 Section 144 of the LRA.  
500
 Section 138(7) of the LRA. 
501
 Section 138(8) of the LRA. 
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2.1.4 Independence and impartiality of the CCMA 
 
The CCMA was established as an institution that is independent of the State, any political 
party, trade union, employer, employers’ organisation, federation of trade unions or 
federation of employers’ organisations.502 The CCMA’s independence and impartiality is 
promoted through the appointment and conditions of service of members;
503
 its funding;
504
 
human resource and administrative support;
505
 managerial framework;
506
 governance, 
                                                 
502
 Section 113 of the LRA. 
503
 The CCMA is governed by a Governing Body - section 116(1) of the LRA. The Governing Body consists of 
a chairperson and nine other members, each nominated by NEDLAC and appointed by the Minister; and the 
Director of the CCMA (who has non-voting power). The chairperson, who is an independent person, is 
nominated by NEDLAC; three members of the Governing Body are nominated by NEDLAC to represent 
organised labour; three members of the Governing Body are nominated by NEDLAC to represent organised 
business; and three members of the Governing Body are nominated by NEDLAC to represent the State. The 
Members of the Governing Body are appointed for a period of three years - section 116(2) of the LRA. 
The Governing Body appoints the Director of the CCMA. The Director is a person who is skilled and 
experienced in labour relations and dispute resolution; and has not been convicted of any offence involving 
dishonesty - section 118(1) of the LRA.  
The Director is required to perform the functions that are conferred on him/her by or in terms of the LRA or by 
any other law; to perform functions that delegated to the Director by the Governing Body; manage and direct the 
activities of the Commission; and supervise the Commission's staff - section 118(2) of the LRA. 
The Governing Body determines the Director's remuneration, allowances and any other terms and conditions of 
appointment not contained in Schedule 3 of the LRA - section 118(3) of the LRA. A person appointed as the 
Director of the CCMA automatically holds the office of a Senior Commissioner. However, only the requirement 
that the Governing Body must prepare a code of conduct for the Commissioners and ensure that they comply 
with the code of conduct in performing their functions in section 117 applies to the Director) - section 118(4) of 
the LRA. The Director, in consultation with the Governing Body, may delegate any of the functions of his or her 
office to a Commissioner, except the functions mentioned in sections 120 and 138(8) - section 118(6) of the 
LRA. 
The Governing Body appoints as Commissioners as many adequately qualified persons as it considers necessary 
to perform the functions of Commissioners by or in terms of the LRA or any other law - section 117(1) of the 
LRA. The Governing Body appoints each Commissioner on either a full-time or a part-time basis; and to be 
either a Commissioner or a Senior Commissioner. The Governing Body appoints each Commissioner for a fixed 
term determined by it at the time of appointment. The Governing Body may appoint a Commissioner, who is not 
a Senior Commissioner, for a probationary period. When making appointments, the Governing Body must have 
due regard to the need to constitute a Commission that is independent and competent and representative in 
respect of race and gender - section 117(2) of the LRA. The Governing Body determines the Commissioners’ 
remuneration, allowances and any other terms and conditions of appointment not contained in the LRA - section 
117(4) of the LRA. 
The Governing Body is required to prepare a code of conduct for Commissioners and ensure that they comply 
with the code of conduct in performing their functions - section 117(6) of the LRA. A Commissioner may resign 
by giving written notice to the governing body – section 117(5) of the LRA. The Governing Body may remove a 
Commissioner from office for serious misconduct; incapacity; or a material violation of the Commission's code 
of conduct - section 117(7) of the LRA. See also Maepe v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration and Another (2008) 29 ILJ 2189 (LAC).  
504
 The CCMA is funded through moneys that the Minister of Labour (with the agreement of the Minister of 
Finance) allocates from public funds; moneys that Parliament appropriate to it; fees payable to the CCMA; 
grants, donations and bequests made to it; and income earned on the surplus moneys deposited or invested – 
section 122 of the LRA. 
505
 The CCMA is composed of a Governing Body, the Director and Commissioners - sections 117,118 and 119 
of the LRA. In addition, the Director appoints staff of the CCMA after consulting the Governing Body. The 
Governing Body determines the remuneration and allowances and any other terms and conditions of 
appointment of staff members - section 120 of the LRA.  
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oversight and supervision;
507
 and accountability and reporting.
508
 These attributes are to 
enable the CCMA to effectively undertake its objectives; and to eliminate any undue 
influence in its activities so that it can function independently and impartially. 
 
2.2 The Labour Court 
 
The Labour Court is a court of law and equity. It is a superior court of record that has 
authority, inherent powers and standing, in relation to the matters under its jurisdiction (such 
as labour matters) equal to that which a High Court has in relation to the matters under its 
jurisdiction. It is also a court of record.
509
  
 
2.2.1 Accessibility of the Labour Court  
 
The Labour Court is accessible to any party that intends to apply to the court. Labour Courts 
are currently situated in Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth. However, 
sessions of the Labour Court can be held in other locations if there are available judges (in 
which case the court sits as a circuit court).
510
 
 
In addition, Labour Court dispute lodgement procedures and time periods promote access to 
the court. Generally, referral of a dispute to the Labour Court must be made within 90 days 
after the CCMA certifies that the dispute remains unresolved. However, the Labour Court 
may condone non-observance of that timeframe where good cause is shown.
511
 An 
application to the Labour Court for the review of a CCMA arbitration award must be made 
                                                                                                                                                        
506
 The CCMA is headed by the Director who manages and directs its activities; and supervises the staff – 
section 118(2) of the LRA.  
507
 Governance, oversight and supervision of the CCMA are undertaken by a Governing Body as the supreme 
policy-making body responsible for policy-making of the CCMA - section 116 of the LRA. 
508
 The CCMA is listed in Schedule 3A of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) 1 of 1999 as a national 
public entity. This implies autonomous financial accountability of the CCMA. Financial accountability and 
reporting for the CCMA is undertaken by the Director. In each financial year, the CCMA is required to submit 
to the Minister a statement of the Commission's estimated income and expenditure, and requested appropriation 
from Parliament, for the following financial year – section 122(3) of the LRA. In addition, the CCMA is 
required to provide the Minister of Labour with a report concerning its activities and the financial position 
during the previous financial year. The Minister tables the annual report in Parliament within 14 days of 
receiving it from the CCMA. However, if Parliament is not in session at that time, the Minister tables the report 
within 14 days of the beginning of the next session of Parliament - Item 9(1) and (2) of Schedule 4 of the LRA. 
509
 Section 151 of the LRA. 
510
 Section 152 of the LRA. 
511
 Section 191(11) of the LRA and Rule 12(3) of the Rules of the Labour Court. 
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within 6 weeks of the award.
512
 The Court may also condone the late filing of an application 
for review where good cause is shown for such late filing.
513
 
 
In the case of dismissals based on operational requirements by employers with more than 50 
employees, if an employer does not comply with a fair procedure a consulting party may 
approach the Labour Court by way of an application for an order. Such an application must 
be brought not later than 30 days after the employer has given notice to terminate the 
employee’s services or, if notice is not given, the date on which the employees are dismissed. 
The Labour Court may, on good cause shown, condone a failure to comply with the time 
limit for making an application.
514
 
 
In disputes about unfair dismissals and unfair labour practices, the employee may refer the 
dispute to the Labour Court for adjudication. This is the case where the employee alleges that 
the reason for the dismissal is automatically unfair; is based on the employer's operational 
requirements; is based on the employee's participation in a strike that does not comply with 
the provisions of Chapter IV; or is because the employee refused to join, was refused 
membership of or was expelled from a trade union party to a closed shop agreement.
515
 
 
2.2.2 Scope of jurisdiction and powers of the Labour Court 
 
In disputes about a matter of mutual interest, one or more trade unions; one or more 
employees; or one or more trade unions and one or more employees can bring a case against 
one or more employers’ organisations; one or more employers; or one or more employers’ 
organisations and one or more employers (and vice versa).
516
  
 
The Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all matters that are provided in the 
LRA (except where the LRA provides otherwise) and in matters provided in other laws to be 
determined by the Labour Court (such as in sections 41 and 66 of the Unemployment 
Insurance Act).
517
 
 
                                                 
512
 Section 145(1) of the LRA. 
513
 Section 145(1A) of the LRA 
514
 Section 189A(17) of the LRA. 
515
 Section 191(5)(b) of the LRA. 
516
 Section 134 of the LRA. 
517
 Section 157(1) of the LRA. 
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The Labour Court also determines disputes between a registered trade union or registered 
employers' organisation, and any one of the members or applicants for membership thereof, 
about any alleged non-compliance with the constitution of that trade union or employers’ 
organisation (as the case may be).
518
 
 
It reviews the performance or purported performance of any function provided for in the LRA 
on any grounds that are permissible in law (subject to section 145 of the Act).
519
 It also 
reviews any decision taken or any act performed by the State in its capacity as employer, on 
such grounds as are permissible in law.
520
 The Court hears and determines appeals in terms of 
section 35 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act;
521
 and undertakes arbitration of 
disputes referred to it at any stage that it becomes apparent that the dispute ought to have 
been referred to arbitration.
522
 
 
The Labour Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court on the violation of 
constitutional rights in the area of employment and labour relations; in disputes on the 
constitutionality of acts or conduct of the State as employer; and in the application of laws 
administered by the Minster of Labour.
523
 This implies that as a rule, in a labour matter with 
constitutional implications, a party should approach the Labour Court.
524
 The Labour Court 
has jurisdiction in all the provinces of the Republic.
525
 
 
The Labour Court has wide powers in order to carry out its functions. The Labour Court is 
empowered to make any appropriate order, including the grant of urgent interim relief; an 
interdict; an order directing the performance of any particular act which order, when 
implemented, will remedy a wrong and give effect to the primary objects of the LRA; a 
declaratory order; an award of compensation in any circumstances contemplated in the LRA; 
                                                 
518
 Section 158(1)(e) of the LRA. 
519
 Section 158(1)(g) of the LRA. See also Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others 
[2007] 12 BLLR 1097 (CC); 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC). 
520
 Section 158(1)(h) of the LRA. 
521
 Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993. See section 158(1)(i) of the LRA. 
522
 Section 158(2) of the LRA. 
523
 Section 157(2) of the LRA. 
524
 See Chirwa v Transnet Limited and Others (2008 (4) SA 367 (CC); 2008 (3) BCLR 251 (CC)) and the 
Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security and Others 2010 (1) SA 238 (CC); 2010 (1) BCLR 35 (CC); (2010) 31 
ILJ 296 (CC); [2009] 12 BLLR 1145 (CC). 
525
 Section 156(1) of the LRA. 
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an award of damages in any circumstances contemplated in the LRA; and an order for 
costs.
526
 
 
It can also order compliance with any provision of the LRA; make any arbitration award or 
any settlement agreement an order of the Court; request the CCMA to conduct an 
investigation to assist the Court and to submit a report to the Court; determine a dispute 
between a registered trade union or registered employers’ organisation, and any one of the 
members or applicants for membership thereof, about any alleged non-compliance with the 
constitution of that trade union or employers’ organisation (as the case may be); condone the 
late filing of any document with, or the late referral of any dispute to, the Court; review the 
performance or purported performance of any function provided for in the LRA on any 
grounds that are permissible in law; review any decision taken or any act performed by the 
State in its capacity as employer, on such grounds as are permissible in law; hear and 
determine any appeal in terms of section 35 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act; and 
deal with all matters necessary or incidental to performing its functions in terms of the LRA 
or any other law.
527
 
 
The Labour Court, acting of its own accord or on the application of any affected party may 
vary or rescind a decision, judgment or order that was erroneously sought or was erroneously 
granted in the absence of any party affected by that judgment or order. It can also do this in 
the case where there is an ambiguity, or an obvious error or omission. However, this will be 
only to the extent of that ambiguity, error or omission; or granted as a result of a mistake 
common to the parties to the proceedings.
528
 
 
The jurisdiction and powers of the Labour Court also enable it to provide a wide array of 
remedies. The Court can provide any appropriate order, including the grant of urgent interim 
relief; an interdict; an order directing the performance of any particular act which order, when 
implemented, will remedy a wrong and give effect to the primary objects of the LRA; a 
declaratory order; an award of compensation in any circumstances contemplated in the LRA; 
an award of damages in any circumstances contemplated in the LRA; and an order for costs; 
a compliance order; and making an arbitration award or any settlement agreement an order of 
                                                 
526
 Section 158(1) of the LRA. 
527
 Section 158 of the LRA. 
528
 Section 165 of the LRA. 
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the Court.
529
 Any decision, judgment or order of the Labour Court may be served and 
executed as if it were a decision, judgment or order of the High Court.
530
 As a result, it is in a 
position to provide appropriate redress and give effect to the rights of parties to labour 
relations disputes. 
 
2.2.3 Fairness of Labour Court procedures 
 
A hearing of the Labour Court is constituted before a single judge.
531
 In any proceedings 
before the Labour Court, a party may appear in person or be represented by a legal 
practitioner; a Director or employee of the party; any member, office-bearer or official of that 
party's registered trade union or registered employers/ organisation; a designated agent or 
official of a council; or an official of the Department of Labour.
532
 
 
The Labour Court resolves disputes on the basis of law and fairness. For example, the LRA 
states that the Labour Court may make an order for the payment of costs, according to the 
requirements of the law and fairness.
533
 
 
Where the Labour Court is of the opinion that a dispute that has been referred to it ought to 
have been referred to arbitration, the Court may stay the proceedings and refer the dispute to 
arbitration; or, with the consent of the parties and if it is expedient to do so, continue with the 
proceedings with the Court sitting as an arbitrator. In this case, the Court may only make any 
order that a Commissioner or Arbitrator would have been entitled to make.
534
  
  
Generally speaking, where the parties to a dispute agree to the resolution of the dispute 
through private arbitration, the Labour Court (and CCMA) gives preference to the resolution 
of the dispute through private arbitration. The LRA states that if the CCMA is of the opinion 
that the dispute ought to have been resolved through private dispute resolution in terms of a 
private agreement between the parties to the dispute, the Commission may refer the dispute to 
the appropriate person or body for resolution through private dispute resolution procedures.
535
 
                                                 
529
 Section 158 of the LRA. 
530
 Section 163 of the LRA. 
531
 Section 152(2) of the LRA. 
532
 Section 161 of the LRA. 
533
 Section 162(1) of the LRA. 
534
 Section 158(2)(b) of the LRA. 
535
 Section 147(6)(a) of the LRA.   
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2.2.4 Expertise, independence and impartiality of the Labour Court 
 
The institutional framework, status and composition of the Labour Court have been designed 
to comply with the constitutional requirement for the independence of courts. The Labour 
Court consists of a Judge President, a Deputy Judge President, as many judges as the 
President deems necessary (on the advice of NEDLAC and in consultation with the Minister 
of Justice and the Judge President of the Labour Court).
536
 
 
The President (of the Republic) appoints the Judge President and Deputy Judge President of 
the Court on the advice of NEDLAC and the Judicial Service Commission and after 
consultation with the Minister of Justice. The Judge President
 
is also consulted in the 
appointment of the Deputy Judge President.
537
 The President also appoints (acting) judges of 
the Labour Court on the advice of NEDLAC and the Judicial Service Commission and after 
consultation with the Minister of Justice and the Judge President.
538
  
 
The Judge President and the Deputy Judge President must be judges of the High Court and 
they must have knowledge, experience and expertise in labour law.
539
 A judge of the Labour 
Court must also be a judge of the High Court, or a person who is a legal practitioner, and 
must have knowledge, experience and expertise in labour law.
540
  
 
The appointment of judges and the operational arrangements of the Labour Court are geared 
towards empowering the Court to carry out its duties efficiently, independently and 
impartially. These relate to the conditions of appointment;
541
 discipline and termination of 
service of judges;
542
 funding of the Court;
543
 its human resource and administrative support 
                                                 
536
 Section 152(1) of the LRA. 
537
 Section 153 of the LRA. 
538
 Section 153(4) of the LRA. 
539
 Section 153(2) of the LRA. 
540
 Section 153(6) of the LRA. 
541
 A judge of the Labour Court is appointed for a period determined by the President at the time of appointment 
– section 154(1) of the LRA. The remuneration as well as terms and conditions of appointment of a judge of the 
Labour Court are the same as that of a judge of the High Court - section 154(5)(a) and (b) of the LRA.  
542
 A judge of the Labour Court may resign by giving written in the office to the President - section 154(2) of 
the LRA. A judge of the Labour Court who is also a judge of the High Court is removed from the office of judge 
of the Labour Court only if that person has first been removed from the office of a judge of the High Court. 
When he or she is removed as judge of the High Court must be removed from office as a judge of the Labour 
Court - section 154(7)(a) of the LRA. The President may remove any other judge of the Labour Court from 
office for misbehaviour or incapacity on the advice of NEDLAC, and in consultation with the Minister of 
Justice and the Judge President of the Labour Court - section 154(7)(b) of the LRA. 
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arrangements;
544
 governance, oversight and supervision of the Court;
545
 and accountability 
and reporting of the Court.
546
 
 
3. COMPETITION REGULATION DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
 
The competition regulation dispute resolution system, as is the case with any other dispute 
resolution system, is required to comply with the constitutional framework (including the 
right of access to justice). The Competition Act established the Competition Commission, the 
Competition Tribunal and the Competition Appeal Court as independent bodies for the 
achievement of the objectives of the Act, which include the resolution of disputes.
547
 The 
system that has been established is made up of accessible and independent, specialist, multi-
tiered institutions with appropriate jurisdiction and powers, as well as fair, sequential and 
complementary procedures.  
                                                                                                                                                        
A judge of the Labour Court who is also a judge of the High Court holds office until the judge’s period of office 
in the Labour Court ends; the judge resigns; the judge is removed from office; the judge ceases to be a judge of 
the High Court; or the judge dies - Section 154(3)(a) of the LRA. Any other judge of the Labour Court holds 
office until the judge's period of office ends; the judge's resignation takes effect; the judge is removed from 
office; or the judge dies - Section 154(3)(b) of the LRA. 
Judges are also subject to professional and judicial discipline. Professional and judicial discipline of a judge is 
undertaken by the (Judicial Conduct Committee and Judicial Conduct Tribunal of the) Judicial Services 
Commission - see Chapters 2 and 3 of the Judicial Service Commission Act 9 of 1994. A judge or magistrate is 
also subject to the discipline of another judge or other judges of a higher court. A judge of a higher court 
supervises the manner in which a judge of a lower court discharges his or her functions - see S and Others v van 
Rooyen & Others 2002 (5) SA 246 (CC); 2002 (8) BCLR 810 (CC) para 24. This implies that the Labour Court 
is supervised by the Labour Appeal Court and higher courts. 
543
 The administration of the Court is undertaken by the Department of Justice in terms of the national budget - 
See Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Annual Report 2009/2010. However, the Office of 
the Chief Justice has been established (through a Proclamation by the President in terms of the Public Service 
Act (Proclamation No 103 of 1994) in anticipation of the enactment of the Superior Courts Act. The Superior 
Courts Bill [B 7 2011] proposes the creation of this Office, comprising an Executive Director appointed by the 
Minister with the concurrence of the Chief Justice. This is a transition to the establishment of a separate court 
administration for the judiciary as a separate branch of government. The court administration will be responsible 
for the administration of all courts - section 12 of the Superior Courts Bill. 
In terms of section 15 of the Superior Courts Bill, the budget of the courts will be determined by the Chief 
Justice in consultation with the heads of courts. The Minister is entrusted with the responsibility of processing 
the budget requests through the normal budgetary channels and processes prescribed by the PFMA. The 
Director-General is charged with the responsibility of accounting for the budget of the courts. 
544
 In addition to the Judge President, Deputy Judge President(s), and Judges of the Court, the Minister of Justice 
appoints the Registrar, Deputy Registrar(s) and officers to undertake administrative duties, subject to the laws 
governing the public service - section 155(1) and (2) of the LRA. 
545
 Governance, oversight and supervision of the Court are undertaken by the Judicial Services Commission 
established in terms of section 178 of the Constitution. 
546
 Financial (and other) administration of the Labour Court and all other courts is undertaken by the Department 
of Justice and Constitutional Development. As a result, financial accountability for purposes of the Public 
Finance Management Act is done by the Director-General of Justice and Constitutional Development as the 
accounting officer - see Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Annual Report 2009/2010. 
Accountability and reporting of the Court is to the Judicial Services Commission established in terms of section 
178 of the Constitution. 
547
 Introduction to the Competition Act.  
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The Competition Commission is the investigation and enforcement agency. It investigates 
and makes decisions on intermediate mergers.
548
 The Commission makes a recommendation 
to the Tribunal after conducting an investigation. A party that is unhappy with a decision of 
the Competition Commission can appeal to the Competition Tribunal or apply for a review of 
the decision.
549
 The Competition Tribunal is the adjudicative body under the Competition 
Act. The Competition Appeal Court considers appeals against decisions of the Tribunal.
550
 
Further rights of appeal are to the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court. 
 
3.1 Competition Tribunal  
 
3.1.1 Accessibility of the Competition Tribunal  
 
The Competition Tribunal has a national office in Pretoria, which implies appeals and review 
applications must be forwarded to this single office. However, access to Tribunal is 
facilitated through its dispute lodgement procedures and time periods. In terms the Act, the 
Competition Commissioner can initiate a complaint against an alleged prohibited practice. A 
person can also submit information concerning an alleged prohibited practice to the 
Competition Commission in any manner or form; or in the prescribed form.
551
  
 
A dispute can be referred to the Tribunal through a Complaint Referral filed by the 
Competition Commission or by a complainant in the prescribed form (Form CT 1(1) and 
                                                 
548
 Section 13B of the Competition Act. Three categories of mergers are regulated by the Competition Act (large 
mergers, intermediate mergers and small mergers). Large mergers are mergers where the combined annual 
turnover in, into or from South Africa of the acquiring firm/s and the target firm/s are valued at R6.6 billion or 
more; or the combined assets in South Africa of the acquiring firm/s and the target firm/s are valued at R6.6 
billion or more; or the annual turnover in, into or from South Africa of the acquiring firm/s plus the assets in 
South Africa of the target firm/s are valued at R6.6 billion or more; or the annual turnover in, into or from South 
Africa of the target firm/s plus the asset/s in South Africa of the acquiring firm/s are valued at R6.6 billion or 
more. In addition, the annual turnover in, into or from South Africa or the asset value of the target firm/s must 
be R190 million or more. 
Intermediate mergers are mergers where the combined annual turnover in, into or from South Africa of the 
acquiring firm/s and the target firm/s are valued at R560 million or more; or the combined assets in South Africa 
of the acquiring firm/s and the target firm/s are valued at R560 million or more; or the annual turnover in, into 
or from South Africa of the acquiring firm/s plus the assets in South Africa of the target firm/s are valued at 
R560 million or more; or the annual turnover in, into or from South Africa of the target firm/s plus the asset/s in 
South Africa of the acquiring firm/s are valued at R560 million or more. In addition, the annual turnover in, into 
or from South Africa or the asset value of the target firm/s must be R80 million or more. 
Small mergers are those that fall below the thresholds for intermediate and large mergers. 
549
 Section 27(1)(c) of the Competition Act. 
550
 Section 37 of the Competition Act. 
551
 Section 49B(1) and (2) of the Competition Act. 
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Form CT 1(2) respectively.
552
 Complaints can be delivered by hand, by mail, or 
communicated by telephone, fax or email.
553
 
 
A complaint against a prohibited practice can be made up to three years after the practice was 
stopped.
554
 However, a complaint cannot be made to the Competition Tribunal against a firm 
that has been a respondent in proceedings completed by the Tribunal in terms the same or 
another section of the Competition Act, which relates substantially to the same conduct.  
 
After a complaint is submitted to the Commission, the Commissioner must refer the 
complaint to the Competition Tribunal within one year if he or she determines that a 
prohibited practice has been established. If the Competition Commission does not refer the 
complaint, it must issue a notice of non-referral to the complainant in the prescribed form 
within the one year period.
555
 However, the Competition Commission and the complainant 
may agree to extend the one-year period. The Competition Tribunal can also extend that 
period on application by the Competition Commission made before the end of the one-year 
period.
556
 
 
Where a complainant files a complaint, it must be done within 20 business days after the 
Commission has issued, or is deemed to have issued a Notice of non-referral to that 
complainant.
557
 However, the Competition Tribunal can condone any non-compliance of its 
rules or a prescribed time limit if good cause is shown.
558
  
 
The Competition Act also promotes access to justice by promoting the quick resolution of 
disputes. Although the Act does not specify a timeframe for the review of the Competition 
Commission’s decisions, it requires the Competition Tribunal to conduct its hearings as 
expeditiously as possible.
559
 
 
                                                 
552
 Rule 14 of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Competition Tribunal. 
553
 Rule 4 of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Competition Tribunal. 
554
 Section 67(1) of the Competition Act. 
555
 Section 50(2) of the Competition Act. 
556
 Section 50(4) of the Competition Act. 
557
 Rule 16 of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Competition Tribunal (Published in GN No. 
22025 in GG 428 on 1 February 2001). 
558
 Section 58(1)(c) of the Competition Act. 
559
 Section 52(2)(a) of the Competition Act. 
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3.1.2 Scope of jurisdiction and powers of the Competition Tribunal  
 
The Competition Tribunal has jurisdiction throughout South Africa in the adjudication of 
competition matters.
560
  The Tribunal adjudicates on any conduct prohibited and adjudicates 
on any other matter that may be considered by it in terms of the Competition Act (such as 
making a decision on large mergers on the recommendation of the Competition 
Commission). It also hears appeals from, or reviews decisions of, the Competition 
Commission that are referred to it in terms of the Act.
561
  
 
Furthermore, the Tribunal has a wide personal scope of jurisdiction. A complainant can be 
referred by the Competition Commission.
562
 At any time after initiating a complaint, the 
Competition Commission may refer the complaint to the Competition Tribunal.
563
 When a 
complaint is submitted to the Commission, the Commissioner refers the complaint to the 
Competition Tribunal, if it determines that a prohibited practice has been established. In any 
other case, the Commission issues a notice of non-referral to the complainant.
564
 The 
Competition Commission may refer all the particulars of the complaint, as submitted by the 
complainant, to the Tribunal or refer only some of the particulars of the complaint. Where it 
refers only some of the particulars, it must issue a notice of non-referral on any particulars of 
the complaint not referred to the Competition Tribunal.
565
 If the Competition Commission 
has not referred a complaint to the Competition Tribunal nor issued a notice of non-referral 
within the prescribed time (or within the extended period), it is considered that the 
Commission has issued a notice of non-referral on the expiry of the relevant period.
566
  
 
A private individual or an entity can then refer a complaint directly to the Competition 
Tribunal, in terms of its rules of procedure (where he or she or it has been issued or is deemed 
to have been issued with a Notice of Non-referral by the Competition Commission). Where 
the Competition Commission issues a notice of non-referral in response to a complaint, the 
complainant may refer the complaint. A private individual or an entity can also approach the 
                                                 
560
 Section 26(1)(a) of the Competition Act. 
561
 Section 27(1) of the Competition Act. 
562
  Section 50(1) or 50(2)(a) of the Competition Act. 
563
 Section  50(1) of the Competition Act. 
564
 Section 50(2) of the Competition Act. 
565
 Section 50(3) of the Competition Act. 
566
 Section 50(5) of the Competition Act. 
132 
 
Tribunal for interim relief in prohibited practice cases.
567
 A party to an action in a civil court 
that has been referred to the Tribunal could also be a complainant.
568
  
 
The wide scope of jurisdiction implies that the Tribunal is able to provide access to justice in 
competition matters to every person and entity in South Africa. However, such a wide scope 
is limited to matters within its jurisdiction. As the Competition Appeal Court has held, the 
Competition Tribunal is an administrative tribunal which can exercise jurisdiction only to the 
extent permitted by the Competition Act.
569
 The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is, therefore, confined 
to a consideration of the complaint as referred. The terms of the complaint to be decided by 
the Tribunal are also constrained by the terms of the complaint initiated by the Competition 
Commissioner or made by some other person or entity. Accordingly, if the original ground 
for the complaint is that there was a prohibited agreement,
570
 the Tribunal cannot determine it 
on the basis that there was a concerted practice
571
 or vice versa.
572
 
 
The Competition Tribunal also has considerable powers in undertaking its duties. The 
Competition Commission conducts investigations on large mergers and makes a 
recommendation to the Tribunal for decision.
573
 It also investigates and refers prohibited 
practices to the Tribunal for prosecution when it determines them.
574
 The Commission is 
empowered to agree the terms of a settlement with a party, in which case the Tribunal must 
decide whether to confirm the agreement in order to give it the force of law.
575
 
 
The Competition Tribunal adjudicates on any prohibited conduct to determine whether a 
prohibited conduct has occurred, and if so, to impose any remedy provided for in the Act. It 
                                                 
567
 Section 51(1) of the Competition Act. 
568
 Section 65(2) of the Competition Act. 
569
 See Omnia Fertilizer Ltd v The Competition Commission in re: The Competition Commission of South Africa 
v Sasol Chemical Industries (Pty) Ltd (CAC Case No: 77/CAC/Jul08). 
570
 Chapter 2 of the Competition Act deals with certain conduct which is prohibited because it is harmful to 
competition in the relevant market. Commercial activities which are prohibited under the Competition Act are 
concerned with conduct relating to a firm's interaction with its competitors (horizontal relationship); interaction 
with its customers and suppliers (vertical relationship); and unilateral conduct by a dominant firm (abuse of 
dominance). 
571
 In terms of section 1 of the Competition Act, ‘concerted practice’ means co-operative, or co-ordinated 
conduct between firms, achieved through direct or indirect contact, that replaces their independent action, but 
which does not amount to an agreement. 
572
 See Netstar (Pty) Ltd and Others v Competition Commission (CAC Cases No.99/CAC/MAY10; 
98/CAC/MAY10 and 97/CAC/MAY10) para 26. 
573
 Section 14B of the Competition Act. 
574
 Section 21(c) and (g) of the Competition Act. 
575
 Section 49D of the Competition Act. See also The Competition Commission v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd & 
Others (CT Case No. 15/CR/MAR 10). 
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adjudicates on any other matter that it may consider in terms of the Act, and makes any order 
provided for in the Act. It also hears appeals from or reviews decisions of the Competition 
Commission that are referred to it. It can make any ruling or order necessary or incidental to 
the performance of its functions.
576
 The Tribunal also has the power to provide interim relief 
to private parties in prohibited practice cases.
577
 
 
The member of the Competition Tribunal presiding at a hearing also has wide powers in 
conducting a hearing.
578
 However, it can only exercise powers provided in the Competition 
Act. It has been held that: 
 
“... as a creature of statute, the Tribunal does not enjoy inherent jurisdiction; nor is it entitled to extend 
any of its substantive powers beyond the four corners of the statute. Where powers incidental and 
necessary are required for it to perform its functions, it must read such powers into its statute only by 
necessary implication.”579 
 
The Competition Tribunal can make an appropriate order in relation to a prohibited practice, 
including interdicting any prohibited practice; ordering a party to supply or distribute goods 
or services to another party on terms reasonably required to end a prohibited practice; 
imposing an administrative penalty, with or without the addition of any other order; ordering 
divestiture; declaring conduct of a firm to be a prohibited practice; declaring the whole or any 
part of an agreement to be void; ordering access to an essential facility on terms reasonably 
required; and confirm a consent agreement as an order of the Tribunal.
580
 
 
The Competition Act requires that each party participating in a Competition Tribunal’s 
hearing must bear its own costs.
581
 However, if the Competition Tribunal does not make a 
finding against a respondent, the Tribunal member presiding at a hearing can award costs to 
                                                 
576
 Section 27 of the Competition Act. 
577
 Section 49C of the Competition Act) 
578
 He or she can direct or summon any person to appear at any specified time and place; question any person 
under oath or affirmation; summon or order any person to produce any book, document or item necessary for the 
purposes of the hearing; or to perform any other act in relation to this Act; give directions prohibiting or 
restricting the publication of any evidence given to the Competition Tribunal; accept oral submissions from any 
participant; and accept any other information that is submitted by a participant – see section 54 of the 
Competition Act. 
579
 See Sasol Chemical Industries (Pty) Ltd v The Competition Commission and others; In re The Competition 
Commission v Sasol Chemical Industries (Pty) Ltd and others [2008] 2 CPLR 351 (CT) at para 33. 
580
 Section 58 of the Competition Act. 
581
 Section 57(1) of the Competition Act. 
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the respondent and against a complainant who referred the complaint.
582
 If the Competition 
Tribunal makes a finding against a respondent, the Tribunal member presiding at a hearing 
may award costs against the respondent, and to a complainant who referred the complaint.
583
 
Therefore, costs in such hearings are discretionary and only between private parties as costs 
cannot be ordered for or against the Competition Commission in such proceedings.
584
 
 
A decision, judgment or order of the Competition Tribunal may be served, executed and 
enforced as if it were an order of the High Court.
585
 The Competition Commission may 
institute proceedings in the High Court on its own behalf for recovery of an administrative 
penalty imposed by the Competition Tribunal.
586
 
 
3.1.3 Fairness of Competition Tribunal Procedures 
 
The Chairperson of the Competition Tribunal publishes each referral made to the Tribunal by 
notice in the Gazette. The notice includes the name of the respondent; and the nature of the 
conduct that is the subject of the referral.
587
 The Competition Tribunal then holds hearings on 
a matter.
588
 Its proceedings are open to the public. They are conducted as expeditiously as 
possible, and in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Hearings may also be 
conducted informally or in an inquisitorial manner.
589
 However, the Tribunal member 
presiding at a hearing may exclude members of the public, specific persons or categories of 
persons from attending proceedings if evidence to be presented is confidential information.
590
  
The exclusion of persons can only be done to the extent that the information cannot otherwise 
be protected; if the proper conduct of the hearing requires such exclusion; or for any other 
reason that would be justifiable in civil proceedings in a High Court.  
                                                 
582
 Section 57(2)(a) of the Competition Act. 
583
 Section 57(2)(b) of the Competition Act. 
584
 See Omnia Fertilizer Ltd v The Competition Commission in re: The Competition Commission of South Africa 
v Sasol Chemical Industries (Pty) Ltd (CAC Case No: 77/CAC/Jul08); and Mainstreet 2 (Pty) Ltd t/a New 
United Pharmaceutical Distributors (Pty) Ltd & others v Novartis SA (Pty) Ltd & others [2006] JOL 18314 
(CT). 
585
 Section 64(1) of the Competition Act. 
586
 Section 64(2) of the Competition Act. Proceedings in the High Court may not be initiated more than three 
years after the imposition of the administrative penalty - section 64(3) of the Competition Act. 
587
 Section 51(3) and (4) of the Competition Act. 
588
 Section 50(1) of the Competition Act. 
589
 Section 52(2)(a) and (b) of the Competition Act. 
590
 Section 52(3) of the Competition Act. 
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Except in case of few procedural type hearings, a matter must be heard and decided by three 
Tribunal members.
591
 The Chairperson of the Tribunal may order that a matter be heard in 
chambers, if no oral evidence will be heard. He or she can also order that oral submissions be 
made at the hearing; or that they are made by telephone or video conference, if it is the 
interests of justice and expediency to do so.
592
 
 
Parties to a hearing of the Competition Tribunal have a right to personal appearance and to 
representation.
593
 They can also put questions to witnesses and inspect any books, documents 
or items presented at the hearing.
594
 Interpreters and translators are provided during Tribunal 
hearings for persons who do not understand the language of the hearing.
595
 Parties to a 
hearing of the Tribunal may participate in the hearing, in person or through a representative,  
 
The Competition Act also provides for the carrying out of alternative dispute resolution 
processes in furtherance of the objectives of the Act. A member of the Tribunal assigned by 
the Chairperson may convene a pre-hearing conference. Such a pre-hearing conference is 
convened on a date and at a time determined by the member with the Competition 
Commission, each complainant who has filed a Complaint Referral, intervenors and the 
respondent.
596
 A pre-hearing conference is used (inter alia) to give directions in respect of 
clarifying and simplifying issues in dispute; obtaining admissions of particular facts or 
documents; the production and discovery of documents whether formal or informal; 
witnesses to be called by the Tribunal at the hearing, the questioning of witnesses and the 
language in which each witness will testify; the determination of the procedure to be followed 
at the hearing, and its expected duration; a date, time and schedule for the hearing; and any 
other matters that may aid in resolving the complaint.
597
 
 
Where a point of law is raised at a pre-hearing conference, and the assigned member of the 
Tribunal considers it practical to resolve that question before proceeding with the 
Conference, he or she member can direct the registrar to set only that question down for 
hearing by the Tribunal. He or she can also adjourn the pre-hearing conference pending the 
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  Section 52 of the Competition Act. 
592
 Section 52(2A) of the Competition Tribunal 
593
 Rule 44 of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Competition Tribunal. 
594
 Section 53 of the Competition Act. 
595
 Rule 49 of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Competition Tribunal. 
596
 Rule 21(1) of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Competition Tribunal. 
597
 Rule 22 of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Competition Tribunal 
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resolution of that question by the Tribunal (and the Competition Appeal Court, if 
applicable).
598
 A pre-hearing conference may be conducted in person or by telephone or both. 
It is not required that the pre-hearing conference must follow formal rules of procedure, and 
is not open to the public.
599
 
 
The Competition Act also does not specify timeframes for the Competition Tribunal to make 
a decision on a merger, to finalise the prosecution of a prohibited practice, or for the review 
of the Competition Commission’s decisions. It merely requires the Tribunal to conduct its 
hearings as expeditiously as possible.
600
 As a result, the average number of days per hearing 
between 2008 and 2010 was 1.13 days per matter.
601
 
 
The registrar of the Tribunal is required to compile a record of any proceeding in which a 
hearing has been held.
602
 The Competition Tribunal provides the participants and other 
members of the public reasonable access to the record of each hearing, subject to any ruling 
to protect confidential information.
603
 Once the Tribunal has arrived at a decision, it also 
publishes its reasons on its website.
604
 
 
3.1.4 Expertise, independence and impartiality of the Competition Tribunal 
 
The Competition Tribunal is able to effectively perform its obligations due to its status and 
nature and the expertise and independence of its members. The Tribunal is a juristic person 
and a Tribunal of record.
605
 The President of the Republic appoints ten persons as members 
of the Tribunal. Tribunal members are appointed on the recommendation of the Minister of 
Trade and Industry, from among persons nominated by the Minister, either on the Minister’s 
initiative or in response to a public call for nominations.
606
 Together, the Chairperson and 
other members of the Competition Tribunal represent a broad cross-section of the population 
                                                 
598
 Rule 21(2) of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Competition Tribunal 
599
 Rule 21(4) of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Competition Tribunal. 
600
 Section 52(2)(a) of the Competition Act. 
601
 See Competition Tribunal Annual Report 2009-2010, 25. 
602
 Rule 57 of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Competition Tribunal. 
603
 Section 52(5) of the Competition Act. 
604
 See http://www.comptrib.co.za/ accessed on 8
th
 May 2011. 
605
 Section 26(1) of the Competition Act. 
606
 Section 26(2) of the Competition Act. Two members (the Chairperson and one other member) are full-time 
executive members of the Tribunal, while eight (including the deputy chairperson) are part-time non-executive 
members. These members constitute the pool from which the chairperson appoints adjudicative panels 
comprising three members - see Competition Tribunal “About us” in www.comptrib.co.za accessed in May 
2011.  
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of the Republic; and have sufficient legal training and experience.
607
 They are also required 
to have suitable qualifications and experience in economics, law, commerce, industry or 
public affairs and to be committed to the purposes and principles of the Act.
608
 In addition, a 
person cannot be a member of the Competition Tribunal if he or she is an office-bearer of a 
party, movement, organisation or body of a partisan political nature. A person is also 
disqualified from membership if he or she is an un-rehabilitated insolvent; is subject to an 
order of a competent court holding that person to be mentally unfit or disordered; or has been 
convicted of an offence committed after the Constitution of 1993 took effect and sentenced to 
imprisonment without the option of a fine.  
 
The conditions of appointment;
609
 and discipline and termination of service of Competition 
Tribunal members;
610
 as well as the operational arrangements of the Tribunal (such as 
funding;
611
 human resource and administrative support;
612
 management;
613
 governance, 
                                                 
607
 Section 28(1) of the Competition Act. 
608
 They must also be citizens of South Africa, ordinarily resident in the country - section 28(2) of the 
Competition Act. 
609
 The Chairperson and each other member of the Competition Tribunal are appointed for five years, although 
the President may re-appoint a member of the Competition Tribunal at the expiry of that member’s term of 
office. However, no person may be appointed to the office of the Chairperson of the Tribunal for more than two 
consecutive terms - section 29 of the Competition Act. If a member is still considering a matter before the 
Tribunal on the expiry of his or her term, the member can continue to act as a member in respect of that matter 
only - section 33 of the Competition Act. 
The Minister of Trade and Industry determines the remuneration, allowances, and other benefits of the 
Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson and other members of the Competition Tribunal (in consultation with the 
Minister of Finance) - section 34(1) of the Competition Act. The Minister also determines other conditions of 
appointment of members of the Competition Tribunal. The Minister cannot reduce a member’s salary, 
allowances or benefits during his or her term of office once these are determined.  
610
 The Chairperson can resign from the Competition Tribunal; or resign as the Chairperson but remain as a 
member of the Tribunal if he or she gives one month’s written notice to the Minister. Any other member of the 
Tribunal can resign by giving at least one month’s written notice to the Minister - section 29(3) & (4) of the 
Competition Act. 
The President can remove the Chairperson or another member of the Competition Tribunal from office (on the 
recommendation of the Minister) if that person becomes an office-bearer of a party, movement, organisation or 
body of a partisan political nature. The Chairperson or member can also be removed if the person becomes an 
un-rehabilitated insolvent; becomes subject to an order of a competent court holding him or her to be mentally 
unfit or disordered; or is convicted of an offence committed after the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa of 1993 took effect, and is sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine - section 29(5)(a) of 
the Competition Act. 
The President can also remove the Chairperson or a member of the Competition Tribunal from office (on the 
recommendation of the Minister) for serious misconduct, permanent incapacity, or for engaging in an activity 
that may undermine the integrity of the Tribunal - section 29(5)(b) of the Competition Act. 
611
 The Competition Commission is financed from money appropriated by Parliament for the Commission; fees 
payable to the Commission in terms of the Act; income derived by the Commission from its investment and 
deposit of surplus money; and money received from any other source – section 40(1) of the Competition Act. 
612
 The Chairperson of the Tribunal appoints staff, or contracts with other persons, to assist the Competition 
Tribunal in carrying out its functions; and determines the remuneration, allowances, benefits, and other terms 
and conditions of appointment of a member of the staff (in consultation with the Minister and the Minister of 
Finance) - section 35 of the Competition Act. 
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oversight and supervision;
614
 and accountability and reporting
615
) also foster its independence 
and impartiality. These enable the Tribunal and its members to function without any undue 
interference and influence.  
 
3.2 Competition Appeal Court 
 
The Competition Appeal Court is a court contemplated in section 166(e) of the Constitution 
with a status similar to that of a High Court. It is a court of record.
616
 The Court hears appeals 
on and reviews the decisions of the Competition Tribunal referred to it by a person affected 
by the decision.
617
 A person who is unhappy with a decision of the Competition Appeal Court 
must appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, or Constitutional Court.
618
 
 
3.2.1 Accessibility of the Competition Appeal Court  
 
The Court convenes in different locations around the Republic. The registry function of the 
Appeal Court is performed by the Tribunal in Pretoria and the Tribunal’s Registrar acts as its 
Registrar.
619
 
 
In merger proceedings, any party to the merger or a person who is required to be given notice 
of the merger (provided the person had been a participant in the proceedings of the 
Competition Tribunal) may appeal that decision to the Competition Appeal Court. The appeal 
                                                                                                                                                        
613
 The Chairperson is responsible to manage the caseload of the Competition Tribunal, and assigns each matter 
referred to the Tribunal to a panel composed of any three members of the Tribunal – section 31(1) of the 
Competition Act. 
614
 Governance, oversight and supervision are undertaken by the National Assembly as the Minister of Trade 
and Industry is required to table in the National Assembly the annual report of the Tribunal (and Commission) 
submitted to him or her - section 41(1) and (2) read with s 42 of the Competition Act. 
615
 The Competition Tribunal (together with the Competition Commission) is listed as a national public entity in 
Schedule 3A of the PFMA. The Chairperson of the Tribunal is the accounting authority of the Competition 
Tribunal for the purposes of the PFMA - section 40(7) read with section 42 of the Competition Act. Each year, 
the Chairperson submits to the Minister a statement of the Competition Tribunal’s estimated income and 
expenditure, and requested appropriation from Parliament, in respect of the next financial year - Section 40(3) 
read with section 42 of the Competition Act. 
Within six months after the end of each financial year, the Chairperson is required to prepare financial 
statements in accordance with established accounting practice, principles and procedures, comprising a 
statement reflecting, with suitable and sufficient particulars, the income and expenditure of the Competition 
Tribunal during the preceding financial year; and a balance sheet showing the state of its assets, liabilities and 
financial position as at the end of that financial year. The Competition Tribunal’s financial records are audited 
each year by the Auditor General - section 40(9) and (10) read with section 42 of the Competition Act. 
616
 Section 36(1) of the Competition Act. 
617
 Section 61(1) of the Competition Act. 
618
 Section 62(4) of the Competition Act. 
619
 Competition Tribunal Annual Report 2009-2010, 50. 
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is made in terms of the Competition Appeal Court rules, within 20 business days after notice 
of a decision by the Competition Tribunal.
620
  
 
3.2.2 Scope of jurisdiction and powers of the Competition Appeal Court 
 
The Competition Appeal Court is a court contemplated in section 166(e) of the Constitution 
with a status similar to that of a High Court.
621
 It has a wide scope of jurisdiction and powers, 
with jurisdiction throughout the Republic.
622
 It has exclusive and final jurisdiction in respect 
of certain matters specified in the Competition Act.
623
 However, it has been stated that the 
Court is a “creature of statute and derives its powers, obligations and jurisdiction from the 
four corners of the statute”.624 Appeals and reviews heard by the Court relate to both mergers 
and cases of prohibited practice. These include procedural issues (such as the right to 
intervene in merger hearings and the management of confidential information) and 
substantive issues (such as the test for determining excessive pricing).  
 
The Competition Appeal Court has shared exclusive jurisdiction with the Competition 
Tribunal on the interpretation and application of chapters 2 (prohibited practices), 3 (merger 
control) and 5 (investigation and adjudication procedures) of the Act.
625
 However, the Court 
cannot review a certificate on a merger issued by the Minister of Finance to the Competition 
Commissioner specifying the names of the parties to the merger and certifying that the 
merger constitutes an acquisition of shares for which permission is required in terms of 
section 37 of the Banks Act;
626
 or it constitutes a transaction for which consent is required in 
terms of section 54 of the Banks Act; and it is in the public interest that the merger is subject 
to the jurisdiction of the Banks Act only.
627
  
 
                                                 
620
 Section 17(1) of the Competition Act. 
621
 Section 36(1)(a) of the Competition Act. 
622
 Section 36(1)(b) of the Competition Act. 
623
 Section 62(1) and (3) of the Competition Act. See also Seagram Africa Ltd v Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery 
Group Ltd and others 2001 2 SA 1129 (C) 1141F-1142I. 
624
 Old Mutual Properties (Pty) Ltd & Another v The Competition Tribunal & Others Competition Appeal Court 
Case No: 21/CAC/JUL02. 
625
 Section 62(1)(a) of the Competition Act. 
626
 Banks Act 94 of 1990. 
627
 Section 62(1)(a) read with section 18(2)  of the Competition Act. 
140 
 
The Competition Tribunal and Competition Appeal Court also share exclusive jurisdiction in 
respect of the functions of the Competition Commission in section 21(1); the functions of the 
Competition Tribunal in section 27(1) and the Appeal Court’s own functions in section 37.628 
 
The Court has jurisdiction over the question whether an action taken or proposed to be taken 
by the Competition Commission or the Competition Tribunal is within their respective 
jurisdictions in terms of the Act. It also has jurisdiction over any constitutional matter arising 
in terms of the Act; and the question whether a matter falls within the shared exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the Appeal Court.
629
 In a bid to ensure greater certainty, the 
Competition Tribunal and the Competition Appeal Court have no jurisdiction over the 
assessment of the amount and awarding of damages arising out of a prohibited practice.
630
 
 
The Competition Appeal Court is empowered to review any decision of the Competition 
Tribunal. It can also consider an appeal arising from the Competition Tribunal in respect of 
any of its final decisions, other than a consent order made in terms of section 63; or any of its 
interim or interlocutory decisions that may be taken on appeal in terms of the Act.
631
 The 
Court can give any judgment or make any order, including an order to confirm, amend or set 
aside a decision or order of the Competition Tribunal; or remit a matter to the Tribunal for a 
further hearing on any appropriate terms.
632
 
 
In an appeal against the decision of the Competition Tribunal in merger proceedings, the 
Competition Appeal Court may set aside the decision of the Competition Tribunal; amend the 
decision by ordering or removing restrictions, or by including or deleting conditions; or 
confirm the decision.
633
 If the Court sets aside a decision of the Competition Tribunal, the 
Court must approve the merger; approve the merger subject to any conditions; or prohibit 
implementation of the merger.
634
 
 
                                                 
628
 Section 62(1)(a) of the Competition Act 
629
 Section 62(2) of the Competition Act. 
630
 Section 62(5) of the Competition Act. 
631
 Section 37(1) of the Competition Act. 
632
 Section 37(2) of the Competition Act. 
633
 Section 17(2) of the Competition Act. 
634
 Section 17(3) of the Competition Act. 
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The Competition Appeal Court must confirm an order by the Competition Tribunal for the 
divestiture of assets by parties who have merged in contravention of chapter 3 of the Act.
635
 
The Court may also make an order for the payment of costs against any party in the hearing, 
or against any person who represented a party in the hearing, according to the requirements of 
the law and fairness.
636
 
 
3.2.3 Fairness of Competition Appeal Court procedures  
 
Adjudication in the Competition Appeal Court (as a division of the High Court) is conducted 
in terms of litigation in public (open court) except if the court directs otherwise in special 
cases. Adjudication is conducted in terms of litigation in public (open court) except the court 
directs otherwise in special cases.
637
 Parties have a right to representation (which includes 
representation by a legal practitioner).
638
 
 
The sheriff or deputy executes all sentences, decrees, judgments, writs, summonses, rules, 
orders, warrants, commands and processes of the court.
639
 A decision, judgment or order of 
the Appeal Court is served, executed and enforced as if it were an order of the High Court.
640
 
 
3.2.4 Independence and impartiality of the Competition Appeal Court  
  
The independence and impartiality of the Competition Appeal Court is protected in the same 
way as other judges. The court is made up of High Court judges specifically appointed to the 
court by the President of the Republic on the advice of the Judicial Services Commission.
641
 
The Minister of Justice can also second any number of judges of the High Court to serve as 
acting judges of the Competition Appeal Court (after consultation with the Judge President of 
the Court).
642
 
 
                                                 
635
 Section 60(3) of the Competition Act. 
636
 Section 61(2) of the Competition Act. 
637
 Section 16 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. 
638
 Rule31 of the Competition Appeal Court Rules. 
639
 Section 36 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. 
640
 Section 64(1) of the Competition Act. 
641
 Section 36(2) of the Competition Act. 
642
 Section 36(4) of the Competition Act. 
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The Judge President and any other judge of the Competition Appeal Court are appointed for a 
fixed term determined by the President at the time of appointment. They serve in the court 
until the expiry of the term; until the date the judge ceases to be a judge of the High Court; or 
when the judge resigns from the Court by giving written notice to the President.
643
 As a judge 
of the High Court, a judge of the Competition Appeal Court is removed from office by the 
President if the Judicial Service Commission finds that the judge is incapable, is grossly 
incompetent or is guilty of gross misconduct; and the National Assembly calls for the judge 
to be removed, by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its 
members.
644
 
 
The Judge President or another judge continues to act as a judge on any matter before the 
court when the term of office of the Judge President and another judge of the Court 
expires.
645
 The tenure of office, the remuneration, and the terms and conditions of service 
applicable to a judge of the High Court are not affected by the appointment and concurrent 
tenure of office of that judge who is appointed as a judge of the Competition Appeal Court.
646
  
 
Some of the administrative and operational arrangements of the Competition Appeal Court 
(such as governance, oversight and supervision
647
) are regulated in the same way as other 
courts. However, even where these are different, they are regulated in a manner that does not 
affect the independence of the court. This includes its funding;
648
 human resource and 
administrative support;
649
 managerial framework;
650
 and accountability and reporting.
651
 
                                                 
643
 Section 39(1) of the Competition Act. 
644
 Section 177(1) and (2) of the Constitution. 
645
 Section 39(2) read with section 33 of the Competition Act. 
646
 Section 39(3) of the Competition Act. 
647
 Governance, oversight and supervision of the Court are undertaken by the Judicial Services Commission 
established in terms of section 178 of the Constitution. 
648
 Funding for the Appeal Court is received from the Department of Trade and Industry and its budget appears 
as a line item on the Competition Tribunal’s budget. The budget is managed by the Judge President and 
administered by the secretariat of the Competition Tribunal secretariat on behalf of the Appeal Court - see 
Competition Tribunal Annual Report 2009/10, 50. 
649
 The Competition Appeal Court does not have a distinct human resource and administrative structure. Human 
resource and administrative support for the Court is provided by the secretariat of the Competition Tribunal - see 
Competition Tribunal Annual Report 2009/10, 50. 
650
 The Judge President of the Competition Appeal Court supervises and directs the work of the Court. He or she 
also presides at proceedings of the Court or designates another judge of Court to preside at particular 
proceedings of the Court; and makes rules for the proceedings of the Court by notice in the Gazette - section 38 
of the Competition Act. 
However, when the Superior Courts Bill is passed, the administration of the Court (together with the other 
courts) will be done by the Office of the Chief Justice. The Office of the Chief Justice has been established 
(through a Proclamation by the President in terms of the Public Service Act 103 of 1994) in anticipation of the 
enactment of the Superior Courts Act. The Superior Courts Bill proposes the creation of this Office, comprising 
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4. CONSUMER PROTECTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
 
The consumer protection dispute resolution system comprises the National Consumer 
Tribunal and National Credit Regulator established by the National Credit Act. They have 
been established “to make it easier and less expensive for consumers and credit providers to 
resolve their disputes” and are important mechanisms in the promotion of consumer rights in 
South Africa.
652
 
 
The National Consumer Tribunal is a tribunal of record which acts as the adjudicative 
body.
653
 The National Consumer Tribunal resolves disputes referred to it by consumers, 
credit providers, credit bureaux, debt counsellors and the National Credit Regulator; and 
matters referred by the National Credit Regulator or complainants related to allegations of 
prohibited conduct.
654
 
 
4.1 Accessibility of the National Consumer Tribunal 
 
The National Credit Tribunal has a single national location in Centurion, Pretoria. Persons 
who want to submit complaints to the Tribunal must forward these to this office. In addition, 
forms for the referral of complaints to the Tribunal are in English, which might adversely 
affect person who are not proficient in the language.  
 
A person or entity that is registered with the National Credit Regulator or an applicant for 
registration may file a complaint within 20 business days after the National Credit Regulator 
                                                                                                                                                        
an Executive Director appointed by the Minister with the concurrence of the Chief Justice. This is a transition to 
the establishment of a separate court administration for the judiciary as a separate branch of government. The 
court administration will be responsible for the administration of all courts - see section 12 of the Superior 
Courts Bill. 
651
 The Court’s budget appears as a line item on the Tribunal’s budget. Therefore, financial accountability and 
reporting is by the Chairperson of the Tribunal as the accounting authority of the Competition Tribunal for the 
purposes of the PFMA - section 40(7) read with section 42 of the Competition Act.  
The Judge President and other judges of the Competition Appeal Court report to the Judicial Services 
Commission established in terms of section 178 of the Constitution. 
652
 Woker T “A critical examination of the role that the National Consumer Tribunal plays in debt relief with 
suggestions for reform” accessed at http://web.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/Law%20Clinic%20Draft%20Papers 
%20from%20Conference/Tanya%20Woker%20Draft.pdf (26 April 2012). 
653
 Section 26 of National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
654
 Section 27(a) of the National Credit Act. 
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makes the decision that is the subject of the application.
655
 However, the Tribunal may allow 
a party to file a complaint at a later time where good cause shown for the delay. 
 
A consumer or credit provider who has unsuccessfully attempted to resolve a dispute directly 
with another party, or through an alternative dispute resolution process, may also file an 
application at any time within 20 business days after the failure of the attempted alternative 
dispute resolution.
656
 The Tribunal may also allow such a party to file a complaint at a later 
time where good cause shown for the delay. 
 
4.2 Scope of jurisdiction and powers of the National Consumer Tribunal 
 
The National Consumer Tribunal adjudicates applications made in terms of the National 
Credit Act, and exercises its functions in accordance with the Act.
657
 The Tribunal cannot 
resolve contractual disputes;
658
 disputes relating to damages and the award of damages 
(except where it confirms a consent order which includes an award of damages); criminal 
matters, the rearrangement of debt (where a consumer is over-indebted) and whether credit 
has been granted recklessly.
659
 However, the Act affords it a wide scope of jurisdiction and 
powers (with its orders having the status of orders of the High Court).
660
  
 
On the application of the National Credit Regulator, the Tribunal can make an order resolving 
a dispute over information held by a credit bureau in terms of Part B of Chapter 4.
661
 It can 
also make an order compelling the delivery of a statement of account or a review of a 
statement in terms of Part D of Chapter 5. It can further review the conduct of a sale of goods 
in terms of section 127 or the distribution of proceeds from such a sale;
662
 and grant leave to 
bring a complaint directly before the Tribunal; and for an order condoning late filing. It can 
make any order provided for in the Act in respect of such an application.  
                                                 
655
 Section 137(2) of the National Credit Act. 
656
 Section 137(3) of the National Credit Act. 
657
 Section 27 of the National Credit Act. See also Malan v Amalgamated Banks of South Africa (Absa) Case No 
NCT/22/2008/149(1) (P) 30 Oct 2008. 
658
 Global Pact 417 (Pty) Ltd and others v Mercedes Benz Financial Services (Pty) Ltd (MBFS) Case No 
NCT/40/2009/149 (1) (P) 20 April 2010. 
659
 Woker T “A critical examination of the role that the National Consumer Tribunal plays in debt relief with 
suggestions for reform” accessed at http://web.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/Law%20Clinic%20Draft%20 
Papers%20from%20 Conference/Tanya% 20Woker%20Draft.pdf (26 April 2012). 
660
 Section 152 of the National Credit Act. 
661
 Section 137(1) of the National Credit Act. 
662
 See Mapeka vs Wesbank NCT/29/2009/128(1) (P), 5 November 2009. 
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The Tribunal can confirm a resolution or agreement as a consent order, which may include an 
award of damages to a complainant (with the consent of the complainant).
663
 It also 
adjudicates allegations of prohibited conduct by determining whether prohibited conduct has 
occurred. The Tribunal can make an appropriate order in relation to prohibited conduct or 
required conduct in terms of Act.
664
 This includes the power to grant interim relief;
665 
declaring conduct to be prohibited in terms of the Act; interdicting any prohibited conduct; 
imposing an administrative fine in terms of section 15 with or without the addition of any 
other order; confirming a consent agreement as an order of the Tribunal; condoning any non-
compliance of its rules and procedures on good cause shown; confirming an order against an 
unregistered person to cease engaging in any activity that is required to be registered in terms 
of the Act; suspending or cancelling the registrant’s registration; requiring repayment to the 
consumer of any excess amount charged (together with interest at the rate set out in the 
agreement); or any other appropriate order contemplated in the Act which is required to give 
effect to a right. 
 
If the Tribunal does not make a finding against a respondent, the presiding member at a 
hearing can award costs to the respondent and against a complainant who referred the 
complaint.
666
 If the Tribunal makes a finding against a respondent, the member of the 
Tribunal presiding at a hearing can also award costs against the respondent and to a 
complainant who referred the complaint.  
 
The member of the Tribunal presiding at a hearing has the power to direct or summon any 
person to appear at any specified time and place.
667
 He or she can question any person under 
oath; order any person to produce any book, document or item necessary for the purposes of 
the hearing; and perform any other action in relation to the Act. He or she can also give 
directions prohibiting or restricting the publication of any evidence given to the Tribunal. 
 
                                                 
663
 Section 138 of the National Credit Act and Liphoko v Absa Bank and others Case No NCT/253/2009/138(1) 
(P) April 2010. 
664
 Sections 149 and 150 of the National Credit Act. See also Motitsoe v Randburg Finance Case No 
NCT/253/2009/138 (1) (P) April 2010; and National Credit Regulator v Chatspare Pty Ltd NCT/08/2008/140 
(1) (P) July 2008. 
665
 See Malan v Amalgamated Banks of South Africa (Absa) Case No NCT/22/2008/149(1) (P) 30 Oct 2008. 
666
 Section 147 of the National Credit Act. 
667
 Section 144 of the National Credit Act. 
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4.3 Fairness of National Consumer Tribunal procedures 
 
A matter before of the Tribunal is considered by a single member or by a panel of three 
members.
668
 When assigning a matter to a panel, the Chairperson ensures that at least one 
member of the panel has suitable qualifications and experience. A decision of a single 
member of the Tribunal hearing a matter or of a majority of the members of a panel in any 
other case is the decision of the Tribunal. The decision of a panel is delivered in writing and 
includes reasons for the decision. 
 
The Tribunal conducts its hearings in public and in an inquisitorial manner.
669
 However, the 
Tribunal member presiding at a hearing may exclude members of the public or specific 
persons or categories of persons from attending the hearing if evidence to be presented is 
confidential information. This can only be done to the extent that the information cannot 
otherwise be protected; if the proper conduct of the hearing requires it; or for any other 
reason that would be justifiable in civil proceedings in a High court. 
 
Tribunal proceedings are conducted as expeditiously and informally as possible, and in 
accordance with the principles of natural justice.
670
 Hearings are relatively simple to follow, 
which means parties do not need legal representation. There are also very few costs involved. 
It has been remarked that: 
 
“The complaint can be expressed in a laymen’s undefined narratory style …. And proof on a balance 
of probabilities is adequate. ... The approach of the NCT should be that, subject to statute, the NCT is 
guided only by the rules of natural justice. In that context the object and test for using the inquisitorial 
power is not to pursue to a point against anyone who is not a consumer as if he were the enemy. The 
inquisitorial power exists to get to the bottom of facts that are material to reaching a correct finding on 
the properly raised complaint.”671 
 
There are specific matters that the Chairperson of the Tribunal assigns for hearing by a single 
member of the Tribunal.
672
 These include any application to the Tribunal by a consumer or 
credit provider who has unsuccessfully attempted to resolve a dispute directly with the other 
                                                 
668
 Section 31 of the National Credit Act. 
669
 Section 142(2) of the National Credit Act. 
670
 Section 142(1) of the National Credit Act. 
671
 Fleming J in National Credit Regulator v Chatspare Pty Ltd (supra) paras 7-9. 
672
 Section 142(3) of the National Credit Act. 
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party and through alternative dispute resolution; consent orders; applications to permit late 
filing; review of requests for additional information; review of an order to cease engaging in 
an activity in terms of section 54; applications for an order limiting consumer requests; or 
applications for an order concerning the remittance of proceeds of sale. At the end of such 
hearings, the Tribunal makes any order permitted by the Act in the circumstances and issues 
written reasons for its decision.
673
 
 
Parties to a hearing of the Tribunal and any other person who has a material interest in the 
hearing may participate in the hearing in person or through a representative.
674
 They may put 
questions to witnesses and inspect any books, documents or items presented at the hearing. 
 
In order to promote the informal resolution of disputes between parties, the Act requires that 
in any dispute between a credit provider and a consumer that may be referred to the Tribunal 
(excluding complaints that could be resolved informally or investigated) and before a party 
may apply directly to the Tribunal, they must attempt to resolve the matter directly between 
themselves.
675
 If they are unable to resolve the matter, they must refer the matter to the 
ombud with jurisdiction for resolution in accordance with the National Credit Act or (if the 
credit provider concerned is a financial institution and a participant in a recognised scheme as 
defined in the Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act) in terms of the Financial Services 
Ombud Schemes Act.
676
 In other cases, they are required to apply to either a consumer court 
for resolution in accordance with the National Credit Act and any provincial legislation 
establishing that consumer court. They can also apply to an alternative dispute resolution 
agent, for resolution by conciliation, mediation or arbitration.
677
 
 
If an alternative dispute resolution agent concludes that either party to conciliation, mediation 
or arbitration is not participating in that process in good faith; or that there is no reasonable 
probability of the parties resolving their dispute through that process, the alternative dispute 
resolution agent must issue a certificate in the prescribed form stating that the process has 
failed.
678
 
 
                                                 
673
 Section 142(4) of the National Credit Act. 
674
 Section 143 of the National Credit Act. 
675
 Section 134(4)(a) of the National Credit Act. 
676
 Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act 37 of 2004. 
677
 Section 134(4)(b) of the National Credit Act. 
678
 Section 134(5) of the National Credit Act. 
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The ombud with jurisdiction, consumer court or alternative dispute resolution agent that 
resolves or assists parties in resolving a dispute in terms of alternative dispute resolution may 
record the resolution of that dispute in the form of an order. If the parties to the dispute 
consent to that order, the agent can submit it to a court to be made a consent order, in terms of 
the court’s rules; or to the Tribunal to be made a consent order in terms of section 138.679 
  
The Tribunal provides the participants and members of the public reasonable access to the 
record of each hearing, subject to any ruling made to protect confidential information.
680
 A 
participant in a hearing before a single member of the Tribunal may appeal a decision by that 
member to a full panel of the Tribunal.
681
 Except in decisions relating to consent orders, a 
participant in a hearing before a full panel of the Tribunal may apply to the High Court to 
review the decision of the Tribunal; or appeal to the High Court against the decision of the 
Tribunal.
682
 
 
A decision, judgment or order of the National Consumer Tribunal is served, executed and 
enforced as if it were an order of the High Court, and is binding on the National Credit 
Regulator; provincial credit regulators; a consumer court; an alternative dispute resolution 
agent or the ombud with jurisdiction; a debt counsellor; and a Magistrate’s Court.683  
 
4.4 Expertise, independence and impartiality of the National Consumer Tribunal 
 
The institutional framework, status and composition of the National Consumer Tribunal 
indicate the desire for it to resolve consumer disputes independently, impartially and 
efficiently. The Tribunal has 11 members appointed by the President of the Republic on a 
full- or part-time basis.
684
 A member of the Tribunal serves for a term of five years, although 
he or she may be reappointed at the expiry of their term of office.
685
 However, a person 
cannot be appointed as Chairperson of the Tribunal for more than two consecutive terms. 
 
                                                 
679
 Section 135(1) of the National Credit Act. 
680
 Section 142(5) of the National Credit Act. 
681
 Section 148(1) of the National Credit Act. 
682
 Section 148(2) of the National Credit Act. 
683
 Section 152 (1) of the National Credit Act. 
684
 Section 26(2) of the National Credit Act. 
685
 Section 29(2) of the National Credit Act. 
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A person cannot be a member of the Tribunal if he or she is an office-bearer of any party, 
movement, organisation or body of a partisan political nature.
686
 This will also be the case if 
the person acquires a direct or indirect financial interest in a registrant with the National 
Credit Regulator personally or through a spouse, partner or associate. A person who acquires 
an interest in a business or enterprise, which may conflict or interfere with the proper 
performance of his or her duties, also cannot be appointed. Other situations which bar a 
person from becoming a member of the National Consumer Tribunal include if the person is 
an un-rehabilitated insolvent or becomes insolvent and the insolvency results in the 
sequestration of that person’s estate; if the person is removed from an office of trust on 
account of misconduct in respect of fraud or the misappropriation of money; if the person is 
subject to an order of a competent court holding that person to be mentally unfit or 
disordered; if the person is convicted in the Republic or elsewhere of theft, fraud, forgery or 
uttering a forged document, perjury, an offence under the Prevention and Combating of 
Corrupt Activities Act;
687
 or an offence under the Financial Intelligence Centre Act;
688
 or an 
offence involving dishonesty; or is convicted of any other offence and sentenced to 
imprisonment without the option of a fine. 
 
Collectively, the members of the Tribunal represent a broad cross-section of the population of 
the South Africa and have sufficient persons with legal training and experience. A member is 
required to have suitable qualifications and experience in economics, law, commerce, 
industry or consumer affairs, and to be committed to the purposes of the Act experience.
689
 
 
The conditions of employment of Tribunal members;
690
 their discipline and termination of the 
service;
691
 and the operational arrangements of the Tribunal (including funding;
692
 human 
                                                 
686
 Section 26(4) read with s 20(2) of the National Credit Act. 
687
 Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004. 
688
 Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001. 
689
 Section 28 of the National Credit Act. Current members come from diverse backgrounds including law, 
academia, business, government and non-governmental organisations – see Woker T “A critical examination of 
the role that the National Consumer Tribunal plays in debt relief with suggestions for reform” accessed at 
http://web.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/Law%20Clinic%20Draft%20Papers%20from%20 Conference/Tanya% 
20Woker%20Draft.pdf (26 April 2012). A member must also be a South African citizen who is ordinarily 
resident in the country. 
690
 The National Credit Act states that during the term of office of a member of the Tribunal, the member’s 
salary, allowances or benefits may not be reduced - section 34 of the National Credit Act. 
691
 The Chairperson may resign from the Tribunal; or resign as Chairperson but remain as a member of the 
Tribunal if he or she gives the Minister one month written notice - section 29(3) of the National Credit Act. A 
member of the Tribunal other than the Chairperson may resign by giving at least month written notice to the 
Minister - section 29(4) of the National Credit Act. 
150 
 
resource and administrative support;
693
 managerial framework;
694
 governance, oversight and 
supervision;
695
 and accountability and reporting
696
) also foster its independence and 
impartiality.   
 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
 
Comparative adjudication institutions or forums were created either as independent 
institutions that are autonomous of the administrative and/or delivery institutions (the CCMA 
is independent of employees/trade unions and employers/employers’ organisations; while the 
Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal are independent of business); or as courts of 
law (the Competition Appeal Court has the status of a High Court).  
 
Various modalities are utilised for the appointment of members of comparative adjudication 
institutions. Members of some of the institutions are appointed by the President of the 
Republic (e.g. Judges in the Competition Appeal Court; Members of the Competition 
Tribunal; and Members of the National Consumer Tribunal), or by a Governing Body (such 
as the Governing Body of the CCMA). The President or Governing Body determines the 
remuneration and other conditions of appointment of the members. They are also empowered 
to discipline the members of these institutions and to terminate their appointment. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
The President removes the Chairperson or any other member of the Tribunal from office on the recommendation 
of the Minister if he or she is disqualified from being a member of the Tribunal - section 29(5)(a) read with 
section 20(2) of the National Credit Act. In addition, the President can also remove the Chairperson or a 
member of the Tribunal from office for serious misconduct; permanent incapacity; or engaging in any activity 
that may undermine the integrity of the Tribunal - section 29(5)(a) of the National Credit Act. 
692
 The National Consumer Tribunal is financed from funds appropriated by Parliament; any fees payable in 
terms of the Act; income derived from their respective investment and deposit of surplus funds; and other funds 
accruing from any source - section 35 of the National Credit Act. 
693
 The registry of the Tribunal (which is led by the Registrar) provides administrative support and secretarial 
functions to the Chairperson and CEO – see National Consumer Tribunal Annual Report 2008, 60. 
694
 The head of the Tribunal is the Chairperson, who is responsible to manage the caseload of the Tribunal. The 
Deputy Chairperson performs the functions of Chairperson in his or her absence - section 31(1) of the National 
Credit Act. 
695
 Governance, oversight and supervision of the National Consumer Tribunal are undertaken by Parliament. 
Every five years the Minister is required to conduct an audit review of the exercise of the functions and powers 
of the National Consumer Tribunal. The Minister also receives an annual report the National Consumer Tribunal 
on its activities, as required by the Public Finance Management Act. When the Minister conducts an audit 
review of the exercise of the functions and powers of the National Consumer Tribunal or receives an annual 
report on the Tribunal’s activities, he or she forwards a copy of the report to the Premier of each province. He or 
she also tables it in Parliament as soon as practicable - section 36 of the National Credit Act. 
696
 The National Consumer Tribunal (and the National Credit Regulator) must each report to the Minister 
annually on its activities, as required by the Public Finance Management Act - section 36 of the National Credit 
Act. 
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For comparative adjudication institutions that are not courts of law, their independence and 
impartiality is further bolstered by their financial autonomy. In the case of the CCMA, the 
Competition Commission and Tribunal, and the National Consumer Tribunal, funding is from 
moneys appropriated by Parliament. Funding for the Competition Appeal Court is received 
from the Department of Trade and Industry as a line item on the Competition Tribunal’s 
budget. 
 
The financial autonomy of the CCMA, Competition Tribunal and the Competition 
Commission is further reflected by their inclusion as Schedule 3A (national public) entities in 
the PFMA. This indicates autonomous financial accountability for these institutions. 
 
The enabling statutes regulate the management of these institution by persons appointed for 
that purpose. Human resource and administrative support is also managed by most of the 
institutions themselves. Governance and supervision is by either parliament, or by a 
Governing Body. This prevents any undue influence on the institutions in the performance of 
their duties.    
 
The statutes establishing comparative social security institutions promote the effectiveness of 
the institutions by requiring that only suitably qualified persons are appointed as members. 
This is done by stipulation minimum academic qualifications and relevant professional and 
other experience. 
 
The scope of jurisdiction and powers of these institutions are also fairly wide. This is ensured 
by the use of terms such as “any matter in the Act”. In addition, the institutions have 
extensive powers, such as the power to subpoena persons. This implies that the institutions 
are also able to provide a wide range of remedies, including (in some cases and in matters 
within their jurisdiction) making an order which any court of law may make, providing 
interim relief and making cost orders. Effectiveness is further promoted by providing some of 
the institutions that are not courts of law with powers to enforce their decisions. The 
decisions of such institutions are deemed to be the judgment of a court and are therefore 
enforceable as such. 
 
Attempts to make the institutions accessible are not always appropriately made. Some of the 
institutions convene in as many places as is necessary; while other have a single centrally-
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located presence. Accessibility is however facilitated by appropriate dispute lodgement 
procedures and time limits. The institutions also allow non-individual claimants to bring 
disputes in some cases; and also allowing the personal appearance of parties to a dispute and 
other interested parties in most cases. Institutions are also empowered to determine 
adjudication procedures, which gives scope for the adoption of flexible procedures. 
 
Dispute resolution in the labour relations, competition and the consumer protection spheres 
provide examples of systems established to resolve disputes in an efficient and effective 
manner. They thus present useful guidelines for the establishment and functioning of any 
proposed social security dispute adjudication. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
SOCIAL SECURITY DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEMS IN COMPARATIVE 
INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTIONS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter reviews the systems established for the resolution of social security disputes in 
jurisdictions that are comparable to South Africa. The jurisdictions examined include 
countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, Australia, New 
Zealand, United Kingdom and Germany. Institutions and procedures established for the 
resolution of social security disputes are investigated. These countries have been selected in 
view of their developed, longstanding and well-established social security systems and 
adjudication institutions and procedures that ensure the reaslisation of social security 
claimants’ right of access to justice.  
 
These institutions and their procedures have been established to realise constitutional, 
statutory and/or common law rights of social security claimants (such as the right of access to 
justice, the right to a fair hearing and the right (of access) to social security). They are also 
established in compliance with the international law obligations of (some of) these countries. 
The variety of the social security adjudication institutions (tribunals and other forums in 
Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom; and courts in Germany) and their 
procedures is also in line with the institutions and procedures proposed in section 34 of the 
Constitution as possible avenues for realising the right of access to courts. The effectiveness 
of the institutions and procedures in achieving access to justice and/or a fair hearing for social 
security claimants could therefore be instructive in proposing a social security dispute 
resolution system for South Africa.  
 
2. SADC COUNTRIES 
 
Rights that have a bearing on the establishment of a social security adjudication framework 
are provided for in the constitutions of SADC countries. In the first instance, these 
constitutions regulate the right (of access) to social security and ancillary rights. Whilst some 
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constitutions provide for directly enforceable rights,
697
 other constitutions provide for the 
rights in more general unenforceable terms.
698
 Examples of the general protection of the right 
to social security include the “principles of national policy” in the Malawian Constitution699 
and the “directive principles of state policy” in the Zambian Constitution.700 However, there 
is no reference to social security in some SADC constitutions.
701
 The right (of access) to 
social security requires the availability of certain procedural guarantees for their enforcement, 
such as the establishment of an appropriate adjudication framework that ensures access to 
justice.
702
 
 
Access to justice and related rights are also guaranteed in some of the constitutions. These 
include the right of access to courts;
703
 the right to have a dispute resolved by an independent 
and impartial tribunal;
704
 the right to a fair hearing;
705
 and the right to secure protection of the 
                                                 
697
 Examples include the Constitution of Angola which guarantees as fundamental rights the rights to health and 
social protection (Article 77), protection to the elderly (Article 82) and protection to the disabled (Article 83). 
The Constitution of Seychelles (Article 37) provides that “the State recognises the right of every citizen to a 
decent and dignified existence and, with a view to ensuring that its citizens are not left unprovided for by reason 
of incapacity to work or involuntary unemployment, undertakes to maintain a system of social security.  
698
 See for example the Constitution of Malawi (section 30); the Constitution of Namibia (Article 95); the 
Constitution of Swaziland (section 60); the Constitution of Tanzania (sections 11 and 23); and the Constitution 
of Zambia (section 112). 
699
 Section 30(1) of the Malawi Constitution states that “all persons and peoples have a right to development and 
therefore to the enjoyment of economic, social, cultural and political development and women, children and the 
disabled in particular shall be given special consideration in the application of this right.” In terms of section 
30(2), “the State shall take all necessary measures for the realization of the right to development. Such measures 
shall include amongst other things, equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, education, 
health services, food, shelter, employment and infrastructure.” However, according to Section 13, the State is 
required to actively promote the welfare and development of the people of Malawi by progressively adopting 
and implementing policies and legislation aimed at achieving gender equality, adequate nutrition, adequate 
health care, enhancing the quality of rural life, providing adequate resources to the education sector, to support 
the disabled, promote the full development of children, respect and support the elderly and to achieve a sensible 
balance between the creation of and distribution of wealth through the nurturing of a market economy and long 
term investment in health, education, economic and social development programmes. 
700
 In terms of the Directive Principles of State Policy of the Zambian Constitution, the State will endeavour to 
provide social protection to its citizens (section 112) subject to the ability of resources (section 110(2). 
701
 There is no reference to social security and other socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights of the Botswana 
Constitution. The Zimbabwe Constitution also has no reference to social security. 
702
 See generally Olivier M “Social security adjudication in the light of international standards: the need for 
reform in Southern Africa” 2011 International Journal of Social Security and Workers Compensation Vol. 3, 
No. 1, 29-54. 
703
 See for example Article 29(1) of the Angola Constitution; Article 82 of the Mozambique Constitution and 
Article 107A(2)(e) of the Tanzania Constitution. 
704
 See Article 41(2) of the Malawi Constitution.   
705
 Articles 29(4) and (5) and 72 of the Angola Constitution; Section 12(8) of the Lesotho Constitution; Article 
12(1)(a) of the Namibia Constitution; Article 19(1) of the Seychelles Constitution; and Section 21(10) of the 
Swaziland Constitution.  
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law.
706
 The realisation of these rights for social security applicants and beneficiaries requires 
the establishment of an adjudication system. 
 
Some constitutions also provide for a right to just administrative action.
707
 This has an impact 
on the decisions, conduct and actions of social security administering institutions and 
adjudication tribunals.
708
 
 
Few countries have adopted legislation to provide for the establishment of an adjudication 
framework for the whole social security system. Some countries have established 
adjudication systems for public social security schemes, while others regulate the 
establishment of a dispute resolution system for private social security schemes. However, 
some countries provide dispute resolution frameworks for certain social security schemes 
only;
709
 and in some cases only the adjudication of particular types of disputes is regulated.
710
  
In some countries social security statutes do not provide for the resolution of disputes.
711
    
 
Where provision has been made for the resolution of social security disputes, no dedicated 
social security adjudication institutions have been created. In these cases, the resolution of 
social security disputes is undertaken by labour courts,
712
 or by ordinary civil courts. An 
appropriate social security adjudication framework that can be considered as a benchmark for 
the development of an effective and efficient social security adjudication system in South 
Africa is therefore lacking.  
 
 
 
                                                 
706
 Section 10(9) of the Botswana Constitution; Article 10(8) of the Mauritius Constitution; Article 18(8) of the 
Zambia Constitution and Article 18(9) of the Zimbabwe Constitution. 
707
 Such as the Malawi Constitution (section 43) and the Swaziland Constitution (section 33). 
708
 Olivier M “Social security adjudication in the light of international standards: the need for reform in 
Southern Africa” 2011 International Journal of Social Security and Workers Compensation Vol. 3, No. 1, 29-
54. 
709
 Such as in section 45 of Namibia’s Social Security Act 34 of 1994; sections 34A-36 of the National Pensions 
Act of Mauritius (Act 44 1976); and sections 35-37 of the National Social Security Authority Act of Zimbabwe.   
710
 See Article 10 of the Social Welfare Act of Zimbabwe which provides for an appeal in social assistance 
disputes to the relevant minister, 
711
 There is no explicit provision for the resolution of social security disputes in the Swaziland National 
Provident Fund Order of 1974 and Zambia’s National Social Security Authority Act 12 of 1989 which regulates 
the National Pension Scheme Authority (NAPSA).  
712
 This is the case in Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland. 
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3. AUSTRALIA  
 
Australia has established institutions and procedures for the resolution of social security 
disputes. These institutions and procedures seek to realise the common law and statutory right 
to a fair hearing; and Australia’s international law obligations in this regard. The established 
institutions and procedures must therefore comply with the scope and contents of the right to 
a fair hearing. Therefore, the social security adjudication systems ensure access to justice for 
parties to social security disputes; as access to justice is considered as an essential aspect of 
the right to a fair hearing (and the right to equality before the law).
713
 As Australian courts 
have held, “[t]he inherent duty to ensure a fair trial and the human rights of equality before 
the law and access to justice may be said to breathe the same air”.714 
 
According to the Human Rights Law Resource Centre,
715
 the basic minimum elements of the 
right to a fair trial which these institutions are required to comply with include equal access 
to, and equality before the courts; provision of legal advice and representation;
716
 elimination 
or reduction of costs of litigation; right to procedural fairness; positive duties to self-
represented litigants; right to an expeditious hearing; right to a competent, independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law; right to a public hearing;
717
 and the right to have the 
free assistance of an interpreter, where necessary.  
 
                                                 
713
 Human Rights Law Resource Centre The Right to a Fair Hearing and Access to Justice: Australia’s 
Obligations (Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee: Inquiry into Australia’s 
Judicial System, the Role of Judges and Access to Justice) 6 March 2009, 8. 
714
 Bell J in Tomasevic v Travaglini & Anor [2007] VSC 337. 
715
Human Rights Law Resource Centre The Right to a Fair Hearing and Access to Justice: Australia’s 
Obligations (Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee: Inquiry into Australia’s 
Judicial System, the Role of Judges and Access to Justice) 6 March 2009, 3. 
716
 The Law Council of Australia has stated that “[e]quality before the law is meaningless if there are barriers 
that prevent people from enforcing their rights. True equality requires that all these barriers – financial, social 
and cultural – be removed for all Australians. The legal assistance system is critical in overcoming these 
barriers” - see Law Council of Australia Legal Aid and Access to Justice Funding 2009-10 Federal Budget, (9 
January 2009). 
717
 It has been held that “the publicity of a trial includes both the public nature of the hearings and the publicity 
of the judgment eventually made in a case. The court or tribunal is obliged to make information about the time 
and venue of the hearing available and to provide adequate facilities for attendance by interested members of the 
public, within reasonable limits. The right to a public hearing means that the hearing should be conducted orally 
and publicly. While the right to a fair and public hearing generally implies the right to an oral hearing, in certain 
circumstances, it may be permissible for a court to determine a matter by written submissions in the interests of 
efficient administration of justice. However, where the hearing is a first instance hearing rather than appeal, only 
exceptional circumstances will justify departure from an oral hearing” - see Human Rights Law Resource Centre 
The Right to a Fair Hearing and Access to Justice: Australia’s Obligations (Submission to the Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs Committee: Inquiry into Australia’s Judicial System, the Role of Judges and Access to 
Justice) 6 March 2009, 31-32). 
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The social security dispute resolution system as a whole; and the institutional framework and 
procedures of each of these institutions are geared towards the achievement of access to 
justice for social security applicants and beneficiaries. As a result, the system is guided by the 
principles for access to justice policy-making (objectives of the Australian justice system).
718
 
The principles or objectives are accessibility,
719
 appropriateness,
720
 equity,
721
 efficiency
722
 
and effectiveness.
723
 
 
The Australian social security dispute resolution system is a multi-level system of sequential 
and complementary internal review (review by the ministry or agency responsible for the 
administration of social security) and external review of decisions by the SSAT, the AAT, the 
Federal Court, the High Court, the Court of Appeals and finally the Supreme Court. However, 
the inquiry into the effectiveness of the Australian system is limited to the first four levels, as 
the bulk of disputes are resolved at these levels (appeals proceed to the Federal Court, the 
High Court, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court only on questions of law). 
 
3.1 Review of decision by ministry or social security administration agency 
 
The first step in the resolution of social security disputes is the internal review of the 
decision. Internal review occurs where a decision made by an officer of ministry or social 
security administration agency is reconsidered by the officer and/or reviewed by another 
person in the ministry or agency. It is a requirement for most (social security) agencies to 
implement appropriate internal review processes. Applicants or beneficiaries must also be 
informed of their rights to a review if they are adversely affected by a decision of the agency. 
This is because an internal review is easy for social security applicants or beneficiaries to 
                                                 
718
 See Australian Government A Strategic Framework for Access to Justice in the Federal Civil Justice System: 
A Guide for Future Action (September 2009) 8. 
719
 The principle of accessibility requires that the net complexity of the dispute resolution system should be 
reduced, and there must be mechanisms that enable people to understand and exercise their rights.  
720
 The dispute resolution system should be structured to create incentives to encourage people to resolve 
disputes at the post appropriate level.   
721
 The dispute resolution system should be fair and accessible for all, including those facing financial and other 
disadvantage.  
722
 The dispute resolution system should deliver fair outcomes in the most efficient manner possible. This may 
include dispute resolution outside a formal dispute resolution process, the prevention of disputes and the 
provision of early assistance and support to prevent a dispute from escalating.    
723
 The various elements of the system should be designed to deliver the best outcomes for users. The elements 
should be directed towards the prevention and resolution of disputes, delivering fair and appropriate outcomes 
and maintaining and supporting the rule of law.   
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access, and it enables a quicker and less expensive means of re-examining decisions where 
applicants or beneficiaries believe a mistake has been made and resolving disputes.
724
 
 
The internal review process involves a review by the Original Decision-Maker, followed by a 
review by an Authorised Review Officer. A social security applicant or beneficiary who is 
unhappy with a decision by an administration agency (such as Centrelink, Child Support 
Agency or Family Assistance Office) has the right to discuss it with original decision-maker. 
The Original Decision-Maker is given an opportunity to review the decision made. Review 
by the Original Decision-Maker gives the applicant or beneficiary an opportunity to correct 
misunderstandings, present new information or evidence, and to get an incorrect decision 
changed quickly. It thus promotes the resolution of a dispute at an expeditious manner.  
 
A person who is still unhappy with a decision of the Original Decision-Maker can apply for a 
review by an Authorised Review Officer (of Centrelink) or an Objections Officer (of the 
Child Support Agency). An Authorised Review Officer is a person with due delegations to 
review a decision made.
725
 In an attempt to expedite the review process, the applicant or 
beneficiary is not required to apply for a review by the Original Decision-Maker before 
applying for a review by an Authorised Review Officer. 
 
When an application is made to an Authorised Review Officer, he or she considers the 
information that formed the basis of the original decision. Where possible, he or she contacts 
the review applicant by phone or in person to discuss the issue(s); checks any new and 
relevant information that may be available; clears up any misunderstandings that may be 
present; corrects any mistakes that were made; changes the original decision (where 
appropriate); and informs the review applicant of the result, explaining the reasons for his or 
her decision.
726
 
 
 
 
                                                 
724
 Commonwealth of Australia Australian Administrative Law Policy Guide (2011) 14. 
725
 Authorised Review Officers are senior and experienced officials with more specialised legal knowledge who 
have had no involvement in the matter. 
726
 Olivier M (assisted by Govindjee A & Nyenti M) Project to set up internal remedy units at district, regional 
and national offices at SASSA (Report prepared for the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA)) May 
2009, 47. 
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3.2 Review of a social security decision by the SSAT 
 
After the review by the ARO or an Objections Officer, an applicant or beneficiary who is still 
unhappy can appeal the decision to the SSAT. Such an appeal is an external review process, 
as it is an application to an institution that is independent of the institution that took the 
original decision. The SSAT, which can be considered as the first level of appeals (external 
reviews) of social security decisions, reviews the decisions agencies such as Centrelink 
(relating to social security, family assistance, and education or training payments) and the 
Child Support Agency (on the provision of child support).  
 
The SSAT was established with the objective of achieving access to justice for parties to 
disputes within its jurisdiction. The SSAT was established to conduct merits review of 
administrative decisions made under the social security law, the family assistance law and 
various other pieces of legislation in a fair, just, economical, informal and quick manner.
727
 
The institutional framework and procedures of the SSAT are therefore geared towards the 
achievement of its objective. This relates to its accessibility; its practices and procedures; the 
scope of its jurisdiction and powers; the competency of its members; and its independence 
and impartiality. 
 
3.2.1 Accessibility of the SSAT 
 
In order for the SSAT to be effective (to conduct merits review of administrative decisions in 
in a fair, just, economical, informal and quick manner), it must be accessible to (potential) 
users of the Tribunal. This requires that the institutional framework, practices and procedures 
and all relevant aspects of the Tribunal should enable affected persons to get redress. As was 
stated in the Foreword to the Report by the Access to Justice Taskforce: 
 
“an effective justice system must be accessible in all its parts. Without this, the system risks losing its 
relevance to, and the respect of, the community it serves. Accessibility is about more than ease of 
access to sandstone buildings or getting legal advice. It involves an appreciation and understanding of 
the needs of those who require the assistance of the legal system.”728 
 
                                                 
727
 Section 141 of the Social Security (Administration) Act. 
728
 Commonwealth of Australia A Strategic Framework for Access to Justice in the Federal Civil Justice System 
(Report by the Access to Justice Taskforce) September 2009, ix. 
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The accessibility of the SSAT ensures, through the location of its offices, the requirements 
and procedures for making an application and the provision of information about the review 
process. In relation to the location of its offices, the National Office of the SSAT is located in 
Melbourne; while regional SSAT offices are based in Sydney (for the Australian Capital 
Territory and New South Wales), Brisbane (for Queensland / Northern Territory), Adelaide 
(for South Australia / Tasmania), Melbourne (for Victoria) and Western Australia (Perth). 
Hearings are generally conducted in the SSAT’s offices in Adelaide, Brisbane, Canberra, 
Hobart, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney. However, SSAT hearings are also conducted in other 
regional centres.
729
 In addition, the SSAT facilitates the participation of parties by arranging 
hearings through tele- or video-conference for persons living in regional areas and those 
unable to attend the hearing at the SSAT premises.
730
 All SSAT premises are wheelchair 
accessible, and the Tribunal provides typewriter and hearing loop services. Applicants and 
other parties can also advise the SSAT of any special needs.
731
 
 
Access to the SSAT is further facilitated through the requirements and procedures for making 
an application. Applications to the SSAT for review can be lodged easily and without undue 
formality. There are no costs for SSAT review applications,
732
 and they can be lodged by 
telephone, in writing or by teletype machine (for hearing impaired applicants). In addition, 
applications for review of Child Support Agency decisions can be lodged in writing at a range 
of government department offices.
733
  
 
Applications for review of Centrelink decisions can be lodged any time after a review of the 
original decision by a Centrelink Authorised Review Officer. If the review is about payment 
of a Centrelink benefit, it should be lodged as soon as possible (within 13 weeks), because 
back-pay may not be possible if a successful application for review is lodged more than 13 
weeks after the Centrelink ARO’s decision.734 For persons resident in Australia, Child 
Support Agency appeals must be lodged within 28 days of receiving an objection decision. 
                                                 
729
 During 2010-2011 the SSAT also conducted hearings in Townsville, Newcastle, Wollongong, Bunbury, 
Whyalla and Launceston. 
730
 Social Security Appeals Tribunal Annual Report 2010-2011, 13. See also Section 161(5) of the Social 
Security (Administration) Act. 
731
 Social Security Appeals Tribunal Annual Report 2010-2011, 13. 
732
 Legal Aid NSW and Welfare Rights Centre Appealing to the Social Security Appeals Tribunal: A self-help 
guide for people who want to appeal against a Centrelink decision (July 2010) 4. 
733
 See Social Security Appeals Tribunal Annual Report 2009-2010, 21. 
734
 Section 145 of the Social Security (Administration Act) 
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Persons living out of Australia must lodge an appeal within 90 days.
735
 However, a person 
may make a written extension application asking the SSAT Principal Member
736
 to consider 
the application for review despite the late submission of the review. The extension 
application must state the reasons for the person's failure to apply for the review within the 
required period.
737
 
 
An applicant whose appeal is urgent can ask the SSAT to give priority to his or her appeal.  
This would be the case for applicants who have no income or are experiencing financial 
problems.
738
 
 
The SSAT assists parties to a hearing by providing information about the review process. 
Where an application for review is sent or delivered to an office of the SSAT, the Principal 
Member of the SSAT gives the applicant and the Secretary written notice that the application 
has been received.
739
 The Principal Member also gives each party (other than the Secretary) a 
copy of the statement about the decision under review.
740
 The Principal Member gives the 
applicant and any other parties to the review written notice of the day, time and place fixed 
for the hearing of the application. It is required that the notice be given a reasonable time 
before the day fixed for the hearing.
741
 
 
The Principal Member takes reasonable steps to give written notice that an application has 
been made to the SSAT for the review of a decision to a person who is not a party to the 
review but whose interests are affected by the decision. Such notice is given at any time 
before the determination of the review.
742
 It is in writing and includes information about the 
                                                 
735
 Section 90 of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act of 1988. 
736
 See “Expertise, independence and impartiality of the SSAT” in para 3.2.4 of this Chapter (below) for the 
description of the Principal Member. 
737
 Section 91 of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act of 1988. 
738
 Legal Aid NSW and Welfare Rights Centre Appealing to the Social Security Appeals Tribunal: A self-help 
guide for people who want to appeal against a Centrelink decision (July 2010) 4. 
739
 Section 157(2) of the Social Security (Administration) Act. 
740
 Section 158(1) of the Social Security (Administration) Act. The statement about the decision sets out the 
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person’s right to apply to the Principal Member to be added as a party to the review. The 
Principal Member also gives each party to the review a copy of the notice.
743
 
 
The SSAT does not provide legal assistance to parties to a review. However, it provides 
parties seeking legal assistance with details of community legal centres.
744
 The Tribunal also 
seeks to improve access to justice through activities and meetings intended to raise awareness 
of the availability of this mechanism. 
 
Access to the Tribunal is also promoted through the regulation of costs. Although the general 
practice is for a party to a SSAT review to bear any expenses incurred in connection with the 
review, the Tribunal may determine that the National Government (Commonwealth) pays the 
reasonable costs that are incurred by a party for travel and accommodation in connection with 
the review.
745
  
 
3.2.2 Scope of jurisdiction and powers of the SSAT 
 
The scope of jurisdiction and powers of the SSAT in reviewing decisions are as set out in 
various statutes.
746
 The enabling statutes grant the Tribunal powers to review a wide range of 
decisions. For example, the Social Security (Administration) Act states that the SSAT can 
review all decisions of an officer under the social security law.
747
 Therefore, almost every 
decision made by Centrelink can be appealed to the SSAT. The SSAT also reviews most 
CSA decisions.
748
 
 
However, due to the need to ensure that disputes are resolved at the appropriate levels 
(sequential and complementary resolution of disputes), the SSAT cannot review a decision 
made by an officer of Centrelink or of the Child Support Agency, unless that decision has 
been reviewed by an Authorised Review Officer or Objections Officer, respectively.
749
 In 
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addition, the SSAT can also conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining whether it has 
jurisdiction to hear an appeal (this is the case where the Child Support Agency rejects an 
objection on the basis that it is not “valid”, and adopts the view that the SSAT has no 
jurisdiction. 
 
The personal scope of jurisdiction of the SSAT is also wide. Any person whose interests are 
affected by the decision of the Ministry for Families, Housing, Community Services and 
Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA), the Child Support Agency or Centrelink, or another relevant 
agency) may apply to the SSAT for review of that decision.
750
 This implies that not only the 
person who is directly affected, but any other person whose interests are affected by the 
decision can apply.  
 
The wide scope of decisions that can be reviewed and the granting of access to the Tribunal 
to a wide range of persons ensure that the Tribunal is able to afford access to justice for as 
many social security applicants/beneficiaries as possible. 
 
The SSAT effectiveness in reviewing the decisions of social security agencies is facilitated 
by the extensive powers granted to it. In reviewing a decision, the Tribunal is not bound by 
legal technicalities, legal forms or rules of evidence. The SSAT was established to conduct 
merits review of decisions made in terms of the enabling social security statutes. Merits 
review is defined as the “process by which a person or body, other than the primary decision-
maker, reconsiders the facts, law and policy aspects of the original decision and determines 
the ‘correct or preferable decision.” In this case the whole decision is made again on the 
facts.
751
 The objectives of merit review are to ensure administrative decisions are correct or 
preferable (that decisions are lawfully-made or, if there is a range of decisions that can be 
lawfully made, that the best decision is made on the relevant facts); to ensure fair treatment of 
all persons affected by a decision; and to improve the quality and consistency of primary 
decision-making.
752
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Merits review of an administrative decision by the Tribunal involves considering afresh the 
facts, law and policy relating to that decision. Merits review is made up of three aspects: 
substantive, procedural and remedial aspects. The substantive element requires that in 
considering the material before it and in making a decision, the Tribunal must seek to ensure 
that the correct or (in a discretionary area) preferable decision is made. As the Tribunal has 
stated: 
 
“The question for the determination of the Tribunal is not whether the decision which the decision 
maker made was the correct or preferable one on the material before him.  The question for the 
determination of the Tribunal is whether that decision was the correct or preferable one on the material 
before the Tribunal.”753  
 
In terms of the procedural aspect of merits review, the reviewer is empowered to exercise the 
powers and discretions of the original decision-maker. In addition, when the reviewer varies 
the primary decision or makes a substitute decision, the reviewer’s decision is deemed to be 
the decision of the original decision-maker. Hence it is said that when undertaking a review, 
the reviewer ‘stands in the shoes of the primary decision-maker’.754  
  
By placing the reviewer in the shoes of the original decision-maker, merits review empowers 
the reviewer to exercise the powers of the original decision-maker. Merits review also affords 
wide powers on the reviewer to make a decision and provide a remedy. The SSAT may 
therefore exercise the powers and discretions of the decision-maker, subject to some 
exceptions. 
 
When the SSAT reviews a decision, it can affirm it, vary it or set it aside. Where the Tribunal 
sets aside a decision, it can substitute it with a new decision or send the matter back to the 
relevant agency for reconsideration, in accordance with directions or recommendations that it 
may provide.
755
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If necessary, the SSAT can take evidence on oath or affirmation for the purposes of a review 
of a decision.
756
 The Tribunal can ask an agency to provide it with information or a document 
that is in the possession of the Agency and that is relevant to the review of a decision.
757
 The 
SSAT may require a person to furnish any information or document which it believes is in the 
possession of the person and is relevant to a review.
758
 The Tribunal may also inspect any 
such document produced and may make and retain copies of the document.
759
 
 
3.2.3 Fairness of SSAT procedures 
 
The practices and procedures at the hearing of the SSAT are also aimed at ensuring that the 
Tribunal is accessible and is able to achieve its objectives. Given the number and diversity of 
persons who apply to the Tribunal for review of decisions, its practices and procedures are 
flexible and informal.  
 
In reviewing a decision, the SSAT is not bound by legal technicalities, legal forms or rules of 
evidence. It is to act as speedily as a proper consideration of the review allows. In 
determining what a proper consideration of the review requires, it must have regard to its 
objective of providing a mechanism of review that is fair, just, economical, informal and 
quick. In reviewing a decision, the SSAT may inform itself on any matter relevant to a review 
of a decision in any manner it considers appropriate.
760
  
 
The hearing of a review is to be in private, although the Tribunal may give directions for 
other persons to be present at a review hearing.
761
 Such a direction takes into account the 
wishes of the parties and the need to protect their privacy.  
 
The SSAT conducts hearings at its offices in rooms which do not have the formality of court 
rooms.
762
 Hearings are conducted in private with only the applicant and SSAT members, 
except where the applicant gives permission for someone else to attend, or a representative of 
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a social security agency is required to attend.
763
 Hearings are conducted face-to-face with the 
applicant and other parties to an appeal in the same room. This is due to the belief that the 
interests of the applicant and other parties are best served and protected when members, 
applicants and other parties have the opportunity to speak directly in an informal 
environment.
764
 However, hearings are also conducted telephonically where a party is unable 
to attend the hearing at the premises of the Tribunal.
765
  
 
With the exception of the social security agency, a party to a SSAT review is permitted to 
make oral and/or written submissions. The Tribunal also permits another person to make 
submissions on behalf of a party to a review of a decision. The party or the party’s 
representative can make the submission by telephone or by means of other electronic 
communications equipment.
766
 This is the case where the review application is urgent; where 
the party lives in a remote area and would unreasonable expenses in travelling to the venue of 
the hearing; where the party fails to attend the hearing and does not indicate that he or she 
intends to attend the hearing; and where the applicant is unable to attend the hearing because 
of illness or infirmity.
767
 
 
However, the social security agency may request permission to make oral and/or written 
submissions, if this would assist the Tribunal in achieving its objectives. The Tribunal may 
grant such a request for submissions if it promotes the Tribunal’s objectives. Oral 
submissions by the social security agency can be made by telephone or by means of other 
electronic communications equipment.
768
 
 
The SSAT can hear an appeal without oral submissions if it considers that it can be 
determined fairly on the basis of written submissions by the parties; and all parties consent to 
the hearing being conducted without oral submissions.
769
 The Tribunal can also ask the social 
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security agency to provide the SSAT with information or a document that the Secretary has 
and that is relevant to the review of a decision.
770
  
 
A party to a SSAT hearing is permitted to have a representative (such as a friend, relative or 
legal practitioner). However, in most cases a legal practitioner is unnecessary for a SSAT 
hearing, as hearings are informal and parties are given an opportunity to present their case.
771
 
 
In furtherance of its objectives, the SSAT is empowered to utilise alternative dispute 
resolution processes if it considers that this will assist in the conduct and consideration of the 
appeal.
772
 A pre-hearing conference is aimed at clarifying the issues in dispute, explaining the 
hearing process to the parties and identifying additional information required for the 
hearing.
773
 At a pre-hearing conference, the Tribunal may fix a date for the hearing; give 
directions about the time for submissions to be made; give directions about the time within 
which evidence is to be brought before the SSAT; and give directions about what evidence is 
to be brought before the SSAT and the time the evidence is to be brought.
774
 
 
If the parties reach an agreement at the pre-hearing conference before a review hearing the 
terms of the agreement are put in writing, signed by or on behalf of the parties; and lodged 
with the SSAT. If the agreement is within the SSAT’s powers; it may make a decision in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement without holding a hearing of the review.
775
 Pre-
hearing conferences therefore promote the SSAT’s objective to fair, just, economical, 
informal and quick review mechanism. Tribunal is able to assist parties to reach agreement as 
a result of a pre-hearing conference in about one quarter of cases in which a conference is 
held.
776
 
 
The SSAT provides an interpreter to assist an applicant or another party (where necessary), 
free of charge. The SSAT also arranges for and pays for the translation of documents in a 
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foreign language.
777
 The provision of interpretation and translation services is vital in such a 
hearing as it ensures a fair hearing and access to justice for the parties. It has been observed 
that: 
 
“in order to have true access to justice, applicants must be able to understand the proceedings and 
processes. In some circumstances, applicants will require the assistance of an interpreter, either for 
their own benefit or to be used with witnesses. Therefore, the right to, and access to, an interpreter is a 
vital part of access to justice. There are two aspects to the access to interpreters: availability of an 
interpreter, and ability to either secure the services of a free interpreter or pay the costs of an 
interpreter.... The unavailability of interpreting services in the courts presents a major barrier to access 
to justice. A party’s ability to participate in the legal process is severely undermined where he or she is 
unable to afford to pay for an interpreter to attend a hearing.” 778 
 
There are no statutory time periods for the finalisation of appeals by the SSAT. However, it is 
required to act as expeditiously as possible, while giving a proper consideration to the 
review.
779
 The SSAT’s determination of what a proper consideration requires is guided by its 
statutory objective of providing a mechanism of review that is fair, just, economical, informal 
and quick. In order to fulfil its objective of providing a mechanism of review that is quick, 
the Service Charter of the SSAT commits the SSAT to ensuring timely service to applicants 
and other parties to reviews.
780
 Timeliness standards in the Service Charter include 
confirmation of receipt of applications within five days; allocation of hearing or pre-hearing 
conference dates as soon as possible; provision to the parties of copies of the documents that 
will be before the SSAT at least seven days before scheduled hearings; written notification of 
the SSAT’s decision within 14 days of the decision; and finalisation of the review within 
three months of lodgement of the application for review. 
 
Although SSAT review hearings may be adjourned, the SSAT will not postpone a review 
hearing if the hearing has already been postponed two or more times. The Tribunal will also 
not postpone a review hearing if this is inconsistent with its objective of ensuring a fair, just, 
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economical, informal and quick review process. A review will also not be postponed if social 
security benefits are paid pending outcome of the review application.
781
  
 
Where the SSAT affirms a decision on a review, it prepares a written statement, setting out 
the decision. It gives each party to the review a copy of the statement within 14 days after 
making the decision. It also give reasons for the decision, orally, to each party to the review 
and explains that the party may make a written request for a written statement within 14 days 
after the copy of the statement is given; or gives each party to the review a written statement 
that sets out the reasons for the decision, sets out the findings on any material questions of 
fact and refers to evidence or other material on which the findings of fact are based.
782
 A 
party make request to the SSAT for the copy of the written statement. The SSAT is required 
to comply with a request for a written statement within 14 days after receipt of the request.
783
  
 
Where the SSAT varies or sets a decision aside, it also prepares a written statement. The 
statement sets out the decision of the SSAT on the review, the reasons for the decision and 
the findings on any material questions of fact. It refers to evidence or other material on which 
the findings of fact are based. The SSAT gives each party to the review a copy of the written 
statement within 14 days after the making of the decision.
784
 
 
The Tribunal also gives each party to the review (other than the social security agency) a 
written notice on the right to apply to the AAT for review of the decision.
785
  
 
3.2.4 Expertise, independence and impartiality of the SSAT  
 
The institutional framework of the SSAT indicates recognition of the fact that for it to be 
effective in resolving disputes, it must be competent to resolve dispute within its jurisdiction. 
It must also be independent of the institutions whose decisions they are reviewing and to be 
impartial. The importance of competence, independence and impartiality in the promotion of 
access to justice system in Australia was captured by the Human Rights Law Resource Centre 
when it stated that: 
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“The broad concepts of competence, independence and impartiality provide necessary safeguards 
against violation of the right to a fair hearing and promote the right to equality. The fact that these 
elements of the right to a fair hearing are considered as absolute demonstrates that they are crucial for 
effective access to justice.”786 
 
The SSAT consists of a Principal Member; Senior Members; Assistant Senior Members; and 
other members. The Principal Member is appointed as a full-time member; while other 
members are appointed as either full-time or part-time members.
787
 Most members of the 
SSAT are appointed on a part-time basis to allow the SSAT flexibility in meeting its review 
workload.
788
 
 
SSAT members are drawn from varied backgrounds and areas of expertise, including 
expertise in law, social welfare, medicine, accounting and government.
789
 Members are 
appointed on the basis of their specialist knowledge, communication skills, knowledge of the 
social security system or child support scheme and their understanding of, and commitment 
to the principles of administrative review.
790
 
 
A SSAT hearing panel normally consists of a single member. However, in complicated cases 
such as child support reviews, a panel is made up of two or more members. The constitution 
of the SSAT by one member for most reviews fulfils the Tribunal’s statutory objective of 
providing a mechanism of review that is not only fair, just, informal and quick but also 
economical. It also increases the Tribunal’s capacity to hear matters and reduces the time 
from application to finalisation of a review.
791
  
 
The SSAT is within the portfolio of FaHCSIA. FaHCSIA provides for the funding of the 
Tribunal;
792
 human resource and administrative support;
793
 governance, oversight and 
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supervision
794
 and accountability and reporting of the Tribunal.
795
 However, the Tribunal was 
established to provide an independent merits review of decisions. It contributes to the 
portfolio of FAHCSIA, as it ensures that the administrative decisions of Centrelink, the Child 
Support Agency and other agencies are consistent with legislation.
796
 As a result, it is 
independent of these agencies whose decisions it reviews. The independence and impartiality 
of the SSAT is further facilitated by the procedure for the appointment and discipline of 
members;
797
 and the management of the Tribunal.
798
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Members are usually appointed for five year terms and may be reappointed (see Social Security Appeals 
Tribunal Annual Report 2010-2011, 17 and Clause 4 of Schedule 3 of the Social Security (Administration) Act). 
The terms and conditions of appointment of SSAT members are as provided in the Social Security 
(Administration) Act or as determined by the Governor-General (Clause 5 of Schedule 3 of the Social Security 
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3.3 Review of social security decisions by the AAT 
 
The AAT was established to provide independent merits review of administrative decisions. 
The objective of the Tribunal is to improve the quality of administrative decision-making 
through the provision of a review mechanism that is fair, just, economical, informal and 
quick. Its mission is to deliver high-quality and independent merits review of administrative 
decisions in a timely fashion, using alternative dispute resolution processes where 
appropriate.
799
  
 
Therefore, the establishment of the Tribunal and its processes facilitate its achievement of its 
mission and objectives. For example, measures have been adopted to ensure that the AAT is 
accessible to review applicants. In addition, the AAT has broad and general jurisdiction to 
review government decisions. The practices and procedures of the Tribunal are also geared 
towards meeting its mission and objectives. Furthermore, the Tribunal has the required 
expertise to hear applications brought before it; and is independent of the institutions whose 
decisions it reviews and impartial.   
 
3.3.1 Accessibility of the AAT   
 
Various mechanisms have been adopted to ensure that the AAT is accessible to review 
applicants. The accessibility of the Tribunal is promoted by the location of its offices and 
venues for its hearing; the requirements for making an application to the Tribunal; provision 
of information about the Tribunal review process to parties (especially self-represented 
parties); the practices and procedures at the hearing; and (where necessary) the use of 
alternative dispute resolution processes.
800
  
  
The AAT has a principal registry (head office) and district registries (district offices). The 
principal registry has offices in Brisbane, Perth and Sydney. The Tribunal also has district 
registries in each of the state capital cities and in Canberra. The registry service for Tasmania 
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(in Hobart) is provided by the Federal Court. The Brisbane (Queensland) registry is 
responsible for applications from Northern Territory.
801
 
 
There is also little formality and technicality in applying to the AAT for the review of a 
decision. The absence of formality and technicality facilitates access for applicants to the 
Tribunal, especially unassisted applicants.
802
 The procedures for making an application to the 
AAT are simple. The main requirements for making an application are that it must be in 
writing and it must contain a statement of reasons for the application. The application must 
also be lodged within the prescribed time limit and where required, an application fee is 
paid.
803
 Although an application form is available, it is not mandatory for applicants to use it. 
Applications can be made in the form of a letter. The statement of reasons is also not 
expected to be a detailed outline of the grounds of the application.
804
 
 
Once an application is made, the AAT itself notifies the decision-maker of the application. 
The decision-maker is then required to send to the AAT and the applicant a statement of 
reasons for the decision under review and every document in the decision-maker’s possession 
or control that is relevant to the review within 28 days.
805
     
 
The AAT assists parties (especially self-represented parties) to participate as fully as possible 
in the review process. The Tribunal offers information on its role and procedures in multiple 
formats. It has published brochures for self-represented applicants to explain the Tribunal’s 
role, when it can assist and the stages in a review. The brochures are designed to be clear and 
easy to understand, and are available in a range of languages and in large print.
806
 The letter 
of acknowledgement of receipt of an application that is sent to an applicant also sets out basic 
information about the review process.
807
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The AAT also has an Outreach Programme which aims to help self-represented parties 
understand the Tribunal’s processes and gives them the opportunity to ask questions about 
practices and procedures. Outreach services are usually provided telephonically. Outreach 
services are also used to ascertain whether a person will require an interpreter or assistance 
because of a disability, and to assess what further information may assist the person.
808
 
During the Outreach, the AAT staff member explains the documents required in terms of 
section 37 of the AAT Act (i.e. statement of reasons for the decision under review and 
documents in the decision-maker’s possession or control that are relevant to the review). He 
or she also explains the next steps in the review and other procedural matters, such as how to 
make an application to stay the decision under review. 
 
A DVD (titled Getting Decisions Right) has also been produced to illustrate the Tribunal’s 
practices and procedures for applicants. The DVD is subtitled in English for people with a 
hearing impairment and available in Arabic, Greek, Italian, Mandarin, Serbian, Spanish, 
Turkish and Vietnamese.
809
 Comprehensive information about the Tribunal and its 
procedures is also available on its website.
810
 
 
Together with legal aid institutions in each of its registries (regional offices), the AAT has 
established legal advice schemes to provide assistance to self-represented parties.
811
 Self-
represented parties are invited to consult the legal aid person for advice and minor assistance. 
Self-represented parties may also be provided legal assistance if they are eligible for legal 
aid. The Tribunal also refers self-represented parties to community legal centres and other 
legal service providers that may be able to advice or represent such persons. These measures 
enhance the accessibility of the AAT for persons without legal representation. 
 
Access to the Tribunal for persons with disabilities is also facilitated. The Tribunal promotes 
easy access for people with a disability by making electronic and printed material available in 
appropriate formats; providing portable hearing loop systems in Tribunal premises; 
facilitating telephone contact for those with a hearing or speech impairment; making all 
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premises wheelchair accessible, and providing facilities for participation in conferences or 
hearings by telephone or video link.
812
 
 
3.3.2 Scope of jurisdiction and powers of the AAT 
 
The AAT has the power to review a decision where national (Commonwealth) legislation 
statute accords it jurisdiction. Therefore, the Tribunal does not have a general power to 
review decisions, but can only review a decision if an Act, regulation or other legislative 
instrument states that the decision is subject to review by the Tribunal. Despite this, the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal covers a wide range of executive decisions, as it currently has 
jurisdiction to review decisions made under more than 400 Acts and legislative 
instruments.
813
 However, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over decisions that relate to 
government policy, although its jurisdiction it includes operational policy.
814
  
 
As a general purpose tribunal, the Tribunal consists of several divisions. These include the 
General Administrative Division; the Taxation Appeals Division; the Veterans’ Appeals 
Division and the Security Appeals Division. The Medical Appeals Division and the Valuation 
and Compensation Division are not yet in operation.
815
 The Tribunal reviews decisions 
relating to social security and family assistance, workers’ compensation, taxation, veterans’ 
affairs, bankruptcy, civil aviation, citizenship and immigration, corporations law, customs, 
freedom of information, industry assistance, passports and security assessments by the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation.
816
 
 
In most instances, the Tribunal acts as a second-tier appeal institution. This means it can only 
review a decision after an internal review of the original decision has been conducted; or after 
a review by an intermediate review by a specialist tribunal. In the case of social security 
appeals, this involves internal reviews by an original decision-maker and an authorised 
review officer and an initial review by the SSAT. The Social Security (Administration) Act 
states that an application may be made to the AAT for review of the decision of the SSAT if a 
decision has been reviewed by the SSAT; and the decision has been affirmed, varied or set 
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aside by the SSAT.
817
 In addition, the AAT may only review a decision that has been 
reviewed by the SSAT.
818
  
 
The Tribunal also has a wide scope of applicants. An application may be made to the 
Tribunal for a review of a decision by or on behalf of any person or persons whose interests 
are affected by the decision (including the Commonwealth or an authority of the 
Commonwealth or Norfolk Island or an authority of Norfolk Island).
819
 In addition, an 
organisation or association can apply to the Tribunal as it is considered to have interests that 
are affected by a decision if the decision relates to a matter included in the objects or 
purposes of the organisation or association.
820
 
 
The parties in a tribunal review proceeding are the person who has applied to the Tribunal for 
a review of the decision; the person who or agency that made the decision; the Attorney-
General (if the Attorney-General intervenes in the proceeding);
821
 and any other person who 
has applied and has been made a party to the proceeding by the Tribunal.
822
  
 
The AAT has wide review powers, as it conducts a merits review of administrative 
decisions.
823
 The Tribunal has held that it is not bound by government policy, although it 
cannot easily depart from such policy.
824
 Merits review of an administrative decision by the 
Tribunal involves considering afresh the facts, law and policy relating to that decision. When 
the Tribunal makes a decision, it takes the place of (stands in the shoes of) the original 
decision-maker.
825
 For example, the AAT Act states that for the purpose of reviewing a 
decision, the Tribunal may exercise all the powers and discretions that are conferred by any 
relevant enactment on the person who made the decision and shall make a decision affirming; 
varying; or setting aside the decision under review. Where it sets a decision aside, it makes a 
decision in substitution for the decision that is set aside; or remits the decision to the original 
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decision-maker for reconsideration in terms of any directions or recommendations of the 
Tribunal.
826
 Therefore, it is able to substitute the decision of the original decision-maker with 
its own.
827
 
 
In reviewing a decision, the Tribunal has the power to take  evidence on oath or affirmation; 
proceed in the absence of a party who has had reasonable notice of the proceeding; and 
adjourn the proceeding from time to time.
828
 The Tribunal can also summon a person to 
appear before the Tribunal at that hearing to give evidence; or to give evidence and produce 
any books, documents or things in his or her possession, custody or control.
829
 
 
The Tribunal may require a person who appears before a Tribunal hearing to give evidence to 
take an oath or to make an affirmation. Appropriate arrangements for the administration of an 
oath or affirmation are also be made if a person participates by telephone, by closed-circuit 
television or any other means of communication.
830
 
 
Although an application to the Tribunal for a review of a decision does not affect the 
operation of the decision or prevent the taking of action to implement the decision,
831
 the 
Tribunal can make an order to halt implementation of the decision or otherwise affecting the 
operation of the decision or a part of that decision.
832
 The Tribunal can make such an order if 
it considers it appropriate for the purpose of securing the effectiveness of the hearing and 
determination of the application for review. The Tribunal takes into account the interests of 
any persons who may be affected by the review. Before the Tribunal makes such an order, it 
must give the person who made the decision a reasonable opportunity to make a submission to 
the Tribunal.
833
 The Tribunal can make an order without giving a reasonable opportunity to 
make a submission if the Tribunal is satisfied that it is not practicable to give the person such 
an opportunity due to the urgency of the case or otherwise.
834
 This enables the AAT to extend 
protection to applicants or beneficiaries who may be negatively affected by the 
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implementation of a decision that is under review. Access to social security benefits can thus 
continue pending the review of a decision. 
 
3.3.3 Fairness of AAT procedures 
 
The AAT Act outlines the practices and procedures of the AAT. It states that, in carrying out 
its functions, the Tribunal must provide a review process that is fair, just, economical, 
informal and quick.
835
 It further states that any proceeding is to be conducted with as little 
formality and technicality, and with as much expedition, as the requirements of the Act and 
other relevant legislation and a proper consideration of the matters before the Tribunal 
permit.
836
 
 
The AAT has thus developed its practices and procedures in terms of these requirements. 
Such provisions are considered “to free tribunals, at least to some degree, from constraints 
otherwise applicable to courts of law, and regarded as inappropriate to tribunals”.837 The 
AAT’s practice and procedure are flexible due to the wide range of its jurisdiction and the 
variety of applicants. Its practices and processes must thus be flexible so as to “facilitate 
access to, and participation in, the review process and allow each application to be dealt with 
in the most appropriate manner.”838  
 
The practices and procedures developed by the AAT are aimed to deliver justice in the 
context of the Tribunal. These enable it to provide fair and just review of a broad range of 
administrative decisions in a flexible and appropriate way to a variety of applicants. It has 
been remarked that: 
  
“… the Tribunal has been given a degree of flexibility to deal with proceedings before it as it sees fit. 
The experience of the Tribunal has been that … there is no one level of formality or informality which 
is appropriate for all cases.”839 
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AAT practices and procedures can thus be tailored in each case to facilitate the participation 
of all of the parties in the review process and ensure that applications move towards resolution 
in an effective and efficient manner. 
 
All applications that are not resolved in the pre-hearing conference are determined in a 
hearing. However, where all the parties agree and the AAT is satisfied that it is appropriate, 
the AAT can determine the application on the basis of the application documents.
840
 Hearings 
before the Tribunal are held in public.
841
 However, the Tribunal is empowered to make 
orders, where appropriate, to protect the identity of parties and witnesses. It can also make 
orders to restrict or prohibit the disclosure of oral evidence or documents given to the 
Tribunal.
842
 Where a hearing is in public but a person participates in the hearing by telephone 
or closed-circuit television or another means of communication, the Tribunal takes such steps 
as are reasonably necessary to ensure the preservation of the public nature of the hearing.
843
  
 
A panel for an AAT hearing can be constituted by one, two or three members.
844
 The 
composition of the Tribunal panel is influenced by the legal and factual issues to be 
determined. The AAT Act specifies factors that the President must have regard to in 
constituting a Tribunal panel.
845
 These include the degree of public importance or complexity 
of the issues of  the hearing; the status of the position or office held by the person who made 
the decision under review; the financial importance of the issues of  the hearing; the purpose 
or object underlying the statute (whether or not that purpose or object is expressly stated, if 
the hearing is the review of a decision made in the exercise of powers conferred by a 
particular statute); the desirability for any or all of the persons who are to constitute the 
Tribunal to have knowledge, expertise or experience in relation to the matters to which that 
proceeding relates; and such other matters as the President considers relevant (if any). 
 
At AAT hearings, parties present evidence and make submissions in the same manner as 
court proceedings. However, the conduct of a hearing depends on the nature of the decision 
under review and the parties in the hearing. AAT hearing procedures are thus adapted to 
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ensure that the hearing is effective and all relevant evidence is presented.
846
 Each party to the 
dispute is given every opportunity to present their case.
847
 Hearings that involve self-
represented applicants are conducted in smaller, more informal hearing rooms. Procedures 
are also modified to assist a self-represented applicant to present his or her case. 
 
In order to enable it to achieve its objectives, the AAT Act provides that the Tribunal is not 
bound by the rules of evidence but may inform itself on any matter in such manner as it 
thinks appropriate.
848
 This discretion is exercised subject to the requirements of procedural 
fairness. The AAT also uses multiple experts for evidence during a hearing. This is reported 
to improve the quality and objectivity of the evidence that is given; and to enhance the 
Tribunal decision-making process (it assists the AAT to reach the correct or preferable 
decision). It also reduces the length of time of the hearing.
849
 
 
The AAT also has different modes of participation in hearings. The Tribunal conducts 
hearings in person, although it has the discretion to allow a person to participate by 
telephone, closed-circuit television, or any other means of communication.
850
 
 
The Tribunal also utilises alternative dispute resolution processes to achieve its objectives.
851
       
Pre-hearing conferences reduce the length of a hearing or eliminate the need for a hearing, 
which reduces the costs incurred by the parties and the Tribunal. During a pre-trial 
conference, parties are able to define the issues in dispute; identify any further supporting 
material the parties may wish to obtain, including witness statements, expert reports or other 
documents; and explore whether the matter can be settled. The AAT pre-hearing conference 
process is flexible and informal. The pre-hearing conference contributes to the fairness and 
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justice of the review process, as it provides self-represented applicants with assistance that 
helps them to understand and present their case.
852
 
 
Where possible, the Tribunal assists parties in reaching agreement. It hears and determines a 
relatively small proportion of cases that cannot be resolved during the pre-hearing 
conference.
853
 Pre-hearing conferences are thus a key way in which the Tribunal seeks to 
make the review process economical, quick and informal. 
 
Where both parties are represented, pre-hearing conferences are generally held by telephone. 
Where an applicant is not legally represented, conferences are held in person at the AAT’s 
premises. However, this would not be the case if it would not be convenient for one of the 
parties because of geographic or other reasons.
854
 
 
3.3.4 Expertise, independence, and impartiality of the AAT 
 
The wide scope of jurisdiction of the tribunal requires it to be flexible. The Tribunal’s 
flexibility is facilitated by the diversity of its membership. The Tribunal is composed of the 
President, other presidential members (deputy presidents), senior members and members who 
are appointed either on a full-time or part-time basis.
855
 The President of the Tribunal is a 
judge of the Federal Court, who is appointed for seven years. Judges of the Federal Court and 
the Family Court may be appointed as presidential members of the Tribunal. In order for a 
person to be appointed as a presidential member, he or she must have been enrolled as legal 
practitioners for at least five years. Senior members must have been enrolled as legal 
practitioners for at least five years or have special knowledge or skills relevant to the duties 
of a senior member. Members are required to have knowledge or skills relevant to the duties 
of a member, such as accountancy, aviation, engineering, law, medicine, pharmacology, 
military affairs, public administration and taxation.  
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Some AAT members have expertise in more than one discipline. Since the Tribunal conducts 
hearings in panels of one, two or three members, a range of expertise is available in an AAT 
hearing.
856
 The range of expertise of the Tribunal enables it to tackle most issues brought 
before it from an informed background. It is thus remarked that: 
 
“The ability to draw on this range of expertise when reviewing decisions contributes significantly to 
the quality of its decisions. It is also valuable for ADR processes where the issues in dispute are 
specialised in nature.”857 
 
In addition to the members, there are also Conference Registrars for the conduct of pre-
hearing conferences. They are not members of the Tribunal, but are appointed personally by 
the President of the AAT. Conference Registrars are legally-qualified and are specialists in 
alternative dispute resolution processes.
858
  
 
The effectiveness of the AAT is promoted by its independence. The Tribunal falls within the 
portfolio of the Attorney-General (Ministry of Justice).
859
 As a result, it is independent of the 
Ministries and institutions whose decisions it reviews and impartial. Its institutional 
framework also ensures that the Tribunal is independent and impartial and is able to attain its 
objectives. The Tribunal’s institutional framework relates to the appointment of its 
members;
860
 discipline and termination of service of its members;
861
 funding of the 
Tribunal;
862
 human resource and administrative support;
863
 managerial framework of the 
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Tribunal;
864
 governance, oversight and supervision arrangements;
865
 and the accountability 
and reporting of the Tribunal.
866
 These mechanisms ensure that the Tribunal is able to ensure 
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administrative decisions should be constituted; and  
(f)   to make recommendations to the Minister as to the desirability of administrative decisions that are the 
subject of review by tribunals other than the Administrative Appeals Tribunal being made the subject of review 
by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal; and  
(g)   to facilitate the training of members of authorities of the Commonwealth and other persons in exercising 
administrative discretions or making administrative decisions; and 
 (h)   to promote knowledge about the Commonwealth administrative law system; and 
 (i)   to consider, and report to the Minister on, matters referred to the Council by the Minister.  
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access to justice for review applicants, by providing a review process that is fair, just, 
economical, informal and quick. 
 
4. UNITED KINGDOM  
 
The proceeding paragraphs reveal that the United Kingdom’s social security system includes 
a multi-level dispute resolution framework that consists of internal and external review of 
decisions. The system is structured to create incentives to encourage people to resolve 
disputes at the post appropriate level. Social security institutions that take decisions are 
empowered to reconsider or revise the decisions. In addition, independent adjudication 
institutions have also been established to review the decisions of the departments or 
institutions. External review of social security decisions is undertaken by specialist multi-
tiered tribunals, specifically established to review administrative decisions and to provide 
effective redress.  
 
The current tribunal review framework is the result of the process of review of the tribunal 
system, which started with the publication of reform proposals in the Report of the Review of 
Tribunals in 2001.
867
 The adjudication framework at the time failed to provide access to 
justice for its users. Commenting on the weaknesses of the adjudication system, the Report of 
the Review of Tribunals stated that: 
 
“In the 44 years since tribunals were last reviewed, their numbers have increased considerably and 
their work has become more complex. Together they constitute a substantial part of the system of 
justice in England and Wales. But too often their methods are old-fashioned and they are daunting to 
users. Their training and IT are under-resourced. Because they are many and disparate, there is a 
considerable waste of resources in managing them, and they achieve no economies of scale. Most 
importantly, they are not independent of the departments that sponsor them. The object of this review 
is to recommend a system that is independent, coherent, professional, cost-effective and user-friendly. 
Together tribunals must form a system and provide a service fit for the users for whom they were 
intended.”868 
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It was thus proposed that a new independent tribunal service should be created to take over 
the management of the tribunals from their sponsoring departments. In addition, the new 
tribunal service was to have a composite, two-tier tribunal structure, under the leadership of a 
senior judge.
869
 
 
The reformed adjudication system was established by the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement 
Act (TCEA).
870
 In line with proposals for the creation of a composite, two-tier tribunal 
structure, the TCEA created the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal, transferring to 
these the jurisdiction of various existing tribunals.
871
 The Act thus creates a new, simplified 
and more consistent legal framework in a bid to make administrative justice in the UK more 
accessible and efficient.
872
 
 
Upon their creation, the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal became part of the 
Tribunals Service that had been created in April 2006, as an Executive Agency of the 
Ministry of Justice. The aim of the Tribunals Service was to establish, for the first time, a 
unified administration for the tribunals system that ensures the public will have the 
opportunity to exercise their rights and to seek effective redress against Government 
decisions.
873
 The Tribunals Service was merged with the Courts Service on 1 April 2011 to 
form one integrated agency for the administration of courts and tribunals – the Courts and 
Tribunals Service. 
 
The TCEA entrenches the independence of the Tribunal service by extending the guarantee 
of continued judicial independence of courts – in the Constitutional Reform Act874 – to 
tribunals.
875
 The Tribunals Service is headed by the Senior President of Tribunals, who 
presides over both of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal.
876
 Both Tribunals are 
divided into Chambers, with each Chamber having its own President.
877
 The independence of 
the Tribunals is further facilitated by issues such as the conditions of appointment and 
                                                 
869
 Carnwath R “Tribunal Justice - a New Start” Public Law Issue 1 (2009) 49. 
870
 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act (Chapter 15) of 2007. 
871
 Section 3(1) and (2) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act. 
872
 Cooper J The Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act Wragge & Co (November 2008) accessed at 
www.wragge.com/analysis.asp on 22 March 2012. 
873
 Tribunal Service About Us accessed at http://www.tribunals.gov.uk/Tribunals/About/about.htm.  
874
 Section 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act (chapter 4) of 2005 imposes a duty on the Lord Chancellor and 
other Ministers to ‘‘uphold the continued independence of’’ the court judiciary.  
875
 See section 1 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act. 
876
 Section 3(4) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act of 2007. 
877
 Section 7 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act. 
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removal of the Senior President;
878
 the conditions of appointment of Tribunal members;
879
 the 
conditions of removal of Tribunal members;
880
 funding;
881
 human resource and 
                                                 
878
 The Queen appoints the Senior President of Tribunals on the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor - 
section 2(1) of the TCEA. The Lord Chancellor pays the remuneration; allowances; and expenses of the Senior 
President of Tribunals as the Lord Chancellor determines - Para 10 of Schedule 1 of the TCEA. Senior President 
of Tribunals remains in office if he or she is of good behaviour, although the Queen has the power to remove 
him or her through a request by both Houses of Parliament. The Queen exercises her power to remove the 
Senior President on the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor - Para 6(2) and (3) of Schedule 1 of the TCEA. 
The Senior President of Tribunals also ceases to be Senior President of Tribunals if he is no longer an ordinary 
judge of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, or a judge of the First or Second Division of the Inner 
House of the Court of Session (of Scotland), or a Lord Justice of Appeal in Northern Ireland - Para 7(2) read 
with Para 2(2)(b) of Schedule 1 of the TCEA. The Senior President of Tribunals retires from office at the end of 
a fixed term contract as Senior President 
 
(Para 6(1) of Schedule 1 of the TCEA). The Senior President of 
Tribunals can also resign at any time resign by giving notice in writing of his or her resignation to the Lord 
Chancellor - Para 8 of Schedule 1 of the TCEA. The Lord Chancellor may also declare that the Senior President 
has resigned if a medical certificate confirms that the Senior President is disabled to perform his or her duties by 
permanent infirmity and is unable to resign due to the infirmity. However, such a declaration must be made with 
the concurrence of Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, the Lord President of the Court of Session (of 
Scotland) and the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland - Paras 9(1) and (2) of Schedule 1 of the TCEA. 
879
 The Queen appoints a person to be one of the judges of the Upper Tribunal on the recommendation of the 
Lord Chancellor - Para 1(1) of Schedule 3 of the TCEA. A person can become a judge of the Upper Tribunal if 
he or she satisfies one of the following criteria: is the Senior President of Tribunals; is a judge of the Upper 
Tribunal by virtue of appointment; is transferred to the Upper Tribunal; is a member of the Asylum and 
Immigration Tribunal (legally-qualified member) appointed in terms of the Nationality, Immigration and 
Asylum Act of 2002 who is the President or a Deputy President of that tribunal, or has the title Senior 
Immigration Judge but is neither the President nor a Deputy President of that tribunal; is the Chief Social 
Security Commissioner, or another Social Security Commissioner, appointed under section 50(1) of the Social 
Security Administration (Northern Ireland) Act of 1992; is a Social Security Commissioner appointed under 
section 50(2) of the Social Security Administration (Northern Ireland) Act (Deputy Commissioners); is either an 
ordinary judge of the Court of Appeal in England and Wales (including the vice-president, if any, of either 
division of that Court), is a Lord Justice of Appeal in Northern Ireland, is a judge of the Court of Session, is a 
puisne judge of the High Court in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, is a circuit judge, is a sheriff in 
Scotland, is a county court judge in Northern Ireland, is a district judge in England and Wales or Northern 
Ireland, or is a District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts); is a deputy judge of the Upper Tribunal; or is a Chamber 
President or a Deputy Chamber President, whether of a chamber of the Upper Tribunal or of the First-tier 
Tribunal, and does not fall within any of the other categories - section 5(1) of the TCEA. The Lord Chancellor 
may appoint a person to be one of the members of the Upper Tribunal who are not judges of the tribunal - Para 2 
of Schedule 3 of the TCEA. A person can also be appointed as a (non-judicial) member of the Upper Tribunal if 
he or she is one of the other members appointed to the Upper Tribunal; is transferred to the Upper Tribunal; is a 
member of the Employment Appeal Tribunal appointed in terms of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996; or is a 
member of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal appointed in terms of the Nationality, Immigration and 
Asylum Act 2002 (members other than “legally-qualified members”) - section 5(2) of the TCEA. 
The Lord Chancellor appoints a person to be one of the judges of the First-tier (Para 1 of Schedule 2 of the 
TCEA). A person can also be a judge of the First-tier Tribunal if he or she is transferred to the First-tier 
Tribunal; is a judge of the Upper Tribunal; is a legally-qualified member of the Asylum and Immigration 
Tribunal appointed in terms of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002 who is not a judge of the 
Upper Tribunal; or is a member of a panel of chairmen of employment tribunals - section 4 of the TCEA. 
880
 A member of the First-tier Tribunal holds and vacates office in accordance with the terms of his/her 
appointment, except where he or she is removed - Para 4(3) of Schedule 2 of the TCEA. A First-tier Tribunal 
member appointed on a salary (as opposed to fee-paid) basis can be removed from office only by the Lord 
Chancellor and only on the ground of inability or misbehaviour - Para 4(1) and (2) of Schedule 2 of the TCEA. 
A First-tier Tribunal member who exercises his or her functions wholly or mainly in Scotland or Northern 
Ireland may be removed from office only with the concurrence of the Lord President of the Court of Session or 
Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, respectively - Paras 3(2) and (3) of Schedule 2 of the TCEA. A First-tier 
Tribunal member who does not exercise functions wholly or mainly in Northern Ireland or Scotland may be 
removed from office only with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales - Paras 3(4) of 
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administrative support;
882
 management;
883
 governance, oversight and supervision;
884
 and 
accountability of the Tribunals.
885
 These enable the Tribunals to be independent of, and 
impartial to, the departments and institutions whose decisions they review.  
 
The TCEA also sets out the overall objectives of the Tribunal service. Section 2 of the Act, in 
creating the new post of Senior President of Tribunals and delineating his responsibilities and 
functions, states that in carrying out his/her functions, the Senior President must have regard 
                                                                                                                                                        
Schedule 2 of the TCEA. See also Schedule 3 of the TCEA for conditions of removal of Upper Tribunal 
members. 
881
 The Lord Chancellor is required to ensure that there is an efficient and effective system to support the 
business of the First-tier and Upper Tribunals (amongst others) and that appropriate services are provided for 
these Tribunals - section 39 of the TCEA. The Lord Chancellor pays the remuneration, allowances and expenses 
of the judges of First-tier Tribunal - Para 5 of Schedule 2 of the TCEA). The Lord Chancellor may provide, 
equip, maintain and manage such tribunal buildings, offices and other accommodation as appear to him 
appropriate for the purpose of discharging his general duty in relation to the tribunals. The Lord Chancellor may 
enter into arrangements for the provision, equipment, maintenance or management of tribunal buildings, offices 
or other accommodation as he or she considers appropriate for the purpose of discharging his general duty in 
relation to the tribunals - section 41 of the TCEA. 
882
 Support for the administration of justice in tribunals and courts (including in the First-tier and Upper 
Tribunals) is provided by the Courts and Tribunals Service. The Courts and Tribunals Service was created on 1 
April 2011, bringing together the Courts Service and the Tribunals Service into one integrated administrative 
agency. The Lord Chancellor may appoint staff as he or she deems appropriate for the purpose of discharging 
his general duty in relation to the tribunals. The Lord Chancellor may also enter into such contracts with other 
persons for the provision, by them or their subcontractors, of staff or services as appear to him appropriate for 
the purpose of discharging his general duty in relation to the tribunals. However, the Lord Chancellor may not 
enter into contracts for the provision of staff to discharge functions which involve making judicial decisions or 
exercising any judicial discretion - section 40 of the TCEA. 
883
 The Senior President of Tribunals presides over the First-tier and Upper Tribunals - section 3(4) of the 
TCEA. Each Chamber of both the First-tier and Upper Tribunals is headed by a Chamber President -section 7 of 
the TCEA. 
884
 The work of the Courts and Tribunals Service is overseen by the Tribunals Service Management Board 
(TSMB). The TSMB is headed by an independent Chair working with non-executive, executive and judicial 
members. The Board ensures that the agency delivers the aims and objectives set by the Lord Chancellor, the 
Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals. The Board is responsible for overseeing the leadership 
and direction of the Courts and Tribunals Service in delivering its aim and objectives. It provides strategic 
oversight and direction to the agency, by undertaking the following activities to support the Chief Executive of 
the Courts and Tribunals Service: leads and oversees the process of change and innovation to ensure delivery of 
strategic business objectives; agrees and reviews achievement against strategic and business plans to achieve the 
Tribunals Service’s (and wider Ministry of Justice) strategic aims and objectives; advises on allocation of the 
Tribunals Service’s financial and human resources to achieve those aims, and review and scrutinise their 
management; ensures delivery of excellent services to tribunal users; ensures compliance with the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOI) and other guidance on information handling, including prompt response to public 
requests for information; champions the promotion of diversity throughout the organisation; ensures that the 
agency operates sound environmental policies and practices in accordance with government guidance; assesses 
and manages risk; and complies with corporate governance principles - Tribunals Service Annual Report & 
Accounts 2009-10, 53. 
885
 The Accounting Officer for the Ministry of Justice has designated the Tribunals Service Chief Executive as 
the agency’s Accounting Officer. He/she is responsible to the minister and accountable to Parliament for the 
agency’s use of resources in carrying out its functions – see Tribunals Service Annual Report & Accounts 2009-
10, 69. The Senior President of Tribunals is required to each year give the Lord Chancellor a report covering, in 
relation to relevant tribunal cases matters that the Senior President of Tribunals wishes to bring to the attention 
of the Lord Chancellor, and matters that the Lord Chancellor has asked the Senior President of Tribunals to 
cover in the report. The Lord Chancellor must publish each report given to him - section 43 of the TCEA.  
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to the need for tribunals to be accessible; for proceedings before tribunals to be fair and to be 
handled quickly and efficiently; for members of tribunals to be experts in the subject-matter 
of, or the law to be applied in, cases in which they decide matters; and to develop innovative 
methods of resolving disputes that are of a type that may be brought before tribunals.
886
 
 
The establishment of the Tribunals and their procedures aim to realise their overall objective 
of achieving access to users (through accessibility, fair procedures, quick and efficient 
resolution of disputes, the appointment of experts and the development of innovative methods 
to resolve disputes).    
 
4.1 Internal review of social security decisions 
 
A person who is unhappy with a decision of a government department or institution can 
request a written explanation or apply for a revision of the decision.
887
 For example, the 
Secretary of State of the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) or an employee of the 
Department (the original decision-maker) may review any decision that has been taken. 
Where a person applied for reconsideration of a decision, the original decision-maker can 
revise it or refuse to revise it. A decision can be reviewed if new facts have been brought to 
his or her notice; or he or she is satisfied that the decision was given in ignorance of some 
material fact; or it was based on a mistake as to some material fact; or was erroneous in point 
of law.
888
 If the decision is not revised or the person is still not satisfied with the revised, he 
or she can appeal for review of the decision by an external body. 
 
Reconsideration of decisions by the original decision-maker reduces the number of appeal 
applications as this enables the Department to explain decisions better and provides an 
additional opportunity for it to correct decisions. It also increases the number of appeal 
applicants whose disputes are quickly resolved, without the need to go to appeal.
889
  
                                                 
886
 Section 2(3) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act. 
887
 See Section 19 of the Social Security Administration Act (Chapter 5) of 1992; Regulation 3 and 3A of the 
Social Security and Child Support (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations 1999; Regulation 11 of the Vaccine 
Damage Payments Regulations 1979; Regulation 17 of the Child Support (Maintenance Assessment Procedure) 
Regulations 1992; and Regulation 4 of the Mesothelioma Lump Sum Payments (Claims and Reconsiderations) 
Regulations 2008. 
888
 Section 19(1)(a) & (b) of the Social Security Administration Act.  
889
 This was revealed in a project launched by Jobcentre Plus (Jobcentre Plus is part of the Department for Work 
and Pensions and provides services that support people of working age from welfare into work, and helps 
employers to fill their vacancies). During the project, Jobcentre Plus telephoned claimants who had made an 
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However, social security claimants are not compelled to seek an explanation or apply for a 
revision. This implies that a claimant can simply appeal the decision within a month, without 
requesting a revision. Proposals are underway to make it compulsory for a person to request 
an explanation or to apply for a revision.
890
  The DWP has remarked that: 
 
“the change will enable the Department to ensure that decisions are changed at the earliest stage in the 
process, and to provide a clear explanation. Claimants will then be able to make an informed decision 
on formally appealing to Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunal Service taking the outcome of the 
reconsideration process into account. These changes are necessary to deliver timely, proportionate and 
effective justice for claimants, make the process for disputing a decision fairer and more efficient.”891  
 
 4.2 Review of decisions by First-tier Tribunal 
  
4.2.1 Accessibility of the First-tier Tribunal 
 
Efforts have been made to facilitate access to the First-tier Tribunal. This relates to the 
location of tribunal venues and appeal lodgement procedures and time periods. The objective 
of the Tribunal is to provide a local service to applicants. As a result, hearing procedures in 
the Social Security and Child Support Tribunal are conducted in 152 venues for hearings 
across England, Scotland and Wales.
892
 In addition, the Tribunal facilitates participation at a 
hearing by making a contribution towards an applicant’s out-of-pocket expenses in attending 
a hearing, such as travel costs, loss of wages and child minding expenses.
893
 
 
A review application can be sent to the Tribunal by pre-paid post, or delivered by hand to a 
specified address or delivered by any other method permitted by the Tribunal.
894
 In social 
security and child support cases, an appellant must send notice of appeal to the decision-
                                                                                                                                                        
appeal application against its Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) decision. The original decision was 
explained to applicants and, if they still disagreed with the decision they were provides with additional 
information or evidence and the decision was reconsidered. This led to 15 per cent of appeal applicants either 
withdrawing their application or having the original decision revised by the Decision Maker – see DWP Impact 
Assessment (IA): To require consideration of revision before appeal (October 2011) 6. 
890
 See Department of Work and Pensions Mandatory consideration of revision before appeal (Public 
consultation) February 2012; and The Social Security, Child Support, Vaccine Damage and Other Payments 
(Consideration of Revision before Appeal) Regulations 2012 (Draft). 
891
 Department of Work and Pensions Mandatory consideration of revision before appeal (Public consultation) 
February 2012, 7. 
892
 Social security and Child Support Tribunal is within the Social Entitlement Chamber, one of six Chambers of 
the First-tier Tribunal. 
893
 See Department of Justice Social security and Child Support Tribunal – Venues accessed at 
www.justice.gov.uk/tribunals/sscs/venues on 22 March 2012. 
894
 Rule 13 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008. 
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maker within a month of receiving notice of the decision that is challenged. If an applicant 
had requested a written statement of reasons for the decision within that month, the notice of 
appeal must be sent within 14 days of the request or the date on which the written statement 
of reasons was provided.
895
 If the appellant provides the notice of appeal to the decision-
maker later than the specified time, the notice of appeal must include the reason why the 
notice of appeal was not provided in time. Where an appeal is not made within the specified 
time, it will be treated as having been made in time if the decision-maker does not object. No 
appeal may be made more than 12 months after the specified time. The notice of appeal must 
be in English or Welsh and signed by the appellant. It must also state the name and address of 
the appellant; the name and address of the appellant’s representative (if any); an address 
where documents for the appellant may be sent or delivered; details of the decision being 
appealed; and the grounds on which the appellant relies.
896
  
 
The decision-maker is required to refer the case to the Tribunal immediately if the appeal is 
made after the specified time and the decision-maker objects to it being treated as having 
been made in time; or the decision-maker considers that the appeal has been made more than 
12 months after the specified time.
897
 
 
4.2.2 Scope of jurisdiction and powers of the First-tier Tribunal 
 
The First–tier Tribunal has a wide range of subject-matter, mainly involving appeals from 
government departments or other public bodies. The Tribunal was created to absorb the work 
of most central government tribunals in time. It hears appeals against decisions on the 
payment of a variety of benefits and other decisions made by the Government delivery 
institutions.
898
The First-tier Tribunal currently consists of six Chambers: War Pensions and 
Armed Forces Compensation Chamber, Social Entitlement Chamber, Health Education and 
Social Care Chamber, General Regulatory Chamber, Tax Chamber, and Immigration and 
Asylum Chamber.
899
 The Social Entitlement Chamber (SEC) hears appeals for Social 
Security and Child Support; Criminal Injuries Compensation; and Asylum Support.  
 
                                                 
895
 Rule 23 and Schedule 1(a) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) 
Rules 2008. 
896
 Rule 23of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008. 
897
 Ibid. 
898
 Section 3(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act. 
899
 Tribunals Service Annual Report & Accounts 2009-10, 128. 
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In terms of Social Security and Child Support, the Tribunal deals with disputes about Income 
Support, Jobseeker's Allowance; Incapacity Benefit, Employment Support Allowance; 
Attendance Allowance, Disability Living Allowance; and Pension Credit and State Pension. 
It also deals with disputes about Child Benefit, Child Support and Child Tax Credit; Statutory 
Sick Pay / Statutory Maternity Pay; Compensation Recovery Scheme/ Road Traffic (NHS) 
charges; Decisions on Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit; and Industrial Injuries 
Disablement Benefit and others.
900
  
 
The First-tier Tribunal can review a decision made by it on application by a person who has a 
right to appeal the decision or on the Tribunal’s own initiative when it considers that the 
decision contains an error of law.
901
 The Tribunal can correct any clerical mistake, other 
accidental slip or omission in a decision, direction or document it produced at any time.
902
 It 
can do this by sending notification of the amended decision or direction, or a copy of the 
amended document, to all parties; and making any necessary amendment to any information 
published in relation to the decision, direction or document. 
 
The Tribunal is required to notify the parties in writing of the outcome of any review, and of 
any right of appeal in relation to the outcome. The Tribunal must give every party an 
opportunity to make representations when reviewing a decision. If the Tribunal takes action 
after the review of a decision without first giving every party an opportunity to make 
representations, the notice of the outcome of the review must state that any party that did not 
have an opportunity to make representations may apply for the action to be set aside and for 
the decision to be reviewed again.
903
 
 
Where the Tribunal has reviewed a decision, it may, in the light of the review, correct 
accidental errors in the decision or in a record of the decision; amend reasons given for the 
decision; or set the decision aside.
904
 Where the First-tier Tribunal sets a decision aside, it can 
re-decide the matter or refer the matter to the Upper Tribunal.
905
 Where a matter is referred to 
the Upper Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal re-decides the matter. It may make any decision 
                                                 
900
 Tribunals Service Annual Report & Accounts 2009-10, 129. 
901
 Rule 40 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008 and section 
9(1) & (2) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act of 2007. 
902
 Rule 36 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008. 
903
 Rule 40(3) and (4) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008. 
904
 Section 9(4) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act of 2007. 
905
 Section 9(5) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act of 2007. 
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which the First-tier Tribunal could make if the First-tier Tribunal were re-deciding the matter; 
and make such findings of fact as it considers appropriate.
906
  
 
The Tribunal can bring to the attention of the parties the availability of any appropriate 
alternative procedure for the resolution of the dispute, where appropriate.
907
 The Tribunal can 
facilitate the use of an appropriate alternative procedure if it is the wish of the parties and the 
procedure is compatible with the Tribunal’s overriding objective. 
 
4.2.3 Fairness of the First-tier Tribunal procedures 
 
The procedures of the First-tier Tribunal allow effective access and participation. The 
Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act empowers the Tribunal to set their own rules of 
procedure.
908
 Hearing procedures of the Tribunal are flexible and adaptable in meeting the 
difficulties that parties face, especially if they are unrepresented. The features and principles 
of the Tribunal enable the development of an approach that meets the needs of users. The 
procedures of the Tribunals are governed by the guiding objectives and principles of enabling 
the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly. Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes 
dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the 
complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties; avoiding 
unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings; ensuring, so far as 
practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings; using any special 
expertise of the Tribunal effectively; and avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper 
consideration of the issues.
909
 Therefore, the procedures of the Tribunal seek to ensure the 
benefit of users of the system, by providing for accessibility, participation, flexibility, 
specialisation and efficiency.
910
 Parties to a dispute are also required to help the Tribunal to 
further its overriding objective and to cooperate with the Tribunal.
911
 
                                                 
906
 Section 9(6), (7) & (8) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act of 2007. 
907
 Rule 3 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008. 
908
 Section 22(2) of the TCEA. The Social Entitlement Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal is guided by the 
Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008 (SI No. 2685). 
909
 Rule 2(1), (2) and (3) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 
2008 (SI No. 2685). 
910
 See Jacobs E “Something Old, Something New: The New Tribunal System” 2009 ILJ (UK) Vol. 38, No. 4, 
417-423 at 420. 
911
 Rule 2(4) and (5) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008 (SI 
No. 2685)The parties to the dispute are required to cooperate with the tribunal both in general (also with each 
other), and in furthering the overall objective. The Tribunal and the parties to the dispute are therefore joint 
actors in proceedings that are conducted fairly and justly. 
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The Tribunal’s rules of procedure provide wide case management powers.912 In addition to a 
general power to regulate its own procedure, case management also enables the Tribunal to 
be proactive throughout the proceedings, and not merely reactive to the application of the 
parties. The guiding objectives of the Tribunal also permit it to override the individual or 
even collective wishes of the parties in order to take account of the efficient operation of the 
system as a whole.
913
 In terms of the Rules, the Tribunal’s case management powers are 
exercised through directions.
914
 Directions are given either on application of a party or at the 
Tribunal’s own initiative; and on application of a party or at the Tribunal’s own initiative if it 
considers it appropriate, they may be amended, suspended or set aside. The power to give 
directives is not only a means for the Tribunal to control the progress of the proceedings, but 
can be used constructively to further the objectives of making the Tribunal accessible and 
permitting effective participation.
915
  
 
The Tribunal may give a direction substituting a party if the wrong person has been named as 
a party; or the substitution has become necessary because of a change in circumstances since 
the start of proceedings. The Tribunal may give a direction by adding a person to the 
proceedings as a respondent. If the Tribunal gives a direction, it may give consequential 
directions that it considers appropriate.
916
  
                                                 
912
 See Rule 5 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008 (SI No. 
2685). The Tribunal’s case management powers enable it to give a direction in relation to the conduct or 
disposal of a review at any time, including a direction amending, suspending or setting aside an earlier direction. 
The Tribunal can also extend or shorten the time for complying with a rule, practice direction or direction; 
consolidate or hear together two or more review applications or parts of reviews raising common issues, or treat 
a case as a lead case; permit or require a party to amend a document; permit or require a party or another person 
to provide documents, information, evidence or submissions to the Tribunal or a party; deal with an issue in the 
hearings as a preliminary issue; hold a hearing to consider any matter, including a case management issue; 
decide the form of any hearing; adjourn or postpone a hearing; require a party to produce a bundle for a hearing; 
halt proceedings; transfer proceedings to another court or tribunal if that other court or tribunal has jurisdiction 
and the Tribunal no longer has jurisdiction to review the decision because of a change of circumstances since 
the hearings started, or the other court or tribunal is considered a more appropriate forum for the determination 
of the case. The Tribunal can also suspend the effect of its own decision pending the determination by it or the 
Upper Tribunal of an application for permission to appeal against, and any appeal or review of, that decision. 
913
 Jacobs E “Something Old, Something New: The New Tribunal System” 2009 ILJ (UK) Vol. 38, No. 4, 417-
423 at 421. 
914
 See Rule 6 of the First-tier Rules. 
915
 See Jacobs E “Something Old, Something New: The New Tribunal System” 2009 ILJ (UK) Vol. 38, No. 4, 
417-423 at 421. Directions can be used to help parties understand and thereby to cooperate with the tribunal and 
the other parties. They can also be used to give guidance on what is required of the parties, and to help them 
understand the evidence that is required and the significance of failing to provide it.  
916
 Rule 9 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008. 
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The Tribunal may make an order prohibiting the disclosure or publication of specified 
documents or information relating to the proceedings; or any matter likely to lead members of 
the public to identify any person whom the Tribunal considers should not be identified.
917
  
 
The Tribunal is required to hold a hearing before making a decision.
918
  It can only decide an 
appeal without a hearing if all parties consent to it or a party does not object to the appeal 
being decided without a hearing; and if the Tribunal considers that it is able to decide the 
matter without a hearing. In this case, the Tribunal is expected to give reasons for exercising 
its discretion in a particular way.
919
 The Tribunal can also finalise a review without a hearing 
where it strikes out a party’s case.  
 
A party to a Tribunal proceeding is entitled to attend a hearing, except where the party has 
been excluded from a hearing.
920
 The Tribunal gives each party entitled to attend a hearing 
reasonable notice of the time and place of the hearing (including any adjourned or postponed 
hearing) and any changes to the time and place of the hearing. The period of notice is at least 
14 days, although the Tribunal may give shorter notice with the consent of the parties or in 
urgent or exceptional circumstances.
921
 A party may appoint a representative (whether a legal 
representative or not) to represent them in the proceedings.
922
 
 
Generally, hearings are held in public. However, a hearing in a criminal injuries 
compensation case must be held in private, unless the appellant has consented to the hearing 
being held in public; and the Tribunal considers that it is in the interests of justice for the 
hearing to be held in public.  The Tribunal may also give a direction that a hearing, or part of 
it, is to be held in private.  Where a hearing or part of it is to be held in private, the Tribunal 
may determine who is permitted to attend the hearing or part of it. The Tribunal may give a 
                                                 
917
 Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008. 
918
 Rule 27 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008. In a 
criminal injuries compensation case, the Tribunal decide a review without a hearing. If the Tribunal decides a 
review without a hearing, a party can make a written application to the Tribunal to reconsider the decision at a 
hearing. However, an application may not be made in relation to a decision not to extend a time limit; not to set 
aside a previous decision; not to allow an appeal against a decision not to extend a time limit; or not to allow an 
appeal against a decision not to reopen a case.  
919
 In MM v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (ESA) [2011] UKUT 334 (AAC), the Upper Tribunal held 
that a failure to explain expressly (or impliedly) why a discretion was exercised in a particular way may involve an 
error of law. This would leave the tribunal's reasons open to attack for inadequacy. 
920
 Rule 28 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008. 
921
 Rule 29 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008. 
922
 Rule 11 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008. 
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direction excluding any person whose conduct it considers is disrupting or is likely to disrupt 
a hearing from the hearing or a part of it.
923
 It can also exclude a person whose presence it 
considers is likely to prevent another person from giving evidence or making submissions 
freely; a person who it considers should be excluded in order to give effect to a direction to 
withhold information that is likely to cause harm; or a person whose presence would defeat 
the purpose of the hearing. The Tribunal may also give a direction excluding a witness from a 
hearing until that witness gives evidence. 
 
If a party fails to attend a hearing, the Tribunal can proceed with the hearing if it is satisfied 
that the party has been notified of the hearing or that reasonable steps have been taken to 
notify the party of the hearing and considers that it is in the interests of justice to proceed 
with the hearing.
924
 
 
The Tribunal may give a decision orally at a hearing.  Except where the Tribunal withholds 
information that is likely to cause harm, the Tribunal must provide to each party a decision 
notice stating the Tribunal’s decision; notification of the right to apply for a written statement 
of reasons (where appropriate); and notification of any right of appeal against the decision 
and the time within which, and the manner in which, such right of appeal may be 
exercised.
925
 This must be done as soon as reasonably practicable after making a decision 
which finally disposes of all issues in the proceedings. 
 
The Tribunal has a duty to give adequate reasons for its review decisions. The Tribunal gives 
reasons for a review decision orally at a hearing or in a written statement of reasons to each 
party.
926
 The Tribunal’s reasons must be adequate. If its reasons are not adequate, its decision 
may be considered to have been made in error of law and set aside on appeal to the Upper 
Tribunal.
927
 If the Tribunal fails to give reasons, a party can apply in writing for the reasons.  
 
A party that is not happy with a decision of the first-tier Tribunal can apply for permission to 
appeal against the decision of the Tribunal to the Upper Tribunal. An appeal may only be 
                                                 
923
 Rule 30 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008. 
924
 Rule 31 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008. 
925
 Rule 33 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008. 
926
 Rule 34 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008. 
927
 See HL v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (DLA) [2011] UKUT 183 (AAC); RC v Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions (IB) and RC v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (ESA) [2011] UKUT 389 
(AAC); and AS v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (ESA) [2011] UKUT 159 (AAC). 
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made on the ground that there is an ‘error of law’. Examples of what can be considered as 
error of law is where the Tribunal applied the law incorrectly, conducted the hearing in 
breach of the proper procedures, or failed to make adequate findings of fact or to give 
adequate reasons for its decision.
928
 
 
4.2.4 Expertise and specialisation of the First-tier Tribunal 
 
The criteria for appointment to the First-tier Tribunal ensure specialisation of the Tribunal. A 
person is eligible for appointment as a judge of the Tribunal only if he or she satisfies the 
eligibility condition for judicial appointment on a five-year basis; if he or she has been an 
advocate or solicitor in Scotland for at least five years; if he or she has been a barrister or 
solicitor in Northern Ireland for at least five years; or if in the opinion of the Lord Chancellor 
he or she has gained experience in law which makes him or her as suitable for appointment as 
if the conditions of appointment have been satisfied.
929
 
 
The Lord Chancellor may appoint a person to be one of the members of the First-tier Tribunal 
who are not judges of the Tribunal.  A person is eligible for such appointment only if he or 
she has qualifications prescribed by order made by the Lord Chancellor with the concurrence 
of the Senior President of Tribunals.
930
 
 
In social security and child support hearings, the panel consists of three members.
931
 Where 
the hearing is on an attendance allowance or a disability living allowance, the Tribunal panel 
is made up of a Tribunal Judge, a registered medical practitioner, and a Member with a 
disability qualification.
932
 The Tribunal consists of a Tribunal Judge and a registered medical 
practitioner where the appeal involves other health- and disability-related issues.
933
 In any 
other case the Tribunal must consist of a Tribunal Judge.
934
  
                                                 
928
 Tribunal Service/Social Security and Child Support How to Appeal: A Step-by-Step Guide 30.  
929
 Para 1 of Schedule 2 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act. 
930
 Para 2 of Schedule 2 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act. 
931
 Para 3 of the Practice statement on the Composition of Tribunals in social security and child support cases in 
the Social Entitlement Chamber on or after 3 November 2008) 
932
 Para 4 of the Practice statement on the Composition of Tribunals in social security and child support cases in 
the Social Entitlement Chamber on or after 3 November 2008. 
933
 Such as the personal capability assessment within the meaning of regulations 34 and 35 of the Employment 
and Support Allowance Regulations of 2008; or the appeal involves the limited capability for work assessment; 
or the determination of limited capability for work- related activity; or the appeal is made under section 11(1)(b) 
of the Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act 1997; or the appeal raises issues relating to severe disablement 
allowance under section 68 of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act of 1992 or industrial injuries 
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Where an appeal may require the examination of financial accounts, the Chamber President 
may determine that a Tribunal panel be constituted to include an accountant. In addition, 
where the complexity of the medical issues in the appeal so demands, the Chamber President 
can include an additional panel Member who is a registered medical practitioner. The 
Chamber President can also add additional Tribunal Judges or Members as he or she 
considers appropriate to provide further experience of the additional Judge or Member or for 
assisting the Chamber President in the monitoring of decision-making standards.
935
  
 
Where the Chamber President considers that a matter relating to the attendance allowance, or 
a disability living allowance or issues of capability assessment only raises questions of law 
and the expertise of any of the other members is not necessary to decide the matter, the 
Chamber President may direct that the Tribunal must consist only of a Tribunal Judge, or of a 
Tribunal Judge and a Member whose experience and qualifications are necessary to decide 
the matter.
936
  
 
The availability of a variety of skilled members and the ability of the First-tier Tribunal to 
constitute hearing panels ensures that the Tribunal has the necessary specialist skills to 
determine appeals. It also affords the Tribunal the necessary flexibility and adaptability in 
providing redress to its users. This justifies the conclusion that: 
 
“Through the chamber structure, the specialism and expertise of existing independent tribunals will be 
preserved, but the ability of members, where expertise allows, to be transferred between chambers will 
allow for a more efficient service.”937 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
benefit under Part V of that Act (except for an appeal where the only issue is whether there should be a 
declaration of an industrial accident under section 29(2) of the Social Security Act of 1998); or the appeal is 
made under section 4 of the Vaccine Damage Payments Act of 1979; or the appeal is against a certificate of 
National Health Service charges under section 157(1) of the Health and Social Care (Community Health and 
Standards) Act of 2003; or the appeal arises under Part IV of the Child Maintenance and Other Payments Act of 
2008 – see Para 5 of the Practice statement on the Composition of Tribunals in social security and child support 
cases in the Social Entitlement Chamber on or after 3 November 2008. 
934
 Para 6 of the Practice statement on the Composition of Tribunals in social security and child support cases in 
the Social Entitlement Chamber on or after 3 November 2008. 
935
 Para 7 of the Practice statement on the Composition of Tribunals in social security and child support cases in 
the Social Entitlement Chamber on or after 3 November 2008. 
936
 Para 8 of the Practice statement on the Composition of Tribunals in social security and child support cases in 
the Social Entitlement Chamber on or after 3 November 2008. 
937
 Cooper J The Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act Wragge & Co (November 2008) accessed at 
www.wragge.com/analysis.asp on 22 March 2012. 
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4.3 Review of decisions by the Upper Tribunal 
 
The Upper Tribunal mainly reviews and decides appeals from the First-tier Tribunal. It also 
has the power to deal with judicial review work delegated from the High Courts of England 
and Wales and Northern Ireland and from the Court of Session.
938
 In addition to the 
protection of its independence, the effectiveness of the Upper Tribunal is promoted (in the 
same manner as the First-Tier Tribunal) through its accessibility, procedural fairness, scope 
of jurisdiction and powers and the expertise and specialisation of its members.  
 
4.3.1 Accessibility of the Upper Tribunal  
 
The Upper Tribunal’s location, appeal lodgement procedures and time periods are designed 
to ensure easy access to the Tribunal. The Administrative Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal 
has a contact for the lodgement of applications in each of the countries of the UK – in 
London, Cardiff, Edinburgh and Belfast for England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, 
respectively. 
 
A document to be provided to the Upper Tribunal in terms of the Rules, a practice direction 
or a direction of the Tribunal must be sent by pre-paid post or by document exchange, or 
delivered by hand to a specified address; sent by fax to a specified number; or can be 
delivered another method permitted or directed the Upper Tribunal may.
939
 
 
A person can only apply to the Upper Tribunal if they have been given leave to apply by the 
Tribunal whose decision they are challenging; or an application for leave to apply has been 
refused. Where an application for leave to apply to the Upper Tribunal is refused, a person 
may apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal.
940
 An application for permission to 
appeal must be made in writing and should be received by the Upper Tribunal at least a 
month after receiving notice from a Tribunal refusing permission to appeal, or refusal to 
admit the application for permission to appeal.
941
 If a person applies to the Upper Tribunal 
later than the one month period or after any other extension period given, the application 
                                                 
938
 Ministry of justice Implementation of the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (Written Ministerial 
Statement to the House of Commons)(undated).  
939
 Rule 13 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules of 2008. 
940
 Rule 21(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules (SI No. 2698) of 2008.  
941
 Rule 21(3) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules of 2008. 
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must include a request for an extension of time and the reason why the application was not 
provided in time. Except if the Upper Tribunal extends the time limit for the application, it 
will not accept the application.
942
 
 
If an application to the Upper Tribunal is for leave to appeal against the decision of another 
tribunal and the application for leave to appeal at the lower tribunal was refused because the 
application for leave or for a written statement of reasons was not made in time, the 
application to the Upper Tribunal must include the reason why the application to the lower 
tribunal was not made in time. The Upper Tribunal will only accept such an application if it 
considers that it is in the interests of justice for it to do so.
943
 
 
The application must contain the name and address of the appellant; the name and address of 
any representative; an address where documents may be sent or delivered to the appellant; 
details of the decision challenged (including the full reference); the grounds relied on by the 
appellant; and whether the appellant wants the application to be dealt with at an oral 
hearing.
944
 
 
In order to enable the applicant to prepare for the appeal, he or she is given a copy of any 
written record of the decision being challenged; any separate written statement of reasons for 
the decision.
945
 If the application is for permission to appeal against a decision of another 
tribunal, the notice of refusal of permission to appeal, or notice of refusal to admit the 
application for permission to appeal from that other tribunal is also provided. 
 
4.3.2 Scope of jurisdiction and powers of the Upper Tribunal 
 
The Upper Tribunal has jurisdiction throughout the United Kingdom. It was established to 
take over hearing appeals to the courts, the Social Security and Child Support 
Commissioners, and similar bodies from the decisions of local tribunals. It is also intended to 
take over some of the supervisory powers of the Courts to deal with the actions of tribunals 
and of the government departments and other public authorities whose decisions may be 
appealed to tribunals; and to deal with enforcement of decisions, directions and orders made 
                                                 
942
 Rule 21(6) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules of 2008. 
943
 Rule 21(7) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. 
944
 Rule 21(4) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules of 2008. 
945
 Rule 21(5) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules of 2008. 
200 
 
by tribunals.
946
 The main functions of the Upper Tribunal are to hear appeals from the First-
tier Tribunal; to decide certain cases that do not go to the First-tier Tribunal; to exercise 
powers of judicial review in certain circumstances; and to deal with enforcement of decisions, 
directions and orders made by tribunals.
947
 
 
The Administrative Appeals Chamber thus has appellate, judicial review and referral 
jurisdiction. It hears appeals against decisions made by the First-tier Tribunal (except an 
appeal assigned to the Tax and Chancery Chamber or the Immigration and Asylum Chamber 
of the Upper Tribunal); assessment decisions of the Pensions Appeal Tribunal in Northern 
Ireland; and decisions of the Pensions Appeal Tribunal in Scotland; a decision of the Mental 
Health Review Tribunal for Wales; against a decision of the Special Educational Needs 
Tribunal for Wales; appeals in terms of section 4 of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 
2006; cases transferred to the Upper Tribunal from the First-tier Tribunal under Tribunal 
Procedure Rules (except an appeal allocated to the Tax and Chancery Chamber); and 
decisions of a Traffic Commissioner.
948
  
 
The Administrative Appeals Chamber of the Upper Tribunal has jurisdiction to judicially 
review procedural decisions of First–tier Tribunals where there is no right of appeal; criminal 
injuries compensation appeals decided by the First–tier Tribunal; and judicial review 
applications in Scotland.
949
 In cases decided in England, Wales or Northern Ireland, the 
Upper Tribunal can grant a mandatory order; a prohibiting order; a quashing order; a 
declaration; and an injunction.
950
 Relief by the Upper Tribunal has the same effect as the 
corresponding relief granted by the High Court on an application for judicial review, and is 
enforceable as if it were relief granted by the High Court on an application for judicial 
review.
951
 In deciding whether to grant relief, the Upper Tribunal must apply the principles 
that the High Court would apply in deciding whether to grant that relief on an application for 
judicial review.
952
  
 
                                                 
946
 See Tribunals Service Annual Report & Accounts 2009-10, 136. 
947
 Tribunals Service Annual Report & Accounts 2009-10, 126. 
948
 Article 10(a) of the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal (Chambers) Order 2010. 
949
 Sections 15 and 21 of the TCEA. See also Article 10(b) of the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal 
(Chambers) Order 2010. 
950
 Section 15(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act of 2007. 
951
 Section 15(3) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act of 2007 
952
 Section 15(4) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act of 2007. 
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The Upper Tribunal also decides cases referred to it by the First-tier Tribunal; a 
determination or decision under section 4 of the Forfeiture Act 1982; proceedings or a 
preliminary issue transferred under Tribunal Procedure Rules to the Upper Tribunal from the 
First-tier Tribunal (except those allocated to the Tax and Chancery Chamber); and cases 
transferred to it from the High Court and the Court of Session.
953
  
 
The Upper Tribunal is a superior court of record.
954
 The Tribunal is conferred the same 
powers, rights, privileges and authority as the High Court in relation to the attendance and 
examination of witnesses, the production and inspection of documents, and all other matters 
incidental to the Upper Tribunal’s functions.955 The test for appealing from the Upper tribunal 
to the Court of Appeal is the same test applying to appeals from the county court and High 
Court to the Court of Appeal. An appeal against a decision of the Tribunal is only possible if 
it would raise an important point of principle or practice or there is some other compelling 
reason.
956
 
 
Where a matter is referred to the Upper Tribunal, it must re-decide the matter. It may make 
any decision which the First-tier Tribunal could make if the First-tier Tribunal were re-
deciding the matter, and make such findings of fact as it considers appropriate.
957
 If in 
deciding an appeal the Upper Tribunal finds that the making of the decision concerned 
involved the making of an error on a point of law, the Upper Tribunal may set aside the 
decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
958
 If it sets aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, the 
Upper Tribunal re-makes the decision or remits the case to the First-tier Tribunal with 
directions for its reconsideration, including procedural directions.
959
 In remitting the case to 
the First-tier Tribunal with directions for its reconsideration, the Upper Tribunal may also 
direct that the members of the First-tier Tribunal who are chosen to reconsider the case are 
                                                 
953
 Sections 19 and 21 of the TCEA. See also Article 10(c), (d) and (e) of the First-tier Tribunal and Upper 
Tribunal (Chambers) Order 2010. 
954
 Section 3(5) of the TCEA. 
955
 Section 25 of the TCEA. 
956
 Jacobs E Tribunal Practice and Procedure: Tribunals under the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 
Legal Action Group (June 2011) 35. 
957
 Section 9(6), (7) & (8) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act of 2007. 
958
 See AS v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (ESA) [2011] UKUT 159 (AAC). 
959
 See RC v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (IB) / RC v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 
(ESA) [2011] UKUT 389 (AAC); MM v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (ESA) [2011] UKUT 334 (AAC) 
and section 12 of the TCEA. 
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not to be the same as those who made the decision that has been set aside.
960
 It may also give 
a decision in connection with the reconsideration of the case by the First-tier Tribunal. In re-
making the decision, the Upper Tribunal may make any decision which the First-tier Tribunal 
could make if the First-tier Tribunal were re-making the decision, and may make such 
findings of fact as it considers appropriate.
961
 
 
The Upper Tribunal can also review a decision made by it of its own initiative, or on 
application by a person who has a right of appeal the decision.
962
 Where the Upper Tribunal 
reviews a decision, it can correct accidental errors in the decision or in a record of the 
decision; amend reasons given for the decision; or set the decision aside. Where the Upper 
Tribunal sets a decision aside, it must re-decide the matter; and make any findings of fact it 
considers appropriate.  
 
The Upper Tribunal may not make an order in respect of costs or expenses in proceedings 
transferred or referred by or on appeal from another tribunal (except to the extent permitted in 
a national security certificate appeal); in proceedings transferred by or on appeal from the 
Tax Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal; or to the extent and in the circumstances that the 
other tribunal had the power to make an order in respect of costs or expenses.
963
 
 
The Upper Tribunal may at any time correct any clerical mistake or other accidental slip or 
omission in its decision or record of a decision. It can do so by sending notification of the 
amended decision or a copy of the amended record to all parties. It must also make all 
necessary amendments to information published in relation to the decision or record.
964
 
 
The Upper Tribunal can set aside its decision or part of a decision and re-make the decision 
or the relevant part of it, if the Tribunal considers that it is in the interests of justice to do so. 
It can only do so if a document relating to the proceedings was not sent to or was not received 
at an appropriate time by a party or the party’s representative; a document relating to the 
proceedings was not sent to the Upper Tribunal at an appropriate time; a party or the party’s 
                                                 
960
 See HL v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (DLA) [2011] UKUT 183 (AAC); EM v Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions (DLA) [2011] UKUT 320 (AAC) and PJ v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions (ESA) [2011] UKUT 224 (AAC). 
961
 Section 12(4) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act of 2007. 
962
 Section 10 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act of 2007. 
963
 Rule 10 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules of 2008. 
964
 Rule 42 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules of 2008. 
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representative was not present at a hearing related to the proceedings; or there was some 
other procedural irregularity in the proceedings.
965
 
 
4.3.3 Procedural fairness of the Upper Tribunal 
 
The Upper Tribunal is also empowered to set its own rules of procedure.
966
 The Tribunal’s 
procedures are also guided by the need to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and 
justly; and the duty for the parties to the dispute to cooperate with the Tribunal.
967
 In order for 
a case to be dealt with fairly and justly, the Tribunal is required to deal with the case in ways 
which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the 
anticipated costs and the resources of the parties; to avoid  unnecessary formality and seeking 
flexibility in the proceedings; to ensure that the parties are able to participate fully in the 
proceedings as far as practicable; to use any special expertise of the Upper Tribunal 
effectively; and to avoid delay, as far as it is compatible with proper consideration of the 
issues.
968
 In addition, the guiding objectives of the Tribunals permit it to override the 
individual or even collective wishes of the parties in order to take account of the efficient 
operation of the whole tribunal system.
969
 
 
The Upper Tribunals’ rules of procedure provide wide case management powers, which 
include a general power to regulate their own procedure.
970
 Case management also enables 
the Tribunal to be proactive throughout the proceedings, and not merely reactive to the 
application of the parties. In terms of the Tribunal’s Rules, its case management powers are 
exercised through directions. The Tribunal may give a direction in relation to the conduct or 
disposal of proceedings at any time, including a direction amending, suspending or setting 
aside an earlier direction.
971
 Directions are given either on the application of a party or at the 
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 Rule 43 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules of 2008. 
966
 Section 22(2) of the TCEA.  
967
 Rule 2 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules of 2008. The parties to the dispute are required to 
cooperate with the tribunal both in general (also with each other), and in furthering the overall objective. The 
Tribunal and the parties to the dispute are therefore joint actors in proceedings that are conducted fairly and 
justly. 
968
 Rule 2 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (SI No. 2698). 
969
 Jacobs E “Something Old, Something New: The New Tribunal System” 2009 ILJ (UK) Vol. 38, No. 4, 417-
423 at 421. 
970
 See Rule 5 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (SI No. 2698).  
971
 Rule 5(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules of 2008. In addition, the Upper Tribunal may 
also extend or shorten the time for complying with any rule, practice direction or direction; consolidate or hear 
together two or more sets of proceedings or parts of proceedings raising common issues, or treat a case as a lead 
case; permit or require a party to amend a document; permit or require a party or another person to provide 
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tribunal’s own initiative. Furthermore, on the application of a party or at the Tribunal’s own 
initiative, directions can be amended, suspended or set aside if it considers it appropriate. The 
power to give directives is not only a means for the Tribunal to control the progress of 
proceedings, but can be used constructively to further the objectives of making the Tribunal 
accessible and of permitting effective participation.
972
  
 
In proceedings before the Upper Tribunal, a party may appoint a representative (whether a 
legal representative or not) to represent them, except where a person is prohibited from 
representing someone.
973
  
 
Each party and any other person permitted by the Upper Tribunal can submit evidence, 
except at the hearing of an application for permission. They can also make representations at 
a hearing which they are entitled to attend, and make written representations where a decision 
is to be made without a hearing.
974
 
 
The Upper Tribunal can decide an appeal without a hearing. However, the Tribunal must 
consider the views expressed by a party when deciding whether to hold a hearing to consider 
any matter, and the form of such a hearing.
975
 Where a hearing is held, each party is entitled 
to attend the hearing.
976
 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
documents, information, evidence or submissions to the Upper Tribunal or a party; deal with an issue in the 
proceedings as a preliminary issue; hold a hearing to consider any matter, including a case management issue; 
decide the form of any hearing; adjourn or postpone a hearing; require a party to produce a bundle for a hearing; 
halt proceedings; transfer proceedings to another court or tribunal if that other court or tribunal has jurisdiction 
in relation to the proceedings and because of a change of circumstances since the proceedings were started, the 
Upper Tribunal no longer has jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings; or the Upper Tribunal considers that the 
other court or tribunal is a more appropriate forum for the determination of the case;  suspend the effect of its 
own decision pending an appeal or review of that decision; in an appeal, or an application for permission to 
appeal, against the decision of another tribunal, suspend the effect of that decision pending the determination of 
the application for permission to appeal, and any appeal; require any person, body or other tribunal whose 
decision is the subject of proceedings before the Upper Tribunal to provide reasons for the decision, or other 
information or documents in relation to the decision or any proceedings before that person, body or tribunal - 
Rule 5(3) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules of 2008. 
972
 See Jacobs E “Something Old, Something New: The New Tribunal System” 2009 ILJ (UK) Vol. 38, No. 4, 
417-423 at 421. Directions can be used to help parties understand and thereby to cooperate with the tribunal and 
the other parties. They can also be used to give guidance on what is required of the parties, and to help them 
understand the evidence that is required and the significance of failing to provide it.  
973
 Immigration and Asylum Act of 1999. See Rule 11 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules of 
2008. 
974
 Rule 33 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules of 2008. 
975
 Rule 34 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules of 2008. 
976
 Rule 35 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules of 2008. 
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The Upper Tribunal gives each party entitled to attend a hearing reasonable notice of the time 
and place of the hearing (including any adjourned or postponed hearing) and any change to 
the time and place of the hearing. The period of notice is at least 14 days except in 
applications for permission to bring judicial review proceedings where the period of notice 
must be at least two working days. In a fast-track case, the period of notice is at least one 
working day. However, in a case that is not fast-tracked, the Tribunal can give shorter notice 
with the consent of the parties or in urgent or exceptional cases.
977
 
  
All hearings of the Upper Tribunal are held in public.
978
 However, the Tribunal can give a 
direction that a hearing or part of a hearing is held in private. Where a hearing or part of it is 
held in private, the Upper Tribunal may determine persons entitled to attend. The Tribunal 
may give a direction excluding from a hearing or part of it a person whose conduct it 
considers will disrupt or is likely to disrupt the hearing. It can also exclude a person whose 
presence it considers is likely to prevent another person from giving evidence or making 
submissions freely. A person can also be excluded if the Tribunal considers that he or she 
should be excluded in order to give effect to the requirement to prevent disclosure or 
publication of documents and information. Other persons that can be excluded include a 
person whose attendance will defeat the purpose of the hearing; and a person under the age of 
eighteen years. The Upper Tribunal may give a direction excluding a witness from a hearing 
until that witness gives evidence. 
 
If a party fails to attend a hearing, the Upper Tribunal may proceed with the hearing.
979
 This 
would be the case where the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that the party has been notified of the 
hearing or that reasonable steps have been taken to notify the party of the hearing, and the 
Tribunal considers that it is in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing. 
 
Where appropriate, the Upper Tribunal brings to the attention of the parties the availability of 
any appropriate alternative procedure for the resolution of the dispute; and if the parties wish 
and provided that it is compatible with the overriding objective, to facilitate the use of the 
procedure.
980
 
 
                                                 
977
 Rule 36 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules of 2008. 
978
 Rule 37 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules of 2008. 
979
 Rule 38 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules of 2008. 
980
 Rule 3 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules of 2008. 
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The Upper Tribunal can give a decision orally at a hearing. However, as soon as reasonably 
practicable after making a decision, the Tribunal must provide to each party a decision notice 
stating the Tribunal’s decision, notification of any rights of review or appeal against the 
decision and the time and manner of exercising such rights.
981
 The decision notice must 
include written reasons for the Tribunal’s decision, except where the decision is made with 
the consent of the parties; or the parties have consented to the Tribunal not giving written 
reasons. 
 
4.3.4 Expertise and specialisation of the Upper Tribunal  
 
In order for the Upper Tribunals to perform its duty to users, it must have the necessary 
expertise and specialisation. This is recognised in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act, 
as it requires the Senior President to have regard to the need for members to be expert in the 
subject matter of, or the law to be applied in, their tribunal.
982
  
 
Upper Tribunal members are appointed on the basis of their knowledge, experience or 
expertise relevant to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.983 The expertise and specialisation of 
Tribunal members is also further promoted through experience in the Tribunal’s jurisdiction 
and the assigning and ticketing
984
 within its various chambers.
985
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 Rule 40 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules of 2008. 
982
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difficulties in finding judges for particular locations and where there are recruitment difficulties in smaller 
jurisdictions – see Prentice B “Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007” (16 July 2009)(written statement 
by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Justice to the House of Commons (Hansard source 
citation: HC Deb, 16 July 2009, c61WS). 
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 Jacobs E Tribunal Practice and Procedure: Tribunals under the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 
Legal Action Group (June 2011) 31. 
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The expertise and specialisation of the members of the Upper Tribunal enhances its status as 
it limits the scope for appealing its decision. The courts have emphasised the significance of 
the expertise and specialisation of a tribunal such as the Upper Tribunal in assessing whether 
an appeal of its decision has a real prospect of success. In Cooke v Secretary of State for 
Social Security the Court of Appeal stated that:  
 
“it is also important that such appeal structures have a link to the ordinary court system, to maintain 
both their independence of government and the sponsoring department and their fidelity to the relevant 
general principles of law. But the ordinary courts should approach such cases with an appropriate 
degree of caution. It is quite probable that on a technical issue of understanding and applying the 
complex legislation the social security Commissioner will have got it right. The Commissioners will 
know how that particular issue fits into the broader picture of social security principles as a whole. 
They will be less likely to introduce distortion into those principles. They may be better placed, where 
it is appropriate, to apply those principles in a purposive construction of the legislation in question. 
They will also know the realities of tribunal life. All this should be taken into account by an appellate 
court when considering whether an appeal will have a real prospect of success.”
986
  
 
5. NEW ZEALAND 
 
New Zealand also implements a multi-tier social security review and appeals process. This 
involves reconsideration (review) by the relevant Ministry (such as the Ministry of Social 
Development and the Ministry of Work and Income). A person who is unhappy with the 
reconsidered decision of a ministry can appeal to the Benefit Review Committee of the 
Ministry. Appeals from the Benefit Review Committee are forwarded to the Social Security 
Appeal Authority (SSAA). A further right of appeal is to the High Court, the Court of Appeal 
and finally to the Supreme Court. The (social Security) dispute resolution system is guided by 
the principles that it should be proportionate, in relation to the complexity of procedures, the 
availability of representation and the provision of appeal mechanisms.
987
 
 
5.1 Reconsideration of social security decisions by relevant ministry 
 
An applicant or beneficiary who does not understand or disagrees with a decision of a 
ministry can seek a reconsideration of the decision through a case manager. The case 
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 Cooke v Secretary of State for Social Security [2002] 3 All ER 279 at [16]. 
987
 Ministry of Justice Tribunal Reform Programme (October 2007) accessed at www.justice.gov.nz.  
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manager explains the decision and corrects any mistakes that may have been made.
988
 A 
person who still disagrees with the decision of the Ministry can apply for a formal review of 
the decision. This can be done by completing a Review of Decision form or writing a letter to 
the local office of the Ministry. A formal review application must be done within three 
months of the original decision, unless the applicant shows good cause why they were unable 
to apply within three months.
989
 Upon receipt of the formal review application, the Ministry 
reviews the original decision. Where the Ministry agrees that the decision is incorrect, it 
varies the decision. Where the Ministry confirms its original decision or part of the decision, 
it sends the review application to a Benefits Review Committee of the Ministry together with 
a statement of the reasons for the decision.
990
 The Ministry endeavours to notify the applicant 
of the internal review outcome within two weeks of receipt of the review application.
991
 The 
internal review of a social security decision by the Ministry thus enables a social security 
applicant or beneficiary who has a dispute with a ministry to have the dispute resolved 
expeditiously.  
 
5.2 Review of decisions by Benefits Review Committees 
 
In addition to the Ministry forwarding review applications to a Benefits Review Committee, a 
person who is dissatisfied with the review decision of the Ministry can challenge the decision 
with the Benefits Review Committee. The Committee ensures that the Ministry makes 
decisions that are correct and fair, with regard to procedure and law.
992
 The committee 
consists of two senior ministry officials and a community representative appointed by the 
Minister. Although this may lead to questions about the objectivity and impartiality of the 
Committees, they are internal review bodies of the Ministry undertaking administrative duties 
and not a quasi-judicial function.
993
 In addition, decisions of the Committees are subject to 
review by an independent and impartial body (the Social Security Appeal Authority).  
                                                 
988
 Ministry of Work and Income Asking for a review of decision accessed at www.workandincome.govt.nz (15 
March 2012). 
989
 Ibid. 
990
 Snow M Reviews can turn into an appealing process Returned and Services Association (New Zealand) June 
2011, accessed at www.rsa.org.nz (15 March 2012). 
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 Ministry of Work and Income Asking for a review of decision accessed at www.workandincome.govt.nz (15 
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 Welfare justice – The Alternative Welfare Working Group Reflections and recommendations: A contribution 
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An application to the Committee must be made within three months of the original decision. 
Where an application is made later than three months, the Committee organises a hearing to 
decide whether it should hear the review application. A review hearing is organised once the 
Committee decides that it can hear the review application. The Benefits Review Committee 
takes a fresh look at all available information and makes a decision about a review 
application, taking into account a review applicant’s individual circumstances. Hearings by 
the Benefits Review Committee are informal and are held in a private venue. Applicants are 
encouraged to attend the review hearing to answer any questions or present information, 
although they can have a lawyer attend on their behalf. Where an applicant attends the 
hearing, they can be accompanied by a support person, client representative or lawyer. The 
Benefits Review Committee communicates the decision soon after a hearing. The Committee 
aims to advise applicants of the outcome of an internal review within two weeks of receiving 
an application. However, it takes about five weeks from the time a review application is 
received by the Benefits Review Committee to get a decision.
994
  
 
Where the Benefits Review Committee affirms the decision of the Ministry or part of the 
decision, it is required to explain an applicant’s right to appeal when it communicates the 
decision of the Committee. An applicant who disagrees with the decision the Benefits Review 
Committee can then appeal to the Social Security Appeal Authority. 
  
5.3 Review of decisions by the Medical Appeals Board 
 
Separate processes are provided for review of decisions relating to the Invalids Benefit, Child 
Disability Allowance or Sickness Benefit and (sometimes) the Veterans Pension.
995
 A person 
can apply to the Medical Appeals Board for a review of a decision by the Ministry to 
declining an application or cancelling a benefit. 
 
Medical Appeals Board is made up of three experts such as doctors, rehabilitation 
professionals or vocation experts. The person who made the original medical assessment does 
not take part in a Medical Appeals Board hearing to ensure a fresh assessment of the issues. 
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Medical Appeals Board hearings are informal. Applicants are encouraged to attend and can 
have a support person or agent with them. An applicant’s case manager guides them through 
the whole process. The Board reconsiders all the information on the applicant’s medical 
condition or ability to work. It also considers if the right decision was made about the medical 
reasons for declining the application or cancelling the benefit. In order to help it in making its 
decision, the Board may require an applicant to be re-examined by a specialist or another 
medical practitioner. The Board pays for the medical examination and other related costs 
(such as travel costs). A decision of the Board is issued within two weeks of the hearing. The 
Board’s decision is final, as there is no further right of appeal. 
 
5.4 Review of decisions by the SSAA 
 
The Social Security Appeal Authority (SSAA) is a statutory board established in terms of the 
Social Security Act.
996
 The SSAA is an independent judicial tribunal administered by the 
Ministry of Justice.
997
 The objective of the Social Security Appeal Authority is to hear 
appeals against decisions made by the social security administration; appeals against 
decisions of the social security administration that have been reviewed by the Benefits 
Review Committee; and appeals where the Benefits Review Committee has declined to hear 
a late application for review of a social security administration decision.
998
 
 
In order to successfully undertake its appeal functions, the establishment and operation of the 
SSAA are guided by the principles that it should be accessible (in terms of geographic 
coverage, costs to users, simple entry and provision of information about the Tribunal to 
users); fair and credible (relating to its independence, the transparency of its proceedings and 
processes, the quality of its decision-making, its specialisation and its observance of the rule 
of law); and that it should be administered efficiently (through minimal delay, efficiency, best 
use of human resources and innovation).
999
 These aspects ensure that the SSAA is able to 
provide access to justice for its users.    
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 Section 12F of the Social Security Act of 1964. 
997
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5.4.1 Accessibility of the SSAA 
 
The SSAA conducts monthly hearings, alternating between New Zealand’s major cities of 
Auckland and Wellington, with occasional hearings being held in Christchurch. In order to 
facilitate participation in its hearing, the SSAA pays the actual and reasonable travelling and 
accommodation expenses (if any) incurred by the appellant who is requested to appear before 
it.
1000
 
 
There are no fees required for the lodging of an appeal with the Authority. Where a decision 
is in a person’s favour (either partly or wholly) the SSAA may order the Ministry of Social 
Development to reimburse an applicant the reasonable costs incurred in bringing the appeal. 
However, if the Authority’s decision is not in a person’s favour, it will not require the person 
to reimburse the other party for any costs. A cost order will only be made where the SSAA 
finds that the appeal was frivolous, vexatious, or should not to have been brought.
1001
 
 
SSAA appeal lodgement procedures and time periods have been simplified to enable a person 
aggrieved by a decision to apply for a review of the decision. Appeals must be in writing and 
submitted by post to the Tribunals Unit of the Ministry of Justice (responsible for 
administrative support for the Authority).
1002
 An appeal may be lodged by an applicant filling 
out a Notice of Appeal form or by writing a letter to the Authority. The form or letter must 
state the applicant’s name and address, his or her Benefit or Pension Number, the date of the 
decision he or she is dissatisfied with, why he or she disagrees with the decision of the 
Benefits Review Committee, the Chief Executive, or the Secretary for War Pensions, what he 
or she would like the Authority to do for him/her, and a copy of the decision he or she is 
appealing.
1003
  
 
If the appeal is against a decision or determination of the Ministry of Social Development 
confirmed or varied by a Benefits Review Committee, the notice of appeal must be lodged 
with the Secretary of the Appeal Authority within three months after the applicant is notified 
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 Section 12L of Social Security Act. 
1001
 Social Security Appeal Authority A Guide to Making an Appeal available at www.justice.gov.nz/ tribunals.  
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of the confirmation or variation of the decision or determination.
1004
 However, the Appeal 
Authority may allow an application to be made to it before or after the end of that period of 3 
months where application is made and good cause is shown (such as an explanation of the 
reasons for the delay).
1005
  
 
Before the lodging of the notice of appeal or immediately after, a copy of it is sent to the 
Chief Executive.
1006
 The Chief Executive is required to send documents relating to the 
decision under review to the Secretary of the SSAA.
1007
 A copy of these documents or any 
further documents forward to the Authority is given to every party to the appeal, and to any 
other party that is entitled to be heard and to tender evidence on a matter referred to in the 
report.
1008
 Equal access to the evidence ensures equality of arms between the parties to 
proceedings.  
 
Except where the SSAA considers that the appeal can be properly determined without a 
hearing, it arranges for a time and place for the hearing of the appeal as soon as it can 
conveniently be held after the receipt of any application for a review. It also gives no less 
than 10 clear days’ notice of the time and place for the hearing to each party to the 
dispute.
1009
 Each party is thus given a reasonable opportunity to assert or defend its rights. 
 
5.4.2 Scope of jurisdiction and powers of the SSAA 
 
The Social Security Appeal Authority reviews decisions made under various social security 
laws.
1010
 However, it does not have the authority to hear and determine any appeal on 
medical grounds or on grounds relating to incapacity or capacity for work. It also does not 
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review a decision or determination relating to an invalid’s benefit; a child disability 
allowance; a veteran’s pension; and a sickness benefit.1011 
 
The parties to a Social Security Appeal Authority review hearing are the applicant or 
beneficiary affected by the decision or determination of the social security administration (on 
the one hand); and on the other hand the chief executive of the Department of Social 
Development or Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs.
1012
 
 
The Authority is a judicial institution for the determination of appeals in accordance with the 
Social Security and War Pensions Acts. It therefore has wide powers in hearing and 
determining an appeal. During a hearing, the Authority has all the powers, duties, functions, 
and discretions that the original decision-maker had in respect of the same matter.
1013
 It may 
receive as evidence any statement, document, information, or matter which it believes may 
assist it to deal with the matters before it, whether or not the same evidence would be 
admissible in a court of law.
1014
 The Authority examines all of the evidence available and 
makes its own decision about an appeal.
1015
 It may confirm, modify, or reverse the decision 
or determination appealed against.
1016
  
 
In addition, the Authority can refer a matter or part of a matter under review to the relevant 
Department that is the original decision-maker for further consideration. In this case the 
Authority informs the Department of its reasons for so doing and gives directions it thinks 
just in relation to the rehearing or reconsideration issues.
1017
 
 
5.4.3 SSAA procedural fairness  
  
The review of a decision by the Social Security Appeal Authority is through a rehearing. 
However, where there is a question of fact, information made available to the Department of 
Social Development of the Department of Veterans Affairs can be presented to the 
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Authority.
1018
 The SSAA can rehear all or part of the evidence, including the evidence of a 
witness if the Authority believes that information on the witness provided by the Department 
is incomplete.
1019
  
 
There is no standard procedure for a Social Security Appeal Authority hearing, which implies 
that a hearing before the Authority will not be considered defective due to the absence of a 
particular procedure. The Authority is empowered to determine its own procedure, except 
where a particular procedure is provided by the Social Security Act or by any regulations in 
force under the Act.
1020
  
 
A hearing of the SSAA is informal and is held in private. It is conducted in a place that the 
Authority considers convenient, having regard to the nature of the issues to be decided. 
However, the Authority can hear an appeal in public if it considers that the interests of the 
parties to the appeal and of all other persons concerned will not be adversely affected.
1021
  
 
Parties to a dispute before the Authority may be present at the hearing. However, where a 
party prefers not to attend the hearing, the Authority considers the review application on the 
basis of the written submissions from all the parties. The Authority may still request a person 
to attend a hearing in some cases. At a review hearing, the Department of Social 
Development or Department of Veterans Affairs may be represented by counsel or by an 
officer of the Department. Any other party may appear and act personally or by counsel or 
any duly authorised representative.
1022
 If a person is represented by a lawyer, he or she can be 
granted legal aid to pay for their legal costs. An applicant can also request the Authority to 
arrange for an interpreter for free at least two weeks before the hearing to arrange one. 
1023
  
 
The Authority issues a written decision approximately six weeks after the date of the hearing 
and forwards a copy of the decision to the applicant. When the Authority determines an 
appeal, the Secretary of the Authority sends a memorandum of the decision and the reasons 
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thereof to the relevant Department and the appellant. The Department takes all necessary 
steps to effect the decision of the Authority.
1024
 If any party is unhappy with the decision of 
the Authority, they can appeal the Authority's decision to the High Court on a question of 
law. 
 
5.4.4 Independence and impartiality of the SSAA 
 
The independence and impartiality of the Social Security Appeal Authority enhance its 
credibility in ensuring justice for its users. The Authority is a statutory board established in 
terms of the Social Security Act.
1025
 It is an independent judicial tribunal administered by the 
Ministry of Justice.
1026
 The Authority’s independence is guaranteed through its 
membership;
1027
 the discipline and termination of its members;
1028
 its funding;
1029
 the 
provision of human resource and administrative support to the Authority;
1030
 its managerial 
framework;
1031
 and its governance, oversight, supervision and reporting arrangements.
1032
  Its 
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credibility is also influenced by the quality of its decision-making, its specialisation and its 
observance of the rule of law. 
 
6. GERMANY 
 
The German Constitution (Basic Law or Grundgesetz (GG) guarantees everyone the right to 
have access to courts. Article 19(4) provides that “a person whose rights are violated by 
public authority may have recourse to the courts. If a court with specific jurisdiction for the 
dispute has not been established, the aggrieved person will have recourse to the ordinary 
courts.”1033 In addition, Article 92 states that “the judicial power shall be vested in the judges; 
it shall be exercised by the Federal Constitutional Court, by the federal courts provided for in 
this Basic Law, and by the courts of the Länder”. This indicates that the Constitution 
excludes the establishment of the tribunal model used in some countries (especially the 
Commonwealth countries). 
 
Jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court indicates that “the Constitution warrants an 
effective and coherent system of remedies against all acts of state that affect the citizens”.1034 
Therefore, the right to have recourse to courts is more than a mere right to file a request, but 
the guarantee of effective judicial review. In order to ensure guarantee of effective judicial 
review, the Constitution vests the legal control of administrative authorities in ordinary and 
special courts that are independent and separate from these authorities.
1035
  
 
The German legal system is, besides the constitutional courts, divided into five independent 
jurisdictions and courts have been established for the different jurisdictions.
1036
 These are the 
ordinary jurisdiction (civil and criminal), labour, administrative, financial and social 
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jurisdictions.
1037
 Each of these jurisdictions is divided between the German Federation (Bund) 
and the 16 federated states (Länder). Regional and/or higher regional courts operate at the 
Länder level for each of the five major court jurisdictions, with a supreme court operating at 
the federal (Bund) level. There is also a special military tribunal and a Federal Patent 
Court.
1038
 The regional and higher regional courts resolve disputes on the basis of facts and 
law, while supreme courts decide on appeals only on points of law.
1039
 
 
This implies that in the social (security) jurisdiction, the courts are organised in three levels. 
Organisation and procedure are regulated by the Code of Social Court Procedure 
(Sozialgerichtsgesetz). In addition, the Civil Procedure Code is to be applied by analogy, if 
this is not forbidden by the differences between the nature of the types of procedure. In the 
first instance are social courts (Sozialgerichte). A party to a dispute before the Social Court 
can lodge an appeal on the merits of the case (Berufung) as well as an appeal on a point of 
law (Revision).
1040
 In the second instance is the state (Länder) or Higher Social Court 
(Landessozialgerichte) for most of the sixteen German states. In two cases there is a joint 
court for two Länder. The Higher Social Courts hear appeals against decisions of the Social 
Courts. An appeal on the merits can in principle be lodged against any decision of a first-
instance social court. However, where the amount in dispute is less than €750, an appeal on 
the merits can only be lodged if the Social Court expressly grants leave to appeal.
1041
 The 
competent Higher Social Court reviews all factual and legal aspects of the case in an appeal 
on the merits of a case.
1042
  
 
The final instance of social security adjudication is by the Federal Social Court 
(Bundessozialgericht).
1043
  The Federal Social Court only decides appeals on points of law 
and not on the facts of a case. Access to the Court is restricted, as an appeal is only accepted 
if leave to appeal is expressly granted by the Higher Social Court (or by a leap-frog appeal in 
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the verdict of the Social Court), or if it has been accepted by the Federal Social Court in 
response to an appeal against refusal of leave to appeal (Nichtzulassungsbeschwerde). An 
appeal can also be accepted by the Federal Social Court in the event of a procedural 
irregularity by the Higher Social Court. An appeal application will be accepted if the legal 
issue involved is significant in principle (i.e. if its significance goes beyond the individual 
case and is generally relevant) or if the court decision deviates from relevant High or Federal 
Court rulings. This is because the role of the Federal Social Court is to ensure legal uni-
formity and the development of the law.
1044
 
 
On all levels, the social courts consist of panels of professional career judges and lay 
judges.
1045
  The panel in the first instance consists of one professional judge and two lay 
judges. On the länder and on the Federal level, the panels consist of three professional and 
two lay judges. The lay judges are appointed by the state on the recommendation of certain 
organisations representing the interests involved, particularly of trade unions and employers’ 
organisations. The panels decide by majority vote. 
 
The accessibility to the dispute resolution system is improved by the range of appeal 
processes available, which include internal review, court action and constitutional 
challenge.
1046
 A person who is dissatisfied with an administrative decision can lodge an 
appeal with a Social Court. Further appeals or applications for review can be made to the 
Higher Social Courts and then to the Federal Social Court. Before an appeal against an 
administrative decision can be lodged with a Social Court, a complainant is required to first 
lodge an application for reconsideration of the decision with the relevant authority or 
institution that made the decision, apart in circumstances where a law provides for an 
exception from this principle.
1047
 The sequential and complementary review and appeal 
framework and the multi-tiered Social Courts system allows for the resolution of disputes at 
an appropriate level. This leads to a small number (10 percent) of cases dealt with in one 
level of the Social Courts framework proceeding to a higher court (in 2005 the Social Courts 
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dealt with about 280,000 cases, while the Higher Social Courts dealt with about 27,500 and 
the Federal Social Court about 2,400).
1048
 
 
6.1 Reconsideration by social security administrative institution 
 
A person who is unhappy with a decision of a social security administrative institution has a 
right to apply for reconsideration or review (a procedure known as Widerspruchsverfahren). 
An application for reconsideration of the decision must be lodged with the relevant authority 
or institution within one month of the decision being made.
1049
 However, in exceptional 
cases, shorter deadlines may be required or longer periods provided for.
1050
 This ensures that 
public administration is able to regulate itself and gives an applicant and the social security 
institution an opportunity to settle the dispute without involving the courts.
1051
  
 
A senior official in the administrative institution or a higher administrative body deals with 
any opposition or objection (Widerspruch), by considering the lawfulness and – in cases of 
discretion – the appropriateness of the decision.1052 Where the application for reconsideration 
is successful, the administrative institution reverses the disputed decision or grants the 
decision sought. Where the relevant authority or institution rejects the application, it issues a 
notice rejecting the application for reconsideration and affirming its initial decision. In case 
of a rejection of the application for reconsideration or where the initial decision remains 
unchanged, a complaint can be lodge with a Social Court.
1053
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6.2 Dispute resolution by the Social Courts 
 
6.2.1 Accessibility of the Social Courts 
 
The right to seek redress is, with few exceptions, restricted to the person whose rights are 
affected. Usually the claimant must show that she or he can possibly have been aggrieved by 
the administrative decision.
1054
  
 
A complainant can lodge the complaint with a Social Court in writing or by describing the 
dispute to a clerk of the Social Court, who puts the complaint in writing.
1055
 The complaint 
must include the name of the complainant and of the respondent. It must also state the 
remedy sought by the complainant. The complaint must also identify the decision notice 
against which the complaint is directed (where applicable). The complaint must also include 
facts and evidence that support it.
1056
 However, all these requirements are not very strict. If 
the complaint is lodged in time with any domestic public authority or with any German 
consulate, it will be regarded as being filed in proper time.
1057
 And if the complaint does not 
have the proper form or is incomplete, the presiding judge of the panel has to take steps to 
have such deficiencies repaired.
1058
 A complaint must first be lodged with the Social Court 
having jurisdiction of the complainant’s residential area at the time of lodging the dispute. An 
appeal must be made to the Social Court within a month of notification of the decision or 
rejection of the review application, if the decision included information as to the available 
avenues of appeal. If this was not the case, the time is one year.
1059
 
 
Bringing a dispute to the social courts is free of charge to insured persons in the statutory 
insurance system, social assistance applicants and beneficiaries and person with 
disabilities.
1060
 This relieves applicants of the burden of court fees, which may restrict access 
to courts. However, other complainants such as public authorities and public-law institutions 
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(such as insurers or public support institutions (Versorgungsamt)) or doctors or hospitals 
disputing about their fee are required to pay a flat rate fee or a fee depending on the amount 
in dispute.
1061
  
 
The availability of legal aid to parties in social court proceedings further promotes access to 
these courts. The Legal Advice Assistance Act requires German States to establish a 
framework for the provision of legal assistance either through legal advice centres or by 
reimbursement of private lawyers who assist needy persons.
1062
 This is granted when a case 
has a good chance of success; and a party cannot afford to pay legal fees due to his or her 
income or assets.
1063
 The court that hears the appeal decides on a person’s eligibility for legal 
aid. Where an application for legal aid is refused, a person may appeal to the higher social 
court. Where legal aid is granted, a person within the court system representing the state 
interest can appeal as well. 
 
6.2.2 Scope of jurisdiction and powers of the Social Courts  
 
The jurisdiction of Social Courts consists of Statutory Pension Insurance for Workers and 
Employees; Craftsmen Insurance; Pension for Farmers; Statutory Accident Insurance; 
Compulsory Health Insurance; Social Long Term Care Insurance; Artists’ Social Security; 
the Law (regulating the practice) of Panel Doctors; tasks undertaken by the Federal Labour 
Agency (which comprises unemployment insurance and support in case of insolvency; basic 
financial security for the unemployed; Social compensation for damage to health (such as 
care for war victims, soldiers, compensation for injuries from immunisation, compensation 
for victims of violence, and certain aspects of the Severely Handicapped Persons Act); Issues 
of Social Aid and issues arising under the Asylum Seekers’ Benefit Act; and other welfare 
benefits (such as basic security benefits for job-seekers and social assistance).
1064
  The Social 
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Courts thus have a wide jurisdiction, covering over almost the whole of the German social 
security system.    
 
Social Courts also have wide powers in the resolution of disputes. Where a court reviews an 
administrative action, it can make a rescissory order (Anfechtungurteil) or make an order to 
take a decision which had been refused or failed to be taken (Verpflichtungsurteil).
1065
 This 
rescinds the administrative action in dispute, eliminating the impairment of the applicant’s 
rights.
1066
 In combination with the recissory order the defendant authority can also be 
sentenced to award the benefit claimed.
1067
 The courts also have the power to make a 
performance order (allgemeine Leistungsklage), if an administrative decision is not needed. A 
performance order obliges the administrative authority to implement the order.
1068
 The court 
can also enforce its decision, of not implemented by the administrative authority. In some 
cases where it is sufficient just to state the legal situation a court can make declaratory order 
(Feststellungsklage).
1069
  
 
The Code of Social Court Procedure also provides for the adoption of interim measures. An 
example is the suspensory effect of the application for a rescissory order, which suspends the 
implementation of an administrative action until a decision is made by the court. However, 
there are exceptions to the automatic suspensory effect of the rescissory application, such as 
where there is a special provision for the immediate enforcement of an administrative action. 
However, an applicant can request the court to completely or partly order or restore the 
suspensory effect. Courts can also provide interim measures in pending cases. Interim 
measures can be provided before a dispute is lodged if there is a risk of an applicant’s rights 
being impaired or to prevent disadvantage.
1070
 Such an interim measure can be utilised to 
maintain payment of social aid benefits to an applicant, thus securing the minimum 
maintenance until the case has been decided.   
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6.2.3 Fairness of Social Court procedures 
 
The procedures of the Social Courts and their organisation are regulated by the Code of 
Social Court Procedure. However, the judge who hears the appeal defines the precise 
procedures of the proceedings.
1071
 The social courts, like all other public law courts, have to 
examine the relevant facts of the case.
1072
 The procedures adopted for the resolution of 
disputes lead to effective running of court proceedings.
1073
  
 
The fundamental right to be heard, guaranteed in Article 103(1) of the Constitution, requires 
that a court considers every relevant aspect brought by the parties in a case.
1074
 A judge is 
required to discuss the factual and legal aspects of the dispute and to ask questions.
1075
 Parties 
are encouraged to submit full statements on all relevant facts on time and to submit relevant 
requests.
1076
  
 
Proceedings of the Social Court usually involve an oral hearing.
1077
 An oral hearing is carried 
out in public, chaired by the presiding judge. Once the facts and the dispute are presented, 
evidence is then presented (if necessary). The presentation of evidence includes the hearing 
of witnesses, including expert witnesses such as doctors, and review of documents submitted 
in support of specific factual claims. The Social Court is not restricted to the evidence 
submitted by the parties to a dispute. The Court is empowered to investigate the matter on its 
own initiative. The Court is required to determine all facts material to making a decision on a 
dispute. Parties to the dispute can also be called to assist in determining all facts material to 
making a decision. In this instance, the complainant and respondent state their case, after 
which the oral hearing comes to an end. A hearing is concluded at the end of the oral hearing 
and usually a decision is announced immediately. 
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Representation by a lawyer is not mandatory for proceedings in the Social and Higher Social 
Courts. However, due to the complicated issues dealt with in social security cases, 
representation is usually required (at least in the Higher Social Courts). Representation is 
necessary for proceedings before the Federal Social Court. A party can be represented by a 
professional attorney, representatives or members of trade unions and employers’ 
organisations or other professional organisations.
1078
 
 
Usually the presiding judge has to prepare the case by all necessary actions in order to finish 
the case by one formal hearing.
1079
 A formal oral hearing may be preceded by a preliminary 
hearing. This is undertaken by the presiding judge alone. A preliminary hearing is used to 
clarify issues in dispute, to give directions, to ascertain the potential of success of the dispute 
and to explain matters to the plaintiff.
1080
 Settlement of a dispute through an agreement is also 
encouraged, as it promotes legal peace and the expedition of dispute resolution.
1081
 Courts 
strive to achieve conciliatory settlement of a dispute at every stage of the dispute resolution 
process. Courts may also submit a proposed settlement prior to the oral hearing, which the 
parties can accept through a written statement to the court. If a party to the dispute does not 
appear for the hearing, the court can decide the dispute according to the documentary 
evidence available.
1082
  
 
6.2.4 Expertise, independence and impartiality of Social Courts 
 
The competence of the Social Courts relates to their ability to provide redress to persons 
whose rights are violated by public authority. The Constitution states that judges are 
independent and subject only to the law.
1083
 The courts are thus required to be independent 
and impartial; and to have the necessary expertise to perform their duties. Such 
independence, impartiality and expertise enable them to provide effective redress to 
applicants. 
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The independence and impartiality of courts is protected through procedures for appointment 
and the conditions of service of judges. The Constitution provides that states may regulate the 
appointment of judges jointly by the Land Minister of Justice and a committee for the 
selection of judges.
1084
 As a result, in the State of Hesse, the appointment of judges in the 
Social Court is undertaken by a committee consisting of 5 judges, seven members of the state 
parliament and the president of the state’s Bar Association.1085 Higher Social Court judges are 
promoted from the ranks of the Social Court judges on the recommendation of the president 
of the Higher Social Court and the state minister of justice. Federal Social Court judges are 
chosen jointly by a committee made up of Land ministers of justice and an equal number of  
members elected by the parliament (the Bundestag), presided by the Federal Minister of 
Justice who has no vote in the committee.
1086
 Spreading the function of appointing judges 
amongst many persons minimises the risk of interference in the selection of judges. 
 
Judges are also protected from arbitrary discipline and termination. The Constitution states 
that permanent full-time judges may be involuntarily dismissed, permanently or temporarily 
suspended, transferred, or retired before the expiration of their term of office only by virtue 
of judicial decision and only for the reasons and in the manner specified by law. It also 
empowers the legislature to set age limits for the retirement of judges appointed for life. In 
the event of changes in the structure of courts or in their districts, judges may be transferred 
to another court or removed from office, provided they retain their full salary.
1087
 
 
The constitutional protection of the independence of judges is further reinforced by statute. A 
judge may only be appointed for life, for a specified term, on probation, or by 
commission.
1088
 Only judges appointed for life can act as judges of a court, except where a 
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federal statute provides otherwise.
1089
 In addition, only a judge may preside over a court. 
Where a court takes action, a judge appointed for life must act as the presiding judge.
1090
 
Where a court gives a decision, no more than one judge on probation or one judge by 
commission or one judge on secondment can participate in the decision-making. In such 
cases the judge concerned must be identified on the roster allocating court business as a judge 
on probation, by commission or on secondment.
1091
 
 
Professional judges are appointed for life and can only be removed in terms of prescribed 
procedures.
1092
 The German Judiciary Act provides that an appointment as a judge is null and 
void where it is made by an authority that is not competent to make such appointment. The 
appointment cannot be confirmed retrospectively.
1093
 An appointment as a judge is also null 
and void where at the time of the appointment, the person appointed was not a German in 
terms of Article 116 of the Constitution or he or she did not have the capacity to hold public 
office.
1094
 The appointment as a judge for life or for a specified term can only be nullified 
after a court declaration having final and binding effect.
1095
  
 
Statutory provisions also clearly specify the grounds on which a judge appointed for life or 
for a specified term can be transferred to another office or discharged from office without his 
own written consent;
1096
 how a judge can be supervised;
1097
 circumstances in which an 
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appointment as a judge can be revoked;
1098
 circumstances in which a judge can be 
dismissed;
1099
 and conditions for a judge to retire.
1100
 
                                                                                                                                                        
transfer or discharge is due to changes being made in the organisation of the courts - section 30(2) of the 
German Judiciary Act. 
1097
 A judge can only be supervised if the supervision does not infringe on his or her independence - section 
26(1) of the German Judiciary Act. Supervision includes the power to censure an improper mode of executing 
an official duty and to urge proper and prompt attention to official duties - section 26(1) of the German Judiciary 
Act. Where a judge applies to a court for a ruling that a supervisory measure infringes on his or her 
independence, the court is required to give a ruling in compliance with the Act - section 26(3) of the German 
Judiciary Act. 
1098
 An appointment can be revoked where the person appointed was not qualified to hold judicial office; or 
where there was a failure of a judicial selection committee to participate in the appointment (as required by 
statute) and the judicial selection committee refuses to confirm the appointment. Appointment as a judge will 
also be revoked where he or she was appointed through coercion, wilful deceit or bribery. An appointment will 
further be revoked where it was not known that the person appointed had committed a minor or serious criminal 
offence that makes him seem unworthy of holding judicial tenure. This is also the case where, on account of the 
criminal offence committed, he or she was or will be sentenced to a penalty with final and binding effect - 
section 19(1) of the German Judiciary Act. An appointment can also be revoked where it was not known that a 
court order had been made removing the person appointed from office or from his profession or withdrawing his 
pension rights - section 19(2) of the German Judiciary Act. In the case of a judge appointed for life or for a 
specified term, where he or she does not give written consent, his or her appointment can be revoked only 
through a final and binding judicial decision - section 19(3) of the German Judiciary Act 
1099
 a judge can be dismissed where he or she loses his status of being a German in terms of Article 116 of the 
Constitution; where he or she takes up employment with another public employer (except where provided by 
statute); or where he or she is appointed a professional soldier or as a soldier serving for a specified term - 
section 21(1) of the German Judiciary Act. In the case where a person takes up employment with another public 
employer the highest service authority concerned can, with the agreement of the new service employer and with 
the consent of the judge, direct that the judge continue court service in addition to the new position or office 
held. Dismissal in these instances can also only be effected through a final and binding judicial decision - 
section 21(3) of the German Judiciary Act. A judge can also be dismissed where he or she refuses to take the 
judicial oath (in terms of section 38); where at the time of his or her appointment he or she was a member of the 
Bundestag (Federal Parliament) or of a Land parliament and did not resign his parliamentary seat within the 
reasonable time-limit set by the highest service authority concerned; where he was appointed after reaching the 
age-limit; where he requests his own dismissal in writing; where he has reached the age-limit or is unfit for 
service and the service relationship has not ended in his retirement, or where he takes up abode or permanent 
residence abroad without the consent of the highest service authority. In this case the judge can only be 
dismissed through a final and binding judicial decision, except where he or she gives his or her written consent - 
section 21(2) of the German Judiciary Act. 
A judge on probation can be dismissed on expiry of six, twelve, eighteen or twenty-four months following his 
appointment - section 22(1) of the German Judiciary Act. A judge on probation can be dismissed on expiry of 
the third or fourth year where he is not suitable for judicial office or where a judicial selection committee refuses 
to give him judicial tenure for life or for a specified term - Section 22(2) of the German Judiciary Act. A judge 
can also be dismissed if he/she conducts himself/herself in a manner which leads, in the case of a judge for life, 
to a disciplinary measure imposable in formal disciplinary proceedings before a court - section 22(2) of the 
German Judiciary Act. Where a judge is dismissed on expiry of a time limit, he or she must be notified of the 
dismissal order at least six weeks before the day of dismissal - section 22(5) of the German Judiciary Act. 
A judge appointed on commission can also be dismissed on expiry of six, twelve, eighteen or twenty-four 
months following his appointment; or at the end of the third or fourth year of service where he or she is found to 
be unsuitable for judicial office or a judicial selection committee refuses to appoint him or her for life or for a 
specified term - section 23 read with section 22(1) and (2) of the German Judiciary Act. In this case the judge 
must also be notified of the dismissal order at least six weeks before the day of dismissal - section 23 read with 
section 22(5) of the German Judiciary Act. A judge appointed on commission can also be dismissed if he or she 
conducts himself or herself in a manner which leads to a disciplinary action being taken against him or her in 
formal disciplinary proceedings before a court - section 23 read with section 22(3) of the German Judiciary Act. 
A judge also ceases to serve where a court makes a judgment in terms of the Judiciary Act which imposes a 
sentence of at least one year's imprisonment for a criminal offence committed with intent; a sentence of 
imprisonment for a criminal offence committed with intent and punishable in accordance with the provisions 
228 
 
German judges are also not subject to orders from judges of higher courts, despite the 
hierarchy of the court. They are not bound by prior decisions of higher courts, except the 
decisions of the Federal Supreme Courts on remand of the same cases and decisions of the 
Constitutional Court in similar cases.
1101
  
 
The courts are administratively independent from other government institutions. However, 
the Land minister of finance decides the budget of the courts. This has the potential of 
affecting the efficient administration of justice.
1102
 
 
The judges of a panel have to follow orders of the presiding judge as to every day procedure, 
such as when to meet, but they are free in all judicial decisions. In a court, all cases have to 
be assigned to a specific panel by abstract ruling not related to certain cases. And this is done 
by a committee elected by the professional judges of the court. 
 
The expertise and specialisation of Social Courts also ensures their competence.  The German 
court system is organised under the principles of “specialisation” and “decentralisation” due 
to Germany’s federal status and the historical development and codification of its law. As a 
result, the Social Courts (as is the case with the other German courts) are specialised courts 
with specific and exclusive jurisdiction.
1103
  
 
Each Social Court consists of a number of chambers, each chamber dealing with specific 
areas of law within the social court jurisdiction. The Social Courts Code stipulates that each 
chamber of the Social Court must be composed of one professional and two honorary (lay) 
                                                                                                                                                        
concerning the ban on wars of aggression, high treason, jeopardy to the democratic constitutional state or 
concerning espionage and jeopardy to external security; disqualification from holding public office; or forfeiture 
of a basic right under Article 18 of the Constitution - section 24 of the German Judiciary Act. 
1100
 A judge appointed for life retires upon reaching the statutory retirement age or on his or her own application 
– section 48 of the German Judiciary Act. A judge (whether appointed for life or for a specified term) can be 
provisionally retired or retired where his or her retirement is imperative in order to avoid grave prejudice to the 
administration of justice - section 31of the German Judiciary Act. A judge can also be retired due to unfitness 
for service where a court decision has been made in this regard - section 34 of the German Judiciary Act. 
1101
 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) Access to justice in Europe: an overview of 
challenges and opportunities (National Thematic Study: Germany) (2010) 2. 
1102
 Discussions with Judges Daniela Evers and Henning Muller, Judges of the Social Court in Darmstadt 
(Hesse, Germany) on 11 April 2012.  
1103
 Damle SV “Specialize the judge, not the court: a lesson from the German Constitutional Court” 2005 
Virginia Law Review Vol. 91:1267-1311 at 1289-1291. 
229 
 
judges.
1104
 At the Higher Social Court and the Federal Social Court, three professional judges 
are supported by again two honorary judges.
1105
  
 
A person can be appointed as a judge if he/she satisfies the legal training requirements.
1106
 
These requirements involve the completion of studies at a university (including written and 
oral examinations) and written examinations by a state committee both being combined to be 
the first examination. After university studies, a person is further required to complete a 
subsequent period of preparatory training after which he/she is required to  pass a second 
state examination (written and oral). The university part of the first examination comprises an 
assessment on specialist subjects, while the state examinations are on compulsory core 
subjects. In addition, every full professor of law at a university within the area of application 
of the German Judiciary Act is qualified to hold judicial office.
1107
 
 
A person can be appointed as a judge if he/she qualified to hold judicial office, and has the 
requisite social skill or competence to be a judge.
1108
 A person who has worked as a judge for 
at least three years after acquiring the qualification to hold judicial office may be appointed a 
judge for life.
1109
 In calculating the three-year work period, work that was done after the 
second state exam is some areas is taken into consideration.
1110
 
 
                                                 
1104
 Section 12(1) of the Social Courts Code. 
1105
 Sections 33(1) and 40(1) of the Social Courts Code. 
1106
 Section 5(1) of the German Judiciary Act.  
1107
 Section 7 of the German Judiciary Act. 
1108
 Section 9 of the German Judiciary Act. See, for example, the North-Rhine/Westphalia Judicial Competence 
Framework for the social skills or competence required for appointment as a judge in the Lander. In terms of the 
framework, social competence of a judge include ability to work in a team, ability to communicate, ability to 
deal with conflicts and to mediate (prepared to compromise; fairness, positive approach in dealing with 
colleagues; constructive criticism; ability to mediate; and being accepted as an authority); and awareness of 
judicial service aspects (respect for interests and concerns of parties and witnesses; politeness; keeping to 
schedules; and taking the necessary amount of time) – see Thomas C Review of Judicial Training and Education 
in Other Jurisdictions (Report prepared for the Judicial Studies Board)(May 2006) 122. 
1109
 Section 10(1) of the German Judiciary Act. 
1110
 Section 10(2) of the German Judiciary Act. In terms of section 11, these include work done as a civil servant 
in the higher civil service; work done in the German civil service or in the service of an international or 
supranational institution, provided that the type and significance of the work done was similar to that involved 
in the execution of an office within the higher civil service; work done as a teacher of law at a German scientific 
institution of higher education, being a teacher qualified to give instruction at a university; and work done as 
counsel (Rechtsanwalt), as a notary, or as a lawyer who, having acquired the qualification to hold judicial office 
(Assessor), assisted counsel or a notary. Work done in other professions is also considered, provided that the 
type and significance of the work done was, like also fit for imparting knowledge and experience for exercising 
judicial office. The taking into account of more than two years of work done presupposes special knowledge and 
experience on the part of the person to be appointed. Appointment as a judge for a specified term is only 
permissible under the conditions and for the duties stipulated by federal legislation. 
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Lay judges are therefore selected for their particular experience as practitioners in the 
applicable area of law.
1111
 And by the way of proposal and appointment they bring in an 
element of representation. However, the professional judges remain the real experts regarding 
the law. Having expert judges who are knowledgeable in the intricacies of a particular part of 
the code (in this case the huge mass of social statutes) works to the benefit of the legal 
system, as the legal codes and their interpretation is complex (they are utilised to resolve all 
legal problems within the area of law). The lay judges are often experts in the field of 
worklife or other elements of practice relevant to a certain case and thus their presence can 
lead to better-reasoned and more efficient dispute resolution.
1112
  
 
However, it is argued that the involvement of non-professionals may result in a prolongation 
of trials, since they are entitled to actively take part in the hearings and in rendering a 
decision. Furthermore, lay judges might be overwhelmed by the complexity of the cases they 
are confronted with and of the legal basis underlying these cases. Some opponents assert that 
conversely their involvement may even lead to a loss of judicial independence as they are 
more likely to be influenced by the media or nongovernmental organisations, particularly in 
highly contested cases. Putting an emphasis on the benefits of expert knowledge of honorary 
judges disregards the fact that judges also need to keep a holistic view of all the parts of the 
legal system that is to be considered in the specific case.
1113
 
 
The efficiency of the German Social Courts is facilitated through the expeditious resolution 
of disputes. Their independence and impartiality (also due their perceived absence of 
corruption) engenders high regard and general acceptance by users. This leads to the 
withdrawal of some review applications on the advice of judges.
1114
 However, the expeditious 
resolution of disputes is hampered by the limited number of judges as this leads to longer trial 
durations. Some procedures intended to protect the rights of applicants also lead to longer 
trial times (such as the right of an applicant to get the opinion of an additional medical 
practitioner in healthcare cases).    
                                                 
1111
 Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs Social security at a glance - total summary Bonn (January 
2011) 162. 
1112
 Damle SV “Specialize the judge, not the court: a lesson from the German Constitutional Court” 2005 
Virginia Law Review Vol. 91:1267-1311 at 1290. 
1113
 Hoffmann-Holland K and Putzer M From common sense to special knowledge? – The role of lay judges in 
Germany (undated) accessed at www.droit.ens.fr/IMG/pdf/HoffmannHollandPutzerLayJudgesGermany-1.pdf 
on 30 March 2012. 
1114
 Discussions with Judges Daniela Evers and Henning Muller, Judges of the Social Court in Darmstadt 
(Hesse, Germany) on 11 April 2012. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
SADC countries have not yet established institutions and procedures for the resolution of 
social security disputes. However, such frameworks have been specifically established in 
Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Germany to review administrative 
decisions and to provide effective redress. In each of these jurisdictions there is a system of 
sequential and complementary internal review (review by the ministry or agency responsible 
for the administration of social security) and external reviews of the decision. External review 
of decisions is also undertaken by specialist multi-tiered tribunals and/or courts (the SSAT 
and AAT of Australia; New Zealand’s SSAA; the United Kingdom’s First-tier and Upper 
Tribunals; and Germany’s Social Courts). These ensure the resolution of disputes quickly and 
easily at the most appropriate level. 
 
The independence and impartiality of the institutions is guaranteed. In the case of tribunals, 
they are mostly created as independent statutory bodies under the supervision of the relevant 
ministry of Justice. 
 
A wide scope of persons can bring disputes to the tribunals and courts. In addition, the scope 
of disputes covered by the institutions is wide, with limited circumscription. The institutions 
are also afforded wide powers in the resolution of disputes. Wide powers also enable them to 
provide an array of possible remedies. 
 
 There is a wide geographical spread of the institutions in each of the jurisdictions to ensure 
effective assess and participation of claimants. Accessibility is also facilitated through 
multiple claims lodgement options and reasonable timeframes. Face-to-face hearings are 
mostly preferred to promote participation of claimants, but other logistical arrangements are 
possible where necessary. The speedy resolution of disputes is guaranteed as dispute 
resolution timeframes are stipulated. In cases where an institution has the status of a court, 
they have the power to enforce their decision. In other instances the decisions are forwarded 
to administrative institutions for implementation. 
 
The appointment of members of the institutions promotes their effectiveness. They are 
appointed by the national executive heads on the recommendation of the relevant Ministers; 
or by multi-stakeholder committees. For example, the Queen of England appoints the Senior 
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President of Tribunals (head of the Tribunals service), while the Governor-Generals (the 
Queen’s Representatives and Heads of State of Australia and New Zealand) appoint members 
of the Social Security Appeal Tribunal and the Social Security Appeal Authority. Judges in 
Germany’s Social Courts are appointed by committees. The conditions of service of the 
members of these institutions are also prescribed by statute.  
 
Efforts are also made to promote the effectiveness of the institutions by stating minimum 
academic qualifications and relevant professional and other experience. This ensures that 
only suitably qualified persons are appointed as members of these institutions. 
 
The responsible government departments provide funding and administrative support service. 
This includes FaHCSIA and the Attorney-General in the case of Australia’s SSAT and AAT 
respectively, the Ministries of Justice in New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Germany. 
  
Governance, oversight and supervision arrangements are undertaken for the tribunals, but 
these vary between the three countries. While FaHCSIA undertakes governance, oversight 
and supervision of the Social Security Appeal; New Zealand’s Department of Social 
Development is supervised by parliament. A Board is responsible for overseeing the Courts 
and Tribunals Service in the United Kingdom. 
 
Therefore, these institutions are generally enabled to effectively resolve disputes that arise in 
the area of social security. They can thus be said to ensure access to justice for social security 
claimants in their respective jurisdictions. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL SECURITY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
SYSTEM 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter analyses the current South African social security dispute resolution system. 
This involves an investigation of the dispute resolution institutions/forums established and 
their procedures. There is currently no uniform social security adjudication institution, due to 
the piecemeal fashion in which schemes were established or protection against individual 
risks regulated. The result is that each statute provides for its own dispute resolution 
institution(s) and processes. Therefore, reviewing South Africa’s current social security 
dispute resolution framework involves a consideration of the institutions and processes 
provided in each statute.  
 
This is to assess their compliance with constitutional prerequisites and international 
standards. It is also to compare and/or contrast them with social security dispute resolution 
systems in comparative international jurisdictions, as well as comparative South African 
(non-social security) systems. It also seeks to identify what gaps and challenges exist (if any) 
in the present social security dispute resolution framework. This is to assess their 
effectiveness in ensuring that every social security applicant or beneficiary (irrespective of 
their social, economic and other conditions) has access to a streamlined, integrated and 
coordinated system that resolves social security disputes in a fair, expeditious and 
participatory manner. A review of the current adjudication system will provide guidelines for 
proposals towards the development of a new adjudicative and institutional framework. 
 
This chapter thus evaluates the dispute resolution systems established in terms of major social 
security legislation, such as the SAA; COIDA; ODMWA; the UIA; the RAFA; the Pension 
Funds Act; and the Medical Schemes Act. In addition, the role of the High Court is 
examined, as it is the external appeals institution for many of the social security dispute 
resolution institutions.  
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The Labour Court also resolves some social security disputes.
1115
 Social security statutes do 
not provide for specific powers to be exercised and procedures to be adopted by the Labour 
Court in the resolution of disputes arising in terms of the relevant statutes. Therefore, the 
powers exercised and the procedures adopted by the court in the resolution of disputes within 
its jurisdiction will be the powers and procedures applicable. 
 
2.  SOCIAL ASSISTANCE ACT DISPUTE RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK  
 
The Social Assistance Act created a framework for the resolution of disputes consisting of 
sequential and complementary review or reconsideration and appeal processes. Internal 
reconsideration is undertaken by the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) which 
administers the social grants system, while the Independent Tribunal for Social Assistance 
Appeals (ITSAA) was established for consideration of appeals. The High Court, Supreme 
Court of Appeal and Constitutional Court are further avenues for appeals. 
 
2.1 Reconsideration by the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) 
 
The Social Assistance Act states that an applicant for, a beneficiary of social assistance or a 
person acting on his or her behalf who disagrees with the decision and reasons for the 
decision by the SASSA may apply to SASSA requesting reconsideration of its decision.
1116
 
An application for reconsideration must be lodged in the prescribed manner within 90 days of 
the decision being made.
1117
 
 
                                                 
1115
 The primary objective of the Labour Court is not to resolve social security disputes - section 1 of the LRA. 
However, provision is made in some social security laws for the referral of certain disputes to the Labour Court. 
An example can be found in the is the Unemployment Insurance Act, which provides for objections to 
compliance orders to be referred to the Labour Court; and for a compliance order to be referred to the Labour 
Court to be made an order of the Court if the employer has not complied with the order - section 41 of the 
Unemployment Insurance Act. In addition, the UIA states that unless provided otherwise, the Labour Court has 
jurisdiction in respect of all matters in terms of the Act, except in respect of an offence in terms of the Act - 
section 66 of the Unemployment Insurance Act. The Act further empowers the Director-General of the 
Department of Labour to state a case for decision by the Labour Court of his or her own initiative or at the 
request of a party with sufficient interest in the matter - section 67 of the Unemployment Insurance Act. 
1116
 Section 18(1) of the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004. 
1117
 Regulation 2(2) of the of the Regulations relating to the Lodging and Consideration of Applications for 
Reconsideration of Social Assistance Application by the Agency and Social Assistance Appeals by the 
Independent Tribunal (GN R746 published in GG 34618  of 19 September 2011) (Regulations to the Social 
Assistance Act of 19 September 2011). 
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Internal review is performed by a senior official from SASSA, who is independent from the 
original decision-maker.
1118
 The Regulations further state that the Chief Executive Officer of 
the Agency or his or her delegate must assign such number of officials as may be necessary 
to consider applications.
1119
 The designated official must occupy a position that is higher in 
rank to that of the official or officials who considered the application in respect of which the 
applicant or beneficiary or a person acting on his or her behalf is requesting 
reconsideration.
1120
 However, neither the Act nor the regulations ensure that officials, 
designated to handle applications for reconsideration, are appropriately qualified to undertake 
reviews. It is therefore necessary that these officials are trained. It may also be necessary for 
officials designated to undertake review functions to do so on an ongoing and full-time basis. 
 
2.2 Determination of appeals by Independent Tribunal for Social Assistance Appeals 
(ITSAA)  
 
The Act further provides that where an applicant or a beneficiary disagrees with a 
reconsidered decision made by SASSA, that person or a person acting on his or her behalf 
may lodge a written appeal with the Minister of Social Development against that decision, 
setting out the reasons why the Minister should vary or set aside that decision.
1121
 When the 
Minister receives the applicant’s or beneficiary’s written appeal and the SASSA’s reasons for 
the decision he may confirm, vary or set aside that decision, or appoint an independent 
tribunal to consider an appeal.
1122
 If the Minister has appointed an independent tribunal, all 
appeals must be considered by that tribunal.
1123
 The Minister has established the Independent 
Tribunal for Social Assistance Appeals (ITSAA) to determine all appeals under the Social 
Assistance Act.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1118
 Regulation 2 of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. The Regulations state 
that an applicant, beneficiary or a person acting on his or her behalf, who disagrees with the decision and 
reasons for the decision by the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), requesting the Agency to 
reconsider its decision. 
1119
 Regulation 3(1) of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. 
1120
 Regulation 3(2) of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. 
1121
 Section 18(1A) of the Social Assistance Act. 
1122
 Section 18(2) of the Social Assistance Act. 
1123
 Section 18(3) of the Social Assistance Act. 
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2.2.1 Accessibility of ITSAA  
 
ITSAA panels are currently deciding appeals in regional clusters in Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal 
and the Eastern Cape. However, plans are underway for ITSAA “to move from a national to 
provincial footprint, so that it could get closer to the communities it served”.1124 This would 
be achieved through the replacement of the three regional clusters with nine functional 
provincial offices, with six co-ordinators handling KZN, Eastern Cape, Gauteng, Western and 
Northern Cape, Limpopo/Mpumalanga, and Free State/North West Provinces.
1125
  
 
The appeal lodgement procedures and time periods also facilitate access for aggrieved 
persons to ITSAA. Parties who disagree with the decision and reasons of SASSA and who 
wish to appeal the decision are required to lodge an appeal to the Independent Tribunal in the 
prescribed form.
1126
 An appeal can be lodged with the Department of Social Development or 
the Independent Tribunal; and may be delivered by hand, post, fax or electronic mail.
1127
 
 
In addition to the required documents, an application must be accompanied by any document 
provided by SASSA as proof of receipt of an application for social assistance. It must also be 
accompanied by a copy of a letter of rejection or approval of social assistance application by 
SASSA; any other relevant document in relation to the application; and (in the case of a 
person applying on behalf of the beneficiary or applicant) a copy of the power of attorney or 
proof of his or her appointment by the applicant or beneficiary to act on his or her behalf.
1128
 
When lodging an appeal, the applicant, beneficiary or a person acting on behalf of applicant 
or beneficiary is allowed to produce any evidence or information which was not provided to 
SASSA at the time of application for social assistance.
1129
 
 
An appeal must be lodged within 90 days after reconsideration of original decision by 
SASSA. However, the Tribunal can condone a late application if good cause is shown. A late 
application will be condoned taking into account the reason for the delay; whether it is in the 
                                                 
1124
 Petersen V Independent Tribunal for Social Assistance Appeals on its Operational Plan and Progress 
Report: National Assembly Briefing (31 Aug 2010). 
1125
 Ibid. 
1126
 See Form 3 (Lodging of an Appeal) in the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. 
1127
 Regulation 14(2)(b) of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. 
1128
 Regulation 14(2)(c) read with Form 3 in Annexure A of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 
September 2011. 
1129
 Regulation 14(3) of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. 
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interests of justice that condonation be granted; and if there are reasonable prospects of 
success.
1130
  
 
2.2.2 Scope of jurisdiction and powers of ITSAA 
 
Any applicant for social assistance grants or any social assistance grant beneficiary or a 
person acting on their behalf can lodge an appeal against the decisions of SASSA in relation 
to all matters regulated by that Social Assistance Act.
1131
 This implies that any decision of 
SASSA that adversely affects an applicant’s or beneficiary’s rights to benefits is appealable 
to ITSAA. It jurisdiction is therefore wide, although limited to the provisions of the Social 
Assistance Act.   
 
The powers and functions of each member of an ITSAA panel are circumscribed in the Act. 
The legal practitioner, as the chairperson, is responsible for deciding and ruling on whether or 
not an appeal is to be upheld (after consultation with the medical practitioner in respect of 
appeals on disability, care dependency, war veteran's grants or grant-in-aid and a member of 
civil society in respect of an appeal relating to a social relief of distress grant).
1132
 He or she 
is also responsible for writing down the decision of the Tribunal panel and the reasons 
thereof, and of signing off on the decision and the reasons.  
 
The medical practitioner is responsible for the assessment of all medical aspects of appeals in 
respect of disability, care dependency, war veteran's grants or grant-in-aid.
1133
 He or she is 
also responsible for advising the legal practitioner on all medical aspects of the appeals and 
for making recommendations in respect of appeals relating to disability, care dependency, 
war veteran's grants or grant-in-aid.  
 
The member of civil society is responsible for advising the Tribunal on the socio-economic 
aspects of the applicant or the beneficiary in respect of an appeal relating to the social relief 
of distress grant.
1134
  
 
                                                 
1130
 Section 18(4) of the Social Assistance Act and Regulation 15 of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act 
of 19 September 2011. 
1131
 Section 18 of the Social Assistance Act. 
1132
 Regulation 9 of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011.  
1133
 Regulation 10 of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011.  
1134
 Regulation 11 of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011.  
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An ITSAA panel has the power to consider all applications for appeal by applicants, 
beneficiaries or persons acting on behalf of the applicant or beneficiary in terms of the Social 
Assistance Act.
1135
 In an instance where it is adjudicating an appeal and it is not satisfied with 
reasons provided by an applicant or beneficiary (or a person acting on behalf of the applicant 
or beneficiary), it may request further written reasons.
1136
 If the Tribunal is not satisfied by 
the reasons provided by SASSA for rejecting the beneficiary's or applicant's request for 
reconsideration, it may also request SASSA to provide written reasons for its decision for 
rejecting the request for reconsideration in terms of section 18(1) of the Social Assistance 
Act.
1137
 The Tribunal is also able to give directions to any party to the appeal on any matter 
within its jurisdiction in connection with that appeal.
1138
 It may at any time request any party 
to the appeal to furnish any written information which is necessary for the determination of 
the appeal;
1139
 may refer the applicant or beneficiary for a second and independent medical 
examination or opinion in terms of regulation 19(1);
1140
 and may postpone the hearing for the 
consideration of an appeal to such date as it may determine.
1141
 
 
When the Tribunal receives the reasons as well as the required information or the required 
medical report and after consideration of the appeal, the Tribunal may act in accordance with 
section 18(2)(b) of the Act (confirm or set aside the decision of the SASSA and substitute it 
with its own.
1142
 
 
The Tribunal is unable to reconsider its decision as such power is restricted to SASSA 
only.
1143
 Neither the Social Assistance Act nor the Regulations to the Act regulate the 
enforceability of the ITSAA’s decisions. This may be because the Tribunal has power to 
substitute the decision of SASSA with its own and the substituted decision has the same 
effect as if SASSA had made the decision. 
 
                                                 
1135
 Regulation 12(1)(a) of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. 
1136
 Regulation 12(1)(b) of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. 
1137
 Regulation 12(1)(c) of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. 
1138
 Regulation 12(1)(d) of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. 
1139
 Regulation 12(1)(e) of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. 
1140
 Regulation 12(1)(f) of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. 
1141
 Regulation 12(1)(g) of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. 
1142
 Regulation 12(3) of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. 
1143
 See section 18(1) of the Social Assistance Act and Regulation 3 of the Regulations to the Social Assistance 
Act of 19 September 2011. 
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2.2.3 Fairness of ITSAA adjudication procedures  
 
An ITSAA appeal is conducted through consideration of the documentary evidence submitted 
by the applicant or beneficiary (or a person acting on behalf of applicant or beneficiary) and 
by SASSA. This is normally done in the absence of the applicant or beneficiary, or a person 
acting on behalf of an applicant or a beneficiary.
1144
 Hearings where an applicant or a 
beneficiary can appear in person to present oral arguments are organised only on exceptional 
bases and at the discretion of the Tribunal.
1145
  
 
The Regulations of the Social Assistance Act seek to ensure the expeditious resolution of 
disputes by requiring the Tribunal to finalise an appeal within 90 days of receipt.
1146
 This is 
important in light of reports of the prevalent and widespread problem of unreasonably long 
delays in processing appeals for disability grants and other social grants in the Eastern Cape and 
other regions in the country.
1147
  Delays in the resolution of disputes by ITSAA can partly be 
attributed to backlogs. In Ntamo and Other v Minister of Social Development and Others, the 
Minister of Social Development undertook to implement a reasonable programme to clear 
existing backlogs of disability appeals by the end of September 2011 and to ensure that 
appeals are determined without undue delay.
1148
 The clearing of backlogs and the 
requirements to finalise appeals within 90 of receipt would guarantee the expeditious 
resolution of disputes by ITSAA. 
 
The Secretariat communicates the appeal findings in writing to an applicant, beneficiary or a 
person acting on behalf of applicant or beneficiary and to SASSA. Notification is delivered to 
the address provided by or any other method chosen by applicant, beneficiary or a person 
acting on behalf of applicant or beneficiary in his or her appeal.
1149
 
 
                                                 
1144
 Regulation 16(1) of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. 
1145
 See Petersen V Independent Tribunal for Social Assistance Appeals on its Operational Plan and Progress 
Report: National Assembly Briefing (31 Aug 2010). 
1146
 Regulation 16(2) of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. 
1147
 An affidavit by Black Sash in Ntamo & Others v Minister of Social Development and Others (Eastern Cape 
High Court (Grahamstown) Case No. 689/2010 of 27 January 2011) states that delays of one year are common 
for clients to be allocated an appeal hearing date. See also Jongile and others v Minister of Social Development 
and others Eastern Cape High Court (Grahamstown) Case No. 1962/2008 and Rugege U Submission to the 
Department of Social Development SECTION27 /AIDS Law Project (14 February 2011). 
1148
 Ntamo & Others v Minister of Social Development and Others para 1. 
1149
 Regulation 20 of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. 
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The Secretariat of the Tribunal, as the custodian of the Tribunal appeal documents, is 
required to retain a copy of the appeal documents, including notification of decision, record 
of proceedings and copies of the Agency's file submitted to the Tribunal for a period of five 
years from the date of communication of the decision on the appeal.
1150
  
 
2.2.4 Expertise, independence and impartiality of ITSAA  
 
The institutional framework, status and composition of ITSAA do not guarantee the 
perception of independence and impartiality.  The members of the ITSAA are appointed by 
the Minister of Social Development, who is also the institutional head of SASSA. They are 
appointed for a specific period of time and on terms and conditions determined by 
Minister.
1151
 
 
The discipline and termination of service of ITSAA members is also undertaken by the 
Minister. In performing their functions and duties, all members of the Independent Tribunal 
are required to maintain a high standard of integrity; respect the confidentiality of 
information of all parties to an appeal; maintain acceptable standards of professionalism and 
ethics; and recuse themselves where there is conflict of interest.
1152
 In addition, a member of 
ITSAA who is a member of a professional body (such as the legal practitioner or medical 
practitioner) he or she is also required to observe the ethical rules applicable to the members 
of such a body.
1153
  
 
The termination of the service of tribunal members will be undertaken by the Minister as the 
Minister appoints members on such terms and conditions as the Minister may determine. In 
addition, the operational arrangements of the ITSAA (its funding;
1154
 human resource and 
administrative support; managerial framework;
1155
 governance, oversight and supervision;
1156
 
                                                 
1150
 Regulation 23 of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. A secretariat which 
provides Human resource and administrative support to ITSAA is based at the Department of Social 
Development; and is staffed by full-time employees of the Department. 
1151
 See Regulation 4 of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. 
1152
 Regulation 13(1) of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. 
1153
 Regulation 13(2) of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. 
1154
 The funds of ITSAA are derived from national budget allocation of Department of Social Development - 
Petersen V Independent Tribunal for Social Assistance Appeals on its Operational Plan and Progress Report: 
National Assembly Briefing (Cape Town, 31 Aug 2010).    
1155
 The operations of ITSAA are managed by a Programme Manager in the Department of Social Development 
- Department of Social Development Strategic Plan 2010-2015, 2. 
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and accountability and reporting
1157
) indicate that it can effectively be considered to be an 
administrative unit of the Department of Social Development.  
 
Therefore, ITSAA lacks the institutional separation that is required between administrative 
accountability, review and revision (on the one hand) and a wholly-independent, substantive 
system of appeals (on the other). At best, it can be described as a higher instance of internal 
review within the Department of Social Development. This is the case with the Benefits 
Review Committee of the Ministries of Social Development and Work and Income in New 
Zealand.
1158
 
 
ITSAA has been provided with the necessary expertise and specialisation to resolve disputes 
efficiently. Each ITSAA panel is made up of a legal practitioner, a medical practitioner and a 
member of civil society
1159
 (the legal practitioner is the Chairperson; while the medical 
practitioner acts as an assessor in cases of disability, care dependency, war veteran’s grants or 
grant-in-aid appeals. The member of civil society acts as an assessor in cases of social relief 
or distress grant appeals).  
 
The legal practitioner must be a person who is an admitted attorney; advocate of the High 
Court of South Africa or a person with experience in the administration of law; who has at 
least five years’ post-admission experience in the practice of law or at least five years’ 
postgraduate experience in the administration of law; who has not been struck off the roll of 
Attorneys or Advocates; who is a fit and proper person; and whose appointment will not give 
rise to a conflict of interests.
1160
  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
1156
 The Department of Social Development Strategic Plan 2010-2015 also indicates that the Tribunal is 
functionally under the supervision of the Director General - Department of Social Development Strategic Plan 
2010-2015, 2. This implies that governance, oversight and supervision are also undertaken by the Director-
General (and Minister). 
1157
 ITSAA does not undertake any financial accountability as its funds are derived from national budget 
allocation of Department of Social Development. The Department also provides a secretariat. The Tribunal also 
has no separate institutional status under Public Finance Management Act. As a result, financial accountability 
for the expenditure of the Tribunal is undertaken by the Department of Social Development. The Tribunal also 
reports to the Director General as it is under his/her supervision - Department of Social Development Strategic 
Plan 2010-2015, 2. 
1158
 See the discussion on the Benefits Review Committee in Chapter Five para 5.2. 
1159
 Regulation 5(1) of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. 
1160
 Regulation 6 of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. 
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A medical practitioner must be a person who is registered with the Health Professions 
Council of South Africa; who has at least five years post-registration experience in the 
practice of medicine; whose registration with the Health Professions Council of South Africa 
has not been revoked; who is fit and proper; and who is not in the full-time employ of the 
public health service or in the full-time or part-time employ of the Agency.
1161
  
 
A member of civil society must be a person of good standing in the community and whose 
appointment will not give rise to a conflict of interest.
1162
  
 
The legal practitioner (as the Chairperson) is responsible for deciding and ruling whether or 
not an appeal is to be upheld.
1163
  The decision is made after consultation with the medical 
practitioner (in respect of appeals relating to disability, care dependency, war veterans or 
grant-in-aid grant) and a member of civil society (in respect of an appeal relating to a social 
relief of distress grant). He is also responsible for writing down the decision of the 
Independent Tribunal and the reasons thereof and to sign off on the decision and reasons for 
the decision.  
 
3. COIDA ADJUDICATION SYSTEM 
 
COIDA provides for the review of, and objections or appeals against decisions of the 
Director General/Compensation Commissioner. Further avenues for appeal are to any 
provincial or local division of the High Court having jurisdiction. COIDA specifies the 
decisions that can be appealed to the High Court. These are only decision relating to the 
interpretation of the Act or any other law; the question whether an accident or occupational 
disease, causing the disablement or death of an employee was attributable to his or her 
serious and wilful misconduct; the question whether the amount of any compensation 
awarded is so excessive or so inadequate that the award thereof could not reasonably have 
been made; or the right to increased compensation in terms of section 56.
1164
 Therefore, a 
person aggrieved by a decision that does not relate to any one of the four specified grounds 
can only apply for a review of the decision at the High Court.  
 
                                                 
1161
 Regulation 7 of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. 
1162
 Regulation 8 of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. 
1163
 Regulation 9 of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 19 September 2011. 
1164
 Section 91(5) of COIDA. 
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In addition to review and objection/appeal processes, COIDA states that if any question of 
law arises in the performance of the functions of the Director-General, he or she may of his or 
her own motion, or at the request of a party with a sufficient interest in any matter or 
proceedings, state a case for decision by a High Court having jurisdiction.
1165
 When the 
Director-General states a case, he or she sets out facts that he found proved; and the view of 
the law which he has adopted in relation to those facts.
1166
 If the Director-General has any 
doubt as to the correctness of a decision given by the High Court regarding a question of law 
in connection with the application of COIDA, he may submit such decision to the Supreme 
Court of Appeal for the question of law to be argued and for the Court to decide the question 
of law for the future guidance of all courts.
1167
 
 
3.1 Review of decisions by Director-General (Compensation Commissioner) 
 
The system is not properly aligned as COIDA limits the decisions of the Director-General 
that can be reviewed (with no such limitation regarding the disputes that can be objected to or 
appealed). In addition, the system is fragmented as some decisions of the Compensation Fund 
are subject to review by the Director-General, while other decisions are subject to an 
objection or appeal to a panel consisting of a presiding officer assisted by assessors.  
 
For example, section 90 states that the Director-General may after notice, if possible, to the 
party concerned and after giving him an opportunity to submit representations, at any time 
review any decision in connection with a claim for compensation or the award of 
compensation. The Director-General may review a decision on the ground that the employee 
has not submitted himself to a medical examination in terms of section 42; a decision that the 
disablement giving rise to the award is prolonged or aggravated by the unreasonable refusal 
or failure of the employee to submit himself to medical aid; a decision that compensation 
awarded in the form of a periodical payment or a pension is excessive or insufficient because 
of existing or changed circumstances; that a decision or award was based on an incorrect 
view or misrepresentation of the facts, or that a decision or award would have been otherwise 
in the light of evidence available at present, but which was not available when the Director-
                                                 
1165
 Section 92(1) of COIDA. 
1166
 Section 92(2) of COIDA. 
1167
 Section 92(2) of COIDA. 
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General made the decision or award.
1168
 After consideration of the evidence and 
representations submitted to him and making the necessary inquiries, the Director-General 
may confirm, amend or set aside his decision. He or she may also suspend, discontinue, 
reduce or increase compensation awarded.
1169
 
 
3.2 Dispute resolution by the Compensation Court (COIDA Panel) 
 
A person affected by a decision of the Director-General/Compensation Commissioner (or a 
trade union or employer’s organisation of which the person was a member at the relevant 
time) may lodge an objection against that decision with the Compensation Commissioner.
1170
 
Such an objection is considered and decided by a panel composed of a presiding officer with 
the assistance of two assessors (also called the Compensation Court).
1171
 The panel of a 
Presiding Officer, assisted by two assessors, is thus a forum for resolution of objections and 
appeals against decisions of the Director-General/Compensation Commissioner. 
 
3.2.1 Accessibility of the Compensation Court 
 
A person objects a decision of the Director-General/Compensation Commissioner to the 
Compensation Court by completing the Compensation Fund’s Objection Against a Decision 
Form (Form W.G. 29) and hand it in at, forward it by telefax or send it by registered mail to 
the Compensation Fund or an office of the Department of Labour or a labour centre.
1172
 An 
objection must be lodged with the Compensation Commissioner within 180 days of the 
decision.
1173
 An objection against a decision submitted later than the required 180 days 
cannot be considered by the Court, as the presiding officer and assessors are not empowered 
to condone late lodgement of objections.
1174
  
 
                                                 
1168
 Section 90(1) of COIDA. 
1169
 Section 90(2) of COIDA. 
1170
 Section 91(1) of COIDA. 
1171
 Section 91(2) read with sections 2(1)(b) and 8(a) of COIDA. 
1172
 See Department of Labour Rules for the Conduct of Hearings before the Compensation Court in section 91 
Hearings of COIDA (accessed at https://www.labour.gov.za/downloads/ documents/useful-
documents/compensation-for-occupational-injuries-and-diseases/Conduct%20of%20hearings_CF_PamphletR. 
pdf on 5 May 2013) Rules 5 and 6 (hereinafter referred to as of the Rules for the Conduct of Hearings before the 
Compensation Court in section 91 Hearings of COIDA). 
1173
 Section 91(1) of COIDA. 
1174
 Sections 91 and 44 of COIDA. 
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The Compensation Court convenes at any place determined by the Commissioner for the 
hearing of an objection.
1175
 English is the language for the lodgement of an objection, 
1176
 as 
well as the language used in hearings. However, the Compensation Fund has appointed 
interpreters in some hearing locations for assistance where an objector is unable to 
understand the language of the hearing.
1177
 
 
3.2.2 Scope of jurisdiction and powers of the Compensation Court 
 
Any person affected by a decision of the Director-General/Compensation Commissioner (or a 
trade union (in the case of an employee) or an employer's organisation (in the case of an 
employer) of which that person was a member) can lodge an objection against a decision with 
the Commissioner.
1178
 This implies that the scope of jurisdiction of the Court is limited to 
deciding objections lodged in terms of section 91(1) relating to matters provided for in 
COIDA and to persons affected by decisions in relation to such matters. In Venter v 
Compensation Commissioner,
1179
 the appellant lodged an objection in terms of section 91(1) 
of COIDA against a decision of the Director-General that his back injury had not been caused 
by, or was related to, the injuries suffered in an accident. At a hearing by a tribunal 
(Compensation Court) appointed in terms of section 91(2), the Tribunal found that the 
appellant was not an employee as contemplated in the Act at the time of the accident. It thus 
held that the claim had to be rejected. On appeal of the Tribunal’s findings to the High Court, 
the Court held that tribunal was: 
 
 “a creature of statute and derived its powers, obligations and jurisdiction from the four corners of the 
statute, i.e. from section 91(2) and (3) of COIDA and from no other source. It was in this respect 
comparable to a Magistrates Court, which was a creature of statute and has no jurisdiction beyond that 
granted by the statute creating it. It has no inherent jurisdiction such as is possessed by the superior 
Courts and can claim no authority which cannot be found within the four corners of its constituent 
Act.”1180   
 
                                                 
1175
 See the Regulations under COIDA (GN 16 in GG No No. 30646 of 11 January 2008)( hereinafter referred to 
as Regulations to COIDA of 2008). 
1176
  See the Objection Against a Decision Form (Form W.G. 29). 
1177
 Compensation Fund Annual Report for the year ended 31 March 2009, 34. 
1178
  Section 91(1) of COIDA. 
1179
 Venter v Compensation Commissionner 2001 (4) SA 753 (T). 
1180
 Venter v Compensation Commissionner para 757CF. 
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Therefore, the Compensation Court’s only power, duty and jurisdiction are to consider “the 
objection lodged in terms of this section (section 91)”. 
 
In considering an objection, the Court can subpoena any person who is able to give 
information concerning the objection, or who is suspected to have or has in his possession or 
custody or under his control any book, document or thing which has a bearing on the 
objection, to appear before the panel at a time and place specified in the subpoena, to be 
interrogated or to produce such book, document or thing, and the panel may retain such book, 
document or thing for further investigation.
1181
 The Court can also call and administer an oath 
to, or accept an affirmation from any person subpoenaed, and may interrogate such person 
and order him to produce any book, document or thing in his possession or custody or under 
his control.
1182
 
 
When the Court considers an objection, the presiding officer can confirm the original 
decision or make any other decision that he or she deems equitable. The presiding officer can 
also make such order as to costs and the payment thereof as he may deem equitable.
1183
 
However, he or she can only confirm the decision or give such other decision where at least 
one of the assessors (excluding the medical assessor) agrees with him or her.
1184
 If none of 
the assessors agrees with the view of the presiding officer, the presiding officer shall submit 
the dispute to the High Court for decision.
1185
 Therefore, an objection against a decision of 
the Compensation Commissioner could potentially be decided at the High Court in the first 
instance. This may pose difficulties for complainants, due to institutional nature and 
procedures of the High Court.
1186
 
 
The presiding officer can correct an error or defect that is incorrectly or defectively cited on 
application by a party and on notice to the parties concerned.
1187
 COIDA does not provide for 
the Court to enforce its rulings. However, in principle, the Court is considered to have the 
                                                 
1181
 Section 6(1) of COIDA. 
1182
 Section 6(2) of COIDA. 
1183
 Section 91(4) of COIDA. 
1184
  Section 91(3)(a) of COIDA. 
1185
 Section 91(3)(b) of COIDA. 
1186
 See Chapter Six, para 9 for the High Court dispute resolution framework. 
1187
 See Rule 18 of the Rules for the Conduct of Hearings before the Compensation Court in section 91 
Hearings of COIDA  
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status of a court at the level of the Magistrates’ Court. As a result, a ruling of the Court is 
enforced as a decision of a (Magistrates’) Court.1188  
 
3.2.3 Fairness of Compensation Court adjudication procedures 
 
Dispute resolution proceedings of the Court are carried out in the same manner as 
proceedings in the Civil Court.
1189
 When the Panel considers and adjudicates an objection, it 
can carry out such investigation as it may deem necessary or may formally hear the 
objection.
1190
 The Court can designate a person to investigate an objection, attend a formal 
hearing, cross-examine witnesses, adduce rebutting evidence and present arguments.
1191
 
When considering an objection, the Panel of Assessors can carry out an investigation if it 
deems necessary or it may formally hear the claim.
1192
 Either party to a dispute may request 
the presiding officer to make an order on the disclosure of the relevant documents. In 
addition, the parties may agree on the disclosure of the documents.
1193
  
 
When the Court decides to hold a formal hearing, it gives notice of the date, time and place of 
the hearing to the parties.
1194
 Parties may appear before the panel at a formal hearing or they 
may be represented by a lawyer or any member, office bearer or official of a registered trade 
union or employers’ organisation.1195 If a party objects to the representation of another party 
or the presiding officer suspects that the representative does not qualify in terms of the rules 
of the Compensation Court, he or she determines the issue.
1196
 
 
If an objector is represented at the hearing but fails to attend in person, the presiding officer 
can continue with the proceedings. He or she can also adjourn the proceedings or dismiss the 
                                                 
1188
 According to Mr Andile Solwandle of the Compensation Fund (per e-mail correspondence of 27 May 2011). 
1189
 According to Mr Andile Solwandle of the Compensation Fund (per e-mail correspondence of 27 May 2011). 
1190
 Section 45(1) of COIDA. 
1191
 Section 46(1)(b) of COIDA. 
1192
  Section 91(2)(c) read with s 45(1) of COIDA. 
1193
 Rule 9 of the Rules for the Conduct of Hearings before the Compensation Court in section 91 Hearings of 
COIDA. 
1194
 Section 45(2) of COIDA. 
1195
 Section 46(1)(a) of COIDA and Rule 12 of the Rules for the Conduct of Hearings Before the Compensation 
Court in s 91 of COIDA. 
1196
 Rule 8 of the Rules for the Conduct of Hearings before the Compensation Court in section 91 Hearings of 
COIDA. The presiding officer can call upon the representative to establish why he or she (the representative) 
should be permitted to appear in terms of COIDA. A representative is required to tender any documents 
requested by the presiding officer in order to establish why the representative should be permitted to appear, 
including constitutions, payslips, contracts of employment, documents and forms. 
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matter by issuing a written ruling.
1197
  In exercising a discretion whether to continue with the 
proceedings; adjourn the proceedings; or dismiss the matter, the presiding officer is required 
to take into account (inter alia) whether an objector has previously failed to attend a hearing; 
any reason given for the party’s failure to attend; whether the hearing can take place 
effectively in the absence of the objector; and the likely prejudice to the party if the ruling is 
given. The presiding officer must be satisfied that the objector had been properly notified of 
the date, time and venue of the proceedings before deciding whether to continue with the 
proceedings; adjourn the proceedings; or dismiss the matter. If a matter is dismissed, the 
presiding officer sends copy of the ruling to the parties. The ruling must be supported by 
written reasons and must clearly and concisely set out a statement of the material facts (in 
chronological order) on which the ruling is based. It must also be in sufficient detail to enable 
any person appealing against the ruling to have a basis or grounds to appeal.
1198
  
 
A hearing may be postponed by agreement between the parties, or by application and on 
notice to the other party. The presiding officer may postpone a hearing without the parties 
appearing if all the parties to the dispute agree in writing to the postponement and if the 
written agreement for the postponement is received at least seven days before the scheduled 
date of the hearing. After considering the written agreement, the presiding officer may 
postpone the matter without convening a hearing or convene a hearing to determine whether 
to postpone the matter.
1199
 
 
Parties to a COIDA hearing are required to hold a pre-hearing conference, if directed to do so 
by the presiding officer. In a pre-hearing conference, the parties must attempt to reach 
consensus on any means by which the dispute(s) can be settled.
1200
 They are also required to 
attempt to reach consensus on facts that are agreed upon; facts that are in dispute; issues that 
the presiding officer is required to decide; the precise relief claimed; the sharing and 
exchange of relevant documents, and the preparation of a bundle of documents in 
chronological order with each page numbered; the exchange of witness statements; any other 
                                                 
1197
 Rule 10 of the Rules for the Conduct of Hearings before the Compensation Court in section 91 Hearings of 
COIDA.  
1198
 Rule 10 of the Rules for the Conduct of Hearings before the Compensation Court in section 91 Hearings of 
COIDA.  
1199
 Rule 11 of the Rules for the Conduct of Hearings before the Compensation Court in section 91 Hearings of 
COIDA. 
1200
 Rule 13 of the Rules for the Conduct of Hearings before the Compensation Court in section 91 Hearings of 
COIDA.  
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means by which the proceedings may be shortened; whether an interpreter is required and, if 
so, for how long and for which languages. Unless, where a dispute is settled, the parties are 
required to draw up and sign a minute, setting out the facts on which the parties agree and 
disagree. An objector or his/her representative must ensure that a copy of the pre-hearing 
conference is delivered to the Presiding Officer within seven days of the conclusion of the 
pre-hearing conference.  
 
The expeditious resolution of disputes is not guaranteed, as COIDA does not specify 
timeframes for the consideration of objections by the Court. The timeframe for the resolution 
of an objection depends on the merits of a particular objection. Finalisation of an objection by 
the Court is further affected by the limitation of the hearing time for an objection to 
three hours per day.
1201
  This is due to the need to ensure financial control by the 
Compensation Fund (relating to control of expenditure spent on the payment of panel 
members). 
  
A copy of the Court’s decision is forwarded to the Compensation Fund. COIDA requires the 
Director-General to keep or cause to be kept a record of the proceedings at a formal 
hearing.
1202
 The Court also provides a copy to a party upon payment of the prescribed 
fees.
1203
 The Compensation Fund is also required to keep a record of any evidence during the 
hearing, any sworn testimony given during any proceedings in connection with the hearings 
before the Court, and any judgment or ruling made by Court. The record must be kept in 
legible hand-written notes or by means of an electronic recording (a party may request a copy 
of the transcript of a record or a portion of a record upon payment of the prescribed fees).
1204
  
 
3.2.4 Expertise, independence and impartiality of the Compensation Court  
 
The Compensation Court also does not appropriately satisfy the requirement for institutional 
separation between administrative accountability, review and revision (on the one hand) and 
a wholly-independent, substantive system of appeals (on the other). The Minister of Labour 
appoints presiding officers to assist the Director-General in the performance of his or her 
                                                 
1201
 According to Mr Andile Solwandle of the Compensation Fund (per e-mail correspondence of 27 May 2011). 
1202
  Section 91(2)(c) read with section 45(7) of (COIDA. 
1203
 Section 91(2)(c) read with section 45(7) of COIDA; and Regulation 8 of the COIDA Regulation of 2008. 
The prescribed fees is R0.50 per page. 
1204
 Rule 14 of the Rules for the Conduct of Hearings before the Compensation Court in section 91 Hearings of 
COIDA. 
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functions in terms of or under COIDA, subject to relevant laws governing the public 
service.
1205
 The Minister also appoints assessors to assist the Director-General in the hearing 
of any objection (after consultation with the Compensation Board).
1206
 Equal numbers of 
assessors represent employees and employers, as they are persons deemed by the Minister to 
represent the interests of employees and employers (the Minister may consult employees’ or 
employers’ organisations in this regard).1207 The Minister can also appoint one or more 
medical practitioners as medical assessors.
1208
  
 
Presiding officers are appointed for a period of three years.
1209
 The Minister also determines 
the period and conditions of appointment of assessor.
1210
 A presiding officer could thus be 
considered to be an employee of the public service, as they are officers and employees 
employed by the Minister according to the laws governing the public service.
1211
 Assessors 
could be considered as contractors, as they are required to submit claims for remuneration (at 
an hourly rate) and for travelling and subsistence allowances to the Compensation Fund for 
attending meetings or hearings or for the investigation of any matter (including where a 
meeting or hearing is cancelled by the Fund).
1212
 
 
It is unclear if and how a presiding officer is disciplined and his or her service terminated as 
COIDA is silent on both these issues.
1213
 However, the Minister of Labour can terminate the 
appointment of an assessor at any time for misconduct, neglect of duty, inability to perform 
his or her functions properly or if he if she no longer represents the interests of employees or 
employers (the grounds on which he or she was appointed).
1214
 
 
The operational arrangements of the Compensation Court (its funding;
1215
 human resource 
and administrative support;
1216
 managerial framework;
1217
 governance, oversight and 
                                                 
1205
  Section 2(1)(b) read with the definition of Presiding Officer in section 1 of COIDA. 
1206
 Sections 8(1) and (4) and 12(1)(c) of COIDA. 
1207
 Section 2 and 8 of COIDA. 
1208
 Section 8(4) of COIDA. 
1209
 According to Mr Andile Solwandle of the Compensation Fund per e-mail correspondence of 27 May 2011. 
1210
 Section 8(5) of COIDA. 
1211
 Section 2(1)(b) of COIDA. 
1212
 See Regulation 4 of the Regulations to COIDA of 2008. 
1213
 Section 2(1)(b) of COIDA (read with the definition of Presiding Officer in section 1) only regulates the 
appointment of a Presiding Officer. 
1214
 Section 8(5) of COIDA. 
1215
 There is not a separate funding arrangement relating to the COIDA adjudication panel as Presiding Officers 
and assessors claim remuneration and travelling and subsistence allowances from the Compensation Fund for 
attending meetings, hearings or for the investigation of any matter - see Regulation 4 of the COIDA Regulations 
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supervision;
1218
 and accountability and reporting
1219
) also revealed the dependant status of the 
Court. Therefore, it cannot be considered as an independent and impartial appeal institution 
for disputes in terms of COIDA.  
 
4. ODMWA DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
 
Two kinds of disputes can potentially arise under the ODMWA. These are disputes relating 
to the certification of an occupational disease and those relating to the payment of 
compensation by the Compensation Commissioner for Occupational Diseases. Decisions 
regarding the presence, nature and degree of a compensatable disease (certification disputes) 
are taken by the Certification Committee of the Medical Bureau for Occupational Diseases 
(the Certification Committee).
1220
 The Medical Reviewing Authority for Occupational 
Diseases reviews decision of the Certification Committee.
1221
 
 
The ODMWA does not provide for any internal dispute resolution processes for disputes 
relating to the payment of compensation by the Compensation Commissioner for 
Occupational Diseases. This implies that a person who is dissatisfied with by a decision of 
the Compensation Commissioner for Occupational Diseases can only bring an action in a 
court with jurisdiction (the High Court). This would be done according to the dispute 
lodgement processes of the High Court. 
                                                                                                                                                        
of 2008. In addition, administrative support for panel of assessors is provided by the Compensation Fund - 
Regulation 6 of the Regulations to COIDA of 2008.  
1216
 There is no separate human resource and organisational structure as human resource and administrative 
support for panel of assessors is provided by the Compensation Fund. Administration officers in Legal Services 
Department of the Fund organise the hearings of objection panels - Regulation 6 of the COIDA Regulations of 
2008, as confirmed by Mr Andile Solwandle of the Compensation Fund (per e-mail correspondence of 27 May 
2011). 
1217
 The Compensation Fund is responsible for the management of the activities of the panel as the Fund is 
responsible for organisation of meetings and hearings and coordination of assessor activities - see the 
Regulations to COIDA of 2008.  
1218
 Presiding officers and assessors report to the Head of Legal Services of the Compensation Fund on behalf of 
the Compensation Commissioner and the Director General. Presiding officers and assessors also report to the 
Head of Legal Services of the Compensation Fund on behalf of the Commissioner and the Director General - 
according to Mr Andile Solwandle of the Compensation Fund (per e-mail correspondence of 27 May 2011).   
1219
 The Compensation Court does not have a separate funding arrangement but is funded by Compensation 
Fund (including remuneration of presiding officers and assessors). In addition, administration officers in Legal 
Services Department of the Fund organise the hearings of objection panels. Since funding for the activities of 
the Panels is provided by the Compensation Fund, financial accountability for Panels is undertaken by the 
Compensation Commissioner as the accounting officer of the Fund. 
1220
 The MBOD was established in terms of section 2 of ODMWA to such functions as may be necessary for the 
purpose of giving effect to the provisions of ODMWA and such other functions assigned to it by the Minister 
from time to time.  
1221
  Sections 46 and 50 of ODMWA. 
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The ODMWA also states that (with the consent of the Minister) the Compensation 
Commissioner for Occupational Diseases can state a special case for the ruling of the High 
Court on any question of law which arises in connection with any matter in which the 
Commissioner has given or is required to give a decision under the Act.
1222
 Where the 
Compensation Commissioner states a special case for the ruling of the High Court, a person 
who has an interest in the decision in question may appear in person or be represented by 
counsel at the hearing of any such case.
1223
   
 
In addition to the dispute resolution procedures in the ODMWA, persons covered by the Act 
also have the right to institute common law proceedings in the High Court (such as against 
the employer for delictual damages).
1224
   
 
4.1 Certification of occupational diseases by Certification Committee 
 
Certification of an occupational disease for compensation by the Compensation 
Commissioner can only be done by the Certification Committee. This is done following a 
medical examination and (in some cases) the submission of certain medical samples. The 
medical examination includes a chest x-ray, lung function test and other medical 
investigations. The certification process entails that for each application submitted and 
evaluated, in addition to the medical examinations, the work period and degree of risk 
exposure needs to be verified by the mining company.
 1225
  
 
After the Certification Committee makes a finding, the Chairperson (or another person 
authorised by him/her in writing to do so on his/her behalf) issues a certificate in the 
prescribed form which sets out the finding of the Committee and contains all other relevant 
information. The Chairperson sends copies of the certificate to the person who is the subject 
                                                 
1222
 Section 58(1) of ODMWA. 
1223
 Section 58(2) of ODMWA. 
1224
 See the recent case of Mankayi v Anglo Gold Ashanti (Case CCT 40/10 [2011] ZACC 3). 
1225
 See generally Roberts J The Hidden Epidemic Amongst Former Miners: Silicosis, Tuberculosis and the 
Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act in the Eastern Cape, South Africa  Health Systems 
Trust/Department of Health (June 2009); Spoor R “Gold miners return to Lesotho to die” in Mines and 
Communities (MAC) of 30 August 2005; Fultz E and Pieris B The Social Protection for Migrant Workers in 
South Africa ILO/SAMAT (Harare, 1997); and AIDS and Rights Alliance for Southern Africa The mining 
sector, tuberculosis and migrant labour in Southern Africa: Policy and Programmatic Interventions for the 
Cross-Border Control of Tuberculosis between Lesotho and South Africa, Focusing on Miners, Ex-Miners and 
Their Families (July 2008). 
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of the certification; or if the subject of the certification is a deceased person, the Chairperson 
sends copies of the certificate to the dependants (if any) of the deceased person.
1226
 
 
The person whose disease was certified, or any other person or organisation acting on his or 
her behalf, or (in the case of a deceased person) the dependants of the deceased or any person 
or organisation acting on behalf of such dependants can lodge an application for review with 
the Reviewing Authority based on the certificate of findings and other relevant 
information.
1227
 
 
It is claimed that it can take up to three years for an application for certification to be 
completed.
1228
 Where an occupational disease is certified, compensation can take months or 
even years to process,
1229
 especially if the miner has returned to a rural area or another 
country and is far away from the necessary medical services.
1230
 As such, workers who 
forward their medical reports to the Medical Bureau for Occupational Disease in 
Johannesburg, for certification and onward forwarding to the Compensation Commissioner 
for Occupational Diseases for payment, have had to wait years for a response and the 
eventual resolution of their claims. This process may lead to further difficulties for former 
workers if the administrative burden of the certification institutions were to rise due to more 
ex-mineworkers being identified and their claims processed. Persons whose diseases are 
being certified may not be able to appeal to the Reviewing Authority, due to the delay in 
finalising the certification. 
 
4.2 Review of decisions by Medical Reviewing Authority for Occupational Diseases 
 
The Medical Reviewing Authority for Occupational Diseases (hereinafter called Reviewing 
Authority) was created as an appeal body to review decisions of the Compensation 
Committee on the presence, nature and degree of a compensatable disease. A person who 
disagrees with a decision of the Certification Committee appeals to the Reviewing Authority. 
                                                 
1226
 Section 48(1) of ODMWA. 
1227
 Section 50(1) of ODMWA. 
1228
 Spoor R “Gold miners return to Lesotho to die” in Mines and Communities (MAC) of 30 August 2005. See 
also Fultz E and Pieris B The Social Protection for Migrant Workers in South Africa ILO/SAMAT, Harare, 
1997, 12. 
1229
 AngloGold Ashanti Report to Society Case Studies 2007 – Occupational Safety and Health, 3. 
1230
 AIDS and Rights Alliance for Southern Africa The mining sector, tuberculosis and migrant labour in 
Southern Africa: Policy and Programmatic Interventions for the Cross-Border Control of Tuberculosis between 
Lesotho and South Africa, Focusing on Miners, Ex-Miners and Their Families July 2008, 15. 
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4.2.1 Accessibility of the Reviewing Authority  
 
Reviews by the Reviewing Authority (as well as the activities of the Certification Committee) 
are undertaken in the premises of the Medical Bureau for Occupational Diseases in 
Johannesburg. The Reviewing Authority reviews decisions through the consideration of the 
documentary evidence available to the Authority.
1231
 As a result, a (former) worker who 
wishes to institute a claim for benefits needs to travel to Johannesburg.
1232
  
 
An application for review must be lodged with the Reviewing Authority within 90 days from 
the date on which notice of the finding was given by the Certification Committee. Failure to 
lodge an application within the required 90-day period will invalidate a person’s right to 
apply for a review, as the Reviewing Authority is not empowered to condone the late 
submission of an application for review to the Authority.
1233
 The limitation of the review 
application lodgement period to 90 days limits a person’s ability to apply for a review of the 
Certification Committee’s findings. This is especially the case regarding former workers and 
their dependants, who may be living in remote rural areas or outside of South Africa. They 
may therefore not be easy to reach, also since the application must be lodged with the 
Medical Bureau in Johannesburg.
1234
 
 
4.2.2 Scope of jurisdiction and powers of the Reviewing Authority  
 
Any person affected by a finding of the Certification Committee, or a person/organisation 
acting on his/her behalf, or the dependants of a deceased person or a person/ organisation 
acting on behalf of the dependants can make an application to the Review Authority for 
review of the decisions of the Certification Committee.
1235
 The Reviewing Authority can 
review any finding of the Certification Committee.
1236
  
                                                 
1231
 Findings of the Certification Committee are expressed in the certificate issued in the prescribed form setting 
out the findings and containing all information relevant to the case. 
1232
 See Rothgiesser S “Social insecurity” in Mail & Guardian (September 19 to 25 2008) 21. See also Spoor R 
“Gold miners return to Lesotho to die” in Mines and Communities (MAC) of 30 August 2005. 
1233
 Section 50(1) of ODMWA. 
1234
 See Roberts J The Hidden Epidemic Amongst Former Miners: Silicosis, Tuberculosis and the Occupational 
Diseases in Mines and Works Act in the Eastern Cape, South Africa  Health Systems Trust/Department of 
Health (June 2009) 28. 
1235
 Section 50(1) of ODMWA. 
1236
 Ibid. Some of the reviewable decisions the Certification Committee include decisions on whether a person is 
suffering from a compensatable disease, or whether he or she was suffering from such a disease at the time of 
his or her death, and if so, the nature and degree of the disease - section 32 of ODMWA. 
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When reviewing a Certification Committee finding, the Chairperson of the Review Authority 
can request a person to submit to him or her any information available to such person which 
the Chairperson considers necessary for the effective performance of his or her functions. The 
Chairperson can also request a person to submit to him or her (or a nominee) any book or 
document in the possession or under the control of the person which contains or is suspected 
to contain any such information. The Chairperson can examine and make copies of or take 
extracts from any such book or document. The information may be requested in the form of a 
sworn declaration by the person furnishing such information.
1237
 
 
The Chairperson of the Reviewing Authority can also request any person to appear before 
him or her at a specified time and place.
1238
 This is to ask the person questions or request him 
or her to produce a book or document. The Chairperson can also administer an oath or 
affirmation to a person and question him or her. The Chairperson can also direct a person to 
appear before the Authority at a specified time and place (of his or her own motion or at the 
request of a person whose case is being dealt with by the Authority by notice in writing) to be 
questioned or to undergo a medical examination.
 1239
 
 
The Chairperson (or any medical practitioner that he or she authorises in writing) can enter 
upon any place where a person whose disease is being certified is (to be) medically examined 
in terms of the ODMWA, or where a person is being nursed or medically treated.
1240
 The 
Chairperson can also attend a medical examination of such a person and (with his consent) 
medically examine him or her or request another medical practitioner to medically examine 
the person. The Chairperson can inspect any instrument or appliance used to examine or treat 
a person and any book or document which contains information relating to an examination or 
treatment. He or she can make copies of or extracts from the book or document.  
 
When the Review Authority reviews a decision of the Certification Committee, it can declare 
that a person is suffering from a compensatable disease or was suffering from such a disease 
at the time of his death. Where it finds that a person is/was suffering from a compensatable 
disease, it can decide the nature and degree of the disease. In the case of a person who has 
                                                 
1237
 Section 42(1) read with section 6(1) and (2) of ODMWA. 
1238
 Section 42(1) read with section 6(3) of ODMWA. 
1239
 Section 42(3) of ODMWA. 
1240
 Section 42(1) read with section 5(1) of ODMWA. 
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previously been found by the certification committee to be suffering from a compensatable 
disease, the degree of the disease can also be decided.
1241
  
 
The Reviewing Authority can confirm the findings of the Certification Committee but cannot 
vary or rescind its findings. Where the Authority disagrees with a decision of the 
Certification Committee, the Chairperson of the Authority is required to request the 
Chairperson of the Certification Committee to submit the case for review to a joint meeting 
of the Certification Committee and the Reviewing Authority.
1242
 It is only in a review of a 
finding of the Certification Committee by a joint Reviewing Authority/Certification 
Committee meeting that the finding of the Certification Committee can be rescinded or 
substituted with the joint meeting’s own finding.1243 The process has been hailed as a 
beneficial one because: 
 
“this means that before a final decision is made the case has been discussed in at least three meetings 
by, in all, ten doctors. Every one of these has been able to state his opinion and debate difficult 
medical points with his colleagues so as to contribute toward a fair decision.”1244  
 
However, the joint Certification Committee/Reviewing Authority meeting portrays a 
conflation of first- and second-level adjudication procedures and of the administrative and 
adjudicative roles. This brings into question both the existence and effectiveness of the 
Reviewing Authority as an independent body established to review the findings of the 
Certification Committee. 
 
The Review Authority is not empowered to reconsider its findings, as the power to reconsider 
a finding is afforded only to the Certification Committee.
1245
 In addition, the ODMWA does 
not regulate whether the decisions of the Reviewing Authority can be enforced and (if so) 
how they can be enforced. This implies that where the Compensation Commissioner fails to 
implement a decision of the Reviewing Authority, an aggrieved person may have to enforce 
his or her rights in a court with jurisdiction.  
 
                                                 
1241
 Section 50 read with section 46 of ODMWA. 
1242
 Section 50(2) of ODMWA. 
1243
 Section 52(1) ODMWA. 
1244
 Wiles FJ “Compensation for Occupational Diseases” SAMJ vol. 71 (April 1987) 416 at 417.  
1245
 Section 47 of ODMWA. 
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4.2.3 Fairness of Reviewing Authority adjudication procedures 
 
Generally, the Reviewing Authority considers the findings and all other relevant information 
issued in the certificate of findings by the Certification Committee.
1246
 However, if a person 
requests to appear in person before the Authority, he or she is permitted to appear. The person 
may also be accompanied by any person of his choice to address the Authority on his/her 
behalf such as a doctor, a lawyer or a trade union official.
1247
  
 
In addition, when reviewing a finding, the Chairperson can request a person to submit to him 
or her the information necessary for the effective review of a finding. A person can also be 
requested to appear before the Chairperson to answer questions that are put to him or her by 
the chairperson or another member of the Reviewing Authority, or in order to undergo a 
medical examination.
 1248
 The Chairperson can enter a place where a person who works or 
has worked or intends to work at a controlled mine or a controlled works is medically 
examined or to be examined.
1249
 He can also enter where a person who works or has worked 
at a controlled mine or a controlled works is being nursed or medically treated. He or she can 
also be present in the medical examination of a person and can medically examine him or her 
(with his consent) or have him or her medically examined by any other medical practitioner. 
The Chairperson can inspect an instrument or appliance used in the medical examination or 
treatment of a person. He or she can demand inspection of a book or document which 
contains information relating to a medical examination or treatment, and can make copies of 
or extracts from the book or document. 
 
After the review, the Chairperson of the Authority or an authorised person issues a certificate 
which sets out the finding(s) and contains all relevant information. The Chairperson or a 
representative sends copies of the certificate to the MBOD; to the Compensation 
Commissioner; to the owner of the mine or works where the person who is the subject of the 
finding works (if the person is still employed at the mine or works); to the person concerned 
or (if the person concerned is deceased) to the dependants (if any) of the deceased. If the 
                                                 
1246
 According to Mr Simon Masilela of the MBOD in a telephone interview on 25 May 2011. 
1247
 Wiles FJ “Compensation for Occupational Diseases” SAMJ vol. 71 (April 1987) 416 at 417.  
1248
 Section 42 read with section 6 of ODMWA. . See generally, the powers and functions of the Reviewing 
Authority discussed in Chapter Six para 4.2.2 of (Scope of jurisdiction and powers of the Reviewing Authority) 
supra.  
1249
 Section 42(1) read with s 5(1) of ODMWA. 
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finding is that of tuberculosis, copies are sent to the local authority of the area in which the 
person concerned resides.
1250
 
 
4.2.4 Expertise, independence and impartiality of the Reviewing Authority 
 
The institutional framework and composition of the Reviewing Authority point out that the 
Authority is not independent of the Department of Health (the Medical Bureau for 
Occupational Diseases and the Compensation Commissioner for Occupational Diseases are 
within the Department of Health). This is revealed by the formalities for the appointment of 
members of the Authority; their discipline and termination of service; and the operational 
arrangements of the Authority (funding;
1251
 human resource and administrative support;
1252
 
managerial framework;
1253
 governance, oversight and supervision,;
1254
 and (financial) 
accountability and reporting).
1255
  
 
The Reviewing Authority is established by the Minister of Health to review decisions of the 
Certification Committee.
1256
 Members (and alternate members) of the Reviewing Authority 
are appointed by the Minister (after consideration of representations (if any) by owners of 
controlled mines or controlled works (or by any organisation acting on behalf of owners) and 
workers of controlled mines or controlled works (or by any organisation acting on behalf of 
                                                 
1250
 Section 52(3) read with s 48 of ODMWA. 
1251
 There is no separate funding arrangement for the reviewing authority as administrative support is provided 
by the MBOD - According to Mr Simon Masilela of the MBOD (per telephone interview of 9
th
 May 2011). In 
addition, members (alternate members) of the reviewing authority who are not in the full-time service of the 
State are remunerated by the Minister of Health - section 41(1) of ODMWA.  
1252
 The Reviewing Authority does not have a distinct human resource and organisational structure since the 
MBOD provides administrative support for the Reviewing Authority - confirmation by Mr Simon Masilela of 
the MBOD (per telephone interview of 9
th
 May 2011). 
1253
 The Minister appoints a member of the Reviewing Authority as its Chairperson and designates another 
member to act as chairperson when there is no chairperson or the chairperson is absent or is for any other reason 
unable to perform his or her functions - section 40(3) ODMWA. 
1254
 The Minister exercises governance, oversight and supervision over the Review Authority, as the Director of 
the MBOD is required to furnish the Minister with a report on the activities of the Review Authority (also the 
MBOD, and the Certification Committee) - section 8 of ODMWA. 
1255
 Human resource and administrative support for the Reviewing Authority is provided by the Medical Bureau 
for Occupational Diseases. As a result, the Bureau undertakes financial reporting for the expenditure of the 
Reviewing Authority. The Director of the MBOD is required to furnish the Minister of Health with a report on 
the activities of the Review Authority (together with the MBOD and the Certification Committee) as soon as 
possible after the close of each financial year - section 8 of ODMWA. The Compensation Commissioner for 
Occupational Diseases is also required to furnish the Minister with a report on his activities with all the 
necessary information in connection with the compensation fund (as soon as possible after the close of each 
financial year) - section 77(2) of ODMWA. 
1256
 Section 40 of ODMWA. 
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such workers).
1257
 The Review Authority consists of three or four members who are all 
medical practitioners.
1258
 In order to maintain institutional separation between the Reviewing 
Authority, the Certification Committee and the Medical Bureau for Occupational Diseases, a 
member (or alternate member) of the Certification Committee or a medical practitioner in the 
employ of the Medical Bureau for Occupational Diseases cannot be appointed as a member 
of the Reviewing Authority.
1259
 
 
A member (alternate member) is appointed for five years. A member (alternate member) who 
is not in the full-time service of the State is appointed on remuneration and other conditions 
of service as the Minister determines in consultation with the Minister of Finance.
1260
 This 
means employees of the public service can be appointed as members of the Reviewing 
Authority. This raises a perception of an absence of impartiality on the part of such members.   
 
Members of the Review Authority are also subject to the discipline of the Minister, who 
determines their conditions of service and can remove them from service. The Minister can 
remove a member (alternate member) by notice, in writing, if the Minister is of the opinion 
that the member (alternate member) is not competent to serve.
1261
 A member’s (alternate 
member’s) service can also be terminated if he or she becomes insolvent; becomes of 
unsound mind; is convicted of an offence and sentenced to imprisonment without the option 
of a fine; or absents himself/ herself from five consecutive meetings without leave of the 
Reviewing Authority.
1262
  
 
The formalities for the appointment of members; their discipline and termination of service; 
and the Authority’s operational arrangements point to unsuitability to act as an appeal forum 
due to the absence of institutional separation with the Department of Health. Its lack of 
powers to vary or rescind a finding of the Certification Committee and to substitute its own 
also makes it an improper higher level internal review forum. 
 
 
                                                 
1257
 Section 40(2)(b) of ODMWA. 
1258
 Section 40(2)(a) of ODMWA. 
1259
 Section 40(4) of ODMWA. 
1260
 Section 41(1) of ODMWA. 
1261
 Section 41(3) of ODMWA. 
1262
 Section 41(2) of ODMWA. 
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5. UIA DISPUTE RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK 
 
The Unemployment Insurance Act established a system of internal reviews and “external 
appeals” that are sequential and complementary. It thus created Regional Appeals 
Committees and a National Appeals Committee of the Board of the Unemployment Insurance 
Fund. Therefore, the Regional Appeals Committees and the National Appeals Committee of 
the UIF Board provide an avenue for appeals against decisions of the Regional Appeals 
Committees relating to objections against the decisions of the Commissioner or claims 
officers. 
 
5.1 Review of decisions by Regional Appeals Committees of the UIF Board 
 
The Act provides that a person who is dissatisfied with a decision of the Unemployment 
Insurance Commissioner to suspend his or her right to benefits or of a claims officer in 
relation to the payment or non-payment of benefits may appeal to a Regional Appeals 
Committee of the UIF Board.
1263
  
 
Regional Appeals Committees are situated at Labour Centres of the Department of Labour 
throughout the country. An appeal to a Regional Appeals Committee is made by submitting a 
Notice of Appeal Form (Form UI 13) either by hand or by registered post to the Regional 
Appeals Committee at the respective Labour Centres of the Department of Labour.
1264
 
 
Decisions of a Regional Appeals Committee are determined by a majority vote of its 
members. After considering an appeal, the committee can confirm or vary the decision of the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund, or rescind it and substitute the decision with its own.
1265
 If 
the person is still not satisfied with the decision of a Regional Appeals Committee, he or she 
may appeal to the National Appeals Committee.
1266
 
 
 
                                                 
1263
 Section 36A of the Unemployment Insurance Act. See also Regulation 8 of the Unemployment Insurance 
Regulations (published in GN 400 in GG 23283 of 28 March 2002). 
1264
 Regulation 8(1) of the Regulations to the Unemployment Insurance Act (GN 400 in GG 23283 of 28 March 
2002). 
1265
 Section 37(4) of the Unemployment Insurance Act. 
1266
 Section 37(2) of the Unemployment Insurance Act. 
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5.2 Appeals to the National Appeals Committee of the UIF Board  
 
The National Appeals Committee of the UIF Board is the last instance of appeal in matters 
falling under the Unemployment Insurance Act. The Act states that decisions by the 
Committee are final, subject to judicial review. This implies that the institutional status, 
independence and impartiality as well as the procedures of such a forum must realise the right 
of access to justice (and related) rights of users. The absence of these would require enquiry 
into the nature and efficiency of the forum by the High Court in judicial review proceedings. 
The nature and efficiency of the National Appeals Committee in achieving access to justice 
and other rights of users is, therefore, paramount. 
 
5.2.1 Accessibility of the National Appeals Committee 
 
The National Appeals Committee is located at the head office of the UIF in 94 Church Street, 
Pretoria. An appeal is made to the Committee by submitting the Notice of Appeal Form (UI 
13) to the head office of the UIF. The appeal can be submitted by hand or by registered post. 
An appeal must be lodged within 90 days of the decision.
1267
 However, the Appeals 
Committee may at any time permit a person to refer a dispute after the time limit where good 
cause is shown.
1268
  
   
5.2.2 Scope of jurisdiction and powers of the National Appeals Committee 
 
Any person can bring a an appeal against a decision of the UIF Commissioner to suspend 
his/her right to benefits; or against a decision of a claims officer relating to the payment or 
non-payment of benefits.
1269
 Any person who is entitled to benefits in terms of the 
Unemployment Insurance Act, and who is aggrieved by a decision of the Regional Appeals 
Committee, can appeal to the National Appeals Committee of the Board.
1270
 
 
The national appeals committee cannot decide disputes relating to the refusal by the UIF to 
pay benefits due to the late submission of a claim. The Committee’s jurisdiction is limited to 
                                                 
1267
 Regulation 8(2) of the Regulations to the Unemployment Insurance Act of 2002. 
1268
 Regulation 9(3) of the Regulations to the Unemployment Insurance Act of 2002.  
1269
 Section 37(1) of the UIA. 
1270
 Section 37(2) of the UIA. 
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decisions of the Commissioner to suspend a person’s right to benefits, or of a claims officer 
relating to the payment or non-payment of benefits.
1271
 
 
After considering an appeal, the National Appeals Committee can confirm or vary the 
decision, or rescind it and substitute the decision of a Regional Appeals Committee.
1272
 
 
The UIA does not regulate the ability of the National Appeals Committee (and Regional 
Appeals Committees) to enforce their decisions. However, an inference could be drawn that 
since they are committees of the UIF Board, their decisions are the decisions of the Board 
and must be enforced by the Fund. 
 
5.2.3 Fairness of National Appeals Committee procedures 
 
The National Appeals Committee may require the appellant to submit any further information 
that it considers necessary to deal with the appeal. This implies that an appeal to the National 
Appeal Committee is decided through the consideration of the documentary evidence 
submitted with no indication of personal appearance before the Committee. Therefore, 
representation by a lawyer or another representative is not required. The decisions of the 
National Appeals Committee are determined by majority vote.
1273
 The UIA does not 
empower the Committee to reconsider an original decision. Also, no timeframes are provided 
for dispute resolution by the Committee. However, the Committee notifies the appellant, in 
writing, within 30 days of its decision.
1274
 
 
5.2.4 Independence and impartiality of the National Appeals Committee 
 
There is a (perceived) lack of independence and impartiality in the resolution of disputes by 
the National Appeals Committee. This results from the appointment and conditions of service 
of its members; their discipline and termination; and the Committee’s dependence on the UIF 
for operational support.  
 
                                                 
1271
 Therefore, the power to condone the late submission of a claim for benefits is limited to the UIF 
Commissioner - see sections 17(2), 22 (2), 25(2), 28(2) and 31(2)) of the UIA. 
1272
 Section 37(4)(b) of the UIA. 
1273
 Section 37(4)(a) of the UIA. 
1274
  Regulation 8(4) of the Regulations to the UIA of 2002. 
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The Board of the Unemployment Insurance Fund is established by the Minister of Labour to 
undertake various duties specified in the UIA.
1275
 Board members also perform any other 
functions which may be requested by the Minister for the purpose of giving effect to the UIA. 
It is required that the UIF Board should prepare and adopt a constitution (subject to approval 
by the Minister) as soon as possible after the appointment of its members.
1276
 The 
constitution of the Board should provide for the establishment and functions of committees of 
the Board, including an appeals committee.
1277
 As a result, the National Appeals Committee 
is one of the committees of the UIF Board.
1278
 
 
The Board consists of 14 members (including a chairperson and the UIF Commissioner).
1279
 
Organised labour, organised business, community and development interest organisations and 
the State are each represented by three Board members.
1280
 Board members are appointed for 
a period of three years and may be reappointed for a further period of three years.
1281
 
Members of the UIF Board could be considered to be office bearers, as they are nominated or 
appointed to represent various interest groups.
1282
 The UIA states that a member of the UIF 
Board, or its committees who is not in the full-time employment of the State, is paid 
remuneration and allowances determined by the Minister in terms of National Treasury 
instructions.
1283
 This implies that full-time employees of the State can be appointed to the 
Board of the UIF (and the National Appeals Committee). They could thus be perceived to be 
dependent on the State and unlikely to be impartial. 
 
The service of members of the Appeals Committees (as members of the UIF Board) can be 
terminated by the Minister of Labour; or through their resignation.
1284
 In addition, NEDLAC 
can request the termination of its nominated members for serious misconduct; for permanent 
incapacity; for being absent from three meetings of the Board without prior permission of the 
                                                 
1275
 Sections 47 and 48(1) of the UIA. 
1276
 Section 50(1) of the UIA. 
1277
 Section 50(2)(a)(i) of the UIA. 
1278
 See Unemployment Insurance Fund Annual Report 2009/10, 11-12.  
1279
 Section 49(1) of the UIA. 
1280
 Section 49(2) of the UIA. The Board members that represent organised labour, organised business and 
community and development interest organisations are nominated by NEDLAC. The members who represent 
the interests of the State are nominated by the Minister of Labour. 
1281
 Section 49(3)(a) of the UIA. 
1282
  Section 49 of the UIA. 
1283
 Section 52 of the UIA. 
1284
 Section 49 of the UIA. 
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Board unless just cause is shown by the member; or for engaging in any activity that might 
undermine the functions of the Board.  
 
The perception of independence and impartiality of the National Appeals Committee in the 
resolution of disputes between the UIF and an applicant or beneficiary is further undermined 
by its funding;
1285
 human resources and administrative support;
1286
 management;
1287
 
governance, oversight and supervision;
1288
 and accountability and reporting arrangements.
1289
 
These arrangements point out its dependence on the UIF and Department of Labour. 
Therefore, it can best be described as a higher level of internal review of UIF decisions. 
 
6. ROAD ACCIDENT FUND ACT DISPUTE RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK 
 
Two kinds of disputes that can arise under the Road Accident Fund Act are disputes relating 
to assessments of motor vehicle accident injuries and disputes relating to claims for the 
payment of compensation for injuries or death resulting from a motor accident. 
 
6.1 Review of decisions by the Road Accident Fund 
 
The Act does not establish any internal dispute resolution procedures for disputes relating to 
claims for the payment of compensation for injuries or death. It states that in such cases, “an 
action to enforce a claim against the Road Accident Fund or an agent of the Fund should be 
brought in any competent court within whose area of jurisdiction the occurrence (accident) 
                                                 
1285
 The National Appeals Committee is not provided direct funding by the National Treasury but by the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund. The Unemployment Insurance Act states that the UIF Commissioner is 
responsible for administering the affairs of the Board - section 51(1) of the UIA. It further states that in order to 
enable the Board to perform its functions effectively the Director-General must provide the Board with the 
necessary financial resources - section 51(2) of the UIA. 
1286
 There is not a distinct human resource and administrative framework for the National Appeals Committee. 
The Director-General is required to provide the Board with the necessary administrative resources and, subject 
to the laws governing the Public Service, with the necessary personnel - section 51(2) of the UIA. 
1287
 The Board is headed by a chairperson appointed by the Minister - section 49 of the UIA.  
1288
 Governance, oversight and supervision is undertaken by the Minster of Labour as the Board exercises its 
powers and performs its duties subject to any directions issued by the Minister; and  any guidelines determined 
by the Director-General - section 48(2) of the UIA. 
1289
 The Commissioner is responsible for administering the affairs of the Board, while the Director-General 
provides the Board with the necessary financial resources. As a result, the UIF Board does not undertake any 
financial reporting. Financial reporting is undertaken by Director-General as the accounting officer of the UIF - 
section 11 of the UIA. The Board is accountable to the Director-General and Minister of Labour, since the 
powers and duties of the Board are exercised and performed subject to any directions issued by the Minister and 
any guidelines determined by the Director-General - section 48(2) of the UIA. Furthermore, the UIF Board 
prepares and adopts a constitution subject to the approval of the Minister - section 50(1) of the UIA. 
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which caused the injury or death took place”.1290 Such cases are brought to the High 
Court.
1291
 
 
Procedures for the resolution of disputes relating to assessments of motor vehicle accident 
injuries are regulated in the Act. There is no provision for the reconsideration of decisions by 
the Road Accident Fund. Disputes relating to assessments of motor vehicle accident injuries 
(disputes where the Road Accident Fund or its agent objects to a serious injury report by a 
medical practitioner; or where an injured person objects to the Road Accident Fund’s or its 
agent’s rejection of a serious injury assessment report by a medical practitioner) are resolved 
by an Appeal Tribunal appointed by the Registrar of the Health Professions Council of South 
Africa (HPCSA) (the Road Accident Fund (RAF) Tribunal).
1292
  A person who is dissatisfied 
with the decision of the Tribunal can appeal to the High Court for a review of the Tribunal’s 
decision. 
 
6.2 Adjudication of disputes by the Road Accident Fund Appeal Tribunal  
 
6.2.1 Accessibility of the Road Accident Fund Appeal Tribunal  
 
Appeals that are to be determined solely on documentary evidence (appeals without a 
hearing) are conducted at the offices of the HPCSA in Pretoria. An exception is where the 
Tribunal requires the injured party to submit to further medical assessment.
1293
 Where an 
appeal is to be determined through a hearing, the venue of the Appeal Tribunal panel hearing 
is determined by the Chairperson of the Panel. Hearings can be held in any location in South 
Africa, depending on logistical needs.
1294
 Where the Appeal Tribunal decides that a hearing is 
necessary (for the purpose of considering legal arguments), the hearing is convened at a place 
determined by the appointed presiding advocate or attorney.
1295
 Where an applicant is 
required to attend a hearing, the Appeal Tribunal provides transport and accommodation 
(where necessary)(the Road Accident Fund provides these on behalf of the Appeal 
                                                 
1290
 Section 15(2) of the Road Accident Fund Act. 
1291
 See e.g. Road Accident Fund v Mdeyide (Minister of Transport, Intervening) [2007] ZACC 7; 2008 (1) SA 
535 (CC); 2007 (7) BCLR 805 (CC). 
1292
 Regulation 3(4) of the Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act (GN 769 in GG No 31249 of 21 July 
2008)(hereinafter called Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act of 2008). 
1293
 Regulation 3(11) of the Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act of 2008. 
1294
 According to Mr Matome Seisa of the HPCSA Legal Department (per telephone interview of 27 May 2011). 
1295
 Regulation 3(10)(e) of the Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act of 2008. 
266 
 
Tribunal)
.1296 
However, transport and accommodation are not provided where the applicant is 
the RAF). 
 
The RAF (when it rejects an assessment by a medical practitioner) or a claimant (in case of 
the rejection of the assessment by the RAF) notifies the Registrar that the assessment or 
rejection is disputed by lodging an Accident Fund Objection Form. The notification sets out 
the grounds upon which the rejection or assessment is disputed. It also includes submissions, 
medical reports and opinions that the applicant relies on. If the RAF is the disputant, it 
provides all available contact details of the other party to the dispute.
1297
 
 
A claimant lodges a dispute within 90 days of being notified of the outcome of the “not 
serious” assessment by the RAF, or 90 days of being notified of the rejection of the “Serious 
Injury Assessment Report” by the RAF. The RAF (or its agent) also lodges an application 
within 90 days where it disputes the assessment performed by a medical practitioner.
1298
 The 
Appeal Tribunal can condone late notification where an application for condonation is sent to 
the Registrar as well as to the other party to the dispute. The Appeal Tribunal does not have 
the power to condone claim applications that is rejected by the Fund because it was not 
submitted within the prescribed time limits.
1299
  
 
6.2.2 Scope of jurisdiction of the Road Accident Fund Appeal Tribunal  
 
A person who is injured in a motor vehicle accident and whose injury has been assessed as 
being “not serious” can appeal against such an assessment to the Tribunal. The Road 
Accident Fund can also apply to the Tribunal where it objects to a decision of a medical 
practitioner where a motor vehicle accident is assessed as “serious” (Serious Injury 
Assessment Report).
1300
  
 
The Appeal Tribunal has powers to verify the nature and extent of a person’s injury.1301 
These powers include the power to direct an injured person to submit to a further assessment 
                                                 
1296
 According to Mr Matome Seisa of the HPCSA Legal Department (per telephone interview of 27 May 2011). 
1297
 Regulation 3(4) of the Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act of 2008. 
1298
 Regulation 3(4)(a) of the Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act of 2008. 
1299
 See section 23 of the Road Accident Fund Act and Regulation 3(5) of the Regulations to the Road Accident 
Fund Act of 2008. 
1300
 Regulation 3(4) of the Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act of 2008.  
1301
 Regulation 3(11) of the Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act of 2008. 
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by a medical practitioner that it designates to ascertain whether an injury is serious (at the 
cost of the Fund or its agent); to request a person (with five day’s written notice) to appear 
before it at a specified place and time so as to examine his or her injury and assess whether 
the injury is serious; to direct that further medical reports should be obtained by one or more 
of the parties and be placed before it; to direct that relevant pre- and post-accident medical, 
health and treatment records pertaining to the injured person be obtained and made available 
to it; to direct that further submissions be made by one or more of the parties and stipulate the 
timeframe within which such further submissions must be placed before it; to refuse to decide 
the dispute until a party has complied with any earlier direction; to determine whether, in its 
majority view, the injury under assessment is serious; to confirm the assessment of the 
medical practitioner or substitute it with its own assessment, if the majority of the members 
of the Tribunal consider it appropriate to substitute; and to confirm the rejection of the 
serious injury reassessment report by the Fund (or an agent) or accept the report. 
  
The Appeal Tribunal’s findings are final and binding on the Road Accident Fund and 
therefore must be implemented.
1302
 
 
6.2.3 Fairness of Road Accident Fund Appeal Tribunal adjudication procedures  
 
The appeal is undertaken through a review of the findings of a medical practitioner in the 
Serious Injury Assessment Report.
1303
 Where the Appeal Tribunal decides that a hearing is 
necessary (for the purpose of considering legal arguments), the presiding officer notifies the 
Registrar of this in writing, stating the reasons.
1304
 The Registrar requests the Chairperson of 
the relevant bar council or law society to appoint an advocate or attorney to consider the 
reasons of the Appeal Tribunal presiding officer and make a recommendation in writing 
whether a hearing is required. The Tribunal considers the advocate’s/attorney’s 
recommendations and determines in writing whether the nature of the dispute requires a 
hearing for the purpose of considering legal arguments.
1305
  
 
                                                 
1302
 Regulation 3(13) of the Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act of 2008. 
1303
 As confirmed by Mr Matome Seisa of the HPCSA Legal Department (per telephone interview of 27 May 
2011). 
1304
 Regulation 3(10)(a) and (b) of the Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act of 2008. 
1305
 Regulation 3(10)(c) and (d) of the Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act of 2008. 
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If a hearing is necessary, the Registrar informs the parties to the dispute that a hearing will be 
held at a place and time determined by the appointed advocate or attorney; the parties’ right 
to legal representation at the hearing (at their own cost); and of any additional procedures 
adopted by the advocate or attorney appointed to preside at the hearing. This indicates that 
personal appearance is permitted where the Tribunal determines that a hearing for the 
purpose of considering legal arguments is necessary. Where a hearing is held, the 
advocate/attorney appointed presides over the hearing.
1306
  
 
If the Tribunal decides that the nature of a dispute does not require a hearing (or where the 
legal issues have been determined), the Tribunal considers the relevant information (such as 
the dispute resolution form and the submissions, medical reports and opinions) relied upon by 
the parties. After consideration of the relevant information, the Tribunal determines through a 
vote whether the majority of the panel members view the injury concerned as serious.
1307
 The 
language of Appeal Tribunal hearings is English. However, interpreters are provided for non-
English speakers.
1308
  
 
There is no guarantee that disputes must be resolved quickly, as there are no timeframes for 
the finalisation of an appeal. Finalisation depends on whether there is a need for further 
assessments.
1309
 However, where an advocate or attorney is required to consider the need for 
a hearing on legal issues, he/she is required to make a recommendation within 10 days for 
consideration by the Appeal Tribunal.
1310
 
 
After consideration of an appeal, the Tribunal notifies the Registrar of its findings within 90 
days after the referral of the dispute, or after any additional period that the Registrar 
authorises in writing on application by the Appeal Tribunal.
1311
 The Registrar then informs 
the parties of the findings of the Appeal Tribunal.
1312
  
 
                                                 
1306
 Regulation 3(10)(e) of the Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act of 2008. 
1307
 Regulation 3(10(h) and (11) of the Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act of 2008. The Tribunal can 
then confirm the assessment of the medical practitioner or substitute it with its own assessment if the majority of 
the members of the Appeal Tribunal consider it appropriate to substitute. It can also confirm the rejection of the 
serious injury reassessment report by the Fund (or an agent) or accept the report. 
1308
 According to Mr Matome Seisa of the HPCSA Legal Department (per telephone interview of 27 May 2011). 
1309
 According to Mr Matome Seisa of the HPCSA Legal Department (per telephone interview of 27 May 2011). 
1310
 Regulation 3(10)(f) of the Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act of 2008. 
1311
 Regulation 3(13) of the Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act of 2008.  
1312
 Regulation 3(10)(f) of the Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act of 2008. 
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6.2.4 Expertise, independence and impartiality of the Road Accident Fund Appeal 
Tribunal 
 
The Road Accident Fund Appeal Tribunal possesses the necessary expertise to resolve 
disputes. It can also be considered independent of the Road Accident Fund and impartial due 
to the procedures for the appointment of its members, their discipline and termination and its 
organisational arrangements (funding;
1313
 human resource and administrative support;
1314
 
managerial framework;
1315
 governance, oversight and supervision;
1316
 and accountability and 
reporting
1317
).  
 
The Registrar of the HPCSA appoints the Tribunal.
 
The Tribunal consists of three 
independent medical practitioners with expertise in the appropriate areas of medicine. The 
Registrar designates one of them as the presiding officer of the appeal.
1318
 The Registrar can 
also appoint an additional independent health practitioner with expertise in any appropriate 
health profession to assist the Tribunal in an advisory capacity.
1319
  
 
When the Registrar appoints the Tribunal members, he or she informs the parties of the 
medical practitioners appointed to the panel (in writing).
1320
 Within 10 days of being 
                                                 
1313
 Funding for the Appeal Tribunal is provided by the Road Accident Fund, as the Regulations to the Road 
Accident Fund Act state that a dispute is referred for consideration by an appeal tribunal paid for by the Fund - 
Regulation 3(8)(a) of the Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act of 2008. 
1314
 The Appeal Tribunal does not have a distinct human resource and administrative structure, as it consists of a 
roll of 10 medical practitioners, from which a panel of 3-4 members are constituted for an appeal - Regulation 
3(8)(b) of the Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act of 2008. The HPCSA (Legal department) provides 
administrative and support staff for the coordination of the Appeal Tribunal’s functions on behalf of the Road 
Accident Fund. The Road Accident Fund compensates the HPCSA for the cost of providing human resource and 
administrative support to the Appeal Tribunal - according to Mr Matome Seisa of the HPCSA Legal Department 
(per telephone interview of 27 May 2011). 
1315
 An Appeal Tribunal is headed by one of the medical practitioners designated as the presiding officer - 
Regulation 3(8)(b) of the Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act of 2008. 
1316
 Governance, oversight and supervision over the Appeal Tribunal is undertaken by the HPCSA General 
Manager on delegation from the Registrar of the activities of the Appeal Tribunal is by the HPCSA General 
Manager on delegation from the Registrar - according to Mr Matome Seisa of the HPCSA Legal Department 
(per telephone interview of 27 May 2011). 
1317
 The fees and reasonable expenses of members of the Appeal tribunal are paid by the Road Accident Fund. In 
addition, Fund compensates the HPCSA for the cost of providing human resource and administrative support to 
the Appeal Tribunal. As a result, financial accountability for the expenditure of the Tribunal is by the RAF. In 
terms of reporting, members of the Appeal Tribunal report to the HPCSA General Manager as a delegate of the 
Registrar - according to Mr Matome Seisa of the HPCSA Legal Department (per telephone interview of 27 May 
2011). 
1318
 Regulation 3(8)(b) of the Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act of 2008. The HPCSA is a statutory 
body established in terms of the Health Professions Act 56 of 1974 to provide for control over the education, 
training and registration for and practising of health professionals. 
1319
 Regulation 3(8)(c) of the Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act of 2008. 
1320
 Regulation 3(9)(a) of the Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act of 2008. 
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informed, a party that is unhappy with any of the appointments can send a written motivation 
to the Registrar and to the other party to the dispute. The motivation must set out the grounds 
for his or her or its objections to the appointment(s). The other party to the dispute may 
respond within 10 days by delivering a response to the Registrar and the aggrieved party. 
When the Registrar receives the written motivation and the response to the motivation (if 
any), he can either confirm the appointment(s) or substitute a member of the Tribunal. 
Thereafter, the Registrar’s decision is final.1321  
 
The Registrar creates a roll of 10 medical practitioners from which members making up an 
Appeal Tribunal hearing panel are appointed. A medical practitioner is nominated as a 
panellist for one or two years. Appeal Tribunal panellists are not employees of the RAF or of 
the HPCSA. They could be considered as office bearers.
1322
 However, the fees and reasonable 
expenses of members of the Appeal tribunal are paid by the Road Accident Fund.
1323
  
 
As independent medical practitioners, the Appeal Tribunal members are not subject to the 
discipline of the RAF. However, as medical practitioners, undertaking professional duties, 
they are subject to the discipline of the Professional Conduct Committee of the HPCSA.
1324
 
The Registrar can remove a panellist from the list of panellists (and possibly from the roll of 
medical practitioners) upon the recommendation of the Professional Conduct Committee of 
the Council.
1325
  
 
The procedures for the appointment of its members, their discipline and termination and its 
organisational arrangements enable the Appeal Tribunal to be independent of the Road 
Accident Fund. Therefore, it is (perceived as) impartial in the resolution of disputes against 
the Fund. It can also resolve disputes effectively due to its procedures, powers and the 
expertise of its members.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1321
 Regulation 3(8)(b) of the Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act of 2008. 
1322
 According to Mr Matome Seisa of the HPCSA Legal Department (per telephone interview of 27 May 2011). 
1323
 Regulation 3(14)(b) of the Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act of 2008. 
1324
 Discipline of  Tribunal members is by the Professional Conduct Committee of the HPCSA in terms of 
section 15(5)(f) of the Health Professions Act 
1325
 According to Mr Matome Seisa of the HPCSA Legal Department (per telephone interview of 27 May 2011). 
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7. PENSION FUNDS ACT DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
 
The Pension Funds Act created a dispute resolution system of reconsideration (reviews) and 
appeals. Reconsideration of a decision is undertaken by a pension fund which took an initial 
decision; while appeals for decisions of pension funds are decided by the Office of the 
Pension Funds Adjudicator. 
 
7.1 Reconsideration of decisions by a retirement fund 
 
The Pension Funds Act requires pension funds to reconsider decisions when a member of the 
fund lodges an application for reconsideration. The Act states that, notwithstanding the rules 
of any fund, a complainant may lodge a written complaint with a fund for consideration by 
the board of the fund.
1326
 When a complaint is lodged, the fund or the employer who 
participates in the fund is required to properly consider it and reply in writing within 30 days 
after receipt of the complaint.
1327
  
 
If a complainant is not satisfied with the reply of the fund or the employer, or if the fund or 
the employer fails to reply within 30 days after the receipt of the complaint, the complainant 
may lodge the complaint with the Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator.
1328
  
 
7.2 Review of decisions by Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator 
 
The Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator is an autonomous statutory body established, in 
terms of the Pension Funds Act, to resolve disputes between members and private retirement 
(pension) funds “in a procedurally fair, economical and expeditious manner”.1329 Its 
organisational arrangements and procedures are thus designed to enable it achieve its 
objective. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1326
 Section 30A(1) of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956. 
1327
 Section 30A(2) of the Pension Funds Act. 
1328
 Section 30A(3) of the Pension Funds Act. 
1329
 See sections 30B(1) and 30D of the Pension Funds Act. 
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7.2.1 Accessibility of the Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator 
 
The Pension Funds Adjudicator operates from a single national office in Johannesburg. All 
complaints have to be sent to this office. A complaint to the Adjudicator is submitted in 
writing, as the Adjudicator does not accept complaints by telephone or in person.
1330
 
Furthermore, he or she does not enter into discussions with a person who has not lodged a 
complaint in writing. The Pension Funds Adjudicator does not investigate a complaint if the 
act or omission which is the basis of the complaint occurred or came to the complainant’s 
attention more than three years before the date of the application.
1331
 If the complainant was 
unaware that the act or omission to which the complaint relates had occurred, the prescription 
period of three years only commences on the date on which the complainant became aware or 
reasonably ought to have become aware of the act or omission.
1332
 
 
Where good cause is shown for delay in application, the Adjudicator can extend the claims 
lodgement period, either before or after the expiry of any prescribed period of his or her own 
motion.
1333
 Some of the relevant factors considered in the condonation of non-compliance 
with any prescribed time limit include the degree of lateness, explanation of the lateness, 
prospects of success, importance of the case and the existence of good faith endeavours to 
resolve the dispute.
1334
 Where no order is made by the Adjudicator extending the time period 
or condoning non-compliance and no request is made for such extension or condonation, the 
Adjudicator is precluded from dealing with a complaint.
1335
 
 
7.2.2 Scope of jurisdiction and powers of the Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator  
 
The Pension Funds Adjudicator has a wide personal scope of jurisdiction. The Adjudicator 
resolves a “complaint” submitted by a “complainant”. A ‘complainant’ means any person 
who is, or who claims to be a member or former member of a fund; a beneficiary or former 
                                                 
1330
 Sections 30A(3) and 30I of the Pension Funds Act. 
1331
 Section 30I(1)  of the Pension Funds Act. See also Delbridge and Others v Liberty Group Ltd and Others 
[2011] 1 BPLR 19 (PFA) and Beach v Pick ‘n Pay Stores Ltd and Another [2002] 6 BPLR 3531 (PFA)). 
1332
 Section 30I(2) of the Pension Funds Act. See also Baloyi v Dichawu National Provident Fund and Others 
[2007] 3 BPLR 281 (PFA) and Beldon v Industex Group Pension Fund [2004] 10 BPLR 6148 (PFA). 
1333
 Section 30I(3) of the Pension Funds Act. See also Baloyi v Dichawu National Provident Fund and Others 
[2007] 3 BPLR 281 (PFA). 
1334
 See Anderson and Others v The HA Swanepoel Group Pension Fund and Another [2003] 10 BPLR 5179 
(PFA); Anderson v Premier Retirement Fund [2000] 10 BPLR 1069 (PFA) and Beach v Pick ‘n Pay Stores Ltd 
and Another [2002] 6 BPLR 3531 (PFA). 
1335
 See Tongaat-Hulett Group Ltd v Murphy NO and Others [2000] 9 BPLR 973 (PFA). 
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beneficiary of a fund; an employer who participates in a fund; a group of members (former 
members) or purported members (former members), beneficiaries (former beneficiaries) or 
purported beneficiaries (former beneficiaries) and employers who participates in a fund; a 
board of a fund or member thereof; or any person who has an interest in a complaint.
1336
 
 
The Act states that a “complaint” means a complaint relating to the administration of a fund; 
the investment of its funds or the interpretation and application of its rules which alleges one 
of four issues. Therefore, a complaint must relate to at least one of the specified issues. The 
complaint must either allege that a decision of the fund or any person purportedly taken in 
terms of the rules was in excess of the powers of that fund or person, or an improper exercise 
of its powers; that the complainant has sustained or may sustain prejudice in consequence of 
the maladministration of the fund by the fund or any person, whether by act or omission; that 
a dispute of fact or law has arisen in relation to a fund between the fund or any person and the 
complainant; or that an employer who participates in a fund has not fulfilled its duties in 
terms of the rules of the fund. However, it does not include a complaint which does not relate 
to a specific complainant.
1337
 This indicates that the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction is 
circumscribed to investigating and resolving complaints as lodged. He or she is restricted to 
the issues pleaded in the complaint, and does not have a general power to investigate issues 
and/or formulate issues for investigation mero motu.
1338
  
 
The Pension Funds Adjudicator resolves disputes in the private retirement insurance 
environment. As a result, it also does not have jurisdiction in relation to institutions that do 
not provide retirement insurance benefits.
1339
 However, its jurisdiction excludes pension 
funds that were established by, or continued through, a collective agreement concluded in a 
bargaining or statutory council in terms of the LRA.
1340
  
  
The Adjudicator cannot investigate a complaint if, before the lodging of the complaint, 
proceedings have been instituted in any civil court in respect of a matter which would 
                                                 
1336
 Section 1 of the Pension Funds Act. 
1337
 Section 1 of the Pension Funds Act. See also Armscor v Murphy NO and Others [1999] 11 PBLR 227 (PFA. 
1338
 See Mine Employees Pension Fund v Murphy NO and Others [2004] 11 BPLR 6204 (W). 
1339
 Beauzec v Old Mutual Life Assurance Company (SA) Ltd [2011] 1 BPLR 11(PFA) and Old Mutual Life 
Assurance Co SA Ltd v The Pension Funds Adjudicator and Others; In re Old Mutual [2008] 2 BPLR 97 (D). 
1340
 See section 2(1) of the Pension Funds Act. See also Arendse v Metal Industries Provident Fund and Another 
[2001] 7 BPLR 2182 (PFA). 
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constitute the subject matter of the investigation.
1341
 This implies that the Act permits 
multiple causes of action and dispute resolution institutions, as a complainant can bring an 
action directly to a court with jurisdiction (the High Court). This negates the objective of the 
establishment of the Office of the Adjudicator (to resolve disputes in a procedurally fair, 
economical and expeditious manner).  
 
The Adjudicator is empowered to do anything necessary or expedient for the achievement of 
his or her objects and the performance of his or her functions.
1342
 In order to achieve his or 
her main objective, the Adjudicator is empowered to investigate any complaint and may 
make an order which any court of law can make.
1343
 In order to facilitate the speedy 
resolution of disputes, the Adjudicator can require a complainant to first approach an 
organisation established to resolve disputes in the pension funds industry (and approved by 
the Registrar of Pension Funds).
1344
 
 
The Adjudicator’s determination is deemed to be a civil judgment of any court of law, as if 
the matter in question been heard by such a court, and is noted as such by the clerk or the 
registrar of the court. In addition, a writ or warrant of execution may be issued by the clerk or 
the registrar of such a court and be executed by the sheriff, six weeks after the date of the 
determination (if an appeal has not been made to the High Court).
1345
 
 
7.2.3 Fairness of Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator adjudication procedures  
 
When the Adjudicator receives written submissions from both the complainant and the 
pension fund, and any other party involved, the adjudicator investigates the complaint by 
phoning or writing to the fund/employer or fund member for more information (if necessary). 
Any further written replies are copied to all the parties as the Adjudicator is required to 
provide the pension fund or person against whom the complaint is made the opportunity to 
comment on the allegations.
1346
 The Adjudicator determines and applies the relevant law to 
the facts of the dispute and makes a decision.
1347
 Since there is no hearing in disputes before 
                                                 
1341
 Section 30H(2) of the Pension Funds Act. 
1342
 Section 30Q(g) of the Pension Funds Act. 
1343
 Section 30E(1)(a) of the Pension Funds Act. 
1344
 Section 30E(1)(b) of the Pension Funds Act. 
1345
 Section 30O of the Pension Funds Act. 
1346
 Section 30F of the Pension Funds Act. 
1347
 The Pension Funds Adjudicator  What you need to know about lodging a complaint (Undated) 
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the Adjudicator, parties do not appear in person and are not entitled to legal 
representation.
1348
  
 
A complaint can be resolved by an organisation established to resolve disputes in the pension 
funds industry (and approved by the Registrar of Pension Funds) before investigation by the 
Adjudicator. This will be the case where the Adjudicator considers it expedient to do so (it 
will facilitate the speedy resolution of the dispute). A complaint dealt with by such an 
organisation is recorded and deemed to be receipt of the complaint by the Adjudicator. 
However, if the complaint is not resolved, the complainant can lodge the complaint with the 
Adjudicator to deal with it.
1349
  
 
Although timeframes within which the Adjudicator must resolve a dispute are not stipulated 
in the Pension Funds Act, one of the objectives of the Adjudicator is to dispose of complaints 
in an expeditious manner.
1350
 The parties to the dispute receive the decision of the 
Adjudicator in the form of a determination or a letter stating reasons for the finding. The 
Adjudicator also sends the determination to the clerk or registrar of the court, which would 
have had jurisdiction had the matter been heard by a court.
1351
 Any person may obtain a 
readable copy of the record of a determination by the Pension Funds Adjudicator on payment 
of a fee determined by the Adjudicator.
1352
 The Adjudicator keeps a permanent record of the 
proceedings relating to the adjudication of a complaint and the evidence given during the 
determination, either in writing or by mechanical or electronic means.
1353
 
 
A party that is unhappy with the determination of the Pension Funds Adjudicator can lodge 
an appeal to the High Court. When a determination is appealed to the High Court, it is once 
again decided on its merits. In addition, determinations by the Pension Funds Adjudicator are 
currently the only tribunal decisions that are reported on a regular basis.
1354
 
 
                                                 
1348
 S 30K of the Pension Funds Act. 
1349
 Section 30E(1)(b), (2) and (3) of the Pension Funds Act. 
1350
 Section 30D of the Pension Funds Act. 
1351
 Section 30M of the Pension Funds Act. 
1352
 Section 30L(1) and (2) of the Pension Funds Act. 
1353
 Section 30L(1) and (2) of the Pension Funds Act. 
1354
 See, for example, the various cases cited here, reported in the Butterworths Pension Law Reports (BPLR). 
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7.2.4 Expertise, independence and impartiality of the Office of the Pension Funds 
Adjudicator 
 
To enable the Pension Funds Adjudicator to achieve its objective, he or she must have the 
necessary expertise and independence. This has been achieved through the conditions of 
appointment and his or discipline and termination of service and the organisational 
arrangements of the Office (funding;
1355
 human resource and administrative support;
1356
 
managerial framework;
1357
 governance, oversight and supervision;
1358
 and accountability and 
reporting
1359
).  
 
Before a person can be appointed as an (acting) Adjudicator, he or she must be qualified to be 
admitted to practise as an advocate under the Admission of Advocates Act
1360
 or admitted to 
practise as an attorney under the Attorneys Act.
1361
 He or she must have practised as an 
advocate or an attorney for an uninterrupted period of at least 10 years. However, a person 
can also be appointed if he or she has been involved in the teaching of law for an 
uninterrupted period of at least 10 years and also practised as an advocate or attorney for a 
period that renders him or her suitable for appointment as an (acting) Adjudicator or 
possesses such other experience as renders him or her suitable for appointment.
1362
 
                                                 
1355
 The Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator is funded through funds provided by the Financial Services 
Board through a budget submitted to and approved of by the Financial Services Board; as well as money 
accruing to the Office from other sources - section 30R of the Pension Funds Act. 
1356
 The Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator human resource and administrative structure is made up of the 
Adjudicator (or Acting Adjudicator); the Deputy Adjudicator(s) and employees of the Office. The Pension 
Funds Adjudicator appoints employees of the Office and determines the remuneration and other terms and 
conditions of employment with the concurrence of the Financial Services Board - sections 30Q(d) and 30S(1)(a) 
and (b) of the Pension Funds Act. 
1357
 The Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator is managed by the (Acting) Adjudicator (assisted by the 
Deputy Adjudicator(s) - section 30 B(2) of the Pension Funds Act. 
1358
 Governance, oversight and supervision is undertaken by the Financial Services Board - see for example 
sections 30Q, 30R and 30S of the Pension Funds Act. 
1359
 The Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator is listed as a public entity in Schedule 3A of the Public 
Finance Management Act. The Adjudicator (or one of his or her employees designated by him or her) is charged 
with the accountability in respect of all moneys received and payments made by the Office - section 30T(1) of 
the Pension Funds Act. As the accounting officer, the Adjudicator is required keep full and correct record of all 
money received or expended by, and of all assets, liabilities and financial transactions of, the Office. He or she 
must also, as soon as is practicable, but not later than three months, after the end of each financial year, prepare 
annual financial statements reflecting, with suitable particulars, money received and expenses incurred by the 
Adjudicator during, and his or her assets and liabilities at the end of, the financial year in question. The records 
and financial statements are audited by the Auditor-General - section 30T(2) and (3) of the Pension Funds Act. 
The Adjudicator submits a report on his or her affairs and functions during a financial year to the Minister, 
including the audited financial statements. This is done within six months after the end of the financial year - 
section 30U of the Pension Funds Act. 
1360
 Admission of Advocates Act 67 of 1964. 
1361
 Attorneys Act 53 of 1979. 
1362
 Section 30C(2) of the Pension Funds Act. 
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The Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator is made up of the Adjudicator, Deputy 
Adjudicator(s) and employees.
1363
 The Minister of Finance appoints the Pension Funds 
Adjudicator or Acting Adjudicator and Deputy Adjudicator(s) after consultation with the 
Financial Services Board.
1364
 The Adjudicator is appointed for a period of three years and 
may be reappointed upon the expiry of his or her term of office.
1365
 The remuneration and 
other terms and conditions of employment of the Adjudicator are determined by the Financial 
Services Board, while the remuneration and other terms and conditions of employment of the 
employees of the Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator are determined by the Adjudicator 
(with the concurrence of the Financial Services Board).
1366
 The remuneration of the 
Adjudicator and his or her employees is paid out of the funds of the Office of the Pension 
Funds Adjudicator.
1367
 
 
The Pension Funds Adjudicator may resign at any time as Adjudicator by tendering his or her 
resignation in writing to the Minister. The resignation must be forwarded to the Minister at 
least three calendar months prior to the date on which the Adjudicator wishes to vacate his or 
her office, unless the Minister allows a shorter period.
1368
 
 
The Minister of Finance may remove the (Acting) Pension Funds Adjudicator or Deputy 
Adjudicator on the grounds of misbehaviour, incapacity or incompetence after consultation 
with the Financial Services Board.
1369
 
 
The Office of the Adjudicator is independent of the private pension funds industry whose 
disputes is resolves. It is also autonomous, which enables it to resolve disputes objectively 
and impartially. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1363
 Sections 30C and 30S of the Pension Funds Act. 
1364
 Section 30C(1) of the Pension Funds Act. 
1365
 Section 30C(3) of the Pension Funds Act. 
1366
 Section 30S(1)(a) and (b) of the Pension Funds Act. 
1367
 Section 30S(2) of the Pension Funds Act. 
1368
 Section 30C(4) of the Pension Funds Act. 
1369
 Section 30C(5) of the Pension Funds Act. 
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8. MEDICAL SCHEMES ACT DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
 
The dispute resolution framework created in terms of the Medical Schemes Act foresees the 
resolution of disputes by the Registrar of the CMS and the CMS. Appeals against decisions of 
the Registrar are decided by an Appeal Board of the CMS. 
 
8.1 Resolution of disputes by Registrar of CMS and CMS 
 
When the dispute is lodged with the CMS, the Registrar analyses the complaint and refers it 
to a medical scheme for comments within four days of receiving it. A medical scheme is 
obliged to provide a written response to the Registrar’s Office within 30 days.1370 The 
Registrar then analyses the response (if any) and attempts to resolve the matter as soon as 
possible after receipt of any comments furnished to him or her. If the Registrar cannot resolve 
the matter, he or she forwards it to the Council to make a decision or ruling (normally within 
120 days of the date of referral of the complaint) and the decision is communicated to the 
parties.
1371
  
 
A party that is aggrieved by a decision relating to the settlement of a complaint or dispute 
may appeal the decision to the CMS within three months after Registrar’s decision.1372 Where 
an appeal is submitted after three months of the decision, the Council can condone its late 
submission (where good cause is shown).
1373
 The Council is empowered to either confirm or 
vary the decision concerned, or rescind it and give such other decision that it deems just.
1374
 
Affected parties have the right to a further appeal to the Appeal Board of the Council. 
 
8.2 Resolution of disputes by the CMS Appeal Board 
 
The Appeal Board of the CMS provides a complainant (i.e. members of medical schemes) 
with a transparent, equitable, accessible, expeditious, reasonable and procedurally fair dispute 
                                                 
1370
 Section 47(1) of the Medical Schemes Act. 
1371
 Section 47(2) of the Medical Schemes Act. See also www.medicalschemes.com 
1372
 Section 48(1) of the Medical Schemes Act. 
1373
 Section 48(2) of the Medical Schemes Act. 
1374
 Section 48(8) of the Medical Schemes Act. A person who is aggrieved by a decision of the Registrar 
(excluding a decision that has been made with the concurrence of the Council) can also appeal against such 
decision to the Council. The Council can also make an order on such an appeal as it deems just - section 49(1) of 
the Medical Schemes Act. 
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resolution process against a decision of the Registrar (acting with the concurrence of the 
Council) or by a decision of the Council.
1375
  
 
8.2.1 Accessibility of the CMS Appeal Board 
 
The CMS has a national office in Pretoria serving the Republic. A person who is unhappy 
with a decision of the Registrar or the Council submits an appeal application to the national 
office. Appeal applications are submitted in writing. In addition, a fee of R2000 is required to 
be paid by the appellant in submitting an appeal.
1376
 This may restrict access to the Appeal 
Board for persons who cannot afford to pay the fee. However, if the Appeal Board sets aside 
a decision of the Council, the appeal application fee is refunded to the appellant. Where the 
Appeal Board varies any decision on appeal, it may also refund all or part of the application 
fee. 
 
A person who lodges an appeal to the Appeal Board is required to submit with his or her 
appeal written arguments or explanations of the grounds of his or her appeal.
1377
 The 
aggrieved party must appeal the decision to the Appeal Board within 60 days of the decision 
being made.
1378
 
 
8.2.2 Scope of jurisdiction and powers of the CMS Appeal Board 
 
A person aggrieved by a decision of the Registrar (acting with the concurrence of the 
Council) or by a decision of the Council can appeal against the decision to the Appeal 
Board.
1379
 The Act defines “complaint” as a complaint against any person required to be 
registered or accredited in terms of the Act (or any person whose professional activities are 
regulated by the Act). The complaint should allege that such a person has acted or failed to 
act in contravention of the Act; or acted improperly in relation to any matter which falls 
within the jurisdiction of the CMS.
1380
 Therefore, the personal jurisdiction of the Appeal 
Board is restricted to complainants who are members of medical schemes. 
                                                 
1375
 Section 50(3) of the Medical Schemes Act. See also Council for Medical Schemes “The complaints 
procedure” accessed at http://www.medicalschemes.com/Content. aspx?1. 
1376
 See section 50(19) of the Medical Schemes Act. 
1377
 Section 50(4) of the Medical Schemes Act. 
1378
 Section 50(3) of the Medical Schemes Act. 
1379
 Section 50(3) of the Medical Schemes Act. 
1380
 Section 1 of the Medical Schemes Act. 
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The scope of disputes is also limited to matters related to the business of a medical scheme (a 
person required to be registered or accredited, or a professional (such as a broker or an 
actuary) regulated by the Act. 
 
In considering an appeal, the Appeal Board has the powers which a High Court has to 
summon witnesses, to cause an oath or affirmation to be administered by them, to examine 
them, and to call for the production of books, documents and objects.
1381
 
 
The Appeal Board may, after hearing the appeal confirm, set aside or vary the decision under 
appeal, or order that the decision is given effect to.
1382
 When the Appeal Board makes a 
decision, it is not empowered to reconsider the decision. After hearing an appeal, the Appeal 
Board has the power to order that the decision be given effect to by the Registrar or the 
relevant medical scheme.
1383
 
 
8.2.3 Fairness of CMS Appeal Board procedures 
 
An appeal is heard on a date and time and at a place fixed by the Appeal Board. The secretary 
of the Board notifies the appellant as well as the Council of the date, place and time fixed by 
the Appeal Board in writing.
1384
 
 
All the evidence and submissions heard by the Appeal Board are heard in public. However, in 
his or her discretion, the Chairperson can exclude from a hearing t any class of persons or all 
persons whose presence at the hearing is deemed unnecessary or undesirable.
1385
 The 
procedure at the hearing of an appeal is determined by the Chairperson of the Appeal 
Board.
1386
 The appellant and the Registrar (or the CMS) are entitled to be represented at an 
appeal hearing by a legal practitioner.
1387
 
 
In order to ensure the (perceived) impartiality of the Appeal Board, the Act requires that a 
member of the Appeal Board recuses himself or herself and be replaced for the duration of 
                                                 
1381
 Section 50(9) of the Medical Schemes Act.  
1382
 Section 50(16) of the Medical Schemes Act. 
1383
 Section 50(16)(b) of the Medical Schemes Act. 
1384
 Section 50(8) of the Medical Schemes Act. 
1385
 Section 50(13) of the Medical Schemes Act. 
1386
 Section 50(14) of the Medical Schemes Act. 
1387
 Section 50(15) of the Medical Schemes Act. 
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the hearing. This is required where it transpires before or during a hearing that the member 
has any direct or indirect personal interest in the outcome of that appeal.
1388
 
 
The decision of the Appeal Board is taken by majority vote of the members.
1389
 No 
timeframes are stipulated for the Appeal Board to finalise an appeal. The decision of the 
Appeal Board is in writing and a copy thereof is furnished to the appellant and to the 
Council.
1390
 
 
8.2.4 Expertise, independence and impartiality of the CMS Appeal Board  
 
In order for the Appeal Board to achieve its objective, the Board is equipped with the 
required expertise and independence from medical schemes. The Appeal Board consists of 
three persons, with a staff member of the Council designated by the Registrar as the secretary 
of the Appeal Board.
1391
 The Chairperson of the Appeal Board is appointed on account of his 
or her knowledge of the law; while the other members are appointed on the basis of their 
knowledge of medical schemes.
1392
 
 
The Appeal Board is established by the Minister of Health to hear appeals in medical scheme 
disputes.
1393
 The members of the Appeal Board are appointed by the Minister of Health for 
three years, although they are eligible for reappointment on the expiration of their term of 
office.
1394
 Members of the Appeal Board could be either employees of the State or 
independent contractors. In terms of the Act, a member of the Appeal Board who is not in the 
full-time employment of the State is paid such remuneration for his or her services as a 
member of the Board (including re-imbursement for transport, travelling and subsistence 
expenses incurred by him or her in performing his or her functions as a member of the 
Appeal Board) as the Minister of Health determines with the concurrence of the Minister of 
Finance.
1395
 
 
                                                 
1388
 Section 50(5) of the Medical Schemes Act.  
1389
 Section 50(17) of the Medical Schemes Act. 
1390
 Section 50(18) of the Medical Schemes Act. 
1391
 Section 50(1) and (2) of the Medical Schemes Act. 
1392
 Section 50(1)(a) of the Medical Schemes Act. 
1393
 The Appeal Board is established in terms of section 50 of the Medical Schemes Act. 
1394
 Section 50(1) and (6) of the Medical Schemes Act. 
1395
 Section 50(20) of the Medical Schemes Act. 
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The Medical Schemes Act is silent on the discipline of members of the Appeal Board. 
However, since members of the Appeal Board are appointed by the Minister of Health, the 
inference could be drawn that they would be subject to the discipline of the Minister.
1396
  
 
The Medical Schemes Act also does not regulate the termination of the services of Appeal 
Board members. It is only stated that any casual vacancy that occurs on the Appeal Board is 
filled by the appointment of another person by the Minister. The person appointed holds 
office for the unexpired period of office of his or her predecessor.
1397
 
 
The effectiveness of the Appeal Board in realising its objectives is further enhanced by its 
organisational framework. This relates to its funding;
1398
 human resource and administrative 
support;
1399
 managerial framework;
1400
 governance, oversight and supervision;
1401
 and 
accountability and reporting arrangements.
1402
 These aspects reinforce its autonomy and 
independence from medical schemes, which is imperative for the resolution of disputes in a 
transparent, equitable, accessible, expeditious, reasonable and procedurally fair manner. 
 
9. RESOLUTION OF SOCIAL SECURITY DISPUTES BY THE HIGH COURT 
 
The High Court is a superior court of record with inherent powers and standing. As a result, 
except where expressly provided otherwise in a statute, the High Court has the power to 
                                                 
1396
 See section 50(1) of the Medical Schemes Act. 
1397
 Section 50(7) of the Medical Schemes Act. 
1398
 There is no specific funding arrangement for the Appeal Board. Members of the Appeal Board who are not 
full-time state employees are paid remuneration for their services as members of the Appeal Board. Funding of 
the activities of the Appeal Board is provided through the CMS. Funds for the Council are from moneys 
appropriated by Parliament on terms and conditions determined by the Minister of Health (with the concurrence 
of the Minister of Finance); fees raised on services rendered by the Registrar; penalties; and interest on overdue 
fees and penalties in respect of services rendered by the Registrar. The Council can also accept moneys or other 
goods donated or bequeathed to it - section 12 of the Medical Schemes Act. 
1399
 The Appeal Board consists of three members. Administrative support is provided by the Council as the 
Registrar designates a staff member to act as secretary of the Appeal Board - section 50(1) and (2) of the 
Medical Schemes Act. 
1400
 A hearing of the Appeal Board is managed by a chairperson, who determines the procedure at the hearing - 
section 50(14) of the Medical Schemes Act.  
1401
 Minister of Health undertakes governance, oversight and supervision of the Appeal Board as he or she is the 
appointing authority - section 50(1) of the Medical Schemes Act. 
1402
 The CMS in listed as a public entity in Schedule 3A of the Public Finance Management Act. This entails a 
direct budgetary appropriation by Parliament; and autonomous accountability for the budget. The Registrar of 
Medical Schemes, as the accounting officer of the Council is responsible for the financial accountability and 
reporting of the Council - section 13 of the Medical Schemes Act.  
The Council is required to submit to the Minister before the end of June of each year a report on the Council’s 
activities during the previous financial year. It must also publish or make available the annual report after 
submission thereof to the Minister - section 14(1) and (2) of the Medical Schemes Act. 
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review the decisions of all social security institutions due to its inherent review powers. The 
High Court also hears appeals against the decisions of some of the social security 
adjudication forums. In some cases (such the failure of assessors to agree with the presiding 
officer in a COIDA Compensation Court hearing) the High Court decides social security 
disputes at first instance. The Road Accident Fund Act also requires a person with a claim 
against the fund to bring an action in any High Court within whose area of jurisdiction the 
occurrence which caused the injury or death took place.
1403
  
 
In addition, various social security statutes specifically provide for some issues to be dealt 
with by the High Court. For example, COIDA outlines issues to be dealt with by High Court. 
The Compensation Commissioner can also state a case on a question of law to the High 
Court.
1404
 In terms of the ODMWA, the Compensation Commissioner for Occupational 
Diseases can also state a case on question of law to the High Court on appeal.
1405
  
 
The High Court is thus an integral part of the current South Africa social security system, 
which requires its institutional framework and processes to promote the realisation of the 
rights of parties in social security disputes. 
 
9.1 Accessibility of the High Court 
 
Provincial or local divisions of the High Court are currently located in Port Elizabeth, Durban 
Umtata/Mthatha, Pietermaritzburg, Grahamstown, Cape Town, Bhisho, Polokwane, 
Thohoyandou, Johannesburg Pretoria, Mmabatho/Mafikeng, Kimberley and 
Bloemfontein.
1406
 An appellant can bring an action in the High Court at any time as there is 
no time limit for the lodging of a case (except where required in a particular law). However, a 
claim could prescribe if it is not lodged within the relevant time limits stipulated in the 
Prescription Act.
1407
 
 
                                                 
1403
 Section 15(2) Road Accident Fund Act. 
1404
 Section 92 of COIDA. 
1405
 Section 58(1) of ODMWA. 
1406
 See Renaming of High Courts Act 30 of 2008. 
1407
 Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
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A person (especially an indigent person) may have limited or no access to the High Court due 
to the high cost of court proceedings and the absence of legal aid.
1408
  In addition, the purely 
technical and legalistic basis of dealing with cases means a person who brings a case to the 
High Court requires legal representation, which an indigent person can hardly afford. In 
relation to social security (specifically social assistance) litigants’ ability to pay legal fees, 
Wallis AJ in Cele v the South African Social Security Agency and 22 related cases rightly 
wondered how people so impoverished that they qualify for social assistance grants can 
afford to pay fees.
1409
  
 
The inaccessibility of (High) Court proceedings for poor and /or marginalised persons has 
been revealed by many court cases. In The Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, 
Eastern Cape Provincial Government v Ngxuza, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that:  
 
“the law is a scarce resource in South Africa. This case shows that justice is even harder to come by. It 
(this case) concerns the way in which the poorest of the poor are to be permitted to access both (the 
law and justice).”1410  
 
In utilising the constitutional right to bring a class action,
1411
 the court in was able to secure 
access to court for a category of particularly vulnerable and desperate persons (social 
assistance (disability grant) beneficiaries whose grants had been unlawfully terminated) to 
enforce their right of access to social security. In this instance the court remarked that: 
  
“[T]he situation seemed pattern-made for class proceedings. The class the applicants present is drawn 
from the very poorest within our society – those in need of statutory social assistance. They also have 
the least chance of vindicating their rights through the legal process. Their individual claims are small: 
the value of the social assistance they receive – a few hundred rands every month – would secure them 
hardly a single hour’s consultation at current rates with most urban lawyers. They are scattered 
throughout the Eastern Cape Province, many of them in small towns and remote rural areas. What they 
have in common is that they are victims of official excess, bureaucratic misdirection and unlawful 
administrative methods. 
 
                                                 
1408
 See Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa Transforming 
the Present- Protecting the Future (Draft Consolidated Report) March 2002, 124. 
1409
 Cele v the South African Social Security Agency and 22 related cases (2009 (5) SA 105 (D) para 2. 
1410
 The Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government v Ngxuza 2001 4 
SA 1184 (SCA) para 1. 
1411
 See section 38 of the Constitution. 
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It is the needs of such persons, who are most lacking in protective and assertive armour, that the 
Constitutional Court has repeatedly emphasised must animate our understanding of the Constitution’s 
provisions. And it is against the background of their constitutional entitlements that we must interpret 
the class action provision in the Bill of Rights. 
 
The circumstances of this particular case – unlawful conduct by a party against a disparate body of 
claimants lacking access to individualised legal services, with small claims unsuitable for if not 
incapable of enforcement in isolation – should have led to the conclusion, in short order, that the 
applicants’ assertion of authority to institute class action proceedings was unassailable.”1412 
 
9.2 Scope of jurisdiction and powers of the High Court 
 
The High Court has a wide scope of jurisdiction as it hears and determines appeals from local 
courts within its jurisdiction. It also reviews proceedings of all local courts in its area of 
jurisdiction. A High Court has jurisdiction over all persons and in relation to all matters 
arising within its area of jurisdiction. It also has jurisdiction over all other matters entrusted to 
it according to law.
1413
 The High Court also has jurisdiction over a person who resides 
outside the court’s area of jurisdiction if the person is joined to a proceeding in the court or 
becomes a party to the proceedings in terms of a third party notice.
1414
  
 
The High Court decides on all constitutional matters (except matters that only the 
Constitutional Court can decide or matters assigned to a court of similar status (such as the 
Labour Court)).
1415
 The High Court also decides on any other matter not assigned to another 
court by an Act of Parliament.
1416
  
 
When the High Court decides a constitutional matter, it can declare that a law or conduct that 
is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency; and can make 
any order that is just and equitable, including an order limiting the retrospective effect of the 
declaration of invalidity, and an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period 
and on any conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect.
1417
 The High 
                                                 
1412
 The Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government v Ngxuza paras 11-
16. 
1413
 Section 19(1)(a) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. 
1414
 Section 19(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. 
1415
 Section 169(a) of Constitution. 
1416
 Section 169(b) of Constitution. 
1417
 Section 172 of the Constitution. 
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Court can provide any relief that is appropriate and can make any order that is just and 
equitable.
1418
 
 
The powers of the High Court to deal with social security matters are unsatisfactory, as it 
mostly has (judicial) review powers with limited appeal powers. In judicial review 
proceedings, a court cannot enquire into the merits of the decision. In addition, it can only set 
aside the decision and refer it back to the decision-maker. This means the original decision-
maker can make the original decision if it complies with all the legal requirements. In 
addition, the Court would more readily defer to the decision of an administrative authority or 
appeal body if the subject matter is very technical or of a kind in which the court has no 
expertise.
1419
 This may not be adequate, as the Court may need to interfere more in the affairs 
of some of the social security dispute resolution institutions/forums, in view of their 
institutional status and expertise.  
 
What may be required is an appeal process where the court can enquire into the merits of the 
original decision and can substitute or amend the decision. It has been argued that: 
 
“A right of appeal is an invaluable safeguard. It provides an aggrieved individual with the assurance 
that the decision will be reconsidered by a second decision-maker. The appellate body is able to 
exercise a calmer, more objective and reflective judgment. Detached from the ‘dust of the arena’, as it 
were, and the immediacy of the initial decision, the second decision-maker is in a better position to 
discern a faulty reasoning process and, in particular, to evaluate facts ... In the end the final decision 
will have been the subject of more careful scrutiny, prolonged debate and sober reflection.”1420 
 
9.3 Fairness of High Court adjudication procedures 
 
Adjudication is conducted in terms of litigation in public (open court) except if the court 
directs otherwise in special cases.
1421
 However, in a civil case the High Court can refer 
certain matters to a referee for investigation and can adopt the referee’s report and make an 
                                                 
1418
 Sections 38 and 172 of the Constitution. 
1419
 Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd [2003] 2 All SA 616 (SCA) 
para 33. In Pushmanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1998) 160 DLR (4th) 193 
(SCC) para 33, it was stated that a court would consider three issues in evaluating relative expertise of an 
administrative authority or appeal body: the court must characterise the expertise of the tribunal in question; it 
must consider its own expertise relative to that of the tribunal; and it must identify the nature of the specific 
issue before the administrative decision-maker relative to its expertise. 
1420
 Baxter L Administrative Law (Juta, 1984) 255. 
1421
 Section 16 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. 
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order in relation to the report when necessary or desirable.
1422
 Such a report is considered a 
finding of the court. In proceedings before the High Court, parties are represented by a legal 
practitioner as everyone has a common law right to be represented by a legal practitioner in 
cases before a court of law.
1423
 
 
The use of litigation as the dispute resolution procedure of the High Court causes many 
problems for parties to social security disputes. Some of these problems include undue delays 
in the finalisation of cases and a purely technical and legalistic basis of dealing with cases, 
with little regard to broader fairness considerations.
1424
 This has an impact on the rights of 
social security applicants and beneficiaries as some have to wait for years while disputes 
regarding benefits are resolved.  
 
There is no possibility of the High Court reconsidering an original decision. In addition, no 
timeframes are prescribed for the finalisation of disputes by the High Court. When a 
judgment is handed, the sheriff of the High Court or his or her deputy executes all sentences, 
decrees, judgments, writs, summonses, rules, orders, warrants, commands and processes of 
the court.
1425
     
 
9.4 Independence and impartiality of the High Court 
 
The independence and impartiality of the High Court is guaranteed by the Constitution.
1426
 
This is promoted through the conditions for appoint, discipline and termination and the 
organisation arrangements of the Court.  
 
The President of the Republic appoints judges of the High Court on the advice of the Judicial 
Services Commission.
1427
 A Judge of the High Court is paid an annual salary at a rate 
determined by the President by proclamation in the Government Gazette (on the 
                                                 
1422
 Section 19(2) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. 
1423
 See MEC: Department of Finance, Economic Affairs & Tourism, Northern Province v Mahumani (2004) 25 
ILJ 2311 (SCA). 
1424
 See Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa Transforming 
the Present- Protecting the Future (Draft Consolidated Report) March 2002, 124. 
1425
 Section 36 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 
1426
 Section 165 states that the courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which 
they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice. No person or organ of state may interfere with 
the functioning of the courts. Organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist and protect the 
courts to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the courts.  
1427
 Section 174(6) of the Constitution. 
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recommendation of the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of Office 
Bearers).
1428
 The annual salary and allowance of a judge is paid out of the National Revenue 
Fund.
1429
 
 
A judge of the High Court is removed from office by the President if the Judicial Service 
Commission finds that the judge is incapable, is grossly incompetent or is guilty of gross 
misconduct; and the National Assembly calls for the judge to be removed, by a resolution 
adopted with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its members.
1430
  
 
The service of a judge employed in a permanent capacity is terminated when he or she attains 
the age of 70 years.  If a judge has been in active service for not less than 10 years, or if he or 
she has not been in service for 10 years, his or her service is terminated on the date 
immediately following the day on which he or she completes 10 years of service.
1431
 
 
The service of a judge employed in a permanent capacity who is 65 years of age or older and 
has performed active service for 15 years is discharged by the President if he or she informs 
the Minister in writing that he or she no longer wishes to perform the service of a judge. The 
service of a judge can also be terminated at any time on his or her request and with the 
approval of the President if there is any reason which the President deems sufficient.
1432
 A 
judge can also be terminated by the President at any if he or she is afflicted with a permanent 
infirmity of mind or body rendering him or her incapable of performing his or her official 
duties.
1433
  
 
Professional and judicial discipline of a judge is undertaken by the (Judicial Conduct 
Committee and Judicial Conduct Tribunal of the) Judicial Services Commission.
1434
 A judge 
or magistrate is also subject to the discipline of another judge of a higher court. A judge of a 
higher court supervises the manner in which a judge of a lower court discharges his or her 
functions.
1435
 
                                                 
1428
 Section 2(1) of Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act 47 of 2001 
1429
 Section 2(5) of Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act 47 of 2001. 
1430
 Section 177(1) and (2) of the Constitution. 
1431
 Section 3(2)(a) of the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act 47 of  2001. 
1432
 Section 3(2)(b) of the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act 47 of  2001. 
1433
 Section 3(2)(c) of the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act 47 of  2001. 
1434
 See Chapters 2 and 3 of the Judicial Service Commission Act 9 of 1994. 
1435
 See S and Others v van Rooyen & Others 2002 (5) SA 246 (CC); 2002 (8) BCLR 810 (CC) para 24. 
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The funding;
1436
 human resource and administrative support;
1437
 managerial framework;
1438
 
governance, oversight and supervision;
1439
 and accounting and reporting
1440
 arrangements for 
the High Court also facilitate its independence and impartiality. 
 
10. CONCLUSIONS  
 
There are various gaps and challenges in the current South African social security dispute 
resolution system. Some of these challenges relate to the uncoordinated and fragmented 
nature of the system; inaccessibility of some social security institutions; inappropriateness of 
some current appeal institutions; the lack of a systematic approach in establishing appeal 
institutions; the limited scope of jurisdiction and powers of adjudication institutions; 
inconsistencies in review and/or appeal provisions in various laws; the unavailability of 
alternative dispute resolution procedures; and the absence of institutional independence of 
adjudication institutions or forums.  
 
10.1 Fragmentation of South African social security dispute resolution  
 
It is clear that the South African social security dispute resolution system is fragmented and 
uncoordinated. There is a wide array of laws providing for dispute resolution institutions or 
forums and procedures. Appeal mechanisms are also fragmented across the social security 
                                                 
1436
 Funding of the High Court (together with all other courts) is provided by the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development in terms of the Department’s national budget. The Department is responsible for the 
administration of Courts - see Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Annual Report 2009/2010.  
However, the Office of the Chief Justice has been established (through a Proclamation by the President in terms 
of the Public Service Act of 1994) in anticipation of the enactment of the Superior Courts Act. The Superior 
Courts Bill proposes the creation of this Office, comprising an Executive Director appointed by the Minister 
with the concurrence of the Chief Justice. This is a transition to the establishment of a separate court 
administration for the judiciary as a separate branch of government. The court administration will be responsible 
for the administration of all courts - section 12 of the Superior Courts Bill of 2010. In addition, the budget of the 
courts will be determined by the Chief Justice in consultation with the heads of courts. The Minister is entrusted 
with the responsibility of processing the budget requests through the normal budgetary channels and processes 
prescribed by the PFMA. The Director-General is charged with the responsibility of accounting for the budget 
of the courts - Section 15 of the Superior Courts Bill. 
1437
 A division of the High Court consists of a Judge President, a Deputy Judge President, Judges, the registrar(s) 
and officers of the Court - section 3 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. 
1438
 A division of the High Court is managed by Judge President, and a Deputy Judge President or Deputy Judge 
Presidents - section 3 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959.  
1439
 Governance, oversight and supervision of the Court is undertaken by the Judicial Services Commission 
established in terms of s 178 of the Constitution. 
1440
 Financial (and other) administration of the High Court and all other courts is undertaken by the Department 
of Justice and Constitutional Development. As a result, financial accountability for PFMA purposes is done by 
the Director-General of Justice and Constitutional Development as the accounting officer - see Department of 
Justice and Constitutional Development Annual Report 2009/2010. Reporting of the Court is to the Judicial 
Services Commission established in terms of s 178 of the Constitution. 
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system, at times involving specially constituted appeal bodies (such as the HPCSA) and at 
times the High Court.  
 
10.2 Inaccessibility of some social security institutions 
 
The accessibility of the various adjudication institutions/ forums is not always appropriately 
ensured. While some forums are geographically spread across the Republic, others are 
centrally located (the Certification Committee and the Medical Reviewing Authority in terms 
of the ODMWA (together with the Medical Bureau for Occupational Diseases (MBOD) are 
located in Johannesburg, while the National Appeals Committee of the UIF Board is located 
in Pretoria). Legislation also empowers some of the adjudications forums to be convened at 
any determined place. 
 
The accessibility of the various adjudication forums is also facilitated through multiple 
application lodgement options (by hand, telefax or registered mail) and reasonable 
timeframes (mostly 90 days after (notification of) the decision and 180 days in the case of 
COIDA). The relevant documentation for the lodging of applications and consideration of 
disputes are in English (e.g. the ODMWA’s “Objection Against a Decision Form” W.G. 29 
and the RAF Objection Form) and the hearings (where applicable) are also conducted in 
English. However, interpreters are provided where necessary. In addition, the Road Accident 
provides for the travel and accommodation needs of persons required to attend a hearing. The 
parties to a dispute are also notified of the dispute resolution outcome. 
 
However, the speedy resolution of disputes is not guaranteed, as timeframes for finalisation 
have not been stated in many statutes.
1441
 In addition no power is granted to the adjudication 
forums to reconsider their original decision (except as provided in terms of COIDA that a 
Presiding Officer may correct the error or defect). Furthermore, avenues for alternative 
(speedier, more flexible) dispute resolution are not available for most disputes (only in terms 
of COIDA are the parties to a hearing required to hold a pre-hearing conference). 
 
The adjudication forums adopt a variety of dispute resolution procedures. Where necessary, 
some of the adjudication forums can convene a hearing, in which case personal attendance of 
                                                 
1441
 It is only the Independent Tribunal for Social Assistance Appeals is required to finalise an appeal within 90 
days from the date on which the appeal was received. 
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the parties and other interested persons is possible. However, some forums resolve disputes 
only by means of documentary evidence.
1442
  
 
External dispute resolution avenues are only through litigation in the High Court (at times the 
Labour Court.
1443
 Due to its inherent review powers, all the decisions of public social security 
institutions are reviewable (on the basis of judicial review) by the High Court (except where 
expressly provided otherwise). Specific issues to be dealt with by High Court on the basis of 
appeal are also outlined in some laws.
1444
 In addition, some laws provide for the resolution of 
disputes by the High Court in the first instance. For example, the Road Accident Fund Act 
requires a person with a claim against the fund to bring a claim in any High Court within 
whose area of jurisdiction the occurrence which caused the injury or death took place. It is 
doubtful whether the High Court is the appropriate venue for the resolution of such disputes 
due to its inaccessibility.  
 
10.3 Inappropriateness of some current appeal institutions 
  
Some social security statutes provide for reviews by and appeals to the ordinary courts 
(especially the High Court). However, the ordinary courts are not always the appropriate 
forums to deal with social security appeals. The powers of these courts to deal with the 
matters are unsatisfactory; as the courts mostly have review powers with little appeal powers. 
They are also apparently not specialised enough to deal effectively with social security 
matters. Appeals to such courts may also pose difficulties for aggrieved persons, due to inter 
alia limited access to the courts especially for indigent persons (also due to costs in the 
absence of legal aid); undue delays that characterise court proceedings; the technical and 
legalistic basis with which cases are dealt (with little regard to broader fairness 
considerations). This leads to the contention that: 
 
                                                 
1442
 See for example the review of a Certification Committee disease certification decision by the Medical 
Reviewing Authority for Occupational Diseases in terms of ODMWA; the consideration of the decision of the 
Regional Appeals Committees by the National Appeals Committee of the UIF Board; the consideration of the 
(reconsidered) decisions of the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) by the Independent Tribunal for 
Social Assistance Appeals; and the resolution of appeals by the Road Accident Fund Appeals Tribunal. 
1443
 Such as in section 66 of the UIA which provides for objections to compliance orders to be referred to the 
Labour Court; and for a compliance order to be referred to the Labour Court to be made an order of the Court) 
1444
 In terms of section 92 of COIDA, the Compensation Commissioner can also state a case on a question of 
law to the High Court; ODMWA also the empowers the Compensation Commissioner for Occupational 
Diseases (CCOD) to also state a case on question of law to the High Court on appeal. 
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“the current South African social security system has a large backlog in terms of the pool of 
beneficiaries. Yet, the adjudication system is not sufficiently specialised and localised, from the 
perspective of access to the system. Instead, the beneficiaries cannot financially afford the system of 
legal representation in the normal court context. Those who could afford to pay the costs still face a 
punitive snail paced legal bureaucratic process. Tedious as it is, the system leaves out the bulk of 
marginalised social security beneficiaries when they lodge a complaint”.1445 
 
10.4 Lack of a systematic approach in establishing appeal institutions 
 
There is also a lack of a systematic approach to the regulation of appeals in the South African 
social security system. While some laws specifically provide for the establishment and 
functioning of appeal institutions and mechanisms; other laws leave such issues to the 
discretion of the relevant Minister.
1446
 It is inappropriate to establish an appeal tribunal purely 
on the basis of Ministerial or Registrar direction/regulation, also due to the gravity and 
importance of the issues at stake, such as the establishment of the institution; the appointment 
of its members; its main objective(s); its jurisdiction, functions and powers; procedures for 
the disposal of complaints; giving parties an opportunity to comment and to be represented; 
time limits; record-keeping; making a determination and enforceability of determinations; 
review possibility; accountability; remuneration; and limitation on liability etc.
1447
 
 
10.5 Limited scope of jurisdiction and powers of adjudication institutions 
 
The scope of jurisdiction and powers of the social security adjudication institutions/forums is 
limited. They can only exercise the powers and functions as circumscribed in legislation. The 
scope of jurisdiction and powers of the High Court as the appeal institution is also sometimes 
limited, particularly in relation to the types of cases or issues that it can decide. The High 
Court is mostly empowered to review decisions taken by the institutions concerned. 
 
                                                 
1445
 Kanyane H “Exploring and developing a culture of good governance” in Olivier MP and Kuhnle S (eds) 
Norms and Institutional Design: Social Security in Norway and South Africa (2008) 104. 
1446
 An example of such a situation is the Social Assistance Act which empowers the Minister (of Social 
Development) to either consider an appeal against a decision of the South African Social Security Agency 
him/herself; or appoint an independent tribunal to consider such an appeal. Where a tribunal is so appointed, all 
appeals against decisions of the Agency must from then on be considered by that tribunal. In addition, in the 
case of the Road Accident Fund, upon receipt of the notification from a party to the dispute or 60 days after 
receiving submissions, medical reports and opinions relevant to the dispute period, the Registrar will refer the 
dispute for consideration by an Appeal Tribunal paid for by the Road Accident Fund - Regulation 3(8)(a) of the 
RAF Act Regulations.  
1447
 See Olivier M, Fourie E & Nyenti MAT “Commentary on the regulations to the Social Assistance Act, Act 
13 of 2004 (A Report to the Department of Social Development)” October 2005, 6. 
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The possible remedies that can be provided by the social security institutions are also limited 
due to the circumscription of such remedies in the various statutes. This emanates from the 
circumscribed powers afforded to the social security institutions.  
 
Some of the social security statutes stipulate that the decisions of the adjudication forums are 
binding on the administrative institutions; and the Compensation Court is considered to have 
the status of a magistrate court (with its decisions enforced as such). However, most of the 
adjudication forums are not afforded the power and mechanisms to enforce their rulings. 
 
In addition, effectiveness of some of the institutions is restricted due to the provision of 
multiple dispute resolution avenues in some statutes. An example is in the Pension Funds Act 
where a party could lodge a complaint within the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator in a civil 
court (High Court). This is problematic as it encourages “forum shopping”1448 and 
undermines the objective of the establishment of the Office of the Adjudicator – to dispose of 
complaints in a procedurally fair, economical and expeditious manner. 
 
10.6 Inconsistencies in review and/or appeal provisions in various laws 
 
Most social security statutes fail to make an appropriate distinction between (internal) 
reviews and (external) appeal procedures. Social security adjudication standards require that 
the administrative organs/institutions that undertake the determination of applicants’ rights to 
social security benefits should also undertake internal review procedures (first level 
adjudication procedures). This implies that where an applicant for social security benefits is 
aggrieved by a decision of the administering institution, he/she should be able to request a 
revision of the initial decision. After the exhaustion of the internal review (first level) 
processes, applicants should have access to an external appeal mechanism or institution 
(second level procedures). 
 
There is a lack of consistency in the provisions relating to reviews and appeals in the various 
laws. Some laws make provision for appeals to appeal bodies established in terms of the 
relevant laws (see for example the case of the UIA and ODMWA), while other laws provide 
                                                 
1448
 Forum shopping refers to the practice where a party selects a dispute resolution avenue with the best 
possible prospects. 
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for appeals to other adjudication bodies such as the Health Professions Council of South 
Africa and the High Court.   
 
10.7 Unavailability of alternative dispute resolution procedures 
 
Social security disputes are resolved mainly by resort to litigation (adversarial adjudication). 
Few social security statutes provide for other external dispute resolution avenues other than 
litigation in the normal court system.
1449
 The absence of alternative dispute resolution 
avenues in South African social security statutes implies that persons not satisfied with the 
internal adjudication processes can only have their right of access to social security enforced 
by means of (adversarial) litigation in the ordinary courts of law. However, the various 
problems plaguing the current court structure indicate that the courts are not the most 
appropriate forum for the resolution of social security disputes. Litigation therefore has an 
adverse impact on the right to social security of beneficiaries/applicants, as it restricts access 
to adjudication. Therefore, alternative mechanisms for the resolution of disputes should be 
considered in the South African social security system. This is to ensure proper redress for 
social security litigants and promote their right of access to social security. 
 
10.8 Lack of institutional independence of adjudication institutions/forums 
 
The review of the current South African social security dispute resolution institutions/forums 
revealed that most of the adjudication forums or institutions can effectively be regarded as 
internal organs of the social security institutions and therefore not independent of these 
institutions (the only exceptions are the Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator and (in 
some respects) the CMS (Appeal Board). In the first place, the Ministers or Directors-General 
of the relevant Departments in charge of the relevant social security institution are in most 
instances responsible for the appointment of members of the adjudication forums (the only 
exception is the Road Accident Fund Appeal Tribunal which is established by the Registrar 
of the HPCSA.
1450
 The relevant Ministers or Directors-General also determine the length and 
                                                 
1449
 The only exception can be found in COIDA (which provides for the organisation of pre-trial conferences); 
the Pension Funds Act (which provides for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, including conciliation 
and/or arbitration) and the LRA (which can stay proceedings and refer a dispute to arbitration; or with the 
consent of the parties and if it is expedient to do so, continue with the proceedings with the Court sitting as an 
arbitrator). 
1450
 See for example section 2(1)(b) read with the definition of presiding officer in section 1 in COIDA; section 
40(2)(b) of ODMWA; section 47 of the UIA and Regulation  4 of the Regulations relating to the Lodging and 
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(other) conditions of employment of members, including remuneration. Ministers or 
Directors-General can further discipline the members and terminate their appointment.  
 
In addition, most of the social security adjudications institutions/forums also do not have 
independent funding through direct appropriations from parliament (the Office of the Pension 
Funds Adjudicator and the CMS being the exception). They are mostly funded by the 
relevant Departments as part of the Departments’ annual budget allocations.1451 The financial 
dependence of the adjudication forums is also indicated by the fact that they are not 
independent accountable institutions in terms of the Public Finance management Act 
(PFMA). Management governance, oversight and supervision are also undertaken by the 
Departmental or institutional heads; and the adjudication forums are also required to report to 
Departmental or institutional heads (in the case of the Road Accident Fund Appeal Tribunal, 
to the Registrar of the HPCSA). Human resource and administrative support is provided 
either by the social security administration institutions or (in the case of the Road Accident 
Fund Appeal Tribunal, the HPCSA).    
 
10.9 Appropriate framework 
 
The gaps and challenges in the current social security dispute resolution system indicate that 
it is unable to realise the right of access to justice and related rights of users of the system. 
There is thus a need for the establishment of an appropriate framework. The establishment of 
such a framework is further motivated by the gravity and importance of the issues at stake. 
 
This calls for the introduction of special and earmarked adjudication institutions and 
procedures, in order to deal effectively with social security disputes. As noted by the 
Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security in South Africa: 
 
“One of the guiding principles in devising an appropriate social security adjudication system is the 
need to ensure that an institutional separation exists between administrative accountability, review and 
revision, and a wholly independent, substantive system of adjudication. The Committee recommends 
that a uniform adjudication system be established to deal conclusively with all social security claims. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Consideration of Applications for Reconsideration of Social Assistance Application by the Agency and Social 
Assistance Appeals by the Independent Tribunal (GN R746 published in GG 34618 of 19 September 2011). 
1451
 See Regulation 6 of the Regulations to COIDA of 2008; (section 41(1) of ODMWA; section 51 of the UIA; 
and Regulation 3(8)(a) of the Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act of 2008. 
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It should, in the first instance, involve an independent internal review or appeal institution. It should, 
in the second place, involve a court (which could be a specialised court) which has the power to 
finally adjudicate all social security matters, and that this court has the power to determine cases on 
the basis of law and fairness. The jurisdiction of this court should cover all social security claims, 
whether under the new UIA, the RAFA, the COIDA and all the other benefits (including the Social 
Assistance Act) emanating from the social security system (including claims falling under the 
jurisdiction of the Pension Funds Adjudicator).”
1452
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1452
 Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security in South Africa: Transforming the 
Present – Protecting the Future (Draft Consolidated Report)(March 2002) 124. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE SOCIAL SECURITY DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The five chapters immediately preceding this chapter have laid down norms, principles and 
standards on the development of a social security dispute resolution system that guarantees 
the right (of access) to justice (and other relevant rights). They are drawn from the 
Constitution
1453
 and international standards;
1454
 and from the implementation of these (or lack 
thereof) in comparative South African dispute resolution systems;
1455
 social security dispute 
resolution systems in comparative international jurisdictions
1456
 and in the current South 
African social security dispute resolution systems.
1457
 These norms, principles and standards 
provide benchmarks and guidelines on the development of an effective and efficient social 
security dispute resolution system in South Africa. 
 
This chapter distils the applicable legal principles, norms and standards pertaining to the 
social security adjudicative and institutional frameworks that should inform and guide the 
development of an effective and efficient social security dispute resolution system in South 
Africa. On the basis of these legal principles, norms and standards, the chapter then proposes 
the most appropriate adjudicative (and institutional) framework for effective and efficient 
social security provisioning, taking into account their applicability in the South African 
context. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1453
 See Chapter Two (constitutional perspectives on developing an effective social security adjudication 
framework). 
1454
 See Chapter Three (social security adjudication standards in international and regional instruments). 
1455
 Chapter Four (dispute resolution systems in key comparative South African (non-social security) 
jurisdictions). 
1456
 Chapter Five (social security dispute resolution systems in comparative international jurisdictions). 
1457
 Chapter Six (current South African social security dispute resolution system). 
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2. PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS INFORMING THE REFORM OF THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL SECURITY ADJUDICATION FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 An integrated approach to realisation of rights  
 
The dispute resolution system established to give effect to the rights of access to justice and 
to social security for social security claimants must have regard to the values that underpin 
the Constitution.
1458
 The promotion of equality requires that not only should all persons have 
access to the dispute resolution mechanisms necessary to protect their rights and interests (i.e. 
sameness of treatment irrespective of circumstance (formal equality)), but also that positive 
measures should be adopted to create the conditions for full and equal participation 
(substantive equality).
1459
 Such measures to empower (potential) users of the system include 
measures aimed at breaking down barriers that may prevent the poor and indigent from 
accessing the social security dispute resolution system. Therefore, in establishing a system, 
the social and economic context of (potential) users should be taken into consideration. 
1460
 
 
The framework must also have regard to other rights that have a bearing on these rights 
(including but not limited to the rights to human dignity, just administrative action and to the 
enforcement of rights) as all of these rights are interrelated, interdependent and mutually 
supporting.
1461
 It must also be informed by constitutional principles on courts and 
administration of justice and basic values and principles governing public administration. 
 
2.2 Creation of a new uniform dispute resolution system  
 
The current South African social security dispute resolution framework is fragmented, with a 
wide array of laws providing for dispute resolution institutions or forums and procedures.
1462
 
As a result, it was recommended by the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System 
                                                 
1458
 The Constitution states that some of South Africa’s foundational values are human dignity, the achievement 
of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms (section 1(a) of the Constitution). See generally 
Chapter Two para 2.2 (the impact of the values underpinning the Constitution). 
1459
 See the discussion on (formal and substantive) equality in Chapter Two para 2.2.1. 
1460
 See Chapter 2 para 3.3.1 (the nature and scope of the right to bring a dispute to court (access to justice)). 
1461
 See for example Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others (2000) 11 
BCLR 1169 (CC) para 24. 
1462
 See Chapter Six para 10.1 (fragmentation of South African social security dispute resolution). 
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of Social Security in South Africa that a uniform adjudication system be established to deal 
conclusively with all social security claims.
1463
 
 
2.3 Establishment of sequential and complementary (internal) reviews and (external) 
appeals procedures  
 
International standards require that social security disputes must be settled in two stages: a 
first complaint phase, generally before the higher level administrative body within the social 
security institutions, and a second stage of appeal against the decision of the administrative 
body, generally before an administrative, judicial, labour or social security court or tribunal. 
This requirement, advanced by South African legislation
1464
 and various international law 
instruments,
1465
 has been implemented in comparative South African jurisdictions,
1466
 
comparative international social security systems
1467
 and some of the current South African 
social security dispute resolution frameworks.
1468
 
 
                                                 
1463
 See Chapter Six para 11 (recommendation: the need to establish an appropriate resolution framework). 
1464
 In terms of section 7(2) of PAJA, a court is prohibited from reviewing an administrative action unless any 
internal remedy provided in any other law has first been exhausted. Therefore, where a social security statute 
provides for a right to apply for reconsideration, or review to be lodged with the social security institution or an 
appeal to an appeal body in terms of the statute, section 7(2) requires that the reconsideration, review or appeal 
must first be undertaken before an application for review to a court is made. However, in exceptional 
circumstances and on application of the affected person, a court may exempt the need to exhaust internal 
remedies if it is in the interests of justice (see Chapter Two para 5.2 on the impact of PAJA on social security 
dispute resolution). 
1465
 E.g. the ILO’s Employment Promotion and Protection against Unemployment Convention 168 of 1988 
(Article 27(1)) and Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention 102 of 1952 (Article 70). See Chapter 
Three para 4.1 (sequential and complementary reviews and appeals procedures). 
1466
 See for example the resolution of disputes in the labour relations jurisdiction by the CCMA and then the 
Labour and Labour Appeals Courts (Chapter Four para 2); and the resolution of disputes in the competition 
regulation jurisdiction first by the Competition Tribunal and thereafter by the Competition Appeal Court (see 
Chapter Four para 3). 
1467
 See for example the resolution of disputes in the Australian social security dispute resolution system (multi-
level system of sequential and complementary internal review, by the ministry or agency responsible for the 
administration of social security and external review of decisions by the SSAT, the AAT, the Federal Court, the 
High Court, the Court of Appeals and finally the Supreme Court (see Chapter Five para 3)); in the United 
Kingdom (internal review of decisions by the government departments or institution that administer social 
security before a hearing by the First-tier Tribunal and onwards to the Upper Tribunal (see Chapter Five para 
4)); in Germany (application by a person who is unhappy with a social security decision for reconsideration or 
review by the relevant authority or institution, before proceeding to the Social Courts, the Higher Social Courts 
and the Federal Social Court (see Chapter Five para 6).  
1468
 In terms of the Pension Funds Act, a complainant lodges an application with the Office of the Pension Funds 
Adjudicator after an application to the relevant pension fund for reconsideration of the fund’s decision (see 
Chapter Six para 7); and the Medical Schemes Act foresees the resolution of disputes by the Registrar of and 
CMS before adjudication by an Appeal Board of the CMS (see Chapter Six para 8).  
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2.4 Guarantee of institutional separation of administrative accountability, review and 
revision  
 
The requirement to establish sequential and complementary (internal) reviews and (external) 
appeals procedures calls for an institutional separation between administrative accountability, 
review and revision (internal review institution) on the one hand; and a wholly-independent, 
substantive system of appeals (external appeal institutions) on the other. This ensures the 
independence of the appeal institution from the administration that reviewed the initial 
complaint, which is a necessary aspect of the concept of appeal.
1469
 The institutional 
separation of internal review and external appeal institutions, which is already applied in 
comparative South African jurisdictions,
1470
 comparative international social security 
systems
1471
 and in some of the current South African social security dispute resolution 
frameworks
1472
 was highlighted by the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive system of 
Social Security for South Africa.
1473
 
 
2.5 Establishment of a court (of general or specialist jurisdiction) or a specialist tribunal 
 
The Constitution and international law do not specify the type of institution that should 
decide (social security) disputes. The right of access to justice in section 34 of the 
Constitution provides for the resolution of a dispute by a court or (where appropriate) another 
                                                 
1469
 See the provisions of the ILO Employment Promotion and Protection against Unemployment Convention 
168 of 1988 (Article 27(1)) and Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention 102 of 1952 (Article 70) and 
remarks by the ILO in this regard in Chapter Three para 4.1 (ILO Social security and the rule of law (General 
Survey concerning social security instruments in light of the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair 
Globalization) (Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(articles 19, 22 and 35 of the Constitution) Report III (Part 1B)) International Labour Conference, 100th 
Session, 2011 (2011) para 434). 
1470
 See for example the institutional separation between employees, employers and trade unions/employers 
organisations and the CCMA; and between the CCMA and the Labour and Labour Appeals Courts (Chapter 
Four para 2); and the institutional separation between the Competition Tribunal and the Competition Appeal 
Court (see Chapter Four para 3)). 
1471
 See for example the institutional separation between social security administration agencies in Australia 
(Centrelink, Child Support Agency,  Family Assistance Office etc) and the SSAT, the AAT, the Federal Court, 
the High Court, the Court of Appeals and finally the Supreme Court (see Chapter Five para 3); the institutional 
separation between social security administration agencies in the United Kingdom (such as Department of Work 
and Pensions (DWP)) and the First-tier and Upper Tribunals (see Chapter Five para 4); The same is true for 
Germany (see Chapter Five  para 6) and New Zealand (see Chapter Five para 5).  
1472
 The Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator is separate and independent of the pension funds whose 
decisions is hears on appeal (see Chapter Six para 7); while the Registrar of the CMS and the CMS and the 
Appeal Board of the CMS are separate and independent of the medical schemes whose decisions they hear on 
appeal (see Chapter Six para 8).  
1473
 See Chapter Six para 11 (recommendations: the need to establish an appropriate dispute resolution 
framework). 
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tribunal or forum. This gives the State the latitude to decide on the most appropriate 
institution to give effect to the right of access to justice. Social security disputes can be 
resolved by a court (of general or specialist jurisdiction) or a specialist tribunal. The choice of 
institution will be made taking into account the category of persons and particular classes of 
disputes.
1474
  
 
The freedom to establish either a court or a tribunal to resolve social security disputes is also 
afforded to state parties of international instruments, such as the ILO Social Security 
(Minimum Standards) Convention 102 of 1952. 
 
2.6 Guarantee of independence and impartiality of dispute resolution institution  
 
Dispute resolution institutions that are effective in providing access to justice must be 
independent and impartial (free from improper internal and external influence). This is 
required by the Constitution and legislation
1475
 and in international instruments.
1476
 The 
independence and impartiality of social security dispute resolution institutions (that have 
been established in comparative South African jurisdictions, in international comparative 
systems and some of the institutions in the current South African social security dispute 
resolution frameworks) is fostered through security of tenure for the court tribunal or forum 
                                                 
1474
 See the discussion in Chapter Two para 3.3.2 (the establishment of a court or another independent and 
impartial tribunal or forum).  
1475
 The right of access to justice in section 34 requires disputes to be resolved by independent and impartial 
courts, tribunals or forums. In addition, the right to procedurally fair administrative action in terms of section 
33(3) of the Constitution requires that an aggrieved applicant or beneficiary who applies for reconsideration, 
review, or appeals a negative decision must be heard by an unbiased decision maker before a decision is taken 
(See the discussions on the establishment of a court or another independent and impartial tribunal or forum in 
Chapter Two para 3.3.2 and on the right to procedurally fair administrative action in Chapter Two paras 5.3.3 
and 5.5). 
1476
 The European Convention on Human Rights are requires independent tribunals (independent of the parties 
and of the executive). Independence is ascertained through issues such as the manner of appointment of its 
members, their terms of office, the existence of guarantees against outside pressures and the question whether 
there is the appearance of independence (See selected adjudication standards emanating from international 
instruments in Chapter Three para 4). 
The independence and impartiality of adjudication institutions in civil matters is also one of the requirements for 
a fair hearing in legal proceedings laid down by the African Commission on Human & Peoples’ Rights in terms 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. It requires Judges or members of judicial bodies to have 
security of tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office. The tenure, adequate 
remuneration, pension, housing, transport, conditions of physical and social security, age of retirement, 
disciplinary and recourse mechanisms and other conditions of service of judicial officers shall be prescribed and 
guaranteed by law. An adjudication institution is also expected to be impartial, with its decision based only on 
objective evidence, arguments and facts presented before it (see Chapter Three para 4.2 for more on the 
guidelines on the requirements for a fair hearing in all legal proceedings laid down by the African Commission 
on Human & Peoples’ Rights,). 
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officials (in terms of appointment modalities,
1477
 conditions of service and discipline and 
termination);
1478
 a basic degree of financial independence for the court, tribunal or forum 
(funding arrangements);
1479
 and control over administrative decisions affecting institution’s 
judicial functions (human resource and administrative support,
1480
 managerial 
                                                 
1477
 Diverse modalities have been utilised for the appointment of adjudicators in comparative South Africa (non-
social security) jurisdictions in order to ensure the independence of the various institutions. In many cases, the 
adjudicators of the institutions are appointed by the President of the Republic (for example in the case of the 
Competition Tribunal and National Consumer Tribunal), or by an independent tripartite Governing Body (for 
example in the case of the CCMA). Only in a few instances are appointments determined by a line Minister (see 
Chapter Four).  
In comparative international jurisdictions, the independence of social security dispute resolution institutions is 
reflected in the appointment of adjudicators by the national executive heads of the respective countries, on the 
recommendation of the relevant Ministers (e.g. the Queen of England appoints the Senior President of Tribunals 
(head of the Tribunals who manages the First-tier and Upper Tribunals); while the Governor-Generals of 
Australia and New Zealand (representatives of the Queen of England in Australia and New Zealand and Heads 
of State of these countries) appoint members of the SSAT and SSAA respectively (see generally Chapter five). 
However, in the current South African social security dispute resolution systems, independence and impartiality 
is not fostered as the Ministers or Directors-General of the Departments that are in charge of the social security 
institutions are mostly responsible for the appointment of members of the adjudication institutions. The only 
exception is the Road Accident Fund Appeal Tribunal which is established by the Registrar of the Health 
Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) (see Chapter Six). 
1478
 Adjudicators in comparative South Africa (non-social security) jurisdictions, the President of the Republic 
(for the Competition Tribunal and National Consumer Tribunal) or an independent tripartite Governing Body 
(for the CCMA) may be responsible for determining the remuneration and conditions of service of adjudicators. 
In some cases, remuneration and conditions of appointment are determined by a line Minister. In addition, only 
the appointing authorities are empowered to discipline the adjudicators and to terminate their services (i.e. only 
the President can discipline adjudicators that he appointed and have their services terminated (see Chapter 
Four). 
In comparative international jurisdictions, the conditions of employment of the adjudicators of social security 
dispute resolution institutions are often prescribed by the statutes that establish them. In addition, adjudicators of 
these institutions can only be disciplined and their service terminated by the national executive heads of the 
respective countries when certain specified circumstances are present (see Chapter Five). 
In the current South African social security dispute resolution systems, the relevant Ministers or Directors-
General determine the period of appointment and (other) conditions of employment of members, including 
remuneration. Ministers or Directors-General can further discipline the members and terminate their 
appointment (see Chapter Six). 
1479
 The independence and autonomy of comparative South African adjudication institutions that are not courts 
is promoted through their source of funding and their financial accountability (funding for the CMS, the CCMA, 
the Competition Commission and Tribunal, and the National Consumer Tribunal comes from moneys 
appropriated by Parliament) (see Chapter Four). 
In New Zealand and the United Kingdom, the respective Departments of Justice provide funding. The AAT of 
Australia is funded through a variety of sources, including money appropriated by Parliament for the Tribunal 
and dispute application filing fees; whereas the SSAT is funded by the Department for Families, Housing, 
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA). In Germany, the Land minister of finance decides the 
budget of the courts) (see generally Chapter Five). 
However, most current social security adjudications forums do not have independent funding through direct 
appropriations from parliament (they are mostly funded by the relevant Departments as part of the Departments’ 
annual budget allocations) and are not independent accountable institutions in terms of the Public Finance 
Management Act (PFMA) 1 of 1999 (see Chapter Six). 
1480
 Dispute resolution institutions in comparative South African jurisdictions generally manage their human 
resource and administrative support by themselves, since they are empowered to independently appoint their 
own staff (see Chapter Four). 
The provision of human resource and administrative support to the adjudication institutions in international 
comparative social security dispute resolution systems varies (in Australia human resource and administrative 
support for the SSAT is provided FaHCSIA in terms of an administrative arrangement whereas Staff of the AAT 
is employed under the Public Service Act of 1999 to assist the Tribunal to carry out its functions; in New 
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framework);
1481
 through governance, supervision and oversight;
1482
 and accountability and 
reporting.
1483
  
 
2.7 Promotion of accessibility of social security dispute resolution institutions  
 
The social security dispute resolution system must be accessible to its (potential) users so as 
to guarantee its effectiveness. Users must be able to reach the institution easily to make an 
application and present a case. Accessibility means that everyone must be able to bring a 
dispute to the court or tribunal to seek redress. Accessibility is promoted through aspects such 
as the geographic or physical location of an institution;
1484
 hearing venues and modalities; 
1485
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Zealand by the Department of Justice; and in the UK by the Courts and Tribunals Service (an independent 
government agency) (see Chapter Five). 
Human resource and administrative support to most of the institutions in the current South African social 
security dispute resolution frameworks is provided by the social security administration institutions themselves. 
The only exceptions are Road Accident Fund Appeal Tribunal, the Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator and 
the Appeal Board of the CMS (see Chapter Six). 
1481
 Statutes establishing the comparative South African dispute resolution institutions specifically regulate the 
management of these institutions (e.g. the Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator is managed by the 
Adjudicator, while the CCMA is headed by a Director) (see Chapter Four). 
The same is true of dispute resolution institutions in international comparative jurisdictions, with statutes 
establishing the social security adjudication institutions regulating the management of these institutions by 
persons appointed for that purpose (see Chapter Five). 
Government departments are invariably responsible for the management of these Institutions (see Chapter Six).  
1482
 Governance, oversight and supervision of the comparative South African dispute resolution institutions vest 
mostly in Parliament (Compensation Tribunal and National Consumer Tribunal) or in a Board / Governing 
Body (CCMA). However, Ministers also undertake governance, oversight and supervision functions in the case 
of the Board of the CMS and the Appeal Board of the FSB (see Chapter Four). 
Governance, oversight and supervision arrangements for dispute resolution institutions international 
comparative jurisdictions are undertaken mostly by Parliament (New Zealand) or by an independent Board (UK) 
or council (for the AAT by the Administrative Review Council). However, FaHCSIA undertakes governance, 
oversight and supervision of the SSAT in Australia (see Chapter Five). 
In the case of current South African social security dispute resolution institutions, oversight and supervision are 
as a rule undertaken by the Departmental or institutional heads (see Chapter Six). 
1483
 Comparative South African dispute resolution institutions have autonomous financial accountability due to 
their listing as national public entities in Schedule 3A of the Public Finance Management Act (see Chapter 
Four). 
In international comparative jurisdictions, financial accountability and reporting is either the responsibility of 
either the line Ministry (in the case of the SSAT in Australia and the SSAA in New Zealand) or the Ministry of 
Justice (UK – which has designated the Tribunals Service Chief Executive as the Accounting Officer) or the 
Registrar of the Tribunal in the case of the AAT (see Chapter Five). 
Financial reporting for most South African social security dispute resolution institutions is done by the relevant 
departments, since the departments provide funding and administrative support; and the dispute resolution 
institutions are not independent accountable institutions in terms of the Public Finance Management Act 
(PFMA) 1 of 1999 (except in the cases of the Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator and the CMS that are 
listed as a public entities in Schedule 3A of the Public Finance Management Act) (see Chapter Six). 
1484
 Access to comparative adjudication institutions by complainants in South Africa has been facilitated in 
various ways. The CCMA, for example, has offices in all the provinces (with more than one office in some 
provinces). In some instances, proper geographical access to institutions is not always sufficiently ensured. As 
examples, some institutions such as the Pension Funds Adjudicator, the Competition Commission and Tribunal 
and the National Consumer Tribunal, only rely upon a single, centrally located presence for the fulfilment of 
their functions (see Chapter Four). 
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education of claimants on available avenues for redress;
1486
 the language(s) utilised during 
proceedings;
1487
 the friendliness of the prescribed documents and forms;
1488
 the diversity of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Some current social security dispute resolution institutions are located across country. However, other 
institutions are located in a single, central venue serving the whole country (such as the Office of the Pension 
Funds Adjudicator and the Medical Reviewing Authority (together with the Medical Bureau for Occupational 
Diseases (MBOD)) that are located in Johannesburg; and the National Appeals Committee of the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund is located in Pretoria (see Chapter Six paras 7.2.1, 4.2.1 and 5.2.1 respectively). 
Some institutions in comparative international jurisdictions also have a presence across the country. In 
Australia, the National Office of the SSAT is located in Melbourne; with regional SSAT offices in Sydney (for 
the Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales), Brisbane (for Queensland / Northern Territory), 
Adelaide (for South Australia / Tasmania), Melbourne (for Victoria) and Western Australia (Perth) (see Chapter 
Five para 3.2.1 (accessibility of the SSAT). 
1485
 Comparative South African dispute resolution institutions endeavour to facilitate access through hearing 
venues and modalities. As examples, although Labour Courts are currently situated in Cape Town, Durban, 
Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth, sessions of the Labour Court can be held in other locations if there are 
available judges (in which case the court sits as a circuit court) (see Chapter Four para 2.2.1 Accessibility of the 
Labour Court). In addition, the Competition Appeal Court convenes in different locations around the Republic 
(see Chapter Four para 3.2.1 (accessibility of the Competition Appeal Court). 
Some of the institutions in comparative international jurisdictions also facilitate access through hearing venues 
and modalities. For example, the UK’s First-tier Tribunal conducts hearings in 152 venues for hearings across 
England, Scotland and Wales (see Chapter Five para 4.2.1 (accessibility of the First-tier Tribunal). In addition, 
in Australia, hearings of the SSAT are generally conducted in its offices in Adelaide, Brisbane, Canberra, 
Hobart, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney. However, SSAT hearings are also conducted in other regional centres. In 
addition, the SSAT facilitates the participation of parties by arranging hearings through tele- or video-
conference for persons living in regional areas and those unable to attend the hearing at the SSAT premises (see 
Chapter Five para 3.2.1 (accessibility of the SSAT). 
Some current South African social security dispute resolution institutions also convene for a hearing at any 
determined place within the country (e.g. the Compensation Court (see Chapter Six para 3.2.1)). 
1486
 It has been held that the right of access to justice in terms of the Constitution includes the ability to achieve 
this, which implies (inter alia) that a prospective litigant must have knowledge of the applicable law; must be 
able to identify that she or he may be able to obtain a remedy from a court; and must have some knowledge 
about what to do in order to achieve access (see Chapter Two para 3.3.1 (the right to bring a dispute to court 
(access to justice))). The basic values and principles governing public administration (Chapter 10 of the 
Constitution) further enjoins the public administration to foster transparency by providing the public with 
timely, accessible and accurate information. There is thus an obligation to educate social security 
applicants/beneficiaries about their right of access to courts and to social security, especially due to the limited 
knowledge of the law and human rights of many South Africans. While some social security statutes recognise 
the need for education on rights (in terms of section 2(4) of the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004, the South 
African Social Security Agency (SASSA) must to publish and distribute to beneficiaries and potential 
beneficiaries, brochures in all official languages of the Republic setting out in understandable language the 
rights, duties, obligations, procedures and mechanisms of the Act, as well as contact details of the Agency or 
anyone acting on its behalf); this is not the case with social security adjudication institutions. It is also not the 
practice in comparative South African dispute resolution systems. However, some dispute resolution institutions 
in comparative international jurisdictions educate claimants on their rights and the adjudication system. In 
Australia, the SSAT assists parties to a hearing by providing information about the review process. It also seeks 
to improve access to justice through activities and meetings intended to raise awareness of the availability of this 
mechanism (see Chapter Five para 3.2.1 (accessibility of the SSAT)). The AAT also assists parties to participate 
as fully as possible in the review process by offering information on its role and procedures in multiple formats. 
It has published brochures for self-represented applicants to explain the Tribunal’s role, when it can assist and 
the stages in a review. The brochures are designed to be clear and easy to understand, and are available in a 
range of languages and in large print. The letter of acknowledgement of receipt of an application that is sent to 
an applicant also sets out basic information about the review process. The AAT’s Outreach Programme helps 
self-represented parties understand the Tribunal’s processes and gives them the opportunity to ask questions 
about practices and procedures. The DVD Getting decisions right (subtitled in English for people with a hearing 
impairment) is also available in Arabic, Greek, Italian, Mandarin, Serbian, Spanish, Turkish and Vietnamese. 
Comprehensive information about the Tribunal and its procedures is also available on its website (See Chapter 
Five para 3.3.1 (accessibility of the AAT)). 
305 
 
dispute lodgment options;
1489
 the reasonableness of timeframes for lodging disputes;
1490
 and 
the provision of financial and other support.
1491
  
 
2.8 Resolution of disputes in procedurally-fair manner  
 
The procedures adopted by a social security dispute resolution institution have an impact on 
the realisation of the right of access to justice of users of the institution. As a result, fair 
procedures are considered central to the resolution of disputes. The Constitution expects 
disputes to be resolved in a fair public hearing. It permits proceedings in a tribunal or forum 
to be different from those of a court as the fairness requirements in terms of section 34 are 
flexible and depend on different factors. Some of the elements of procedural fairness 
                                                                                                                                                        
1487
 Comparative adjudication institutions in South Africa generally provide interpretation services during 
tribunal processes (e.g. the Competition Tribunal and the CCMA provide skilled interpreters to assist non-
English speakers during hearings (see Chapter Four).  
1488
 Forms and other documentation for dispute lodgement with comparative South Africa dispute resolution 
institutions are often available only in English (see, for example, Chapter Four para 4.1 (accessibility of the 
National Consumer Tribunal)). 
Documents and forms used by current social security dispute resolution institutions are also mostly in English 
1489
 Access to some current social security adjudication institutions is promoted through the diversity of dispute 
lodgement options available (e.g. in the case of the Compensation Court by hand, through telefax or by 
registered mail to the Compensation Fund or an office of the Department of Labour or a labour centre (see 
Chapter Six para 3.2.1 (accessibility of the Compensation Court)). 
1490
 Reasonable notice of the time when a dispute is to be lodged must be given to a person concerned (the 
notice must be such that it gives the person an adequate and fair opportunity to seek judicial redress. The 
adjudication institution should also be given the power to condone a failure to comply with any notice 
requirements). South African comparative adjudication institutions vary with respect to the stipulated claim 
lodgement time periods and periods of prescription. A period of 30 days is utilised by the CCMA. However, late 
referrals may be condoned once good cause has been shown for a delay. An applicant who misses the stipulated 
30=day period for lodging a dispute with the CCMA, for example, would fill out a simple “Application for 
Condonation” form, explaining the period of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the prospects of success in the 
matter and any prejudice likely to be caused to the other party. The other (employer) party is given a chance to 
respond to this application, after which a Commissioner makes a finding as to whether or not the late referral 
should be condoned. 
Reasonable time periods dispute lodgement are also provided for the lodgment of disputes with some current 
social security institutions (e.g. a deadline of 180 days after receiving notice of the decision is provided to make 
an objection to the Compensation Court in terms of COIDA (see see Chapter Six para 3.2.1 (accessibility of the 
Compensation Court)). However, for most institutions, the deadline is 90 days after receiving notice of the 
decision. In addition institutions are also not empowered to condone late dispute lodgement submissions. 
1491
 Some current social security dispute resolution institutions and institutions in international comparative 
systems promote access by assisting claimants with expenses and other costs. As examples, the First-tier 
Tribunal facilitates participation at a hearing by making a contribution towards an applicant’s out-of-pocket 
expenses in attending a hearing, such as travel costs, loss of wages and child minding expenses (see Chapter 
Five para 4.2.1 Accessibility of the First-tier Tribunal). The Social Security Appeal Authority also pays the 
actual and reasonable travelling and accommodation expenses (if any) incurred by the appellant who is 
requested to appear before it (see Chapter Five para 5.4.1 (accessibility of the Social Security Appeal 
Authority)). 
Some current social security dispute resolution institutions also provide assistance to claimants in order to 
promote access (e.g. where an applicant (other than the RAF) is required to attend a hearing, the Appeal 
Tribunal (in this case the Road Accident Fund) provides transport and accommodation (where necessary) (see 
Chapter Six para 6.2.1 (accessibility of the Road Accident Fund Appeal Tribunal)).
.
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include
1492
 public proceedings;
1493
 procedural equality;
1494
 the power to determine the 
appropriate procedures;
1495
 personal appearance and appropriate representation;
1496
 the 
expeditious resolution of disputes and simple proceedings;
1497
 inexpensive adjudication 
procedures;
1498
 provision of free legal assistance by the State to claimants who cannot afford 
legal assistance;
1499
 guarantee of an effective remedy;
1500
 provision of a reasonable 
                                                 
1492
 See the discussion on the constitutional requirement of procedural fairness (including the requirement of a 
public hearing) in Chapter Two para 3.3.3; and Chapter Three para 4 on selected adjudication standards 
emanating from international instruments. 
1493
 The Constitution and international law instruments require the resolution of disputes in a public hearing (see 
Chapter Two para 3.3.3 on procedural fairness (including the requirement of a public hearing; and Chapter 
Three para 3 (protection of the right of access to justice in international instruments) and para 4 (selected 
adjudication standards emanating from international instruments)). In comparative South African jurisdictions, 
comparative international social security systems and some South African social security dispute resolution 
systems hearings (where they are held) are in public (see Chapter Four para 3.1.3 on the fairness of Competition 
Tribunal Procedures; Chapter Four para 3.2.3 on the fairness of Competition Appeal Court procedures; Chapter 
Four para 4.3 Fairness of National Consumer Tribunal procedures; Chapter Five para 3.3.3 on fairness of AAT  
procedures; and Chapter Five para 4.2.3 Fairness of First-tier Tribunal procedures). 
1494
 See Chapter Three para 4.5 on procedural guarantees to ensure a fair hearing in international instruments. 
1495
 Some institutions are empowered to determine their own dispute resolution procedures. For example, in the 
UK, the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act empowers the First-tier Tribunal to set their own rules of 
procedure, which enables its procedures to be flexible and adaptable in meeting the difficulties that parties face, 
especially if they are unrepresented (see Chapter Five para 4.2.3 on Fairness of First-tier Tribunal procedures). 
1496
 Personal appearance and appropriate representation are some of the elements of the right to procedural 
fairness in terms of the Constitution (see Chapter Two para 3.3.3 on procedural fairness (including the 
requirement of a public hearing)). They are also guaranteed in many of the reviewed dispute resolution 
institutions or forums. As examples, personal appearance and/or appropriate representation are allowed in the 
CCMA (see Chapter Four para 2.1.3 on the fairness of CCMA procedures); in the Labour Court (see Chapter 
Four para 2.2.3 on the fairness of Labour Court procedures); in the Competition Tribunal (see Chapter Four para 
3.1.3 on the fairness of Competition Tribunal procedures); in the National Consumer Tribunal (see Chapter Four 
para 4.3 on the fairness of National Consumer Tribunal procedures); in the AAT (see Chapter Five para 3.3.2 
Fairness of AAT procedures); in the Road Accident Fund Appeal Tribunal (Chapter Six para 6.2.3 on the 
Fairness of Road Accident Fund Appeal Tribunal adjudication procedures)     
1497 International standards require the expeditious resolution of disputes. This aims to protect the parties 
against excessive delays in legal proceedings and to highlight the impact of delay on the effectiveness and 
credibility of justice (see the discussion in Chapter Three para 4.4 on expeditious (rapid) and simple 
proceedings). Dispute resolution institutions also seek to resolve disputes speedily. As examples, CCMA 
processes are designed to ensure that disputes are resolved quickly (see Chapter Four para 2.1.3 on the fairness 
of CCMA procedures); the Competition Tribunal is required to conduct its hearings as expeditiously as 
possible); the National Consumer Tribunal is required to conduct proceedings as expeditiously as possible ()(see 
Chapter Four para 4.3 on the fairness of National Consumer Tribunal procedures); the SSAT is required to act as 
expeditiously as possible (see Chapter Five para 3.2.2 Procedural fairness of the SSAT).  
1498
 See Chapter Three para 3 on the protection of the right of access to justice in international instruments and 
para 4.5 on procedural guarantees to ensure a fair hearing). While it is free to bring a dispute to most South 
African social security and comparative dispute resolution institutions (see Chapters Four and Six), others such 
as the Appeal Board of the CMS charge a refundable fee (see Chapter Six para 8.2.1 on the accessibility of the 
CMS Appeal Board). In other cases such as in the High Court, claimants have to pay court and attorney fees 
(see Chapter Six para 9.1 on the accessibility of the High Court). In most international comparative social 
security systems, bringing a dispute is free of charge (such as in the German Social Courts (see Chapter Six para 
6.2.1 on access to the German Social Courts) and the SSAT (see Chapter Five para 3.2.1 on the accessibility of 
the SSAT)).  
1499
 See Chapter Two para 3.3.3 (procedural fairness (including the requirement of a public hearing)) on the 
right to free legal assistance in terms of the Constitution; and Chapter Three para 4.6 on international standards 
pertaining to the guarantee of representation and legal assistance. The provision of free legal assistance varies 
amongst the various jurisdictions. Most litigants in civil matters in South Africa (including social security 
claimants) do not have access to free legal assistance/ legal aid (see Chapter Two para 3.3.3 on procedural 
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opportunity to make representations (oral or written), adequate notice of any right of review 
or internal appeal (where applicable), adequate notice of the right to request reasons, and 
adequate reasons for decisions;
1501
 notification of decisions;
1502
 and provision of alternative 
dispute resolution avenues.
1503
 
 
2.9 Appointment of suitably-qualified persons as adjudicators 
 
International standards require that only suitably-qualified persons should be appointed as 
members of (social security) dispute resolution institutions.
1504
 The stating of minimum 
academic qualifications and relevant professional and other experience (including legal 
qualifications and experience) in the laws would enhance effectiveness. Minimum 
qualifications and experience requirements for adjudicators are stipulated in (some) of the 
statutes establishing dispute resolution institutions in comparative South African 
                                                                                                                                                        
fairness (including the requirement of a public hearing). However, free legal assistance is provided to social 
security claimants in Australia (see Chapter Five para 3.2.1 on the accessibility of the SSAT and para 3.3.1 on 
the accessibility of the AAT); Germany (see Chapter Five para 6.2.1 on the accessibility of the Social Courts).  
1500
 See Chapter Three para 4.7 on international standards pertaining to the provision of effective (enforceable) 
remedies. The decisions of some of the tribunals or forums are deemed to be the judgment of a court, and they 
are afforded powers to enforce their decisions as is the case with courts. For example, relief by the Upper 
Tribunal has the same effect as the corresponding relief granted by the High Court on an application for judicial 
review, and is enforceable as if it were relief granted by the High Court on an application for judicial review 
(see Chapter Five para 4.3.3 on the scope of jurisdiction and powers of the Upper Tribunal). In addition, the 
Compensation Court is considered to have the status of a court at the level of the Magistrates Court. As a result, 
a ruling of the Court is enforced as a decision of a (Magistrates) Court (see Chapter Six para 3.2.2 Scope of 
jurisdiction and powers of the Compensation Court).  
1501
 Section 33(2) of the Constitution and sections 3(2)(b) and 5 of PAJA require that everyone whose rights 
have been adversely affected by administrative action has the right to be given written reasons (see Chapter Two 
paras 5.1, 5.3.4 and 5.4). 
1502
 For example, as part of its commitment to ensure timely service to applicants and other parties to reviews, 
timeliness standards in the SSAT Service Charter include written notification of the SSAT’s decision within 14 
days of the decision (see Chapter Five para 3.3.3 on fairness of SSAT procedures). The quick resolution of 
disputes is one of the objectives for the establishment of the First-tier and Upper Tribunals in the UK. Therefore, 
as soon as reasonably practicable after making a decision, each Tribunal must provide to each party a decision 
notice stating the Tribunal’s decision (see Chapter Five paras 4.2.3 on the fairness of First-tier Tribunal 
procedures and 4.3.3 on fairness of Upper Tribunal procedures). 
1503
 In South Africa, he Competition Act also provides for the Competition Tribunal to carry out alternative 
dispute resolution processes (a pre-hearing conference) in furtherance of the objectives of the Act (see Chapter 
Four para 3.1.3 on the fairness of Competition Tribunal Procedures). In the UK, the First-tier and Upper 
Tribunals are permitted to bring to the attention of the parties the availability of any appropriate alternative 
procedure for the resolution of the dispute; and can facilitate the use of such an alternative procedure if it is the 
wish of the parties and the procedure is compatible with the Tribunal’s overriding objective (see Chapter Five 
paras 4.2.3 and 4.3.3 the fairness of First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal procedures, respectively). 
1504
 See, for example, the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa 
(1999) Section A, Article 4 which states that the sole criteria for appointment to judicial office should be the 
suitability of a candidate for such office by reason of integrity, appropriate training or learning and ability; and 
that no person should be appointed to judicial office unless they have the appropriate training or learning that 
enables them to adequately fulfil their functions. 
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jurisdictions,
1505
 international comparative jurisdictions
1506
 and South African social security 
systems.
1507
 
 
2.10 Granting dispute resolution institutions wide powers and extensive scope of 
jurisdiction 
 
The Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa 
recommended that a social security adjudication system that is established should deal 
conclusively with all social security claims. It should have the power to finally adjudicate all 
social security matters and should have the power to determine cases on the basis of law and 
fairness. Its jurisdiction should cover all social security claims emanating from the social 
security system.
1508
  
 
Institutions with wide powers and extensive scope of jurisdiction have been created in 
comparative South African jurisdictions and in social security systems in international 
comparative jurisdictions. Although circumscribed by statute, the scope of jurisdiction of 
some of the comparative South African dispute resolution institutions is fairly wide. A wide 
scope of persons can bring disputes to the institutions, and the institutions can deal with an 
extensive range of matters.
1509
 These institutions enjoy extensive powers, such as the power 
to subpoena persons and also perform a fairly wide scope of functions (the use of terms such 
                                                 
1505
 In terms of the Competition Act (Section 28), the Chairperson and other members of the Competition 
Tribunal must have sufficient legal training and experience (they must have suitable qualifications and 
experience in economics, law, commerce, industry or public affairs; and be committed to the purposes and 
principles of the Act) (see Chapter Four para 3.1.4). The National Credit Act also states that the Tribunal must 
have sufficient persons with legal training and experience (suitable qualifications and experience in economics, 
law, commerce, industry or consumer affairs) (see Chapter Four para 4.4). 
1506
 In terms of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act (Para 2 of Schedule 2) a person can only be 
appointed to be one of the members of the First-tier Tribunal if he or she has qualifications prescribed by order 
made by the Lord Chancellor with the concurrence of the Senior President of Tribunals. Upper Tribunal 
members are also appointed on the basis of their knowledge, experience or expertise relevant to the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction (see Chapter Five para 4). The AAT Act also stipulates that presidential and senior members of the 
AAT must have been enrolled as legal practitioners for at least five years; and must have knowledge or skills 
relevant to the duties of a member, such as accountancy, aviation, engineering, law, medicine, pharmacology, 
military affairs, public administration and taxation (see Chapter Five para 3.3.4). 
1507
 As examples, the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act states minimum qualifications and experience 
requirements for the members of the ITSAA panel who are legal practitioners and medical practitioners. The 
Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act also state minimum qualifications and experience requirements for 
the medical practitioners that make up the Appeal Tribunal. The Pension Funds Act also states m minimum 
qualifications and experience requirements for a person to be appointed as an (Acting) Adjudicator (see Chapter 
Six). 
1508
 Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security in South Africa: Transforming the 
Present – Protecting the Future (Draft Consolidated Report)(March 2002) 124 (see Chapter Six para 11). 
1509
 See for example Chapter Four para 4.2 (scope of jurisdiction and powers of the National Consumer 
Tribunal) on the parties that can make an application to the National Consumer Tribunal. 
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as “any matter in the Act” ensures a wide interpretation their powers and functions).1510 The 
institutions provide a wide range of remedies, such as making an order which any court of 
law may make, providing interim relief and making cost orders. Some of the institutions can 
also reconsider their decisions.
1511
 Institutions that are not courts of law are also empowered 
to enforce their decisions. The decisions of such institutions are often deemed to be the 
judgment of a court and are then enforced as such. 
 
Social security dispute resolution institutions in international comparative jurisdictions also 
have wide powers and extensive functions. A wide scope of persons can bring disputes to the 
tribunals and courts. In addition, the scope of disputes covered by the institutions is wide, 
with limited circumscription. The institutions are also afforded wide powers in the resolution 
of disputes. Wide powers also enable them to provide an array of possible remedies.
1512
 
 
2.11 Prevention of multiple dispute resolution institutions and avenues  
 
In order to promote the effectiveness of a dispute resolution system, parties must be 
prevented from bringing multiple causes of action. This negates the objective of the 
establishment of a multi-tiered dispute resolution system with the aim of resolving disputes at 
the appropriate level.  
 
A lower level dispute resolution institution is considered an “internal remedy” to be 
exhausted before approaching a higher level institution on further appeal or on review.
1513
 
This principle, which is applied in comparative South African legal jurisdictions and 
international comparative social security dispute resolution systems,
1514
 is not the case with 
some South African social security institutions.
1515
  
                                                 
1510
 See Chapter Four para 2.1.2 (scope of jurisdiction and powers of the CCMA) on the CCMA’s power to 
subpoena persons. 
1511
 For example, the CCMA can vary or rescind a decision in case where an obvious material error has been 
made (see Chapter Four para 2.1.2 on the scope of jurisdiction and powers of the CCMA.  
1512
 See Chapter 5 para 3.2.3 on the scope of jurisdiction and powers of the SSAT; Chapter Five para 3.3.2 on 
the scope of jurisdiction and powers of the AAT; Chapter Five para 4.2.2 on the scope of jurisdiction and 
powers of the First-tier Tribunal; Chapter Five para 4.3.2 on the scope of jurisdiction and powers of the Upper 
Tribunal; Chapter Five para 5.4.2 on the scope of jurisdiction and powers of the SSAA; Chapter Five para 6.2.2 
on the scope of jurisdiction and powers of the German Social Courts.  
1513
 Section 7(2) of PAJA requires that any internal remedy provided in any other law must first be exhausted 
before a court is approached for the review of an administrative action. 
1514
 For example, the SSAT in Australia cannot review a decision made by an officer of Centrelink or of the 
Child Support Agency unless that decision has been reviewed by an Authorised Review Officer or Objections 
Officer (see Chapter Five para 3.2.2 on the scope of jurisdiction and powers of the SSAT). In addition, an 
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3. PROPOSED ADJUDICATIVE (AND INSTITUTIONAL) FRAMEWORK FOR 
EFFECTIVE SOCIAL SECURITY PROVISIONING 
 
At present, the South African social security system consists of various institutions that are 
responsible for the administration of particular risks and for the resolution of disputes. In the 
absence of a new, uniform, social security administrative institution, the dispute resolution 
functions to be performed by an administrative institution must be allocated to each of the 
current institutions. This means that to ensure the most appropriate dispute resolution system, 
there must be properly functioning internal review or revision frameworks within the various 
institutions. In addition, a uniform, external appeal institution must be created to hear appeals 
emanating from the (reviewed or reconsidered) decisions on the basis of law and fairness. 
The proposed framework thus consists of internal review or revision frameworks and a 
wholly independent social security appeal institution. 
 
However, it must be noted that these proposals will be affected by current reform initiatives 
relating to the development of a comprehensive social security system
1516
 and the enactment 
of the Superior Courts Bill.
1517
 The establishment of the National Social Security System will 
                                                                                                                                                        
application can only be made to the AAT for review of the decision of the SSAT if the decision has been 
reviewed by the SSAT; and the decision has been affirmed, varied or set aside by the SSAT. In addition, the 
AAT may only review a decision that has been reviewed by the SSAT (see Chapter Five para 3.3.2 on the scope 
of jurisdiction and powers of the AAT). In the UK, a person can only apply to the Upper Tribunal if they have 
been given leave to apply by the Tribunal whose decision they are challenging; or an application for leave to 
apply has been refused (see Chapter Five para 4.3.1 on the accessibility of the Upper Tribunal). 
1515
 The Pension Funds Act permits multiple causes of action and dispute resolution institutions, applicants to 
the Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator can simultaneously institute a complaint in a civil court (High 
Court) (see Chapter Six para 7.2.2 on the scope of jurisdiction and powers of the Pension Funds Adjudicator.  
1516
 In the 2007 State of the Nation address, it was announced that the government plans to establish a National 
Social Security System (NSSS) in order to address SA's social security challenges (see Mbeki T State of the 
Nation Address of the President of South Africa to the Joint Sitting of Parliament (9 February 2007)). The NSSS 
will be developed on principles of equity, risks pooling, mandatory participation, administration efficiency and 
solidarity (see National Treasury Social Security and Retirement Reform: Second Discussion Paper (23 Feb 
2007) para 27). It will be a multi-pillar system, consisting of social assistance grants (funded from general 
government revenue, with the means test threshold either removed or significantly increased, providing a safety 
net against poverty in old age, and providing basic support to the disabled, children and care-givers); mandatory 
participation in a national social security system, up to an agreed earnings threshold, providing basic retirement, 
unemployment, death and disability benefits; additional mandatory participation in private occupational or 
individual retirement funds (for individuals with earnings above the threshold, ensuring that individuals at all 
earnings levels make appropriate provision for insurance coverage and income replacement in retirement) and 
supplementary voluntary savings (see National Treasury, Social Security and Retirement Reform: Second 
Discussion Paper (23 Feb 2007) para 13). 
1517
 The Superior Courts Bill, 2011 [B 7 2011]. The Bill aims to rationalise, consolidate and amend the laws 
relating to the superior courts (Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Courts) in a 
single Act of Parliament. It further makes provision for the administration of the judicial functions of all courts, 
including governance issues, by the Chief Justice as the head of the judiciary (section 2(1)(c) of the Bill). 
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streamline the administration of social security, since the administration of the different risks 
will be undertaken by a single institution. This implies that the review or reconsideration of 
decisions (currently undertaken by an array of institutions) will also be carried out by a single 
institution. In addition, the Superior Court Bill, once enacted, will ensure a single, integrated, 
accessible and affordable court system. It will also promote the independence and 
impartiality of the system, with court governance undertaken by the Chief Justice. This has 
the impact of facilitating the resolution of (social security) disputes that are brought before 
the superior courts.   
 
3.1 Internal review or reconsideration of decisions by relevant institution 
 
An effective and efficient dispute resolution system should include a framework for the 
review or reconsideration of a decision by a social security administrative institution. This 
will give the authority an opportunity to consider the correction of a decision by a trained 
senior review official. The review official should be able to vary or rescind the original 
decision where it is found to be incorrect and substitute it. The establishment of well-
structured and properly-aligned internal review frameworks will lessen the workload of the 
appeal institutions and will also enhance decision-making by the institution.
1518
 
 
3.1.1 Reconsideration of SAA decisions  
 
The Social Assistance Act provides for the reconsideration of decisions by SASSA. A 
decision is reconsidered by a designated official who occupies a position that is higher in 
rank to that of the official or officials who made the original decision. However, there are no 
requirements that officials designated to handle applications for reconsideration are 
                                                                                                                                                        
The Bill is intended to give effect to item 16(6) of Schedule 6 to the Constitution, in terms of which all courts 
must be rationalised with the view to establishing a judicial system suited to the requirements of the 
Constitution. It is also aimed at promoting the achievement of a single, integrated, accessible and affordable 
court system, as well as establishing an integrated system of court governance, within a single judiciary, with 
the Chief Justice as the head of the judiciary. The Bill envisages that the Chief Justice will exercise 
responsibility over the establishment and monitoring of norms and standards for the exercise of the judicial 
functions of all courts. 
The Bill further seeks to rationalise and strengthen the rule-making mechanism to improve the efficiency of the 
courts. This will enhance the role of the judiciary in making the rules for all courts and provide for a meaningful 
role by the Minister and Parliament in the processing and approval thereof, which are legislative measures 
geared to enhance access to justice. 
1518
 See Olivier M, Govindjee A & Nyenti M Project to set up internal remedy units at district, regional and 
national offices at SASSA (Report prepared for the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) ISLP (May 
2009) 129. 
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appropriately qualified to undertake reviews. It is therefore necessary that these officials are 
trained. It may also be necessary for officials, designated to undertake review functions, to do 
so on an ongoing and full-time basis. 
 
The current timeframe of 90 days for the lodging of an application for reconsideration should 
be maintained. However, SASSA should be empowered to condone the late lodgement of 
applications for reconsideration. In addition, to promote the geographical and physical 
accessibility of the SASSA internal adjudication framework, reconsiderations should be 
conducted at the level of the SASSA District office.  
 
If an applicant or beneficiary is unhappy with the outcome of the reconsideration, a right 
should be provided for the dispute to be referred to an official that is higher in rank and 
situated at regional level for reconsideration or to ITSAA (as a higher level of internal 
review). An applicant or beneficiary should be given an opportunity to be heard where the 
circumstances of the reconsideration permit. As is the case within the current ITSAA tribunal 
framework, the hearing should be done by a panel.
1519
  
 
In light of the envisaged establishment of a uniform external social security appeal institution, 
a person who remains unhappy with the reconsidered decision of SASSA will have a right to 
lodge an appeal with the new uniform appeal institution. It is thus proposed, except if ITSAA 
is a higher level of internal review, that it should be disbanded. 
 
3.1.2 Review of COIDA decisions 
 
COIDA provides for the review of the decisions of the Compensation Commissioner 
(Director-General) and for the lodging of objections and appeals. The system is not properly 
aligned, as the Act limits the decisions of the Director-General that can be reviewed, although 
there is no such limitation regarding the disputes that can be objected to or appealed. In 
addition, the system is fragmented, as some decisions of the Compensation Fund are subject 
to review by the Director-General, while other decisions are subject to an objection or appeal 
to the Compensation Court (panel of a presiding officer assisted by assessors). The 
Compensation Court was thus considered as an external appeal forum for objections and 
                                                 
1519
 Such as the inclusion of a medical practitioner and a member of civil society in the ITSAA panel when the 
Tribunal considers an appeal against a decision of SASSA. 
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appeals against the decision of the Compensation Commissioner. However, as was revealed, 
the Compensation Fund fails to meet the standards for an external adjudication institution. 
 
The presiding officer, with the assistance of the assessors, should undertake the review of the 
decisions of the Compensation Fund. This implies that a person affected by a decision of the 
Director-General/Compensation Commissioner (or a trade union or employer's organisation 
of which the person was a member at the relevant time) may lodge an application for review 
of the decision with a Compensation Court. 
 
The presiding officer and assessors should be sufficiently qualified to review the decisions of 
the Compensation Commissioner. The scope of jurisdiction of the Compensation Court 
should be wide, as they should be able to review any decision of the Director-
General/Compensation Commissioner. Their powers must also be extensive, to be able to 
confirm, vary or set aside the original decision and substitute it.  
 
The accessibility of the Compensation Court should be promoted. This can be achieved 
through its current practice of convening at any place determined by the Commissioner for 
the hearing of an objection. The current time limit of 180 days for the lodgement of 
objections and appeals should be applied to applications for review, as it provides a 
reasonable opportunity for prospective applicants to be able to apply for review. The 
Compensation Court should also have the power to condone late submission of applications.  
 
The Compensation Court should be empowered to determine the procedure of a review 
(which should be as informal as possible). Parties should be given an opportunity to submit 
representations to the panel. Reasonable timeframes for the finalisation of a review 
application should be specified. The presiding officer should be empowered to confirm the 
decision in respect of which the objection was lodged or give such other decision as he may 
deem equitable after consultation with the assessors.  
 
Parties must also be able to appeal the Court’s decision to the proposed new uniform appeal 
institution. This will require the revocation of the right of a person who is affected by 
selected decisions of the Compensation Court to lodge an appeal with the High Court. 
Finally, COIDA must further be revised to abolish the power of Director-General to state a 
case for consideration by the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal.  
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3.1.3 Review of ODMWA decisions 
 
To create a streamlined and uniform (internal and external) social security adjudication 
system, a framework for the review or reconsideration of ODMWA compensation claim 
decisions must be established. This may be done by extending the scope of jurisdiction of the 
Reviewing Authority.  
 
The framework for the review of disputes relating to the certification of an occupational 
disease also needs to be reformed. The Reviewing Authority should be designated as the 
internal review or reconsideration forum, as it fails to meet the standards of an external 
appeal forum. In this case, a person who is unhappy with a decision of the Certification 
Committee and the Compensation Commissioner should lodge an application with the 
Medical Reviewing for the review or reconsideration of the decision. This may require the 
inclusion in the Reviewing Authority of persons with knowledge and experience in issues 
relating to the decisions of the Compensation Commissioner. 
 
The dispute lodgement procedures and timeframes provided for lodgement of applications 
with the Reviewing Authority will still be applicable. However, multiple dispute lodgement 
mechanisms must be provided (such as by hand, post, fax or electronic mail). In addition, the 
Reviewing Authority should also have the power to condone applications which are 
submitted late, where good cause is shown. This will increase the accessibility of the 
ODMWA adjudication framework by enabling more people to lodge applications for 
reconsideration. 
 
The Reviewing Authority should have the power to review any finding of the Certification 
Committee and the Compensation Commissioner. It should also be able to confirm, vary or 
rescind the decisions. As a higher authority for the review of ODMWA decisions, the 
Reviewing Authority should be able to make decisions on its own, not in a joint sitting with 
the Certification Authority. This will ensure the separation of the decision-making function 
(by the Certification Committee) and the internal review or reconsideration function. 
 
The current review procedures should be maintained (such as personal appearance, 
representation and notification of review decisions). However, timeframes for the finalisation 
of reviews must be stipulated.      
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Geographical or physical accessibility of the Certification Committee and the Reviewing 
Authority must be facilitated. The certification of diseases and review of decisions should be 
undertaken in as many locations as practically possible (instead of the single Johannesburg 
location). The certification procedure must also be expedited. 
 
A person who is aggrieved by a review decision of the Reviewing Authority should have the 
right to lodge an appeal with the envisaged new social security appeal institution. In addition, 
the power of the Compensation Commissioner for Occupational Diseases to state a special 
case for the ruling of the High Court on any question of law which arises in connection with 
any matter in which the Commissioner has given or is required to give a decision under the 
Act must be repealed.      
 
3.1.4 Review of UIA decisions 
 
The analysis of the institutional status and framework of both the Regional Appeals 
Committees and the National Appeals Committee indicates that they are both internal organs 
of the Department of labour.
1520
 Therefore, the Unemployment Insurance Fund internal 
review or reconsideration framework must be reformed, with the relevant forum designated. 
 
Since the Regional Appeals Committees of the (UIF) Board are more geographically or 
physically distributed around the Republic, they offer the most accessible option for persons 
unhappy with decisions of the Fund. In addition, members of the Regional Appeals 
Committees could be considered to be more senior in rank to the original decision-makers at 
the UIF. Suitably qualified or trained persons should thus be appointed to undertake review 
or reconsideration of UIF decisions. The Regional Appeals Committees would still have to 
undertake the same scope of jurisdiction that is currently in place in terms of the UIA. 
 
In addition to submitting a Notice of Appeal Form (Form UI 13), either by hand or by 
registered post to the Regional Appeals Committee at the respective Labour Centres of the 
Department of Labour, aggrieved persons should also be able to lodge an application for 
review by fax and electronic mail. An appeal should be lodged within 90 days of the decision, 
although the Appeals Committee should permit a person to refer a dispute at any time after 
                                                 
1520
 See Chapter Six para 5 (Unemployment Insurance Act dispute resolution framework). 
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the time limit. The Regional Appeals Committees must also be empowered to decide disputes 
relating to a refusal to pay benefits due to the late submission of a claim for benefits to the 
UIF. 
 
The Regional Appeals Committees should also conduct hearings for the determination of 
disputes. This will give the parties to the dispute an opportunity to appear in person and to 
participate in the adjudication process. The Regional Appeals Committee should also have a 
right to permit representation (where it deems it necessary) either by a lawyer or another 
representative such as a UIF, trade union or employers’ organisation official. The UIF should 
appoint interpreters in each region to assist persons unable to participate in the proceedings in 
the language used. Timeframes for dispute resolution by the Regional Appeals Committees 
must be stated. The Committees must also be empowered to reconsider an original decision 
to correct any defects. The accessibility of Regional Appeals Committees should also be 
promoted by providing the Notice of Appeal Form (UI 13) in English and in the majority 
language of the region.  
 
The National Appeals Committee of the UIF Board would thus cease undertaking dispute 
resolution functions. A person who is unhappy with the review or reconsideration decision of 
a Regional Appeals Committee would thus have the right to lodge an appeal directly with the 
envisaged uniform social security appeal institution. 
 
3.1.5 Review of RAFA decisions 
 
There is a need to establish mechanisms for the resolution of disputes relating to the payment 
of compensation for injuries or death resulting from a motor accident. This may require the 
development of guidelines on the payment of compensation for injuries or death resulting 
from a motor accident.
1521
 
 
The Road Accident Fund Act provides a dispute resolution mechanism for disputes relating 
to assessments of motor vehicle accident injuries. However, no proper mechanism for the 
internal Road Accident Fund review or reconsideration of its decision has been established. 
This raises the prospect of either the creation of an internal framework for the Road Accident 
                                                 
1521
 See, for example, Schedule 4 of the COIDA which provides guidelines on the manner of calculating 
compensation for occupational injuries and diseases.   
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Fund to review or reconsider its decisions; or designate the Appeal Tribunal appointed by the 
Registrar of HPCSA as the internal review forum for the Fund.  
 
Proposals for the reform of the Road Accident Fund dispute resolution framework were made 
by the Road Accident Fund Commission in 2002.
1522
 The Commission held that where an 
adverse decision is made to a road accident claimant, the decision should be communicated to 
him or her without delay. Such notification should include a statement of the findings and of 
the reasons for the decision.  It should also include information about the right to and the 
means of instituting an appeal, including time limits on application.
1523
  
 
The Commission proposed that the Road Accident Fund should establish its own internal 
review mechanism or body capable of monitoring decisions on benefits and initiating 
immediate reconsideration of such decisions where there is an indication or notification by a 
claimant of a dispute.
1524
 The Commission further proposed a two-tiered (external) appeals 
system.
1525
 However, in order to develop a speedy, streamlined and effective Road Accident 
adjudication system, this should be reduced to an internal review mechanism and an external 
appeal.   
 
The Commission suggested that the internal review mechanism could include ongoing 
monitoring of decisions of the Road Accident Fund by more senior members of management, 
automatic referral of decisions under dispute to more senior line management and even the 
creation of an internal review body with the Road Accident Fund comprising senior members 
of management. This will ensure the reconsideration of erroneous or ill-advised decisions and 
could constitute an internal “quality control device”.1526  
 
The proposals of the Road Accident Commission have led to the reform of the motor vehicle 
accident compensation system, notably through the development of a new policy framework 
                                                 
1522
 See Road Accident Fund Commission Report to His Excellency The President of The Republic of South 
Africa 2002.  
1523
 Ibid, 780. 
1524
 Ibid, XLIV. 
1525
 Ibid, 782. The proposal consisted of a first stage appeal to a Benefits Review Panel and thereafter an appeal 
to a Benefits Appeal Tribunal.  
1526
 Ibid, 782. 
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for the compensation of motor accident victims (including the resolution of disputes);
 1527
 and 
the amendment of the RAFA.
1528
 
 
It is therefore proposed that a benefits review panel comprising a senior member or senior 
members of management be set up within the Road Accident Fund to undertake internal 
review or reconsideration of decisions. Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Road 
Accident Fund will be entitled to appeal to a benefits review panel. Benefits review panels 
should be established on a regional basis, to promote accessibility for claimants. Senior 
management officials appointed as review officers should be people with expertise in road 
accident compensation and in the Road Accident Fund. Although reviews must be lodged 
within a specified period after the claimant has been notified of an adverse decision, the panel 
should have the power to extend the period when there are good reasons for so doing. 
 
It may be necessary to have multi-member panels so that the desirable range of expertise and 
skills and social security issues is properly represented. One member should be legally 
qualified, while others should have skills or expertise in other disciplines relevant to the road 
accident insurance system (such as medicine, rehabilitation, employment and welfare).  
 
As an initial adjudication process the review/reconsideration will deal with a large number of 
cases, it should provide accessible, speedy, informal and economical procedures. However, it 
should maintain an appropriate standard of procedural fairness. It should provide a reasonable 
opportunity for claimants to make representations (to put his or her case forward).
1529
 The 
Panels should have the power to reverse, affirm or vary the decision under review, to 
substitute its own decision or to remit the matter to the administrative authority with or 
                                                 
1527
 See, for example, Department of Transport Draft Policy on the restructuring of the Road Accident Fund as 
compulsory social insurance in relation to the comprehensive social security system (GN 121 in GG 32940 of 
12 February 2012) which seeks to transform the current structural problems of the compensation system for road 
users and to align a revised benefit scheme to the principles and objectives of the Constitution; and aims to 
expand the social security safety net within the constraints of limited resources, provide more appropriate social 
support and introduce measures to use public resources more economically and effectively. 
1528
 The Road Accident Fund Amendment Act 19 of 2005 removed the limitation on passenger claims; removed 
the members of the same household exclusion; removed the passenger for reward on motorcycle exclusion; 
provides that general damages are only payable if a serious injury was sustained; requires medical expenses for 
emergency treatment to be paid according to the HPCSA Tariff; and limited the annual loss irrespective of the 
actual loss for loss of earnings and loss of support claims to R160 000.00 per annum (with the amount increased 
quarterly by inflation)). The Road Accident Fund (Transitional Provisions) Act 15 of 2012 provides for 
transitional measures in respect of certain categories of third parties whose claims where limited under the 
RAFA. 
1529
 Ibid, 782. 
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without directions. The panel should have all the powers and discretions conferred on the 
Road Accident Fund. 
 
Where an oral hearing is not necessary, the panel should review a decision on the basis of the 
material in the file and other documents before it. In cases of urgency, or where distance is a 
problem, telephone hearings may be employed. Hearings should be held in public. The Fund 
should provide interpreters to facilitate participation by claimants. Claimants should also be 
entitled to legal or other representation. Where a hearing is necessary, the Road Accident 
Fund should provide travel, accommodation and other assistance to claimants.
1530
  
 
Benefits Review Panels should give its decisions in writing within a few days of the hearing 
and to provide reasons. This will enable both the appellant and the road accident benefits 
scheme to assess the soundness of the decision and to decide whether to appeal further. It will 
also protect the appellant and the administrative authority against careless or arbitrary 
decisions.
1531
 
 
3.1.6 Review of Medical Schemes Act decisions 
 
Since one of the functions of the CMS is to investigate complaints and settle disputes in 
relation to the affairs of medical schemes as provided for in the Medical Schemes Act, it 
should be the designated internal dispute resolution forum. This implies that any person who 
may be aggrieved by any decision of a medical scheme or the Registrar should apply to the 
Council for a review of such decision.  
 
As is currently the case with appeals to the Council, applications for reviews should be in the 
form of an affidavit directed to the Council. An application should be furnished to the 
Registrar not later than three months after the date on which the decision concerned was 
made, or such further period as the Council may, for good cause shown, allow.  
 
The council should be able to determine whether a hearing is necessary or not. This will 
ensure that disputes that can be resolved through the consideration of documentary evidence 
are speedily resolved. Where a hearing is deemed necessary, the Council should determine 
                                                 
1530
 Ibid, 782-784. 
1531
 Ibid, 784. 
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the date, time and place for the hearing. This power will enable the Council to convene a 
hearing in different locations within the Republic, thereby facilitating the accessibility of the 
dispute resolution system. The Registrar must also inform the parties to a dispute, in writing, 
about the hearing not less than 14 days before such a hearing. The parties to the dispute are 
thus offered sufficient opportunity to prepare for the hearing. 
 
Complainants may appear before the Council in person or through a representative to tender 
evidence or submit a written argument or explanation to the Council. The procedure at the 
hearing of a review application shall be determined by the Council. After hearing the 
application, the Council may confirm or vary the decision concerned, or rescind it and give 
such other decision as it may deem just. The decision of the Council must be in writing and 
copies must be given to the parties to the dispute.  
 
A party who is unhappy with the decision of the Council can appeal such a decision to the 
envisaged uniform appeal institution. 
 
3.1.7 Review of Pension Funds Act decisions 
 
Considering the vast number of occupational and private pension funds, the Pension Funds 
Act does not specify how individual pension fund review procedures should be carried out. 
The Act leaves it to the funds to outline their internal dispute resolution mechanisms in their 
rules. It is also impossible to attempt setting out here how internal fund dispute resolution 
processes should work. However, it may be helpful to illustrate how some best practices in 
internal dispute resolution within the retirement industry. A good example of an appropriate 
internal dispute resolution within the retirement industry is the complaints resolution 
procedure of the Professional Provident Society of South Africa (PPS).
1532
 The PPS 
                                                 
1532
 Established in 1941, the Professional Provident Society of South Africa (PPS) was initially registered as a 
paragraph 1(c) benefit fund (in terms of the Income Tax Act of 1962) conducting its core business under the 
ambit of pension fund business. However, PPS was effectively transformed into Professional Provident Society 
Limited (Limited by Guarantee) (“PPS Limited”) in September 2001, and Professional Provident Society 
Insurance Company (“PPS Insurance”), a wholly owned subsidiary of PPS Limited, providing the benefits 
offered by PPS; namely, Sickness, Partial and Permanent Incapacity Benefits, and Life Assurance Benefits as a 
registered Long-term Insurance Company. PPS has grown to provide for the sickness and disability needs of 
over 70% of South Africa’s graduate professionals. PPS is owned exclusively by its members and has more than 
140 000 graduate professional policyholders. The retirement scheme run by PPS is the Professional Provident 
Society Retirement Annuity Fund (“PPS RA Fund”) – see PPS Section 51 Manual for Professional Provident 
Society Limited (Limited by Guarantee) (“PPS Limited”) accessed at https://www.pps.co.za/portal/ 
docs/Section%2051%20Manual.pdf on 6
th
 December 2011. 
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complaints resolution procedure aims to ensure that a proper process is followed by the PPS 
to resolve any complaint. The procedure outlines channels available to aggrieved persons in 
the resolution of disputes. Claimants are encouraged to use the Member Services Department 
as the first point of contact and resolution of a complaint. As required by the Pension Funds 
Act, claimants are expected to submit complaints in writing.
1533
 
 
Where a complaint is not satisfactorily resolved during interaction with the Member Services 
Department, a claimant may seek further assistance from the manager of the department. The 
manager acknowledges receipt of the complaint within 8 working hours of receipt thereof. 
The manager then endeavours to resolve the complaint and supplies an acceptable response 
within 5 working days from date of acknowledgement of the complaint. The manager’s 
response constitutes PPS’ final decision in respect of the complaint and set out 
comprehensive reasons for such decision.
1534
  
 
If the manager does not deal with the complaint satisfactorily or if the claimant does not 
agree with the final PPS decision, he/she has an opportunity to lodge an appeal with the 
Independent Internal Arbitrator of the PPS. The Independent Internal Arbitrator 
acknowledges receipt of the formal complaint in writing within 3 days of receipt thereof and 
requests all such further information from the claimant as is deemed necessary. The 
Independent Internal Arbitrator investigates the complaint by gathering all the relevant facts 
from whichever source deemed necessary. If he or she is unable to finalise the information 
gathering process and propose a resolution within 20 working days, he keeps the claimant 
updated regarding progress made in resolving the complaint. However, every effort is made 
to provide a response within 20 working days of receipt of the complaint, but not later than 6 
weeks after receipt of the complaint, as far as it is within the power of the Independent 
Internal Arbitrator. If a claimant is not satisfied with the outcome, or if a solution has not 
been proposed within 6 weeks from receipt of the complaint, the complaint can then be 
referred to the Pension Funds Adjudicator.
1535
 
 
                                                 
1533
 See PPS Complaints Resolution Procedure available at www.pps.co.za (accesses on 6
th
 December 2011).  
1534
 Ibid. 
1535
 Ibid. See also section 30A(3) of the Pension Funds Act which states that if the complainant is not satisfied 
with the reply of the fund or the employer, or if the fund or the employer who participates in a fund fails to reply 
within 30 days after the receipt of the complaint, the complainant may lodge the complaint with the Office of 
the Pension Funds Adjudicator. 
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The Complaints Resolution Procedure of the PPS indicates that it applies a multi-tier internal 
dispute resolution system. This ensures that as many disputes as possible are resolved with 
the fund in an accessible, speedy and informal process. Only those disputes that are 
unresolved or unsatisfactorily resolved proceed to the Pension Funds Adjudicator. It thus 
provides a benchmark for the creation of an internal dispute resolution system in a pension 
fund. 
 
However, due to the proposed creation of a uniform social security external dispute resolution 
framework, the role of the Pension Funds adjudicator (as the external dispute resolution 
institution for the occupational and private retirement industry) becomes redundant. It is thus 
proposed that once the uniform external dispute resolution framework is established, the 
Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator should be abolished.    
 
3.2 A uniform social security (external) appeals framework
1536
 
 
There are various options for establishing an appropriate social security adjudication 
framework. These include the creation of a uniform, independent and impartial administrative 
tribunal followed by appeal to the High Court; the establishment of a uniform social security 
tribunal, followed by review to a special court (with the status of the High Court); the 
creation of a new specialised court structure for social security matters; the utilisation of 
existing court structures (general or special court/ lower or higher court) followed by existing 
(special appeal) options; and the establishment of a new government institution or enabling 
an existing government institution to conduct social security appeals.  
 
                                                 
1536
 Professors Marius Olivier and Avinash Govindjee contributed in the development of these proposals during 
a research project undertaken for the Department of Social Development on “Developing a policy framework 
for the South African social security adjudication system”. However, this thesis predates the research project, 
although the period of the research project (March-December 2011) fell within the period of the thesis (January 
2010-April 2012). Before the commencement of the project for the Department, substantial research towards the 
thesis had been carried out and proposals developed before the commencement of the research project. As a 
result, the candidate brought knowledge to the project, which the project reports (draft and final reports) and the 
policy (draft and final policy) drew significantly from - see for example M Olivier, A Govindjee & M Nyenti 
Developing a Policy Framework for the South African Social Security Adjudication System: First (Research) 
Report (Report prepared for the Department of Social Development, South Africa (May 2011)) and M Olivier, 
A Govindjee & M Nyenti Developing a Policy Framework for the South African Social Security Adjudication 
System: Policy (Report prepared for the Department of Social Development, South Africa (December 2011)). 
However, the thesis also benefited from the work of the research project, as the research and initial proposals 
were debated during extensive discussions over ten months with Professors Olivier and Govindjee. 
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The utilisation of the existing courts or the establishment of a new dedicated court raises 
serious questions regarding accessibility. Courts are, for a number of reasons, generally less 
accessible than tribunals. Court processes are usually formal in nature and ordinary people 
struggle to give a proper account of their case before Magistrates and Judges without the 
assistance of legal representatives, which often results in a cost implication for the people 
concerned. The people who, following this option, will be asked to take their appeals directly 
to a court come, in most cases, from the ranks of the poor, alternatively they have 
experienced an injury or illness, road accident or have fallen into unemployment and seek 
some form of compensation or other assistance. The new system must make social security 
adjudication as accessible as possible for these people and, following such an approach, fails 
to achieve this end. In addition, if any one of these options is implemented, it means that 
there will be a further appeal to the High Court or to the new dedicated court (with the status 
of the High Court) instead of an application for judicial review. 
 
3.2.1 Creation of a uniform, independent and impartial administrative tribunal followed by 
appeal to the High Court  
 
The first option is to create a uniform, independent and impartial administrative tribunal. The 
Tribunal will thus serve as the new highest level of non-judicial appeal in social security 
matters. This means that all appeals against administrative conduct in terms of the SAA, 
COIDA, ODMWA, UIA, RAFA, the Medical Schemes Act and the Pension Funds Act will 
proceed to the Tribunal before the High Court is approached. This option appears to be the 
most appropriate (external) appeal option in developing an adjudicative and institutional 
framework for effective and efficient social security provisioning in South Africa.  
 
This option is considered the most appropriate option in terms of the constitutional 
requirements of realising the right of access to courts. It is also aligned with the international 
standards framework applicable (for example, International Labour Organisation, United 
Nations and other human rights instruments) as well as with national and international best 
practice. In addition to constitutional and administrative law considerations, and the national 
and international comparative standards, various other legal and policy considerations inform 
the choice of a tribunal as the preferred option. As the most appropriate option considered, 
the key characteristics of this option will be discussed in detail.  
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The Tribunal should enjoy a high status as the overarching appeals tribunal for social security 
adjudication in South Africa. It should be listed as a national public entity under Part A of 
Schedule 3 of the PFMA. The Tribunal will have the status of an “organ of state”. The basic 
values and principles governing public administration (contained in chapter 10 of the 
Constitution) will apply to the Tribunal. 
 
In addition to being constitutionally compliant and enhancing access to social justice, the 
proposed tribunal must be specifically aligned with the applicable international standards 
framework. For example, the International Labour Organisation recommends dispute 
resolution procedures designed to ensure simple and rapid social security dispute 
adjudication. 
 
There should be a specific, new statute dedicated to explaining the following details of the 
Tribunal. There is also a need to ensure that provisions, contained in existing legislation, are 
aligned with the existence of a new, designated tribunal. In particular, the legal framework 
should clearly indicate that all social security decisions which affect social security 
applicants, beneficiaries or dependants of applicants or beneficiaries may be appealable to the 
Tribunal, and not to another body or to the courts. 
 
3.2.1.1 Accessibility of the Tribunal 
 
The proposed Tribunal deliberately bears the characteristics of an accessible, flexible, 
inexpensive and efficient dispute resolution forum. It is explicitly suggested that no fees be 
charged to social security applicants, beneficiaries or dependants of applicants and 
beneficiaries who seek to exercise their right to access the Tribunal in order to appeal against 
the decision of a social security body. 
 
(a) Geographical/physical location 
 
The Tribunal must have a proper national presence. The President of the country, after 
consulting the relevant Minister,
1537
  must determine the location of the Tribunal’s head 
office. The Tribunal must maintain at least one office in each province of the Republic, and 
                                                 
1537
 The relevant Minister should preferably be the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, so as to 
ensure the independence and impartiality of the Tribunal. 
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as many local offices as is considered necessary. These are also matters to be determined by 
the President of the country, after consultation with the relevant Minister. Provision should be 
made for the Tribunal to travel “on circuit” to outlying areas in a region in order to ensure 
better access to justice for people likely to require its services. 
 
The Tribunal should be sufficiently capacitated to fulfil its appeal functions across the 
country. The President of the Tribunal will be able to delegate any of the functions of that 
office to regional heads of the Tribunal. This will ensure the effective decentralisation of 
authority. A dispute should generally be heard in the region in which the cause of action 
arises, unless the president or deputy president of the Tribunal decides otherwise. 
 
The Tribunal should be physically located in its own premises in all regions of the country 
and have / lease its own buildings and offices from which it functions. 
 
(b) Required documentation and forms 
 
A series of forms and precedents must be developed by the Tribunal, including a standard 
appeal form for the ordinary referral of disputes to the Tribunal. 
 
The required documentation and forms must be designed to ensure a seamless, streamlined 
and simplified progression of information between the pursuit of internal remedies and 
adjudication before the Tribunal. 
 
(c) Claim lodgement time periods and prescription 
 
Appeals to the Tribunal would already have been the subject of (streamlined and simplified) 
internal reconsideration and remedies, which would have taken a period of time to finalise. A 
60 day period of time is recommended for the lodging of an appeal to the Tribunal. It should 
be possible for the Tribunal to condone a late referral where a good explanation has been 
provided for the failure to refer the dispute timeously. 
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(d) Disputes resolution timeframes  
 
The Tribunal should complete its hearing of the appeal as expeditiously as possible, given 
that it has wide discretion to deal with the appeal in a manner the appointed adjudicator 
considers to be most appropriate in the circumstances. Adjudicators should issue a signed 
appeal decision, with brief reasons, within 14 days of the conclusion of the appeal hearing. 
The President of the Tribunal, or the regional head, should be empowered to grant an 
extension of the time period for the finalisation of an appeal decision where the adjudicator 
demonstrates good reasons for an extension. 
 
A maximum period of six weeks should be allowed for an applicant to review the decision of 
the Tribunal to the High Court. This period will commence from the date that the Tribunal 
award is served on the affected party. 
 
(e) Languages and related issues (including interpretation) 
 
The Tribunal should introduce a language policy in order to ensure that various constitutional 
rights are not unjustifiably limited by the Tribunal’s use of language. The Tribunal’s decision 
should be issued in English. 
 
The Tribunal should have at its disposal the services of interpreters who are fluent in at least 
all of the official languages of the country. Should interpretation not be available in a non-
official language of preference, the appellant may be made responsible for securing and 
paying for the required interpretation services.  
 
The Tribunal and its staff should be properly geared towards assisting users of the new 
system. Staff should be properly sensitised towards helping appellants who are likely to be 
drawn from the ranks of the most vulnerable members of South African society. 
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3.2.1.2 Scope of jurisdiction and powers of the Tribunal 
 
(a) Jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
 
The Tribunal must have jurisdiction throughout the Republic as a designated social security 
appeals body. Its jurisdiction should be wide-ranging and it should not be possible to easily 
bypass the Tribunal and proceed directly to court in cases where the Tribunal has jurisdiction 
over a dispute. Legislation should ensure that an appeal to the Tribunal is a necessary internal 
or domestic remedy (in relation to the courts), which must be exhausted before any court 
intervention. Jurisdiction should, however, be limited to causes of action contemplated by 
legislation and directly related to the appeal against an unsatisfactory underlying decision of a 
public social security body. The person who appeals to the Tribunal should always be an 
applicant, beneficiary or a dependant of an applicant or beneficiary who is dissatisfied with 
any decision taken by a public social security institution in terms of legislation.  
 
Class actions should be excluded. Disputes where the cause of action is not based on an 
appeal against an underlying social security decision should also not be permitted. For 
example, disputes against service providers, contractual or delictual disputes and criminal 
offences will be excluded from the material scope of jurisdiction. These matters should 
continue to be dealt with directly by the courts. 
 
(b) Powers of the Tribunal 
 
The Tribunal must have a wide range of powers at its disposal. This would include the 
independent discretion to confirm, vary or set aside the underlying administrative decision. In 
cases where an underlying social security decision is set aside, the adjudicator may make a 
final and binding ruling on the matter, without the need for the case being sent back to the 
social security body concerned. Tribunal decisions must be considered to be “final and 
binding”, unless set aside by the High Court on review.  
 
Any decision made by the Tribunal may be accompanied by a costs order where this is 
warranted. Adjudicators may also make an order regarding the disclosure of relevant 
documents in appropriate circumstances. 
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The Tribunal must compile and publish information and statistics about its activities. It may 
conduct and publish research into matters relevant to its function. The Tribunal may advise a 
party to a dispute about the procedure to be followed in appealing to the Tribunal. A party 
may be assisted by the staff of the Tribunal to obtain legal advice, assistance or 
representation. Stakeholders may be given advice or training relating to the primary objects 
and functions of the Tribunal. 
 
The Tribunal may make rules to regulate its proceedings and may publish guidelines 
regarding any relevant matter. 
 
The effective decentralisation of authority to designated regions will accelerate the 
enforceability of national decisions and facilitate a national roll-out of the chosen strategy. A 
decision of the Tribunal may be served, executed and enforced as if it were an order of the 
High Court. An appeal decision that orders the payment of an amount of money could be 
executed by virtue of a tribunal-issued warrant of execution, or by way of the standard 
warrant of execution prescribed in the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the High 
Court. 
 
(c) Remedies provided by the Tribunal 
 
The effectiveness of the Tribunal’s remedial powers is safeguarded by the range of remedies, 
powers and functions at the disposal of adjudicators, as discussed above. Costs should be 
limited to cases where legal representatives have been engaged by the party appealing against 
the decision of a social security body. The Tribunal should be hesitant to award costs against 
unsuccessful appellants. However, in cases of frivolous and vexatious applications for appeal 
an adverse costs order might be issued in order to deter the launching of unnecessary appeals. 
 
The Tribunal should also be empowered to make a costs order de bonis propriis, in order to 
deter legal representatives from adopting a money-making approach to the Tribunal. The 
President of the Tribunal should appoint taxing officers to perform the functions of a taxing 
officer in terms of the Rules of the Tribunal. Any bill of costs should be taxed in the same 
manner as cases falling within Schedule B of the prescribed Magistrates’ Court tariff (in 
terms of the Magistrates’ Courts Act). 
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The Tribunal will also be permitted to make an order of contempt of the Tribunal in limited 
cases, subject to the confirmation of the High Court. 
 
3.2.1.3 Tribunal adjudication procedures 
 
The core work of the Tribunal is to be conducted by legally qualified adjudicators. Given the 
nature of some of the disputes likely to come before the Tribunal, it is also necessary for 
assessors to be part of the new structure. 
 
(a) Adjudication procedures (including consideration of evidence) 
 
A measure of flexibility is granted to adjudicators in deciding social security appeals. This is 
consistent with international standards and with the status of the Tribunal as an administrative 
body tasked with expeditiously determining a large number of disputes on appeal. 
Adjudicators should be able to conduct the appeal hearing in a manner considered appropriate 
in order to determine the dispute fairly and quickly. The merits of the dispute must be 
evaluated properly, but with the minimum of legal formalities. 
 
Parties are entitled to present evidence, including new evidence which was unavailable or not 
presented at the time that the public social security institution dealt with the matter. Parties or 
their representatives may call witnesses and address concluding arguments. Witnesses may be 
subpoenaed in order to secure their attendance for purposes of testifying before the Tribunal 
or for purposes of obtaining relevant documentary evidence. Subpoenaed witnesses will be 
entitled to appropriate witness fees. Failure to comply with the terms of an issued subpoena 
may result in a finding of contempt of the Tribunal. 
 
Once a social security applicant, beneficiary or dependant of an applicant or beneficiary has, 
on the face of their application, demonstrated compliance with the statutorily established 
criteria for benefits, the onus should shift to the social security institution to justify why the 
person is not entitled to the benefits in question. 
 
The Tribunal will be constituted by either a single adjudicator, or by a panel of three 
adjudicators (for more complex cases), with the assistance of an assessor where required. 
Adjudicators are permitted to direct the filing of statements within a set period of time, 
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setting out the material facts upon which the applicant relies and the legal issues arising. The 
President of the Tribunal, or a regional head, might also convene a “pre-hearing conference” 
in certain, exceptional situations where further clarity is necessary. 
 
The admissibility of innovative evidentiary techniques, such as the presentation of video-
evidence, requires consideration, given the possibility that a number of appellants may be 
physically unable to access the Tribunal.  
 
(b) Appearance and representation (including legal aid) 
 
The basic requirements of administrative justice and natural justice principles ensure that 
parties appearing before the Tribunal will have a proper opportunity to argue the issues in 
dispute. Parties to the dispute are entitled to be present in person. The parties enjoy equal 
access to evidence, may present evidence, call witnesses and address concluding arguments. 
 
Legal representation should be permitted, but regulated. Unless agreement was obtained 
regarding legal representation, an applicant or beneficiary who required legal representation 
would have to apply for this. The presiding officer would be obliged to grant legal 
representation, unless there were factors which made legal representation unnecessary. In this 
case, the presiding officer would furnish reasons for rejecting the application. The State 
should take steps to ensure that appropriate legal assistance is readily available for those who 
qualify for this, thereby enhancing the sense of meaningful access to justice for vulnerable 
members of society. 
 
Parties who fail to attend proceedings before the Tribunal will not be penalised by having 
their disputes dismissed – the Tribunal will still make a decision on the papers before them in 
such instances, thereby restricting the likely number of rescission applications. 
  
(c) Alternative dispute resolution avenues  
 
No alternative dispute resolution processes are foreseen, other than a pre-appeal settlement 
being concluded between the parties. Pre-trial processes include the possibility of the filing of 
statements and a pre-trial conference. Only in highly exceptional cases, and upon the specific 
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request of both parties, will an adjudicator facilitate some form of mediation, conciliation or 
settlement of a dispute. 
 
(d) Notification of decisions 
 
A decision of a single adjudicator of the Tribunal hearing a matter alone, or a majority of the 
adjudicators in any other case, will be considered to be the decision of the Tribunal. The 
decision must be in writing, accompanied by proper reasons and signed.  
 
Adjudicators should issue a signed appeal decision, with brief reasons, within 14 days of the 
conclusion of the appeal hearing. The Tribunal must serve a copy of that appeal decision on 
each party to the dispute or their duly appointed representative. Appellants should be notified 
using their preferred method of communication as indicated on the referral form. The social 
security body against whom the appellant has appealed must also be informed of the outcome 
of the appeal. It is suggested that a proper system of notification be developed in this regard. 
Notification could also be duplicated to the state attorney in cases where a finding adverse to 
the social security body has been made. 
 
The President of the Tribunal, or the regional head, should be empowered to grant an 
extension of the time period for the finalisation of an appeal decision where the adjudicator 
demonstrates good reasons for an extension. 
 
The Tribunal decision will only be filed with the reviewing court upon receipt of an 
application for review. 
 
All decisions of the Tribunal should be published on a tribunal website. 
 
(e) Reconsideration of decision 
 
Any adjudicator who has issued an appeal decision, or another adjudicator appointed by the 
regional head of the Tribunal for this purpose, may vary or rescind an appeal decision either 
of their own accord, or in response to an application for variation or rescission. This would be 
likely in cases where there is an ambiguity or an obvious error or omission in the appeal 
decision. 
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3.2.1.4 Expertise and independence of the Tribunal 
 
(a) Appointment of Tribunal adjudicators 
 
The Tribunal’s core functions will be carried out by appointed regional heads and 
adjudicators. The Tribunal must represent a broad cross-section of the population. It must 
comprise sufficient persons with legal training and experience to deal with a wide range of 
potentially complex disputes on appeal. As many competent persons as is considered 
necessary should be appointed across the country as adjudicators to perform the required 
functions. The number of adjudicators appointed will also depend upon the number of cases 
being referred to the Tribunal in the various parts of the country. 
 
Given the nature of some of the disputes which are likely to come before the Tribunal, it is 
also necessary for assessors to be part of the structure being created. A list of approved, 
suitably qualified assessors should exist for each region. The role of assessors shall be limited 
to providing advice to the adjudicator(s) appointed to hear the appeal. Adjudicators should be 
able to apply to the regional head for the aid of an assessor and the regional head will draw 
from the list of approved assessors depending upon the specific expertise sought. Assessors 
would not be able to cast a vote, or have any decision-making powers, in order to influence 
the Tribunal’s final decision on the matter. 
 
The President of the country must appoint the President and Deputy President of the 
Tribunal, on the advice of the relevant Minister. The Minister may appoint the adjudicators 
and assessors, perhaps on the recommendation of the President of the Tribunal and with due 
consideration of inputs received from labour and employer representatives.  
 
The President of the Tribunal should be empowered to appoint suitably qualified adjudicators 
as Regional Heads for each of the regions identified. When making all appointments, due 
regard should be had to the need to constitute a tribunal that is independent, competent and 
representative in respect of race, gender and the appointment of disabled people. 
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(b) Determination of conditions of service of Tribunal adjudicators 
 
The relevant Minister, on the recommendation of the President of the Tribunal, would be 
responsible for determining the conditions of service and remuneration of regional heads, 
adjudicators and assessors. The President of the country should determine these matters for 
the President and Deputy President of the Tribunal, after consultation with the relevant 
Minister and the Minister of Finance. Adjudicators and assessors would be expected to go on 
circuit within their regions when the need arises.  
 
Each adjudicator should be a citizen of South Africa, ordinarily resident in the country. It is 
important that tribunal members’ salary, allowances and benefits may not be reduced during 
their term of office. Adjudicators should be appointed on a full-time basis for a three year 
(fixed-term) period. This period may be renewed, depending upon the adjudicator’s 
performance. The President, Deputy President and regional heads of the Tribunal may be 
appointed for a renewable period of five years. 
 
(c) Qualifications of Tribunal adjudicators 
 
Given the strong legal nature of the matters to be determined by the Tribunal, and considering 
the fact that the process is an appeal, it is recommended that all adjudicators require the 
Bachelor of Laws (LLB) degree prior to appointment, coupled with five years’ practical 
experience post-LLB. Certain occurrences should disqualify a person from appointment, for 
example if the prospective adjudicator is an unrehabilitated insolvent or has been convicted 
of a serious offence. 
 
Qualifications criteria for the position of President and Deputy President of the Tribunal 
should be increased in order to demand ten years’ practical work experience post-LLB, 
coupled with relevant managerial and financial experience. The latter requirements are 
particularly important, given the range of managerial functions and finance-related 
obligations which are the responsibility of the Tribunal’s leadership. 
 
Specific, tailor-made training (perhaps via an informal / internal training institute) would be 
important for adjudicators. 
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(d) Discipline and termination of service of adjudicators of the Tribunal 
 
The President of the Tribunal may, on one month’s written notice addressed to the Minister, 
resign from the Tribunal completely or simply resign from his or her position as President. 
Any other adjudicator or assessor may resign by giving at least one month’s written notice to 
the Tribunal President. 
 
The President of the country may, on the recommendation of the Minister, remove the 
Tribunal President for serious misconduct, permanent incapacity or for engaging in any 
activity that may undermine the integrity of the Tribunal. The relevant Minister may do 
likewise with respect to adjudicators and assessors. 
 
(e) Funding of the Tribunal 
 
The Tribunal must be financed and provided with working capital from money appropriated 
by Parliament; any fees payable in terms of relevant legislation; income derived from the 
investment and deposit of surplus money and any other money which accrues lawfully from 
any source. No fees should be charged to appellants. 
 
The Tribunal President may, on behalf of the Tribunal, invest or deposit any money that is 
not immediately required for tribunal contingencies or to meet current expenditures.  
 
(f) Human resource and organisational structure of the Tribunal 
 
The Tribunal will be headed by a President. A Deputy President and regional heads will also 
be appointed. Adjudicators and assessors will be appointed to conduct the main business of 
the Tribunal. 
 
The Tribunal President should be permitted to appoint other (administrative) staff, or contract 
with other persons, to assist the Tribunal in carrying out its functions, including a suitable 
tribunal secretariat. The remuneration, allowances, benefits and other terms and conditions of 
appointment of a member of staff may be determined by the Tribunal President, in 
consultation with the relevant Minister and the Minister of Finance. 
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(g) Managerial framework and administrative support 
 
The Tribunal should be headed by a President. This person should be highly skilled and 
experienced in social security dispute resolution. The President will manage and direct the 
activities of the Tribunal and supervise the Tribunal’s staff.  
 
A Deputy President should also be appointed to assist the President and to perform the 
functions of the President whenever that office is vacant, or when the President is for some 
other reason temporarily unable to perform his / her functions. These office bearers should be 
stationed at the chosen “head office” of the Tribunal. 
 
Each region of the country will be headed by a regional head, who is subordinate in status to 
the President and Deputy President of the Tribunal, and who will report to the Tribunal 
President. This is important in order to ensure the effective decentralisation of authority, 
enforcement of head office decisions and a national roll-out of the chosen strategy. 
 
The administrative staff of the Tribunal could fall under the authority of a Registrar, who 
would report directly to the Tribunal President. Regional registrars could also be appointed. 
 
(h) Governance, oversight and supervision  
 
At least once every five years, the relevant Minister must conduct an audit review of the 
exercise of the function and powers of the Tribunal. As soon as is practicable after receiving 
a report of an audit review, the Minister must send a copy of the audit report / annual report 
to the Premier of each province and table it in Parliament. 
 
An adjudicator will be prohibited from representing any person before the Tribunal. If, during 
a hearing, it appears that there is a conflict of interest, the adjudicator must immediately and 
fully disclose the fact and nature of that interest to the regional head and withdraw from any 
further involvement in that hearing. 
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(i) Accountability and reporting 
 
The Tribunal must comply with generally accepted standards of accounting practice, 
principles and procedures. The Tribunal must report to the Minister regarding its activities on 
an annual basis. This is required by the PFMA. As soon as is practicable after the end of each 
financial year, the Tribunal must provide the relevant Minister with a report regarding its 
activities and financial position.  
 
As soon as is practicable after receiving a report of an audit review, or after receiving the 
annual report from the Tribunal, the relevant Minister must send a copy of the audit report / 
annual report to the Premier of each province and table it in Parliament. 
 
It is particularly important that both the President and Deputy President of the Tribunal 
possess suitable managerial experience and general financial knowledge to enable these 
obligations to be carried out successfully. 
 
3.2.1.5 External dispute resolution avenues 
 
The Tribunal, reasonably and justifiably, limits a person’s right to approach a court to 
adjudicate a social security-related dispute. The High Court retains the power to review 
tribunal decisions in terms of PAJA. In exceptional cases, it might be possible to approach 
the High Court directly for special relief, such as the granting of an interdict or in class action 
disputes. Appeals against decisions of the High Court can be directed to the Supreme Court 
of Appeal and the Constitutional Court. 
 
3.2.2. Establishment of a uniform social security tribunal, followed by review to a special 
court (with the status of the High Court) 
 
Another option that was considered is the establishment of a uniform, independent and 
impartial administrative tribunal to conduct appeals as well as a special court, with the status 
of the High Court, to undertake judicial review of the decisions of the Tribunal. This tribunal 
should serve as the new highest level of non-judicial appeal, meaning that all appeals against 
administrative action in the form of benefits-related decisions by a social security institution 
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in terms of the UIA / COIDA / ODMWA / RAFA and the SAA should proceed to the 
Tribunal before the special court with the status of the High Court is approached. 
 
In terms of this option, a special court of the status of a High Court is earmarked as the body 
responsible for judicial review of the social security tribunal’s decisions. Special courts, such 
as the Labour Court, Labour Appeal Court and Competition Appeal Court serve a useful 
function in instances where the disputes in question require detailed knowledge of a 
specialised branch of law. In such cases, judges of the High Court, while being general legal 
experts, are not considered to be the most suitable presiding officers for the disputes in 
question. Specially trained judges (with knowledge of the particular legal discipline 
concerned) are appointed to preside over matters in the special court, although there is a great 
deal of overlap between the manner in which they function, their conditions of appointment, 
status and the like.  
 
One of the problems which result from the creation of specialised courts with the status of a 
High Court is the cost concerned with setting up an independent court structure. While it is 
true that the creation of a specialised court structure for social security matters may 
potentially result in excellent decisions being made by appointed members of the judiciary 
who have special expertise in social security law, there is a serious risk that cost and other 
practical constraints may result in this option proving to be unsustainable. This caution must 
be read together with existing South African government policy which envisages the 
integration of specialist courts into the court system (an example of this is the uncertainty 
regarding the Superior Courts Bill, which contemplates the collapsing of the Labour Court 
within the ordinary structures of the High Court).  
 
The possibility of expanding the jurisdiction of the Labour Court (which already exists as a 
special court of the status of the High Court) to hear social security appeals has been given 
serious consideration. However, the Labour Court is not experienced in dealing with social 
security matters. It is not particularly well-placed, at least in comparison with the High Court, 
to deal with the review of an administrative decision taken by a new social security tribunal. 
Matters such as class actions, emanating from social security disputes, constitute foreign 
territory for a court such as the Labour Court, and such matters proceed much more naturally 
to the High Court. When considering the present involvement of the Labour Court in social 
security matters, it becomes clear that its current jurisdiction is very limited (being restricted 
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to matters directly related to the employment relationship) and that it would require 
substantial legislative expansion for the Labour Court to be tasked with the review of the 
complete range of appeal decisions expected from the Tribunal. Significantly, The Labour 
Court also has a limited presence in the country and is concentrated only in a few centres. 
 
It may also be added that courts such as the Labour Court, Labour Appeal Court and 
Competition Appeal Court have a “limited jurisdiction” in the sense that lower-level bodies 
(such as the CCMA or the Competition Commission or Competition Tribunal) would have 
dealt with a range of matters which otherwise may have proceeded directly to these courts. 
The High Court inherently enjoys a comprehensive jurisdiction to deal with a range of 
potential disputes or preliminary matters which may arise in this area. This has the potential 
of creating confusion regarding the jurisdiction of both the High Court and of the newly-
created special court with the status of a High Court on these matters (an example is the 
uncertainty on the jurisdiction of the High Court in employment and labour relations disputes, 
where conflicting Constitutional Court rulings on the matter have left the jurisdiction issue 
unresolved). 
 
3.2.3 Creation of a new specialised court structure for social security matters 
 
This option involves two sub-components, both of which were given consideration. In the 
first place, there is the potential for creating a uniform special court (equivalent in status 
either to a lower or higher court) followed by appeal via the ordinary court structure. 
Alternatively, it is possible to create a new, uniform special court followed by appeal to a 
special appeal court. 
 
In this option the new body to be created is a court rather than a tribunal. The consequences 
of this differentiation are as follows: 
 
o The decisions of the new court will not amount to an “administrative decision” and 
would not be subject to judicial review in terms of PAJA, but would be subject to 
appeal in terms of the court structure. 
o The new court would form part of the judiciary, and would accordingly be excluded 
from the definition of an organ of state by being considered to be a national public 
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entity and the like. This has significant implications for the accountability, reporting 
structure, governance, leadership and legal construct of the new court. 
o As a part of the judiciary, the new court would be independent and subject only to the 
Constitution and the law. No person would be permitted, in general, to interfere with 
the functioning of such a court, although higher courts will always exercise the right 
to overturn the decisions of lower courts through their judgments on appeal. The 
higher courts exercise a supervisory function over lower courts and the accepted 
principles of “judicial precedent” forces lower courts to follow the decisions of higher 
courts, even where they may disagree with that higher court’s decision. 
 
While a number of these principles have favourable implications, from a practical perspective 
it may be particularly costly to roll-out a new sub-court structure across the country to hear 
social security disputes. The formal processes associated with court action might also not be 
particularly suitable to social security decision-making. In addition to the cost of creating 
such a court sub-system, the costs associated with litigating before courts in general must also 
be factored in. Both the sub-options in question are unlikely to result in the speedy resolution 
of disputes, given the backlogs generally associated with court processes. This option only, 
and in exceptional cases, operates in a few countries in the world, such as Germany. 
However, this option may not be possible due to the existing government policy which 
envisages the integration of specialist courts into the court system. 
 
3.2.4 Utilisation of existing court structures (general or special court/ lower or higher 
court) followed by existing (special appeal) options  
 
This option foresees the use of existing lower courts (such as the Magistrates’ Courts) or 
higher courts (either the High Court itself, or perhaps the Labour Court, already dealt with 
above) as the body to which social security appeals should be brought. Again, this option 
differs from the preferred option in that the use of a court replaces the preferred recourse to 
an independent and impartial tribunal. This option differs from the previous option discussed 
in that it is the existing court structure is utilised, rather than proposing the creation of a 
partially / completely new court system. Accordingly, this option attempts to address one of 
the most significant weaknesses of the previous option, namely the actual cost associated 
with establishing new courts in South Africa.  
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Unfortunately, while it may appear to be cost-effective to rely on the existing court structure 
(the Magistrates’ Courts, High Court or Labour Court), the major problem not addressed by 
this option is the serious backlog and lack of capacity generally associated with the current 
court system, apart from the appropriateness of the court system in South Africa (as discussed 
above). The Magistrates’ Courts and High Courts are generally considered to already be 
overloaded, and one of the reasons for proposing the creation of a new tribunal (instead of a 
court) is precisely in order to alleviate the existing burden on the courts. As indicated 
previously, utilising courts to adjudicate and determine social security disputes on an appeal 
basis (against the decision of a social security body) is unlikely to be expeditious or cost-
effective.  
 
Perhaps more importantly, as discussed above, issues of the inaccessibility of the courts (due 
to the formality of their procedures and the length of time it will take to achieve justice due to 
multiple appeals) make this option inappropriate. 
 
3.2.5 Establishment of a new government institution or enabling an existing government 
institution to conduct social security appeals  
 
This option involves consideration of the merits of situating a new social security appeals 
body within government. Such an option will be similar to the manner in which the 
Independent Tribunal for Social Assistance Appeals (ITSAA) is presently located within the 
Department of Social Development as an organisational component. Expanding the 
Independent Tribunal for Social Assistance Appeals to permit it to deal with all social 
security appeals is also contemplated as part of this option.  
 
The possible benefits of such an approach would be some cost-efficiency (at least in the sense 
that existing support and infrastructure could be built upon when creating the appeals 
institution). It will also likely ensure a sense of governmental control over the new institution. 
This perceived benefit of government control could, however, also be the biggest cause for 
concern regarding this option. By locating the new social security appeals body as an internal 
component of government, this institution is not likely to be characterised as being 
“independent” of government. For example, appellants who must travel to an existing 
government department to lodge an appeal against a national public entity may perceive an 
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unfavourable decision on appeal as being due to institutional bias on the part of the new 
body.  
 
Even in the absence of such a perception, it is expected that this option would carry with it 
the burden of continued wide jurisdiction of the High Court. Put simply, the new (internally 
located) social security appeals body would not constitute an adequate replacement for access 
to justice or an independent tribunal (as provided for in section 34 of the Constitution). 
Therefore, dissatisfied appellants may be entitled to approach the High Court on a wide range 
of matters. There would, in other words, be very little argument (with this option) to suggest 
a restricted role for the courts and a major risk would be that the courts would continue to be 
burdened with numerous social security-related cases – either on an appeal or review basis.  
 
Section 34 of the Constitution states that “everyone has the right to have any dispute that can 
be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where 
appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum”. There is some authority to 
suggest that a construct which results in social security appeals being carried out by a 
government body would leave the door open for people who are dissatisfied to approach the 
High Court to decide their social security disputes in a manner akin to a full appeal. Social 
security appellants could argue for wide recourse to the High Court in social security disputes 
because the government body decision would not be considered to be a decision made by an 
“independent and impartial tribunal or forum”. In addition, it could be argued that section 
169(b) of the Constitution states that the High Court may decide any non-constitutional 
matter not assigned to another court by an Act of Parliament.  
 
There would appear to be little point in pursuing this option, as the consequence will be little 
more than what is already the status quo in the country. Apart from, perhaps, consolidating 
the highest level of internal social security appeals under a single body, the broad possibilities 
for proceeding to court imply that this body’s decisions would not serve as “final and 
binding” and the potential for judicial involvement is great. 
 
An option such as this that has the effect of forcing large numbers of people to seek redress in 
the high court will not promote the right of access to justice. This is because of the many 
challenges faced by social security (and other) litigants in the present court system (such as 
costs, delays etc).  
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